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LARGE CASH TRANSFERS TO THE
ELDERLY IN SOUTH AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

We examine the social pension in South Africa, where large cash sums—about twice the median per capita income of African households—are paid to people qualified by age but irrespective of previous contributions. We present the history of the scheme and use a 1993 nationally representative survey to investigate the redistributive consequences of the transfers, documenting who receives the pensions, their levels of living, and those of their families. We also look at behavioral effects, particularly the effects of the cash receipts on the allocation of income to food, schooling, transfers, and savings. Two methodological issues run through our analysis. The first is the danger of interpreting simple correlations and regressions without adequate consideration of likely biases. The second is the problem of measuring the effects of a program that is determined by individual or household characteristics. We examine both in the context of the South African pension. Our results are consistent with the view that pension income is spent in much the same way as other income, and that a rand is a rand, regardless of its source.

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1. Introduction

Although many governments in developing countries profess redistributive aims, and although standard efficiency arguments suggest that cash transfers are the best way of accomplishing such aims, direct cash transfers to the poor are rare. In this paper we examine a counter example, the “social pension” in South Africa, where large cash sums—about twice the median per capita income of African households—are paid to people qualified by age but irrespective of previous contributions. We present the history of the scheme and explain how such large transfers could come about in an economy in which the recipients were not only politically weak, but without any political representation whatsoever. We then use a 1993 nationally representative survey to investigate the redistributive consequences of the transfers, documenting who receive the pensions, their levels of living, and those of their families. We also look at behavioral effects, particularly the effects of the cash receipts on the allocation of income to food, schooling, transfers, and savings. We also look for relationships between pension receipts and other “direct” indicators of welfare, the nutritional status of children, access to health care, and the ownership of major consumer durables.

The pressing policy issue for South Africans is whether it makes sense to target seven billion rands (nearly \$2 billion) of social expenditure through the current pension schemes. Our analysis contributes to the discussion by documenting the redistributive and behavioral effects of the transfers. We find that, at least as far as immediate incidence is concerned, the social pension is an effective tool of redistribution, and that the households it reaches are predominantly poor. Because so many of the elderly among South Africa’s African population live with children, the social pension is also effective in putting money into households where children live. In most countries, social expenditures on the elderly and social expenditures on children are alternatives, but South African living arrangements mean that, at least to some extent, the pension is an instrument that simultaneously reaches both groups. The fraction of children living with a pensioner is highest among children whose household per capita incomes are the lowest, so that the pension not only reaches the households in which children live, but disproportionately reaches children in poverty.

An understanding of the South African experience is relevant more broadly, for the design of transfer policy in other countries, and for several topics in the literature in economics and economic development. Perhaps the most important issue is the place of cash transfers in anti-poverty measures. It may be that cash transfers are rare because they are not viable; they may be difficult to administer, they may not reach their intended beneficiaries, or they may not be politically sustainable, arguments on which we elaborate below. One of the ultimate goals of our research is to discover whether these conventional prejudices against cash transfers are well-based. If cash transfers are successful in South Africa, is it only because of its unique history and political situation, or are there lessons that should lead to a general positive reevaluation of cash transfers as a component of anti-poverty programs in developing countries?

Governments implement a wide range of in-kind transfers and price subsidies, but rarely use payments of cash, even though such payments are typically part of an optimal (second best) tax equilibrium. Cash can be targeted directly to the desired beneficiaries, it allows recipients freedom of choice in their spending and it avoids the losses that are associated with providing goods whose shadow value to the recipient is less than their cost to the provider. We also expect any distortionary effect of cash transfers on labor supply to be small and insignificant in many developing countries (and especially South Africa), given high rates of under- and unemployment. Even in famine situations, there are good arguments for using cash in preference to in-kind food aid. Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen (1989) find that distributions of cash remedy the failure of “entitlements” and allow the market to deliver food efficiently in response to the appropriate price signals, see also Stephen Coate (1989). Previous South African evidence is consistent with similar effects on poor households in a *non-famine* context. Indeed Elizabeth Ardington and Frances Lund (1994, p.19) argue from their field-work that pensions are “a significant source of income, with definite redistributive effects; they are a reliable source of income, which leads to household security; they are the basis of credit facilities in local markets, further contributing to food security; they deliver cash into remote areas where no other institutions do; they are gender sensitive towards women; and they reach rural areas as few other services do.”

Our analysis of the national survey data in this paper is consistent with this summary. Yet transfers are rare in developing countries around the world.

The explanation may lie in political and administrative feasibility. Producers of in-kind goods have an interest in stimulating their output, and are often politically powerful. Governments often wish to increase consumption of merit goods, and favor allocations to children (or others) who consume such goods. It may also be hard to administer cash transfers in poor countries. In largely illiterate populations with poor record-keeping it is difficult to collect income tax or to pay subsidies through the direct tax system. In the absence of good information, means testing based on income is impossible or unreliable, and it is hard to prevent fraud through money going to recipients who are not entitled to the benefit, or through the diversion of funds by corrupt administrators or politicians. Yet pensions in South Africa are administered by a maze of regional authorities, several of whose administrative capabilities are likely no better than those in many countries with lower per capita incomes, particularly in Asia. The South African authorities also succeed in handling the logistic and security problems associated with making regular monthly deliveries of large cash sums to illiterate elderly people in remote rural areas.

More generally, social pensions in South Africa also provide an example of “indicator” targeting, where benefits are delivered based on a characteristic—in this case age—that is more or less perfectly correlated with the characteristic in which we are most interested—in this case poverty. The costs and effectiveness of this and other types of targeting have recently been surveyed in the context of Latin America by Margaret Grosh (1994) who provides a number of case studies where targeting has been effective in addressing poverty at modest cost in terms of administration and distortion of behavior. One of the main topics of this paper is to investigate the nature of the correlation between age and poverty, and to begin looking at the behavioral responses that could affect the ultimate incidence of the scheme.

Our analysis of South Africa also investigates whether different kinds of income have different effects. There are several possible reasons. Pension income is more regular than farm income, for example, so that

additional pension income may generate more expenditures than additional farm income. Here we focus on a two-way classification of income, by source—wages, property income, or transfers— and by the person responsible for receiving it—individual A’s earnings, or individual B’s entitlement to the social pension. Once again, these questions are of interest beyond the South African context and, depending on the classification, refer to two separate literatures. One is on intra-household allocation and on “unitary” versus “collective” models of household decision making, see in particular François Bourguignon and Pierre-André Chiappori (1992), and Martin Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Valerie Lechene (1994). Unitary models treat the household as a single decision making unit, while the collective models allow for different interests within the household whereby it becomes possible for the ownership of income to affect the pattern of its use. Because the South African transfers are so large, and because they accrue to people who are not typically the main providers, we have a good laboratory in which to look for switches in expenditure, either towards goods directly favored by the elderly, such as health care, or indirectly, such as expenditures on their grandchildren. Alternatively, if household heads make decisions about the allocation of expenditure, and since in 86 percent of pension households the pensioner is either the head or the head’s spouse, it is possible that pension income is spent like other income.

