The Political Economy of Government Debt

Alberto Alesina & Andrea Passalacqua
Working Paper 21821
DOI 10.3386/w21821
Issue Date

This paper critically reviews the literature which explains why and under which circumstances governments accumulate more debt than it would be consistent with optimal fiscal policy. We also discuss numerical rules or institutional designs which might lead to a moderation of these distortions.

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Topics

Macroeconomics
Fiscal Policy

Programs

Political Economy

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