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“HALL OF FAME” VOTING: THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT

We examine the determinants of election as Fellow of the Econometric Society, an example of voting within a group to confer honor on some members and perhaps achieve additional status for the entire group. Using data from annual elections from 1990-2000, we find that objective measures of quality help determine elections, as do attestations of quality by previous honorees. What one might view as ascriptive characteristics, such as candidates’ subspecialty or institutional affiliation/location, also affect their electoral success.

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Its main object shall be to promote studies that aim at a unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems.... (Frisch, 1933, page 1, quoting the Constitution of the Econometric Society)

I. Hall of Fame Issues

Halls of fame are ubiquitous. People in groups appear to have a tremendous desire to honor those members who have achieved more than the ordinary. These mini-pantheons range from the very well known, the National Baseball Hall of Fame, to such remarkably obscure institutions as the Cleveland-style Polka Hall of Fame. Partly the desire to distinguish among members may be self-congratulatory—to validate the general activity in which the group engages by showcasing the achievements of some members. Partly too it may be a way of creating class distinctions within the group (Basu, 1989).

Economists have paid almost no attention to the economic issues surrounding halls of fame. A central issue is that of mechanism design—how should nominations of new members proceed, and what criteria for election should be instituted? Rules for eligibility and election differ widely among halls of fame and would be a most interesting research topic.¹ Another central issue, one that should inform discussion of the first issue, is what determines electoral outcomes—which group members are “enshrined” (to use the baseball terminology). Only one study (Findlay and Reid, 1997) has examined even this issue (in the specific context of racial discrimination in baseball). Our purpose here is to understand the determinants of election to a specific honor, that of Fellow of the Econometric Society. This effort should serve to broaden understanding of the general process by which groups honor their members. For this particular group it should enable us to understand the relative influences both of measures of productivity and of easily observable characteristics that might seem important to the casual observer of the electoral process.

This study was partly motivated by the question of whether elections of Fellows of the Econometric Society are “fair,” where our definition of fairness is that votes are based solely on the quality of the candidates. If so, then conditional on quality other characteristics of the candidates (such as institutional

¹For example, the National Baseball Hall of Fame requires that a winner receive 75 percent of the electors’ votes. Someone who fails to get at least 5 percent is disqualified from the normal electoral route for all future ballots. This rule contrasts sharply to the apparently less stringent procedure in the Econometric Society. The differences may be due to the greater noise/signal ratio in the economics profession than in the baseball world.

affiliation, number of nominators or subspecialty) should not influence the probability of election. One might object that even fully informed individuals can differ in their assessments of quality, and furthermore that neither the voters nor the econometrician can be fully informed about the quality of the candidates. Empirically, we find that, conditional on measures of the quality of the candidates, other characteristics do significantly predict election. Various interpretations of this finding are possible, and we discuss these issues in the conclusion.

II. The Electoral Institution

Election as a Fellow of the Econometric Society is considered an honor by most members of the economics profession. It recognizes prior professional achievements (within what are the more technical areas of economics). There are roughly 500 living Fellows. During the 1990s names were placed on the ballot in one of two ways: 1) By the Nominating Committee of the Society; or 2) By petition of at least three members (who did not have to be but usually were current Fellows). The ballot contains the candidate's name and current affiliation; a list of at most six publications; a short statement delineating the candidate's contribution to economics; and an indication of whether the nomination was by Committee or by endorsers and, if the latter, the names of all the endorsers. The ballot deadline is April 30. Anyone can be nominated, although typically no one with fewer than six papers is on the ballot.

The electorate is the set of active (dues-paying) current Fellows. Fellows receive the ballot in early autumn along with the nomination form for each candidate, mark their ballots and return them to the Society's office. Results are announced in December. Names on the ballot are in alphabetical order, with a different starting point in the alphabet in each annual election. Voters check the names of individuals whom they wish to be elected. A candidate is elected who is approved on at least 30 percent of the ballots cast. (Typically about half the Fellows cast votes.) Losing candidates can be nominated in later years by either of the two methods, but the process must be undertaken *de novo* in each year.

III. Data

Thanks to the officers of the Society, we obtained all the available records on the Fellows elections. These consisted of two separate sets of data. For the six elections from 1995 through 2000, which included 301 candidates, we have the nomination forms that each Fellow received with the ballot. For the elections 1990-94, which contained 225 candidates, we know only the names of the winning and losing candidates.