There are rather different issues associated with sources of income. These have already arisen in the United States in the context of welfare payments through AFDC. In a recent survey, Haveman and Wolfe (1995) cite several studies that purport to show that while family income typically has a beneficial effect on various measures of child success—test scores, graduating from high school, avoiding teen pregnancy, and eventually earning high incomes—the effects of AFDC income are less, and in some cases even negative. Since money is money, and there is no obvious channel through which its labeling should affect behavior, there must be a suspicion that such results are not what they seem. One possibility is that the AFDC income is correlated with some unobserved determinant of performance, neighborhood effect, low school quality, or perhaps the mysterious “negative force of an underclass heritage,” Hill and O’Neill (1994). These effects of AFDC in the

U.S. are mirrored for the social pension income in South Africa; for example, in African households pension income appears to have little or no effect on many expenditures of interest, including food, education, and health. We find a good deal of support for measurement error as an explanation of such results, so that when our estimate of income is a poor one, the receipt of the transfer may indicate poverty more precisely than does a low value of measured income. Using the best corrective procedures we can muster, our results are consistent with the view that pension income is like other income, so that even if a dollar is not always a dollar, a rand is always a rand.

The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 begins with a brief history of the social pension in South Africa and explains how the monthly payments are made. We then use the 1993 data to provide a description of the people who receive it and of the households in which they live. We document the progressivity of the scheme, and how living arrangements bring the pension to households with larger than average numbers of children. Section 3 turns to a behavioral analysis of the effects of pensions on the disposition of expenditures, focussing on food, health, and education. We also look at the relationship between pension receipt and direct measures of child health and nutrition. With appropriate correction for measurement error, we typically find no special effects of the pension; pension income is spent like other income.

Our evaluation of the pension scheme is quite favorable, and we believe that the South African experience calls for a serious look at direct cash transfers more generally. Even so, there are two important issues that we do not address, and evidence on either could temper our conclusions. One is the effect of pensions on living arrangements, for example grandchildren moving to live with their grandparents. At the time of the survey in 1993, the pension scheme had been in full operation for less than a year, so that the available data are unlikely to be informative about this question. The second issue is the effect on private transfers, and in particular the extent to which remittances are reduced to share the pension benefits between the direct recipients and those who were previously supporting them. This is the topic of a paper by Jensen (1996).

2. Social pensions in South Africa

2.1 Pension arrangements

The social pension in South Africa is a largely unintended consequence of the country's recent history. Most White workers are covered by private occupational pension schemes, and a means-tested state pension was originally introduced as a safety-net to provide for the limited numbers of White workers who reached retirement without adequate provision. Occupational pensions have limited portability and, although workers receive a lump-sum on separation from an employer, in most cases the amount is simply the accumulated contribution of the employee. Because African workers in the past have had less attachment to the formal labor force, and even those with long-term employment relationships were generally excluded from their employers' pension programs, Ambrogi (1994, p.17)..

The political forces behind social pension provision in South Africa differ from those in many developing countries. It is often the case that demand for social pensions is driven by poverty among the elderly as multi-generation living arrangements break down, when the young are either no longer willing or perhaps able to care for aging parents. In South Africa, the initial extension of the social pension to the Coloured and Indian population was in part an attempt to make the three-chamber parliament politically palatable, van der Berg (1994). The size of the state pension was gradually equalized across all racial groups during the disintegration of the apartheid regime. With the possible exception of the youngest pensioners, none of the current African recipients could have held any reasonable expectation during their working lives that such a pension would be available. The social pension for elderly Africans thus provides an unusual opportunity to examine the consequences of giving people sums of money that are both large and unanticipated.

Given the current distribution of income and of private pensions between races in South Africa, the social pension scheme is largely a transfer from the country's wealthy White population to its much less wealthy African, Indian and Coloured populations. However, in a country with large fractions of the adult population unemployed and children living in poverty, the elderly are perhaps not the most obvious target

for social transfers. Since South Africa is no exception to the rule that benefits create their own constituencies, there is no immediate prospect of large-scale change, but it remains to be seen whether current pension levels are maintained in the long-run or are allowed to erode. South Africa also has a child maintenance grant system from which Africans have historically been excluded, and it is currently being debated whether and to what extent the old age pension scheme should be replaced by other transfer schemes. Documentation of the beneficiaries of the current system is an important input into current discussions.

The maximum benefit in 1993 was 370 rand a month (about \$3 a day) and was and is paid to all women over the age of 60 and men over the age of 65. (This age differential is technically illegal under the current draft constitution, and is itself under discussion.) Payment is subject to a means test. For a single age-qualified individual, "means" are defined as the sum of income and an income value assigned to assets, and the pension is reduced one for one when means exceed 90 rand a month (in 1994) until means reach 370 rand, beyond which point no pension is provided; note that this generates a discontinuous drop of 90 rand a month at pre-pension means of 370 rand. For age-qualified married couples, means are (to a first approximation) calculated by pooling and dividing by two. The means test does not take into account income of other family members, so that, for example, there is no incentive for family dissolution or migration. The effectiveness of the test varies across the several regional authorities that administer the scheme; some object to means testing on principle, and others are incapable of carrying it out, see Lund (1993). Nevertheless, the means testing is almost certainly effective to the extent that it excludes almost all Whites as well as some upper-income Africans including probably most of those who receive private pensions. As we shall see, 80 percent of age-qualified Africans receive a social pension and, of those, the vast majority receive the maximum.

The benefits are large; 370 rand is around half of average *household* income, and it is more than *twice* the median per capita monthly household income of Africans, see Table II below. A comparison with the United States might be instructive. The US annual poverty line for a family of four in 1992 was \$14,228 or

\$3,557 per head. A useful poverty line for poor countries is the \$1 per person a day suggested by World Bank (1990); this converts to 105 rand per person per month, and about 35 percent of Africans were in poverty by this criterion at the time of the survey. A grant of 370 rand a month is 3.52 times the poverty line, so that the rough equivalent in the US would be a payment of \$1,000 a month.

The extension of the social pension to the whole population took several years, and was operating fully in all areas—including remote rural areas—only by the beginning of 1993. It is no mean task to deliver large amounts of cash on a monthly basis to an elderly rural population, many of whom are illiterate. How this is done is of interest because fraud and lack of effective administration are often thought to prevent the adoption of such schemes elsewhere. Once age-qualified people are registered as eligible for the pension, they are given an identifying number and are fingerprinted. On the appointed day, the pension team drives through the countryside making stops at convenient locations, such as local stores or meeting points. The team consists of an administrator and “tellers” who help the recipients operate automatic teller machines (ATMs) mounted on vans, together with armed guards, who keep non-pensioners and others—including the traders attracted by the event—away from the distribution site. The ATMs are similar to the machines found in the US or Europe, but with one additional feature; they can check fingerprints. The vans are equipped with a local area net that is capable of checking identity by matching the finger in the ATM with records of the prints of those who are eligible, and doing so within the usual timespan of an ATM transaction. This technology—which has only recently been developed—permits fast and accurate identification of individuals, even in the absence of the forms of identification typical of industrialized countries.

