IGIER Universita' Bocconi
Via Roentgen 1
Tel: 39 2 583 6 3305
Institutional Affiliation: IGIER
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|April 2017||Is Europe an Optimal Political Area?|
with , : w23325
Published: Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, 2017. "Is Europe an Optimal Political Area?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol 2017(1), pages 169-234. citation courtesy of
|November 2010||Italians Are Late: Does It Matter?|
in Demography and the Economy, John B. Shoven, editor
|January 2010||The Political Resource Curse|
with , , : w15705
Published: Fernanda Brollo & Tommaso Nannicini & Roberto Perotti & Guido Tabellini, 2013. "The Political Resource Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1759-96, August. citation courtesy of
|June 2007||The Growth Effect of Democracy: Is It Heterogenous and How Can It Be Estimated?|
with : w13150
|April 2006||Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change|
with : w12175
Published: Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2009.
"Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change,"
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 88-126, July.
citation courtesy of
|February 2006||Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details|
with : w11993
Published: Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. "Democracy and development: The devil in the details." American Economic Review 96 (2006): 319-324. citation courtesy of
|September 2005||Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?|
with : w11600
Published: Alberto Alesina & Filipe R. Campante & Guido Tabellini, 2008. "Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 1006-1036, 09. citation courtesy of
|August 2005||Why Do Politicians Delegate?|
with : w11531
|July 2004||Economic and Political Liberalizations|
with : w10657
Published: Giavazzi, Francesco and Guido Tabellini. "Economic And Political Liberalizations," Journal of Monetary Economics, 2005, v52(7,Oct), 1297-1330. citation courtesy of
|January 2004||Bureaucrats or Politicians?|
with : w10241
Published: “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task,” American Economic Review, March 2007, 97: 169-79 "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks,” Journal of Public Economics, April 2008, 92, 426-447
|December 2003||How Do Electoral Rules Shape Party Structures, Government Coalitions, and Economic Policies?|
with , : w10176
Published: Persson, Torsten, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini. "Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies." Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2, 2 (2007): 155-88.
|March 2001||Electoral Rules and Corruption|
with , : w8154
Published: Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, 2003. "Electoral Rules and Corruption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 958-989, 06. citation courtesy of
|April 1999||Political Economics and Public Finance|
with : w7097
Published: Auerbach, A. and M. Feldstein (eds.) Handbook of Public Economics. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier, 2002.
|December 1998||The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians|
with : w6848
Published: European Economic Review, Alfred Marshall Lecture, Vol. 43 (1999): 699-735. citation courtesy of
|December 1997||Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy|
with : w6329
Published: Handbook of Macroeconomics, Taylor, J. and M. Woodford, eds., North Holland, Amsterdam: 1999.
|April 1996||Monetary Cohabitation in Europe|
with : w5532
Published: American Economic Review, Vol. 86, no. 2 (May 1996): 111-116. citation courtesy of
|August 1991||The Optimality of Nominal Contracts|
with Scott Freeman: t0110
|July 1991||External Debt and Political Instability|
with : w3772
|May 1991||Political Instability, Political Weakness and Inflation: An Empirical Analysis|
with : w3721
Published: Sims, A.C. (Ed.) Advances In Econometrics, 2(0), 1994.
|January 1991||Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? Theory and Evidence|
with : w3599
Published: American Economic Review, Vol. 84 (1994): 600-621.
|Rules versus Discretion in Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis|
in Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy, Robert E. Baldwin, editor
|October 1990||The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration|
with : w3460
Published: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59 (1992): 689-702. citation courtesy of
|Explaining Fiscal Policies and Inflation in Developing Countries|
with : w3493
Published: Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 10, pp. S16-S48, (1991). citation courtesy of
|June 1990||Rules versus Discretion in Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis|
with : w3382
Published: Robert Baldwin, editor. Empirical Studies in Commercial Policy. Empirical Studies in Commercial Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,(1991).
|February 1990||A Positive Theory of Social Security|
Published: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(3), June 2000: 523-45. citation courtesy of
|December 1989||Seigniorage and Political Instability|
with , : w3199
Published: Cukierman, Alex, Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini. "Seigniorage And Political Instability," American Economic Review, 1992, v82(3), 537-555. citation courtesy of
|October 1989||Public Confidence and Debt Management: A Model and A Case Study of Italy|
with , : w3135
Published: R. Dornbusch and M. Draghi, editors. Debt Management and Capital Markets. London: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
|August 1989||The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution|
Published: Tabellini, Guido. "The Politics Of Intergenerational Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, 1991, v99(2), 335-357. citation courtesy of
|November 1988||Voting on the Budget Deficit|
with : w2759
Published: American Economic Review, vol. 80, no. 1, pp. 37-49, March 1990. citation courtesy of
|July 1988||Rules and Discretion in Trade Policy|
with : w2658
- European Economic Review, December 1989. citation courtesy of
- Robert W. Staiger & Guido Tabellini, 1991. "Rules versus Discretion in Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy, pages 11-46 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
|June 1988||External Debt, Capital Flight and Political Risk|
with : w2610
Published: Journal of International Economics, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 199-220, November 1989. citation courtesy of
|July 1987||A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt in a Democracy|
with : w2308
Published: "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, 57(3), July 1990: 403-414.