Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act
Competitive exams are a standard method for selecting civil servants. Yet, there is limited evidence on their effectiveness. We digitize personnel and financial data to study the impacts of the 1883 Pendleton Act, which mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs-collection districts. Although the act improved targeted employees’ professional background and reduced turnover, it did not increase cost-effectiveness in customs revenue collection. Moreover, it incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts’ hierarchical structures. These results illustrate how, by triggering countervailing organizational responses, policies that succeed at improving specific organizational aspects might nevertheless fail to improve overall performance.
Published Versions
Diana Moreira & Santiago Pérez, 2024. "Civil Service Exams and Organizational Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, vol 16(3), pages 250-291.