The Effect of Retirement Incentives: Micro-Evidence for Italy
This chapter discusses the evidence at the individual level of the retirement decision in Italy, also in relation to pension reforms. By exploiting different sets of micro-data, it computes retirement financial incentive measures in the public pension system, based on the real individuals working careers and estimates the impact of these on the decision to retire/continue to work. We model individual behavior and compute predictions to retire by age and year. In addition we perform simulations in order to assess what would have been the probability to retire, have the reforms not been adopted.
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