Shareholder Power and the Decline of Labor

We thank Simcha Barkai, Philip Bond, Murillo Campello, Wei Jiang, Matthias Kehrig, Anna Stansbury, Luke Stein, Amir Sufi, John Van Reenen, and conference and seminar participants at AFA Annual Meetings, Australian National University, Babson College, Bank of Italy-CEPR Labor Workshop, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (Naples), Chicago Fed, Cornell University, Korean Microdata Research Group, Labor and Finance Group, LERA Annual Meetings, NBER Economics and Politics of Mega-Firms Conference, Sciences Po Summer Workshop in Economics: Labor, Seoul National University, and SOLE for helpful comments, and Tanya Bakshi, Vitor Costa, Daniel Gallego, and Katya Potemkina for excellent research assistance. Any views expressed are those of the authors and not those of the US Census Bureau. The Census Bureau’s Disclosure Review Board and Disclosure Avoidance Officers have reviewed this information product for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information and have approved the disclosure avoidance practices applied to this release. This research was performed at a Federal Statistical Research Data Center under FSRDC Project Number 1572 (CBDRB-FY20-P1572-R8820; FY22-P1572-R9381). We thank Charles Hokayem, Frank Limehouse, Nichole Szembrot, and Lanwei Yang for helping with data and clearance requests. All errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.