The pension scheme has been in operation for too short a time to permit more than a provisional assessment of the risks of corruption and fraud. There is little evidence of widespread abuse by pensioners, but there have been problems with administrators creating fictitious pensioners. The fragmentation of control over multiple local authorities has introduced opportunities for abuse, and there are obvious risks in transporting large sums of cash around the countryside, particularly a countryside where rates of violent crime are

high by world standards.

2.2 Who benefits from the pension?

The data for this paper come from the national household survey of South Africa carried out jointly by the World Bank and the South African Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town. During the last five months of 1993, in the period leading up to the elections in April 1994, the survey collected data from some 9,000 randomly selected households from all races and areas, including the so-called independent homelands. As is inevitable in collecting data from South Africa, the survey follows the apartheid-era classification of race into White, Coloured, Indian and African. We adopt the terminology throughout the paper, with capitalization signifying this specialized usage. The survey follows the general methodology of the World Bank's Living Standard Surveys in that it is an integrated survey, collecting information on a wide range of household characteristics and activities. Such surveys are well designed for the task at hand since interventions as large as the social pension are likely to have far-reaching effects on household welfare and behavior.

Table I describes pension receipt by race and location, as recorded in the World Bank/SALDRU data. Each household was asked to report income from the state pension for each household member, and Table I presents the counts of people who reported positive receipts in the last month. The counts are grossed up by the sampling weights, so that the figures presented here are estimates of the total numbers of women and men by race who reported receiving a pension in the second half of 1993. The first row of the table shows the counts of women and men who are age-qualified for the pension, i.e., the total number of men aged 65 and older, and the total number of women aged 60 and older. The second row displays counts of pension recipients, and the third row presents estimates of the percentage of age-qualified people who report receiving a pension. We have made no attempt to allow for means testing, so that the estimates in row three are simply the percentages of people in an age group who report receiving a pension, not a measure of take up among

those entitled.

The estimates should be treated with a certain amount of caution. Age reporting in the survey is far from perfect, and there is a good deal of age 'heaping,' respondents rounding their ages to the nearest multiple of five or ten. As a result, some of the women (men) who say that they are 60 (65) years old are undoubtedly younger and therefore not qualified for the pension. There is also a non-trivial number of respondents who claim to be in receipt of a state pension even though they report their age to be less than the qualifying age. Roughly a quarter of all men aged 60 to 65, who are thus within five years of age-qualification, report receiving a social pension, while a much smaller number (10 percent) of women within five years of qualification report pension receipt. This difference suggests that, while the legal issue is far from settled in Pretoria, in practice some local authorities may already be equalizing the age of pension eligibility between men and women.

According to the estimates in Table I, 1.2 million elderly women and 0.5 million elderly men are in receipt of state pensions. The total is a close match to the figure of 1.6 million given by the Director General of the Department of National Health and Population Development, quoted in Donna Ambrogi (1994). The take-up rates of 80 percent for African women, and 77 percent for African men, are consistent with the evidence from KwaZulu-Natal quoted in Ardington and Lund (1994). As is to be expected from the means testing, and from the occupational and income differences between racial classifications, the fractions of elderly receiving the pensions are much higher for Africans than for other groups, although even among Coloureds and Indians nearly two-thirds of the elderly report receiving the pension. Only 14 percent of White women and 7 percent of White men report receiving any pension payments.

The bottom panel of Table I disaggregates African pension receipt by urban, rural and metropolitan area. The take-up rates presented speak strongly to the program's effectiveness in reaching rural households. The take-up rates among rural elderly Africans—roughly 80 percent for both men and women—are just shy of take-up rates in urban areas (83 percent). The lower take-up rates in metropolitan areas (67 percent for men)

may reflect greater prevalence of occupational pensions among city-dwellers.

Table II presents some characteristics of households containing at least one pension recipient, together with the corresponding characteristics for the population as a whole. The first panel shows demographic characteristics for all households by racial group. Households with pension income are larger than average, which is not surprising since it takes the presence of a pensioner for the household to receive a pension. More interesting is the fact that households with pension income have more children than average, 2.28 as opposed to 1.69. This difference is entirely attributable to African households since, for the other three races, there are *fewer* children in pensioner households. The importance of three generation households among the African population was signaled in Ardington and Lund's previous work on KwaZulu-Natal. Only White households conform to the standard North American and European pattern whereby old people live largely by themselves or with other old people; there is only one child for every eight White pensioner households. Much the same point can be seen from the statistics on average age. The average age difference between pensioner and all households is only 6.3 years for Africans, but is 11.3 years for Coloureds, 13.8 years for Indians, and 24.9 years for Whites.

Given the marked differences in demographic structures between African and White pensioner households, and the much larger fraction of the former that receive state pensions, it is clearly possible that age-based transfers have favorable effects, not only for the elderly, but also for their children and grandchildren. Of the 11.9 million African children under the age of 16, 3.8 million (32 percent) live with a social pensioner. (This contrasts sharply with the living arrangements of White children; only one-half of one percent of South Africa's 1.2 million White children live with a social pensioner.) Of course, much depends on what happens to the money, whether it is simply used to supplement family income, or whether it is focussed to specific purposes, an issue to which we shall return in Sections 2 and 3.

Perhaps the most notable feature of the income data in the second panel of Table II is the extraordinary difference between incomes of White and African households; median per capita household incomes *differ by*

a factor of ten. Without this large difference, the pension transfers would surely be infeasible. The table also shows that the pensions successfully target poorer households and that, even including the pension income in monthly income, mean and median incomes per head are lower in households with pensions, in some cases substantially so. Given the possible influence of a few large income figures, medians are the preferred indicator of central tendency in incomes. The difference between median per capita income between pensioner and all households is smallest among Africans, but African incomes are so low, and pensions so large, that the median incomes of pensioner households are necessarily relatively high. The next three rows of the panel document the importance of pension income, especially among Africans. Over all African households, the average share of pensions in income is 13.3 percent, and is 61.6 percent among households with at least one pension recipient. Because higher income households have lower pension shares, average pension income is lower, 43.5 percent of average income among these households. Among African households, 21.3 percent receive some pension income, compared with 17.0 percent among all households.

The final panel in Table II presents information on family structure, the percentage of households with pensioner heads, the percentage of households in which three generations of one family are represented—typically grandparents, parents and children—and the percentage of households in which the middle generation, of prime age workers, is missing—so-called "skip-generation" households. The first row shows that almost 85 percent of all pension households are headed by pension recipients or the spouses of pension recipients, and the figure is slightly higher among African households. We restrict our counts of three- and skip-generation households to those in which at least one member is under the age of 16, in order to flag households with children present. More than a quarter of all African households (28 percent) contain three generations. Again, the comparison between African and White households attests to the difference in living arrangements between the groups; fewer than 3 percent of White households have three generations present. Households receiving a pension are more likely to house three generations than are other households. While this is true for all racial groups, it is most notably so for Africans and Coloureds, where a full 60 percent of

pensioner households hold three generations.

Due in part to the legacy of apartheid, it is common for African adults to migrate in order to find work, leaving their parents and their children to care for each other. The bottom row of Table II shows that roughly 14 percent of African pensioner households are skip-generation households. Taken together, three- and skip-generation households account for nearly three quarters of all African pensioner households.

