Yale Univ., Dept. of Political Science
PO Box 208301
New Haven, CT 06520-8301
Institutional Affiliation: New York University Abu Dhabi
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|December 2006||When is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"|
with James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik: w12789
The conventional wisdom in political science is that for a democracy to be consolidated, all groups must have a chance to attain power. If they do not then they will subvert democracy and choose to fight for power. In this paper we show that this wisdom is seriously incomplete because it considers absolute, not relative payoffs. Although the probability of winning an election increases with the size of a group, so does the probability of winning a fight. Thus in a situation where all groups have a high chance of winning an election, they may also have a high chance of winning a fight. Indeed, in a natural model, we show that democracy may never be consolidated in such a situation. Rather, democracy may only be stable when one group is dominant. We provide a test of a key aspect of our mode...
Published: Mario Chacón & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2011. "When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 55(3), pages 366-396, June.