Financial Integration and Monetary Policy Coordination
    Working Paper 32009
  
        
    DOI 10.3386/w32009
  
        
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          Financial integration generates macroeconomic spillovers that may require international monetary policy coordination. We show that individual central banks may set nominal interest rates too low or too high relative to the cooperative outcome. We identify three sufficient statistics that determine whether the Nash equilibrium exhibits under-tightening or over-tightening: the output gap, sectoral differences in labor intensity, and the trade balance response to changes in nominal rates. We find that, independently of the shocks hitting the economy, under-tightening is possible during economic expansions or contractions. For large shocks, the gains from coordination can be substantial.
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      Copy CitationJavier Bianchi and Louphou Coulibaly, "Financial Integration and Monetary Policy Coordination," NBER Working Paper 32009 (2023), https://doi.org/10.3386/w32009.
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