The overwhelming representation of three- and skip-generation households among African pensioner households could be a response to the pension, at least in part. Children may relocate to live with an elderly parent who is receiving a large and reliable cash payment. However, there are several reasons why this is unlikely: African families were living in three generation households long before the pension became universal; the pension system only came fully on line shortly before the survey date, giving households little time to regroup; and nothing prohibits pensioners from providing transfers to children and grandchildren who do not live with them. Whatever the determinants of household structure, the numbers in Table II show that, in a vast majority of cases, transfers to elderly Africans are received by households with children.

The effect of pension transfers on the distribution of income is displayed graphically in Figure 1, which shows the distribution of income including and excluding pension income for African households (left panel) and all households (right panel). The graphs are non-parametric (kernel) estimates of the density of the logarithm of per capita household income, constructed on an individual basis and taking into account the sampling weights so as to approximate the densities in the population.

In each case, the density is estimated using both total income and income excluding pension income. Note that this is a mechanical exercise that takes no account of changes in behavior such as a decrease in remittances to the elderly. If such responses are important, income levels in the absence of the pension would not equal income minus the pension. In addition to the two density curves, we have plotted a vertical line at (the logarithm of) 105 rand per month per person, which approximates a poverty line of \$1 per person per day. This is less generous than most of the poverty lines in use or under discussion in South Africa, but the

fact that the African distribution has its mode near this point establishes that African households are poor by any international standard.

The left-hand densities are more dispersed than the right-hand densities because the all-African income distribution is more equal than that for the whole population. Indeed, the presence of rich White households can be seen in the bulge at the right of the right-hand densities. The effect of pension income is to shift mass from the lower tail to the middle of the distribution, reducing poverty and inequality by squeezing up the distribution. Figure 2 shows the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the logarithms of household per capita income including and excluding the pension. About 35 percent of Africans live on less than \$1 a day. This figure would be 40 percent if the pension incomes were removed and there was no offsetting change in pre-pension incomes. Because the two distributions do not cross, it is immediately clear that, in the absence of behavioral response, pensions reduce poverty and that the result is independent of the choice of poverty line.

It is not immediately clear why age-based targeting is so progressive in South Africa nor whether it would be so more generally. In neither developed nor developing countries is there any simple general relationship between age and poverty. The official poverty counts in the U.S. show that the fraction of the elderly in poverty is slightly less than the fraction of the non-elderly who are poor and much less than the fraction of children in poverty. In developing countries, an assessment of the economic status of the elderly is made difficult by the fact that nearly all the elderly live in households that also contain non-elderly people, see Deaton and Christina Paxson (1995), but some observers have claimed that general poverty among the elderly is a myth, World Bank (1994). In the current context, the social pension could be progressive either because pensioner households have low incomes, or because means testing is effective, or both. In fact, means testing seems to be relatively unimportant, at least among Africans, a finding that is documented in Figure 3.

The graphs show average pension receipts as a function of household income, exclusive of the pension, in the left-hand panel for African households, and in the right-hand panel for White households. The conditional

expectations are calculated using Jianqing Fan's (1992) locally weighted regression smoother, which allows the data to determine the shape of the function, rather than imposing (for example) a linear or quadratic form. The solid line shows actual average receipts, and the broken line what average receipts would be if each age-qualified person received a monthly pension of 370 rand. For Africans, potential and actual receipts are virtually identical, because the take-up is high and because most people receive 370 rand. The progressivity of the pension, the fact that the line slopes down from left to right, comes from the poverty of households in which the African elderly live, and not from denying or limiting pensions to those with higher incomes. The same is not true among White households where receipts and potential receipts coincide only at the lowest White income levels, and where at higher incomes, few age-qualified people report receiving anything from the social pension.

Figure 4 is a disaggregation by income of our finding that 32 percent of African children live in households where there is at least one pensioner. It shows the fraction is higher the poorer the household in which the children live, so that, if we are concerned with the helping the poorest children, the pension is likely to be more effective than the 32 percent would suggest.

The determinants of pension receipt are further examined in Tables III and IV where we look both at the probability of pension receipt among age-qualified individuals and at the amount of household pension income received. We need these results, not only to complete the current discussion, but also in anticipation of the behavioral analysis in section 3. Table III presents OLS estimates of the effects on household pension receipts of household income (excluding pensions), demographic composition, and geographic location for all households (column one) and for African households separately (column two). As is to be expected, the main determinants of pension receipts are the numbers of age-qualified men and women in the household, but conditional on these numbers, household income excluding pensions is negatively and significantly correlated with pension income received, and reported payments are higher in the erstwhile "independent" homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei. Holding all else constant, the replacement of a prime-age adult (aged

25 to pension age) with someone age-qualified for the pension is expected to increase pension income by 200 to 300 rand per month, an effect that dominates all others in the regression. Indeed, the close connection between pension income and the number of elderly will present an identification problem when we come to analyze the effects of pensions on behavior.

Also in anticipation of the behavioral analysis, we present estimates of the determinants of pension receipt in which income excluding pensions is instrumented on a number of characteristics of the household head. The instrumentation is not designed to correct for the endogeneity of income—which we believe is of secondary importance given widespread unemployment among Africans—but rather to correct for measurement error in the estimates of income. The instruments, which are listed in the notes to the Table, relate primarily to the head's employment and education and are selected because we expect them to be relatively well measured, because they are plausibly uncorrelated with the measurement error in income, and because they have no obvious direct effect on either the probability of pension receipt or its size.

The estimates are presented for all households (column three) and separately for African households (column four). In both cases, the instrumentation of household income doubles the estimated negative effect of other household income on pension receipts; in the African case, the estimated impact of an extra rand of other income on pension income is reduced from -0.010 to -0.027 . The absolute values of the coefficients on most of the household demographic variables also increase markedly, as would be expected if household income were measured with error and true household income were correlated with household composition. In what follows, we will also find that instrumenting household income has a significant effect on estimates of pension income disposition. Pension income is relatively well-reported and is negatively correlated with true household income so that, when true household income is measured poorly, pension income acts as an indicator that the household is poor even in the presence of measured income. Note that this does *not* imply that the administrators of the pensions means test do a better job of measuring income than the household survey; the result could hold even if the administrators made no effort to measure income and provided pensions to all

who are age qualified. All that is needed is that the presence of age-qualified people in the household has predictive power for low income in the presence of imperfectly measured income.

Household income excluding pensions and household demographic variables affect pension income through their effect on the probability of pension receipt. This can be seen in Table IV, in which the determinants of pension take-up are examined for age-qualified Africans. The first column is a probit, the second a linear probability model, and the third a linear probability model in which income excluding pensions is instrumented using the instrumental variables listed in Table III. The effect of other household income on the probability of pension receipt more than doubles when this income is instrumented, and the estimated impacts of household demographic variables rise in absolute value, again speaking to the role of measurement error in the uninstrumented regressions.

