Paris School of Economics
48 boulevard Jourdan
Institutional Affiliation: Paris School of Economics
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|March 2017||Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp|
with Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Yeon-Koo Che, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth: w23265
In 2012, New Orleans Recovery School District (RSD) became the first U.S. district to unify charter and traditional public school admissions in a single-offer assignment mechanism known as OneApp. The RSD also became the first district to use a mechanism based on Top Trading Cycles (TTC) in a real-life allocation problem. Since TTC was originally devised for settings in which agents have endowments, there is no formal rationale for TTC in school choice. In particular, TTC is a Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism, but so are other mechanisms. We show that TTC is constrained-optimal in the following sense: TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms when each school has one seat. When schools have more than one seat, there are multiple poss...