For all of the elections we can construct two sets of (possibly objective) measures of quality: 1) The candidate's average number of citations by other scholars in the two years prior to candidacy. These citation counts were obtained from various issues of the *Social Science Citation Index*. We divide citation counts into four intervals and use indicators for them. 2) An indicator of whether the candidate had previously been an Associate Editor or Coeditor of *Econometrica*, and a count of the candidate's publications in *Econometrica* before the nomination. We can also construct a variety of indicator variables representing characteristics of the candidates that would appear not to be objective measures of quality (although some may be correlated with quality, or be viewed by voters as informative about quality). These include: 1) Gender. 2) Location/affiliation. We divide this into indicators for the Top 17 North American institutions (based on Oster and Hamermesh, 1998), other North American institutions, Europe and Israel, and all other locations.² 3) Field. These are divided into econometricians, theorists, and others.³

In addition, the 1995-2000 data allow us to include variables that reflect the nature of the nomination, which may indicate the professional esteem in which the candidate is held. These variables are indicators for

²The 17 schools are: Berkeley, Carnegie-Mellon, Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, MIT, Minnesota, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Princeton, Rochester, San Diego, Stanford, UCLA, Wisconsin and Yale.

³Any classification of scholars into subspecialties is necessarily arbitrary. Here we tried to classify as theorists those who did mostly pure theory, as econometricians those who mostly developed econometric technique, leaving the category "other field" for everyone else. Thus this last category includes such diverse researchers as empirical labor economists and public finance theorists, for examples. To remove some of the inherent measurement errors the classifications were independently assessed by two observers and then averaged. Of the 526 candidates, 455 (87 percent) were classified identically by the two assessors. 49 of the 71 disagreements involved classifying scholars as theorists versus the category other field. Because of these disagreements, these indicators can take on a value of 0, 0.5 or 1.

the four categories: Placed on the ballot by the Nominating Committee; nominated privately (i.e. not by the Nominating Committee) with 3-9 endorsers, 10-24 endorsers, or over 24 endorsers.

IV. Results

All the descriptive statistics for the samples can be inferred from Table 1, which lists the probability (frequency) of election by the candidates' characteristics. The probability of election was substantially and significantly lower in the second sub-period ($\Delta p = -0.114$, s.e. = 0.042). The number of candidates on the ballot each year increased (from 45 to 50.2), but the number elected remained unchanged.

The typical nominee has published at least once in *Econometrica* and is unsurprisingly far more heavily cited than the typical person who submits papers to top economics journals.⁴ Roughly 22 percent of nominees get on the ballot through the Nominating Committee. Of the remaining 78 percent, 38 percent have between 3 and 9 endorsements, 46 percent have between 10 and 24 endorsements, and 16 percent have at least 25 endorsements.⁵

Those scholars whose work is more heavily cited are more likely to be elected. In each sub-period the probability of election is monotonic in these indicators of citation frequency. Having additional publications in *Econometrica* or having been involved editing it had no effect in the early set of elections, but in the later years both conferred an electoral advantage. Those who are placed on the ballot by the Nominating Committee are substantially more likely to be elected than most other nominees; but the small group that has at least 25 endorsers is still more likely to be elected. The differences in election probabilities by presumably objective characteristics are in exactly the directions one would expect. Evidence of one's peers' approbation also increases one's chances of being elected.

Over one-third of the nominees are from North American institutions outside the Top 17, while 30 percent are from Top 17 North American institutions. Another 26 percent are from Europe or Israel, with 9

⁴Hamermesh, (1994) shows that only 27 percent of authors submitting to the most widely cited economics journal had been cited 10 or more times by others in the previous year.

⁵The number of endorsements ranges up to 79. This huge total may underlie the decision of the Society to list no more than 10 names on the nomination forms beginning with the 2001 Fellows election.

percent coming from outside North America or Europe/Israel. The distribution across fields is not uniform, but each major classification is represented by over 20 percent of the nominees in each period. Only a tiny fraction of the nominees are women.⁶

There are huge differences in the probability of election by candidates' location/affiliation. Scholars in the Top 17 North American institutions have a far higher chance of election than other North American economists. This latter group and Europeans-Israelis have roughly equal chances of election. Nominees from Asia, Australasia and Latin America (there were no Africans) have a much lower probability of election than any other group. Theorists and, to a lesser extent, those classified into the miscellaneous category, "other field," have higher probabilities of election than econometricians. Being an econometrician appears to be a bad way to be elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society. The difference between econometricians and others did, however, narrow over the 11-year period. Finally, women have a lower probability of being elected, but the gender difference is not large.

