Eric Helland

Claremont McKenna College
Department of Economics
Claremont, CA 91711
Tel: 909-607-7275

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Claremont McKenna College

NBER Working Papers and Publications

April 2016Are Settlements in Patent Litigation Collusive? Evidence from Paragraph IV Challenges
with Seth A. Seabury: w22194
The use of “pay-for-delay” settlements in patent litigation – in which a branded manufacturer and generic entrant settle a Paragraph IV patent challenge and agree to forestall entry – has come under considerable scrutiny in recent years. Critics argue that these settlements are collusive and lower consumer welfare by maintaining monopoly prices after patents should have expired, while proponents argue they reinforce incentives for innovation. We estimate the impact of settlements to Paragraph IV challenges on generic entry and evaluate the implications for drug prices and quantity. To address the potential endogeneity of Paragraph IV challenges and settlements we estimate the model using instrumental variables. Our instruments include standard measures of patent strength and a measure of...
February 2016Self-insuring against Liability Risk: Evidence from Physician Home Values in States with Unlimited Homestead Exemptions
with Anupam B. Jena, Dan P. Ly, Seth A. Seabury: w22031
When faced with financial uncertainty, rational agents have incentives to take steps ex ante to reduce the probability (self-protection) or size (self-insurance) of a loss. However, in the case of liability risk, especially physician responses to malpractice risk, most empirical analyses have focused exclusively on measuring self-protection. This paper studies whether physicians invest in self-insurance by exploring how they respond to policies that allow them to lower the financial cost of malpractice liability. Specifically, we test whether physicians exploit provisions of bankruptcy laws and adjust the value of their home purchases to protect assets from liability claims exceeding their malpractice policy limits. We find that in states with unlimited “homestead” exceptions—provisions ...
March 2014Unintended Consequences of Products Liability: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Market
with Darius N. Lakdawalla, Anup Malani, Seth A. Seabury: w20005
In a complex economy, production is vertical and crosses jurisdictional lines. Goods are often produced by a global or national firm upstream and improved or distributed by local firms downstream. In this context, heightened products liability may have unintended consequences for consumer safety. Conventional wisdom holds that an increase in tort liability on the upstream firm will encourage that firm to improve safety for consumers. However, in the real-world, policy actions in a single jurisdiction may not be significant enough to influence the behavior of an upstream firm that produces for many jurisdictions. Even worse, if liability is shared between upstream and downstream firms, higher upstream liability may decrease the liability of the downstream distributor and encourage it to beh...
NBER Videos

National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email:

Contact Us