We can find no evidence against the supposition that means testing acts only on whether or not individuals receive the pension, and not on the amount received given that any pension is paid. In supplementary regressions, the amount of the pension received was regressed on province indicators and the predicted probability of receiving a pension and the fit was compared with unrestricted regressions on all the variables in Table IV. The F-statistics were 0.14 for the OLS regression and 1.00 for the instrumental variable regression, suggesting that the impact of income and household demographic variables on pension income work only through their effect on the probability of pension take-up.

3. The behavioral effects of pension income

3.1 Pension income and food expenditures

A good place to start an inquiry into the allocation of pension income within the household is with food expenditures. Most people who live in households that receive pension income are poor, and if pension income is simply added to household resources, we should expect it to show up in additional purchases of food. We follow a familiar and standard procedure. Food expenditures are regressed on income excluding pensions, and

on pension income. If the coefficients are the same, it would appear that pension income is treated like other income. If the coefficient on pension income is larger, the recipients are favoring food over other expenditures—as is sometimes found for income controlled by women as opposed to income controlled by men—and if the coefficient is smaller, pension income is being directed in some other way. Although these tests are simple enough in principle, there are a number of practical issues, including choice of functional form, measurement error, the selection of other covariates to include in the regression, and the possible endogeneity of pension incomes if there are unobserved household features that affect both food expenditures and the likelihood of receiving a pension. The last two considerations often go together; for example, household size makes the pension income more likely and increases food expenditure, and it is important that it be included in the regressions.

Table V presents evidence from a range of regressions for African households, who receive most of the pension income, whose behavior is of most interest to us, and on whom we focus for the rest of the paper. In all cases, we regress food expenditure on income excluding pensions and on pension income, while also controlling for household size, the number of people aged 0 to 5, 6 to 15, 16 to 18, 19 to 21, and 22 to 24, the age of the household head, head's age squared, head's years of education, an indicator for a female head, province indicators, and metro/urban/rural indicators. To exclude the effect of a few very large outliers, households reporting incomes greater than 10,000 rand a month were omitted, as were negative and zero incomes. Including the very high incomes—there are 177 households that report monthly income above this cutoff—depresses the coefficient on income, but does not otherwise much affect the results. The specifications in Table V, as we move from left to right, differ in their inclusion of the number of age-qualified elderly men and women as determinants of food expenditure, and in their instrumentation for other income (column 3), for other and pension income (column 4), for total income (column 5), and in their use of the number of elderly men and women as instruments for income and pension income (column 6). The patterns in this Table will recur in similar forms in other cases so we discuss them in some detail.

The first column shows the simplest possible case, an OLS regression of food expenditures on income excluding the pension, on income from the pension, on household size, and on the other controls that are common to all regressions. In this specification, the estimated marginal propensity to spend on food out of pension income is about a third of the estimated marginal propensity to spend on food out of non-pension income. If food is “good,” pension income is only a third as “good” as other income. The second column adds the number of age-qualified males and females to the regression. Both coefficients are large and positive although they are jointly insignificant with an F -ratio of 2.27. These coefficients might be positive because the elderly have a preference for food, either for themselves, or on behalf of others, so that the presence of elderly men and women increases food demand by about twice as much as does the presence of a non-elderly person. An alternative interpretation is that the number of elderly people is a good predictor of pension income, indeed so good that there is collinearity between these variables and the pension variable and it is difficult to measure their separate effects. Given that demand equations from other countries rarely show any separate influence for the elderly, the second interpretation is a plausible one. Nevertheless, there can be no general presumption that the numbers of the elderly do not affect household preferences, and since the cash benefit is determined by the numbers of the elderly, clear identification is always going to be difficult and will have to be argued on a case by case basis.

The third column reports results for the same specification, but with instrumentation for possible measurement error in non-pension income. In the first-stage regression of non-pension income on the instruments and on the other variables in the regression, the F -statistic on the instruments is 53.7. Consistent with the presence of measurement error, the coefficient on income rises by about a quarter, from 0.092 to 0.110. Pension income attracts a positive coefficient, but it is small and insignificantly different from zero. As before there are positive coefficients on the numbers of men and women that are age-qualified for the pension, and as before, there is the suspicion that these estimates are proxying for the pension itself. Testing this suspicion is difficult because it is hard to predict pension income *except* by the number of age-qualified people, so that

we lack convincing instruments. Nevertheless, the instruments that we use for non-pension income also have some ability to predict pension income, with an F -statistic of 12.1 in a first-stage regression. In the resulting second-stage regression, shown as column 4 of the Table, pension income has a coefficient that is twice as large as that on non-pension income, but the numbers of age-qualified men and women now have large (insignificant) *negative* coefficients. This regression tells us little more than what we know already, that predicted pensions are collinear with the number of people age-qualified for the pension.

Column 5 is discussed below after looking at the final regression, in column 6, which contains our preferred specification for food. According to this latter, the elderly are excluded from the main regression, so that we are assuming that elderly people do not affect the demand for food any differently than do prime-age adults. We are thus free to use the numbers of age-qualified men and women as instruments, thus improving the fit of the first stage regressions, especially for pension income, where the F -ratio rises from 12.1 to 263.2. We also use an over identification test of the hypothesis that, conditional on the validity of the other instruments, the numbers of men and women who are age-qualified for the pension belong in the instrument set and not in the main regression. The result is a value of 0.19. The main regression then delivers the result that pension income and non-pension income have the same effect on food expenditures. Both coefficients are significantly different from zero, but not from one another. Although other interpretations are clearly possible, we would argue that the exclusion of the elderly from the main equation is reasonable, as is the assumption that both income and pension income are reported with error, albeit more for the former. Given these, the money from pensions is no different from money from other sources, at least for food expenditures; a rand is a rand whatever its source.

Column 5 looks at the matter in another way. Now we impose that a rand is a rand by combining the two types of income, and then enter once again the numbers of age-qualified men and women. As expected, these have small and insignificant coefficients, judged either separately or in combination. Conditional on a rand being a rand, there is no evidence that the elderly have food preferences any different from other adults.

It is instructive to compare the first regression in column 1 with the final regression in column 6. The two regressions have the same specification, but the former is estimated by OLS, while the latter is instrumented to allow for measurement error in both reported pension income and in measured non-pension income. If we were to assume that pension income was accurately reported, and instrument only for non-pension income, we get part way to the final result. The coefficient on non-pension income rises to close to its final value, and the coefficient on pension income rises from 0.36 to 0.46. Even if pension income were accurately measured, there is the possibility of downward bias in the presence of mis-measured non-pension income, because the receipt of pension income indicates low non-pension income. Even so, there also appears to be misreporting of pension income, so that the instrumentation of both variables is required to bring the estimated coefficients to equality.

3.2 Pension income and the disposition of income

The disposition of pension income is investigated in Table VI. There are thirteen columns in the table; ten expenditure categories, remittances or transfers out of the household, saving defined as explicit contributions, and “saving” defined as a residual between measured income and measured total consumption. Once again, our two main difficulties are (a) limited variation in pension income conditional on the numbers of elderly, and (b) mis-measurement of income, and the shortage of good predictors of income that can reasonably be assumed not to have a direct effect on the allocation of income. For some of these goods, it makes sense to do as we did for food, and assume that the elderly do not affect consumption directly, but only through the pension, but for others—remittances or expenditures on health—such an assumption cannot be maintained. There are also a number of variables—head’s age, head’s education, and an indicator that the head is female—that do an excellent job of predicting income and would be good instruments for the measurement error, but which once again cannot safely be assumed not to affect directly the allocation of expenditures.