Perhaps the most surprising statistics in Table 1 indicate the substantial discrepancies between the numbers of names on the ballots and the numbers of separate individuals listed. The best way to appreciate the extent of repeated appearances is to consider the candidates in 1995-2000 by the number of times they had been on the ballot in the five years preceding an appearance. Of the 301 candidates, only 186 had not appeared on the ballot at least once between years $t-1$ and $t-5$. Of the others, 81 had appeared once in that interval, 22 had appeared twice, 8 three times, and 4 four times. Repeated appearances on the ballot constitute over one-third of the candidates. Even this is an underestimate, since it cannot account for people who lost in elections before 1990.

All of the differences shown in Table 1 are partial. Citation practices and the number of publications in *Econometrica* differ across fields; and the distribution of fields may differ by location. For all of these reasons isolating the separate impact of each quality measure and ascriptive characteristic is essential. In

⁶This fraction, 0.044, is almost identical to female representation (4.1 percent) among tenured full professors in the top 10 Ph.D.-granting American economics departments (CSWEP, 2000, Table 3).

Table 2 we therefore present estimates of probits relating the probability of election to the variables described in Table 1. The Table reports the impacts of one-unit increases in the independent variables on the probability of election, with standard errors of these estimates in parentheses.

The first three columns of Table 2 list estimates for the entire eleven-year sample and the two sub-periods, excluding variables representing the method of access to the ballot. There is no evidence of a statistically significant structural shift between the two periods ($\chi^2(10)=15.29$)—the equation in column (1) describes the overall structure quite well. The estimates generally corroborate the inferences from the probabilities presented in Table 1. Affiliation with a Top 17 North American institution sharply and significantly increases the probability of election relative to other North Americans. Europeans and Israelis have a substantial and nearly significantly greater chance of election than North American economists outside Top 17 institutions, while location outside North America and Europe/Israel reduces the probability of election relative to other North Americans.⁷ Being a theorist significantly increases the probability of election relative to being an econometrician, while those in “other fields” also do better than econometricians.⁸ Having one’s work cited more widely increases one’s probability of election, while having additional publications in

⁷We experimented with various other measures of institutional affiliation. Instead of distinguishing among North American economists by this method, we divided the group into those at private institutions and others. This distinction does not describe the data as well. Similarly weaker results are produced if we classify candidates in North America by location in the Ivy League and MIT versus other institutions. We also disaggregated the indicator for location in Europe and Israel into four subcategories: United Kingdom, France, Israel and other Europe. The impacts in the probit reported in column (1) were 0.083 (s.e.=0.093), 0.184 (s.e.=0.114), 0.200 (s.e.=0.141) and 0.190 (s.e.=0.097) respectively (relative to the excluded category, other North America). A test for equality of these four effects could not reject the hypothesis ($\chi^2(3)=1.05$). Creating a separate indicator for the 27 Canadians on the ballot resulted in a marginal effect (compared to other North Americans outside the Top 17) of 0.007 (s.e.=0.107). The only additional breakdown that seems to matter arises when we include a separate indicator for candidates affiliated with one of the Top 5 private institutions: Chicago, Harvard, MIT, Princeton and Stanford. The coefficient on this indicator in an expanded version of the probit in column (1) was 0.271 (s.e.=0.095), implying that candidates from these schools had a 27-percent greater chance of election than otherwise identical candidates from other schools in the Top 17.

⁸If instead of using the averaged indicators for field we use either assessor’s ratings alone to form categories, we are less successful in describing the electoral process. Another possibility is that the threefold classification is too broad, and that distinguishing between theoretically and empirically oriented economists in “other fields” might be valuable. The same two assessors divided this group into applied theorists and empirical economists. Decomposing the indicator “other field” into two parts and reestimating the model in column (1) resulted in an estimated marginal impact for “other theorists” of 0.198 (s.e.=0.079) and for “empirical economists” of 0.084 (s.e.=0.082) relative to econometricians. The t-statistic testing the equality of these coefficients is 1.39.

