Department of Economics
University of Maryland
3115C Tydings Hall
College Park, MD 20742
NBER Program Affiliations:
NBER Affiliation: Research Associate
Institutional Affiliation: University of Maryland
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|November 2018||Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India|
with Mario Macis, Pradeep Chintagunta: w25279
We use a field experiment with 3,176 patients at 122 tuberculosis treatment clinics in India to test whether peer referrals increase screening and identification of patients with an infectious disease. Low-cost financial incentives considerably raise the probability that current patients refer prospective patients for screening and testing, resulting in the cost-effective identification of new tuberculosis cases. Incentivized referrals operate through two mechanisms: peers have private information about individuals in their social networks (beyond their immediate families) to target for outreach, and peers are more effective than traditional contact tracing by paid health workers in inducing these individuals to get tested.
|February 2015||Facilitating Savings for Agriculture: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi|
with Lasse Brune, Xavier Giné, Dean Yang: w20946
We implemented a randomized intervention among Malawian farmers aimed at facilitating formal savings for agricultural inputs. Treated farmers were offered the opportunity to have their cash crop harvest proceeds deposited directly into new bank accounts in their own names, while farmers in the control group were paid harvest proceeds in cash (the status quo). The treatment led to higher savings in the months immediately prior to the next agricultural planting season, and raised agricultural input usage in that season. We also find positive treatment effects on subsequent crop sale proceeds and household expenditures. Because the treatment effect on savings was only a small fraction of the treatment effect on the value of agricultural inputs, mechanisms other than alleviation of savings con...
Published: Lasse Brune & Xavier Gin� & Jessica Goldberg & Dean Yang, 2016. "Facilitating Savings for Agriculture: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(2), pages 187 - 220. citation courtesy of
|May 2012||Revising Commitments: Field Evidence on the Adjustment of Prior Choices|
with Xavier Giné, Dan Silverman, Dean Yang: w18065
The very poor in developing countries often make intertemporal choices that seem at odds with their individual self-interest. There are many possible reasons why. We investigate several of these reasons with a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural Malawi involving large stakes. We make two contributions. First, we construct a new dependent variable: revisions of prior choices regarding the allocation of future income. This allows us to directly examine intertemporal choice revision and its determinants. In particular, this dependent variable permits a novel test for the existence of self-control problems: we find that revisions of money allocations toward the present are positively associated with measures of present-bias from an earlier baseline survey, as well as the (randomly assigned) c...
Published: Xavier Giné & Jessica Goldberg & Dan Silverman & Dean Yang, 2017. "Revising Commitments: Field Evidence on the Adjustment of Prior Choices," The Economic Journal, . citation courtesy of
|September 2011||Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi|
with Xavier Giné, Dean Yang: w17449
We report the results of a randomized field experiment that examines the credit market impacts of improvements in a lender's ability to determine borrowers' identities. Improved personal identification enhances the credibility of a lender's dynamic repayment incentives by allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters and expand credit for good borrowers. The experimental context, rural Malawi, is characterized by an imperfect identification system. Consistent with a simple model of borrower heterogeneity and information asymmetries, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. The change in repayment rates is driven by reductions in adverse selection (smaller loan...
Published: Xavier Gine & Jessica Goldberg & Dean Yang, 2012. "Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2923-54, October. citation courtesy of