In computing the estimates in the table, we have tried to avoid controversial assumptions about excluding

variables from the main equations, so that, for example, we have not attempted to use age or education as instruments. However, we have made two changes from the treatment of food expenditures in Table V. We exploit the presumption that tastes should not change just at the precise moment that people become old enough to get the social pension, and include in the main regressions, not the numbers of age-qualified men and women, but the numbers of men and women aged 50 or over. When we instrument pension income, we also combine the numbers of age-qualified men and women into a single measure of the number of age-qualified people. Otherwise, the procedures are the same as for food. The two rows in the top panel of the Table show the OLS estimates of the marginal propensities to spend out of non-pension and pension income. These regressions were computed including the full set of controls, but since we are mostly interested in the two propensities, and on how they change with instrumentation, we do not report the other estimates. The rows in the bottom panel show the 2SLS results, with both kinds of income instrumented. We report the two marginal propensities, the coefficients on the numbers of males and females aged 50 or more, the effects of having a female head, and the coefficient on the number of years of education of the head. Finally, we show the t -test of the hypothesis that the two marginal propensities are the same—as was the case for food—as well as the χ^2 over identification test for the legitimacy of the number of age-qualified pensioners as an instrument, conditional on the validity of the other instruments. Note finally that because the expenditure categories here are exhaustive, so that expenditures across the columns add to the sum of pension and non-pension income, the estimates in each of the first four rows sum to unity, and those in the next four rows to zero.

The OLS estimates in the first two rows show a repetition of what we found for food, that the marginal propensity to consume out of pension income is estimated to be lower than that out of non-pension income. This is true for all of the expenditure categories except health expenditures, and is true for the sum of the first twelve columns, since the last column, which is one minus the sum of the first twelve, shows that 85 percent of pension income is allocated at the margin to the residual category, as opposed to 52 percent of non-pension

income. While it is possible that a large share of pension income is saved, these very large estimates almost certainly owe a great deal to the measurement error that is common to both income and residual unallocated income.

Instrumenting for measurement error in the next two rows reduces both coefficients in the “residual savings” column, more so for pension income than for other income, although both remain large. We estimate that 49 percent of non-pension income and 67 percent of pension income are unallocated at the margin; the estimated standard errors are 3.2 percent and 10.0 percent respectively, and the difference is not significantly different from zero, $t = 1.97$. It would be unwise to treat these numbers as good estimates of the propensity to spend on residual saving; not only does this category include any omitted expenditure categories, but because measurement error in income is directly carried through into this category, the IV estimate, although consistent, is biased towards unity in finite samples.

What happens overall also happens for most of the individual expenditure categories; as was true for food, the marginal propensity to spend out of pension income is brought closer to the marginal propensity to spend out of non-pension income. For all categories except “other expenditures” the t -test cannot reject the equality of the coefficients although, in some cases, the test is helped by the relatively high standard errors induced by the instrumentation. Although a few of the OID test-statistics would lead to rejection at conventional levels, none of the statistics are very large for a sample of 5,243 observations. We therefore tend to accept the validity of the t -tests, and with them the view that money from the social pension is spent in the same way as other income. Evidence to the contrary is as likely to be a consequence of measurement error as of real differences in behavior.

There are a number of other noteworthy features of the table. Female-headed households behave differently from male-headed households. They spend a great deal less on alcohol and tobacco and on transportation; there are also more modest or less significant decreases in expenditures on housing, other goods, formal saving and remittances. We estimate relatively modest direct or taste effects of elderly household

members on consumption patterns; they spend less on clothing, on alcohol and tobacco, on education, and on transportation. The estimated coefficient of pension income in the schooling equation is negative, but it is not significantly different from the estimated coefficient on non-pension income, so that there is no evidence that the pension income of grandparents is not used to assist the education of grandchildren in three generation families. However, the evidence is somewhat stronger against the view that the elderly favor educational expenditure over other uses of funds. Households with better educated heads also spend differently, reporting higher levels of expenditure on everything except remittances and alcohol and tobacco. It is possible that these effects are proxying for higher incomes—in which case education should be included among the instruments rather than among the regressors—or that households with better educated heads provide a fuller and more accurate account of their expenditures.

We have also considered a number of variants of the results in Table VI that are not shown explicitly. For each expenditure category, we ran regressions corresponding to column 5 in Table V, imposing the restriction that a rand of pension income is spent in the same way as is a rand of other income. Conditional on the truth of this assumption, we can test for taste differences associated with the presence of the elderly. We find negative effects on expenditures for clothing, schooling, transportation, and alcohol and tobacco. In Table VI, where the elderly are included only as instruments, these negative effects are projected on to pension income and appear as differences between the coefficients on pension and non-pension income. Since it is plausible that old people spend less on these commodities, we suspect that the differences are real, although not very important, whether judged by the *t*-tests in Table VI or by those on the elderly in the supplementary regressions. However, given the close predictability of the pension by the number of age-qualified people, it is beyond the ability of our data to distinguish an explanation in which the pension is spent differently from other income from one in which all income is spent in the same way at the margin but where there are intercept differences associated with the different tastes of the elderly.

We have repeated the regressions separately for households who live in rural and urban/metropolitan

areas. The range of goods available is much wider in urban than in rural areas, and needs, especially food needs, are likely to be different in agriculture from those in urban occupations. We found few differences of any importance. The marginal propensity to spend on remittances and on housing are sharply higher in urban areas, but are still insignificantly different between pension and other income. The large estimated coefficients on income for the unallocated or residual saving category remain as large as before and do not differ between urban and rural households.

We have also considered the relationship between pension income and other direct measures of economic status, including the ownership of various durable goods—cars, refrigerators, stoves, radios, televisions, and telephones—as well the health status of infants—measured as standardized height for age, weight for age, and weight for height scores. On the grounds that pensions might change the cost-benefit calculations for health treatment, we also looked at whether pension receipt made it more likely that people who were sick were treated by a doctor or at a hospital as opposed to not at all, or by a traditional healer. Crude correlations show a *negative* relationship between pension receipt and some of these indicators. For example, the standardized height for age score for African children aged up to 60 months is -1.16 in non-pension households, and -1.39 in pensioner households; the difference has a t -value of 2.35 after allowing for intrahousehold correlations. But pensioner households are poorer than non-pension households, and their heads are generally much less well educated. Household income has a modest positive effect on indicators of child nutrition, and a much larger effect on the ownership of the various durable goods. Head's years of education has a positive effect on both sets of measures. We found no consistent effects of pension income on any of the measures although, for the health measures, it is difficult to find any significant effects once incomes are instrumented. We can certainly accept the hypothesis that pension and non-pension incomes have the same effect, but the result is not informative given the imprecision of the estimates.

These final results are hardly surprising. At the time of the survey, the pension had been operating in full for less than a year so that it would not have had time to have much effect on the stocks of durable goods or

of child health, which are the accumulated result of decisions and events over several years.