Econometrica raises the chances of election in the second half of the sample period but not the first.⁹ There is no apparent impact of gender on electoral outcomes.

Given the apparently greater ease of election for theorists, one might expect that the growth in the fraction of electors who themselves are theorists would enhance the electoral chances of theorists in subsequent cohorts of candidates. Testing for this by introducing trends in the impact of field on the probability of election showed no such effect—the interactions of the indicators for theorist and other field with a time trend had t-statistics of -0.09 and -0.21 respectively. Also, the fraction of theorists on the ballot actually fell slightly over the period (from 38 percent of candidates in 1990-94 to 32 percent in 1995-2000.) Theorists constitute an increasing fraction of Fellows, especially compared to econometricians; but their growing dominance has been reflected neither in a growing share of candidates nor in increasingly greater ease of election conditional on candidacy.

Another possibility is that electors have in mind a limited number of people in each subspecialty for whom they might vote—that there may be electoral crowding. To examine this phenomenon we calculated for each candidate the fraction of total candidates on the ballot that year in the same field. For the entire sample the mean of crowding was 0.359 (s.e. 0.086). By adding this crowding measure to the probits in columns (1)-(3) we essentially ask whether crowding in a particular field and year relative to that field in other years has any impact. Crowding did reduce a candidate's chances of election, but the estimates were never statistically significant. In the pooled equation a one standard deviation increase in crowding decreased the probability of election by only 0.030.

Column (4) of Table 2 presents the estimates of the complete equation for 1995-2000, including both the variables that are available for all eleven years and the information on the method by which the candidate was placed on the ballot. Being placed on the ballot by the Nominating Committee enhances the election probability compared to obtaining a moderate number of endorsements. Being endorsed by large numbers of

⁹We experimented with an indicator for publication in *Econometrica* and with a vector of indicator variables describing the number of such publications. In each subperiod and for the entire period neither formulation described the data as well as the count of publications in the journal.

nominators is still better. Having one's candidacy vouchsafed by many endorsers provides a greater fillip to the probability of election than any other information.

As we noted, repeat appearances on the ballot are common. The propensity to repeat also appears to have risen over the sample period. Although the rise is not statistically significant, the ratio of separate individuals to candidacies fell from 0.796 during 1990-94 to 0.744 during the next five elections, 1995-1999. Perhaps this decline in "new faces" explains the declining probability of election—having previously lost may stigmatize candidates and reduce their subsequent electoral chances conditional on their quality and ascriptive characteristics. Of course, if this fact were known to members of the Society, it would hardly be rational for them to exert the effort necessary to place the "loser" on the ballot. An alternative explanation for the decline is that technical change in the form of email has reduced the costs of placing a low-probability candidate on the ballot.

To examine whether "new faces" are more attractive, in column (5) we add to column (4) a measure of the number of ballot appearances by the candidate in the previous four elections (mean = 0.502). Additional recent appearances on the ballot significantly raise the conditional probability of a candidate's election. Nominators' extra effort in placing a losing candidate on the ballot may thus be rational, as there is at least some payoff.¹⁰

What might explain the absence of a stigma to prior losses and even the apparent positive return to repeated ballot appearances? One possibility is that the very fact that endorsers undertook the effort to place the previous loser on the ballot again may convince voters that a candidate is worthy of election. This hypothesis implies diminishing returns to repeated appearances: The marginal impact of additional information that other Fellows think highly of a candidate's work should eventually diminish. Yet additional estimates show that the marginal impacts of appearances in Years t-1 through t-4 are statistically the same.

¹⁰We experimented with the number of appearances in the previous three and five years, neither of which described electoral outcomes as well as did appearances in the past four years.

Recognizing that there are multiple appearances leads to the realization that all the estimates presented in Table 2 are of impacts on the probability of election conditional on appearance on the ballot. Modeling and estimating unconditional probabilities would be interesting and indeed seems to be part of a general class of econometric problems where prior exit from a state guarantees that one cannot be among those selected into the state in subsequent time periods. In this example, however, it is difficult to conjure up unobserved factors that might affect selectivity onto the ballot without affecting election and thus identify such a structural model; and in any case we lack a good idea of the set of potential nominees in any year.¹¹ Suffice it to note that those losers who are renominated are likely to be of unobservably higher quality than losers who never reappear, implying that the coefficient on past appearances in column (5) of Table 2 overestimates the impact of the previous losers' appearances.

