Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game
There is a large and diverse body of evidence that people condition their behavior on the characteristics of others. If type is visible then one agent seeing another with whom they are interacting, or observing some other close proxy for type, can affect outcomes. We explore the economics of revealing type in a simple laboratory experiment to learn about the underlying motivations for discrimination.
Published Versions
Anthony Heyes & John A. List, 2016. "Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 319-23, May. citation courtesy of 
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