4. Conclusions

The South African social pension is an example of a transfer scheme where eligibility is determined by age. In spite of the simplicity of the targeting indicator, the pension is effective in reaching the poorest households and those with children. African households whose per capita income places them at the 5th percentile of African households receive around 175 rand per month on average, while those at the 95th percentile receive almost nothing. These outcomes do not depend on the ability to assess income or wealth to operate a means test. Although the pension is in principle subject to a means test, its effect is mostly to exclude Whites; the distributional consequences among African households would be almost the same if take-up were universal. Because of differential life-expectancy and differences in the age qualification, pensions reach almost three times as many women as men, and because of South African living arrangements, pensions are also effective in reaching the households in which children live. Large fractions of the poorest children live in households that receive pension income. The South African authorities have overcome the difficulties of making cash transfers to even remote rural areas, and of checking eligibility among even illiterate pensioners.

As always, the behavioral effects of the scheme are harder to assess than the characteristics of its recipients. Simple correlations and regressions have a tendency to link pension receipt with undesirable outcomes, but these results can reasonably be attributed to the fact that pension recipients are different from others—in particular they are poorer and less well educated—or more subtly, to measurement error in income, so that even conditional on low measured income, the receipt of the pension may indicate low economic status. Our results in this paper are consistent with the view that pension income is spent in much the same way as other income. Since pension income usually accrues to the head of household who may also be the main decision maker, this conclusion is perhaps to be expected. Even so, without the social pension, an elderly head of household would often not be the principal earner, and it has been claimed that decision-making powers are

linked to earnings. And while the distinction between pension and non-pension income does not seem to be very important, we do find evidence that expenditure patterns are different for different types of households. Female-headed households spend a less on alcohol and tobacco, and the presence of elderly household members turns expenditure away from transportation and from schooling. The finding on alcohol and tobacco suggests that women have different tastes from men, and is evidence against simple unitary models of household decision-making. That the elderly travel less (presumably to work) and spend less on education is hardly a surprise, but it shows that such differences do not automatically rule out unitary decision making.

Our behavioral analysis is limited by the short time since the full pension was introduced. Some consequences, such as health status, the possession of durable goods, or living arrangements, will take time to adapt, and will have to be re-examined in later work. We have also not considered the effects of the social pension on private transfers (remittances) into the recipient households. If there are important compensatory effects—and there is some evidence of this from other countries, Donald Cox and Emmanuel Jimenez (1992)—then at least some of the benefits of the pensions are accruing to younger and presumably better-off people, so that the progressivity of the scheme will be less than indicated by the immediate incidence analyzed here.

There are two methodological issues that run through our analysis and that are worth restating. The first is the danger of interpreting simple correlations and regressions without adequate consideration of likely biases. Omitted heterogeneity is an obvious problem—the recipients of state transfers are *designed* to be different from non-recipients—but as important, and perhaps less obvious, is the fact that measurement error may preclude regression analysis from providing adequate controls, even for observable covariates such as income. The second issue is the problem of measuring the effects of a program that is determined by individual or household characteristics. If unemployment benefit, food stamps, or pensions are a function of circumstances and household characteristics, and if those characteristics have a direct influence on behavior, then the behavioral consequences of the program are not identified. In some applications, the lack of identification may be masked by the failure of the formula to characterize benefits precisely, so that

estimation is possible, even though the sources of identification and the interpretation of the results are far from clear. In the case of the South African pension, the take-up of pensions among qualified Africans is so nearly universal that the formula is close to the reality, and the identification problem is stark and inevitable.

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Table I: Numbers of South Africans qualifying for and receiving the old-age pension, by race.
(thousands)

	ALL RACES		COLOURED		INDIANS		WHITES	
	men	women	men	women	men	women	men	women
Qualified by age	719	1,689	41	109	11	30	151	269
Reporting receipt	437	1,156	24	72	7	19	11	37
percent	61	68	58	66	67	62	7	14
Underage by < 5 years	332	483	27	39	9	10	70	87
Reporting receipt	75	46	2	1	1	0	1	2
percent	23	10	7	2	10	0	1	2
Total monthly outlay (millions of rand)	191	443	9	26	3	6	4	13
AFRICANS								
	ALL		RURAL		URBAN		METROPOLITAN	
	men	women	men	women	men	women	men	women
Qualified by age	516	1281	385	948	69	181	61	152
Reporting receipt	395	1028	296	762	58	150	41	116
percent	77	80	77	80	83	83	67	77
Underage by < 5 years	225	348	144	224	40	56	41	68
Reporting receipt	71	43	46	24	21	12	4	8
percent	31	12	32	11	53	21	10	12
Total monthly outlay (millions of rand)	175	398	133	301	27	57	15	41

Those qualified are men 65 or older and women 60 or older; those underage by < 5 years are men aged 60–64 and women aged 55–59. Those reporting receipt are the individuals (members of households) in the survey who reported receiving the old age pension in the last month. Source: Authors' calculations based on World Bank/SALDRU survey, August–December 1993.

Table II: Demographic Characteristics of Pension Households

	ALL RACES		AFRICANS		COLOUREDS		INDIANS		WHITES	
	All Households	Pension Households	All Households	Pension Households	All Households	Pension Households	All Households	Pension Households	All Households	Pension Households
<i>Demographics</i>										
# males	2.10	2.67	2.24	2.78	2.23	2.12	2.13	1.80	1.49	0.97
# females	2.34	3.35	2.54	3.43	2.44	3.26	2.25	2.76	1.52	1.58
# children	1.69	2.28	1.95	2.43	1.68	1.48	1.33	0.88	0.76	0.13
Age (average)	28.89	34.89	27.31	33.62	27.00	38.34	28.42	42.21	35.97	60.90
<i>Incomes</i>										
Mean p.c.i.	710	284	321.8	200.75	537.28	387.9	1004.6	786.5	2384.6	2254.13
Median p.c.i.	263	160	170.51	146.67	327.3	282.4	670.5	482.8	1708.2	742.7
<i>Pensions</i>										
Fraction with	17.0	100	21.3	100	12.57	100	9.75	100	2.9	100
Ave pension income	74.50	439.25	94.22	443.03	52.25	415.8	40.31	413.4	11.40	387.3
Income share of pension	10.3	59.2	13.3	61.6	5.4	42.2	2.2	23.4	1.1	36.5
<i>Family Structure</i>										
fraction households with pensioner head	14.3	84.6	18.4	86.5	9.1	72.0	5.8	59.9	1.9	64.8
3 generations (with a child)	22.5	58.3	27.8	60.2	22.3	60.7	13.1	39.9	2.8	8.97
Skip generation	3.0	12.6	3.9	13.6	2.0	6.9	0.4	3.9	0.1	0