V. Discussion and Conclusions

We defined a “fair” electoral process as one with votes depending solely on the quality of the candidates. Conditional on quality, in that case other characteristics of the candidates should not influence the probability of election. This is in principle an empirical question, although we face the immediate problem that the quality of the candidates is not observable.

The probit equations describing the probability of election as a Fellow of the Econometric Society contain some variables that we regard as objective measures of quality, namely citation counts and publication in or editing of *Econometrica*. The variables for method of nomination and for current affiliation are perhaps more arguable, but we regard them as correlates rather than objective measures of quality. Finally, we include some variables that we do not view as correlates of quality, namely field (subspecialty) and gender. This last assertion seems straightforward, but counterarguments could be made (theorists might on average be of higher

¹¹As an initial attempt we reestimated the probit in column (4) of Table 2 over only those candidates whose names had not appeared on the ballot in the previous five years and who thus may have never appeared before. Except for a smaller impact of the citations measures on the election probabilities of these electoral “virgins,” the probit coefficients were very similar to those shown for the full set of 301 candidacies.

quality than econometricians), or selectivity in the nominating process could induce a correlation conditional on nomination.

Our fundamental result is that, conditional on objective quality measures, other characteristics, including method of nomination, current affiliation and subspecialty, do significantly influence the probability of election. This raises the central question of “fairness.” Ultimately we cannot resolve this question because, with the quality of the candidates observed imperfectly, multiple states of the world are consistent with our result. Consider some possible “explanations” of the results.

1. The electoral process is fundamentally unfair. For example, suppose that theorists at high-prestige institutions make up a large fraction of the electorate and are happier to vote for their friends, or at least for candidates like themselves, than for people they do not know and who may work in other fields. We prefer not to believe that this is the case, but it is a possible explanation.

2. At the other extreme, the process may be completely fair, and the significance of non-quality characteristics of the candidates may be spurious, due to our (the authors’) failure to measure quality correctly. In this state of the world voters observe quality perfectly, and their votes do not depend on other characteristics of the candidates. Since we do not measure quality equally well, other characteristics are spuriously significant because they correlate with the part of quality not captured by our quality measures. This is not implausible for some of the characteristics we consider, such as institutional affiliation and nature of the nomination, but it is not a compelling explanation for the significance of the field indicators. For it to be satisfactory, either field must be correlated with quality or our objective quality measures must be capturing true quality to a significantly different extent across fields.

3. It is not plausible that voters observe quality perfectly. Votes may be based on best guesses about the quality of the candidates. The best guess is influenced by objective measures of quality and by private knowledge, but also by the information contained in observable variables that are correlated with quality. (Voters are trying to be fair in the sense defined above.) For example, if individuals at the Top 17 U.S. institutions are on average of higher quality than others, a rational voter will be more likely to vote for such

an individual (even conditional on all other available information), because that affiliation raises the voter's opinion of the candidate's quality. Once again, this provides a plausible explanation of many of our results, but it does not provide a compelling explanation for the significance of the field indicators. That would require a correlation between field and the portion of quality not explained by the full set of other information available to the voter, and we are skeptical of such a correlation.

4. Yet another explanation of our results is that voters may not try to make their best guess about the quality of every candidate, but instead may simply vote yes only for candidates whom they have good reason to believe are of high quality. In this scenario the default vote is no, and thus candidates who are not well known to the voters are not elected. For example, voters may know more about candidates who are at prominent U.S. institutions. This is true both because many voters are themselves at these institutions, so that they know the candidates personally, and also simply because being at such schools may increase one's professional visibility. This explanation is also consistent with the learning implicit in the positive impact on election probabilities of additional previous nominations.

No doubt other explanations are also possible. At this point, we simply note that in Scenario 1 the election is unfair but not much can be done about it. In Scenario 2 the election is fair, so no changes are necessary. In Scenario 3 the election is not fair even though the voters are trying to be fair, while in Scenario 4 the election is not fair. The unfairness under Scenarios 3 and 4 might be mitigated by changes in the voting mechanism. For examples, one might provide voters with more information or find ways to have candidates voted upon by people who could be expected to be more familiar with their work.¹²

¹²Some other scholarly societies do this. As one example, the nomination form for Fellow of the American Statistical Association has nine different sections, with four pages of factual information, up to four pages of supporting statements for various types of activities, and up to eight letters of support from members (typically Fellows). Also, the election decision is made by a selection committee rather than by a vote of all Fellows. The discussion that occurs during that committee's deliberations may provide additional information to its members. An alternative approach is to admit the informational difficulties facing electors and create a multi-tiered process that allows voting among specialists at some stage of the electoral process. A version of this approach is used to determine election to the National Academy of Sciences in the United States.

