Research School of Finance,
Actuarial Studies and Statistics
E-Mail: antje.berndt @anu.edu.au
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2018||Corporate Credit Risk Premia|
with Rohan Douglas, Darrell Duffie, Mark Ferguson: w24213
We measure credit risk premia - prices for bearing corporate default risk in excess of expected default losses - using Markit CDS and Moody’s Analytics EDF data. We find dramatic variation over time in credit risk premia, with peaks in 2002, during the global financial crisis of 2008-09, and in the second half of 2011. Even after normalizing these premia by expected default losses, median credit risk premia fluctuate over time by more than a factor of ten. Credit risk premia comove with macroeconomic indicators, even after controlling for variation in expected default losses, with higher premia per unit of expected loss during times of market-wide distress. Countercyclical variation of premia-to-expected-loss ratios is more pronounced for investment-grade issuers than for high-yield issuer...
Published: Antje Berndt & Rohan Douglas & Darrell Duffie & Mark Ferguson, 2018. "Corporate Credit Risk Premia," Review of Finance, vol 22(2), pages 419-454.
|October 2010||How Does the U.S. Government Finance Fiscal Shocks?|
with Hanno Lustig, Sevin Yeltekin: w16458
We develop a method for identifying and quantifying the fiscal channels that help finance government spending shocks. We define fiscal shocks as surprises in defense spending and show that they are more precisely identified when defense stock data are used in addition to aggregate macroeconomic data. Our results show that in the postwar period, over 9% of the U.S. government's unanticipated spending needs were financed by a reduction in the market value of debt and more than 73% by an increase in primary surpluses. Additionally, we find that long-term debt is more effective at absorbing fiscal risk than short-term debt.
Published: Antje Berndt & Hanno Lustig & Sevin Yeltekin, 2012. "How Does the US Government Finance Fiscal Shocks?," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 69-104, January. citation courtesy of
|July 2010||The Role of Mortgage Brokers in the Subprime Crisis|
with Burton Hollifield, Patrik Sandås: w16175
Prior to the subprime crisis, mortgage brokers originated about 65% of all subprime mortgages. Yet little is known about their behavior during the runup to the crisis. Using data from New Century Financial Corporation, we find that brokers earned an average revenue of $5,300 per funded loan. We decompose the broker revenues into a cost and a profit component and find evidence consistent with brokers having market power. The profits earned are different for different types of loans and vary with borrower, broker, regulation and neighborhood characteristics. We relate the broker profits to the subsequent performance of the loans and show that brokers earned high profits on loans that turned out to be riskier ex post.
|June 2010||The Role of Mortgage Brokers in the Subprime Crisis|
with Burton Hollifield, Patrik Sandås
in Market Institutions and Financial Market Risk, Mark Carey, Anil Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan, and René Stulz, organizers