Professor of Finance
Via Rontgen, 1
Institutional Affiliation: Bocconi University
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2018||Signaling Safety|
with Roni Michaely, Michael Weber: w24237
Contrary to signaling models' central predictions, changes in the level of cash flows do not empirically follow changes in dividends. We use the Campbell (1991) decomposition to construct cash-flow and discount-rate news from returns and find the following: (1) Both dividend changes and repurchase announcements signal changes in cash-flow volatility (in opposite direction); (2) larger cash-flow volatility changes come with larger announcement returns; and (3) neither discount-rate news, nor the level of cash-flow news, nor total stock return volatility change following dividend changes. We conclude cash-flow news—and not discount-rate news—drive payout policy, and payout policy conveys information about future cash-flow volatility.
|March 2010||Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund|
with Marco Becht, Julian Franks, Colin Mayer
in Corporate Governance, Michael Weisbach, editor
|November 2005||Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the United Kingdom |
with Julian Franks, Colin Mayer
in A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, Randall K. Morck, editor
|July 2004||Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the UK|
with Julian Franks, Colin Mayer: w10628
Family ownership was rapidly diluted in the twentieth century in Britain. The main cause was equity issued in the process of making acquisitions. In the first half of the century, it occurred in the absence of minority investor protection and relied on directors of target firms protecting the interests of shareholders. Families were able to retain control by occupying a disproportionate number of seats on the boards of firms. However, in the absence of large stakes, the rise of hostile takeovers and institutional shareholders made it increasingly difficult for families to maintain control without challenge. Potential targets attempted to protect themselves through dual class shares and strategic share blocks but these were dismantled in response to opposition by institutional shareholders ...
Published: Julian Franks & Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, 2005. "Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the United Kingdom," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 581-612 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.