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Table 1. Election Probabilities by Characteristic, Fellows Elections 1990-2000^a

Years:	1990-2000	1990-1994	1995-2000
Number of Candidates:	526	225	301
Number of Different Candidates	358	179	218
Probability of Election:	.348	.413	.299
<i>Econometrica</i> Publications:			
None	.322 (121)	.432 (44)	.260 (77)
1-2	.319 (235)	.389 (95)	.271 (140)
>2	.406 (170)	.430 (86)	.381 (84)
<i>Econometrica</i> Editing:			
Yes	.449 (69)	.423 (26)	.465 (43)
No	.333 (457)	.412 (199)	.271 (258)
Citations:			
<10	.199 (151)	.227 (75)	.171 (76)
10-24	.310 (142)	.400 (65)	.234 (77)
25-49	.387 (119)	.524 (42)	.312 (77)
≥50	.553 (114)	.651 (43)	.493 (71)
Nomination Method:			
By Committee			.431 (65)
By Endorsers:			
<10			.135 (89)
10-24			.248 (109)
≥25			.605 (38)
Location:			
Top 17 No. America	.525 (158)	.662 (65)	.430 (93)
Other No. America	.278 (180)	.308 (78)	.255 (102)
Europe-Israel	.309 (139)	.362 (58)	.272 (81)
Other	.143 (49)	.208 (24)	.080 (25)
Field ^b :			
Theorist	.409 (159)	.493 (75)	.333 (84)
Other	.365 (181)	.448 (67)	.316 (114)
Econometrician	.235 (115)	.245 (53)	.226 (62)
Gender:			
Male	.351 (504)	.417 (218)	.301 (286)
Female	.273 (22)	.286 (7)	.267 (15)

^aNumber of observations in parentheses next to the election probabilities.

^bOnly those economists who were uniformly classified into a subfield are included in this tabulation.

Table 2. Probit Estimates of the Probability of Election, 1990-2000^a

	1990-2000 N=526 Persons=358	1990-1994 N=225 Persons=179	1995-2000 N=301 Persons=218		
Independent Variable					
No. <i>Econometrica</i> Publications	.034 (.014)	-.020 (.023)	.176 (.055)	.074 (.019)	.165 (.051)
<i>Econometrica</i> Editing	.198 (.074)	.100 (.120)	.269 (.097)	.288 (.102)	.259 (.104)
Citations:					
10-24	.130 (.065)	.198 (.097)	.108 (.088)	.101 (.093)	.102 (.092)
25-49	.250 (.071)	.355 (.104)	.186 (.092)	.189 (.097)	.181 (.097)
≥50	.421 (.068)	.486 (.096)	.380 (.093)	.396 (.102)	.399 (.102)
Nominating Committee				.243 (.096)	.230 (.097)
10-24 Endorsers				.112 (.079)	.127 (.078)
25 or More Endorsers				.633 (.085)	.646 (.088)
Location:					
Top 17 No. America	.263 (.058)	.303 (.091)	.266 (.075)	.324 (.081)	.343 (.081)
Europe-Israel	.148 (.063)	.144 (.099)	.170 (.084)	.213 (.090)	.232 (.091)
Other	-.107 (.082)	.019 (.143)	-.197 (.077)	-.194 (.065)	-.229 (.038)
Field:					
Theorist	.267 (.065)	.270 (.105)	.267 (.085)	.316 (.086)	.339 (.084)
Other	.137 (.069)	.051 (.120)	.164 (.084)	.203 (.085)	.234 (.084)

Female	.003 (.111)	-.019 (.209)	.005 (.127)	.016 (.134)	.042 (.140)
Appearances in last four years					.120 (.036)
Likelihood Ratio χ^2 (df)	111.68 (21)	53.86 (15)	65.72 (16)	107.11 (19)	117.77 (20)

^aThe coefficients are the estimated effects of one-unit increases in the independent variable. Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. Each probit also includes a vector of variables indicating the year of the election.