Johns Hopkins University
100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
Institutional Affiliation: Johns Hopkins University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|May 2020||Can the Covid Bailouts Save the Economy?|
with , : w27207
The covid-19 crisis has led to a sharp deterioration in firm and bank balance sheets. The government has responded with a massive intervention in corporate credit markets. We study equilibrium dynamics of macroeconomic quantities and prices, and how they are affected by government policy. The interventions prevent a much deeper crisis by reducing corporate bankruptcies by about half and short-circuiting the doom loop between corporate and financial sector fragility. The additional fiscal cost is zero since program spending replaces what would otherwise have been spent on intermediary bailouts. The model predicts rising interest rates on government debt and slow debt pay-down. We analyze an alternative intervention that targets aid to firms at risk of bankruptcy. While this policy prevents ...
|June 2018||A Macroeconomic Model with Financially Constrained Producers and Intermediaries|
with , : w24757
How much capital should financial intermediaries hold? We propose a general equilibrium model with a financial sector that makes risky long-term loans to firms, funded by deposits from savers. Government guarantees create a role for bank capital regulation. The model captures the sharp and persistent drop in macro-economic aggregates and credit provision as well as the sharp change in credit spreads observed during the Great Recession. Policies requiring intermediaries to hold more capital reduce financial fragility, reduce the size of the financial and non-financial sectors, and locally increase macro-economic volatility. They redistribute wealth from savers to the owners of banks and non-financial firms. Current capital requirements are close to optimal.
|October 2015||Phasing Out the GSEs|
with , : w21626
We develop a new model of the mortgage market where both borrowers and lenders can default. Risk tolerant savers act as intermediaries between risk averse depositors and impatient borrowers. The government plays a crucial role by providing both mortgage guarantees and deposit insurance. Underpriced government mortgage guarantees lead to more and riskier mortgage originations as well as to high financial sector leverage. Mortgage crises occasionally turn into financial crises and government bailouts due to the fragility of the intermediaries' balance sheets. Increasing the price of the mortgage guarantee "crowds in" the private sector, reduces financial fragility, leads to fewer but safer mortgages, lowers house prices, and raises mortgage and risk-free interest rates. Due to a more robust ...
Published: Elenev, Vadim & Landvoigt, Tim & Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn, 2016. "Phasing out the GSEs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 111-132. citation courtesy of