Kevin R. Williams
Yale School of Management
165 Whitney Avenue
New Haven, CT 06520
NBER Program Affiliations:
NBER Affiliation: Faculty Research Fellow
Institutional Affiliation: Yale University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|February 2020||Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games|
with James D. Dana Jr.: w26794
This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show that when the elasticity of demand falls across periods, strong competitive forces prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then enrich the model by allowing firms to use inventory controls, or sales limits assigned to individual prices. We show that competing firms can profitably use inventory controls. Thus, although typically viewed as a tool to manage demand uncertainty, we show that inventory controls can also facilitate price discrimination in oligopoly.
|May 2019||Aiming for the Goal: Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding|
with Joyee Deb, Aniko Oery: w25881
We study reward-based crowdfunding campaigns, a new class of dynamic contribution games where consumption is exclusive. Two types of backers participate: buyers want to consume the product while donors just want the campaign to succeed. The key tension is one of coordination between buyers, instead of free-riding. Donors can alleviate this coordination risk. We analyze a dynamic model of crowdfunding and demonstrate that its predictions are consistent with high-frequency data collected from Kickstarter. We compare the Kickstarter mechanism to alternative platform designs and evaluate the value of dynamically arriving information. We extend the model to incorporate social learning about quality.