Christopher A. Parsons
Foster School of Business
Uniersity of Washington
PACCAR Hall, 4273 E Stevens Way NE
Seattle, CA 98195
Institutional Affiliation: University of Washington
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|July 2014||The Geography of Financial Misconduct|
with Johan Sulaeman, Sheridan Titman: w20347
We find that a firm's tendency to engage in financial misconduct increases with the misconduct rates of neighboring firms. This appears to be caused by peer effects, rather than exogenous shocks like regional variation in enforcement. Effects are stronger among firms of comparable size, and among CEOs of similar age. Moreover, local waves of financial misconduct correspond with local waves of non-financial corruption, such as political fraud.
Published: CHRISTOPHER A. PARSONS & JOHAN SULAEMAN & SHERIDAN TITMAN, 2018. "The Geography of Financial Misconduct," The Journal of Finance, vol 73(5), pages 2087-2137.
|Urban Vibrancy and Corporate Growth|
with Casey Dougal, Sheridan Titman: w20350
We find that a firm's investment is highly sensitive to the investments of other firms headquartered nearby, even those in very different industries. It also responds to fluctuations in the cash flows and stock prices (q) of local firms outside its sector. These patterns do not appear to reflect exogenous area shocks such as local shocks to labor or real estate values, but rather suggest that local agglomeration economies are important determinants of firm investment and growth.
Published: CASEY DOUGAL & CHRISTOPHER A. PARSONS & SHERIDAN TITMAN, 2015. "Urban Vibrancy and Corporate Growth," The Journal of Finance, vol 70(1), pages 163-210.
|November 2007||Strike Three: Umpires' Demand for Discrimination|
with Johan Sulaeman, Michael C. Yates, Daniel S. Hamermesh: w13665
We explore umpires' racial/ethnic preferences in the evaluation of Major League Baseball pitchers. Controlling for umpire, pitcher, batter and catcher fixed effects and many other factors, strikes are more likely to be called if the umpire and pitcher match race/ethnicity. This effect only exists where there is little scrutiny of umpires' behavior -- in ballparks without computerized systems monitoring umpires' calls, at poorly attended games, and when the called pitch cannot determine the outcome of the at-bat. If a pitcher shares the home-plate umpire's race/ethnicity, he gives up fewer runs per game and improves his team's chance of winning. The results suggest that standard measures of salary discrimination that adjust for measured productivity may generally be flawed. We derive th...
Published: Parsons, Christopher A., Johan Sulaeman, Michael C. Yates, and Daniel S. Hamermesh. 2011. "Strike Three: Discrimination, Incentives, and Evaluation" American Economic Review, 101(4): 1410-35.