Table III: Determinants of pensions receipts

	All (OLS)	Africans (OLS)	All (IVE)	Africans (IVE)
income exc pension	-0.0085 (10.6)	-0.0101 (6.2)	-0.0143 (10.6)	-0.0267 (7.7)
household size	13.62 (9.6)	8.35 (5.3)	15.05 (9.0)	12.39 (6.2)
kids 05	-17.92 (7.4)	-13.64 (5.3)	-19.59 (6.9)	-18.60 (5.7)
kids 6-15	-11.42 (5.7)	-7.00 (3.2)	-12.33 (5.2)	-10.72 (4.0)
members 16-24	-10.48 (5.3)	-7.94 (3.7)	-10.54 (4.6)	-10.04 (3.8)
females ≥ 60	251.86 (69.7)	295.17 (73.7)	246.83 (61.4)	291.70 (61.8)
males ≥ 65	221.89 (42.4)	282.55 (48.8)	215.76 (38.8)	272.87 (43.1)
Cape	-7.4 (0.5)	12.7 (0.9)	-4.4 (0.3)	11.3 (0.7)
Natal	1.3 (0.1)	9.0 (0.6)	5.4 (0.3)	1.5 (0.1)
Transvaal	2.3 (0.2)	13.3 (1.0)	6.1 (0.4)	15.0 (1.0)
Orange F.S.	19.9 (1.4)	30.7 (2.2)	20.8 (1.3)	31.8 (2.0)
KwaZulu Natal	12.0 (0.9)	13.3 (1.0)	11.5 (0.7)	11.4 (0.7)
Kangwane	2.9 (0.2)	11.1 (0.7)	0.1 (0.0)	12.2 (0.7)
Qwa-Qwa	33.0 (1.5)	36.5 (1.7)	36.9 (1.4)	35.9 (1.4)
Gazankul	17.5 (1.1)	18.1 (1.2)	18.9 (1.1)	16.9 (1.0)
Lebowa	21.8 (1.6)	22.8 (1.6)	25.1 (1.6)	19.6 (1.2)
Transkei	42.5 (3.0)	38.4 (2.8)	46.1 (2.9)	33.1 (2.1)
Bophuthatswana	43.6 (3.1)	47.4 (3.4)	52.3 (3.3)	55.4 (3.5)
Venda	28.3 (1.6)	19.9 (1.1)	35.9 (1.8)	29.9 (1.5)
Ciskei	121.1 (7.6)	114.8 (7.3)	135.2 (7.6)	125.7 (7.1)
constant	-18.8 (1.4)	-20.7 (1.5)	-12.2 (0.8)	-10.6 (0.7)
Number of obs	8377	6049	7250	5344

NOTES: Regressions are restricted to households with total monthly income excluding pensions that is non-negative and less than 10,000 rand per month. In the instrumental variable regressions, income excluding pensions is instrumented using the following instrumental variables: whether the head is present, female, employed, holds a regular wage job, is a casual laborer, is self-employed in agriculture, self-employed in another field, the head's standard of completed education, head's pay-type (monthly, nightly, or weekly), and head is a dual job-holder.

Table IV: Determinants of the Probability of a Receiving a Pension Conditional on Age Qualification

	Probit	OLS regression	IV regression
Income excluding pension	-0.0002 (5.9)	-0.00006 (6.2)	-0.00017 (7.0)
Household size	0.0585 (2.0)	0.0168 (2.2)	0.0452 (4.5)
Number of kids 0-5	-0.1178 (2.4)	-0.0325 (2.4)	-0.0604 (3.8)
Number of kids 6-15	-0.0083 (1.1)	-0.0045 (0.4)	-0.0363 (2.8)
Number of members 16-24	-0.1297 (3.0)	-0.0366 (3.2)	-0.0550 (4.2)
Number of females ≥ 60	0.1368 (1.5)	0.0433 (1.8)	0.0387 (1.5)
Number of males ≥ 65	-0.0861 (1.1)	-0.0246 (1.2)	-0.0511 (2.4)
Cape	0.4356 (1.7)	0.1433 (1.9)	0.1231 (1.6)
Natal	0.4277 (1.5)	0.1399 (1.7)	0.0738 (0.9)
Transvaal	0.1327 (0.6)	0.0470 (0.7)	0.0548 (0.8)
Orange Free State	1.0637 (0.3)	0.2673 (3.7)	0.2751 (3.7)
QwaZulu	0.3926 (0.2)	0.1330 (2.1)	0.1183 (1.8)
Kangwane	0.3685 (1.2)	0.1258 (1.4)	0.1274 (1.3)
QwaQwa	1.0852 (2.0)	0.2688 (2.2)	0.2014 (1.6)
Gazankul	0.4870 (1.8)	0.1553 (2.1)	0.1607 (2.0)
Lebowa	0.4806 (2.1)	0.1521 (2.3)	0.1235 (1.8)
Transkei	0.2179 (1.0)	0.0815 (1.3)	0.0259 (0.4)
Bophutatswana	0.8711 (3.5)	0.2390 (3.5)	0.2209 (3.1)
Venda	0.5246 (1.9)	0.1612 (2.1)	0.2219 (2.7)
Ciskei	0.9320 (3.3)	0.2395 (3.2)	0.1962 (2.5)
constant	0.3753 (1.6)	0.6412 (9.4)	0.6721 (9.3)

NOTES: Regressions are restricted to African individuals, and are run on those qualified by age for the pension, i.e. men aged 65 and over and women aged 60 and over. The first column is a probit, the second a linear probability model, and the third a linear probability model in which income excluding the pension is instrumented using the instrumental variables listed in Table A1. In supplementary regressions, the amount of the pension received was regressed on province dummies and the predicted probability of receiving a pension and the fit compared with unrestricted regressions on all the variables shown above. The F-statistics are 0.14 for the OLS regressions and 1.00 for the IV regressions, so that there is no evidence against the proposition that means testing acts only on whether or not individuals receive the pension, and not on the amount received given that any pension is paid.

Table V: Food expenditures, incomes, and the social pension, African households only

	No Instruments	No Instruments	Instrument for Other Income Only	Instrument Other and Pension Income	Inst Total Income	Inst Both (n60f,n65m as insts)
Income Excl Pensions	.093 (.004)	.092 (.004)	.110 (.014)	.123 (.024)	--	.118 (.014)
Social Pension Income	.036 (.023)	.001 (.029)	.011 (.030)	.240 (.337)	--	.116 (.041)
Total Income	--	--	--	--	.117 (.014)	--
Household Size	43.57 (3.95)	42.38 (3.99)	38.36 (5.00)	34.56 (7.51)	36.57 (5.10)	36.38 (5.17)
Number Age- Eligible Females	--	31.07 (14.63)	30.26 (14.67)	-30.30 (89.89)	2.34 (12.6)	--
Number of Age- Eligible Males	--	13.24 (17.16)	16.64 (17.37)	-34.86 (77.41)	-7.07 (15.7)	--
F-test: joint sig (n60f, n65m)	--	2.27	2.22	0.19	0.12	--
Chi-square test (2)	--	--	--	--	--	0.56

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses for regression coefficients. Number of observations are 5,243 for all regressions.

Also included in each regression: household size; number of household members aged 0–5, 6–15, 16–18, 19–21, 22–24; age of household head; age of head squared; head's years of education; a dummy for female-headed households; (old, i.e. pre-election) province indicators; metro indicators.

Income excluding pensions and social pension income are instrumented on indicators that the head of household is present; head is employed; head holds a regular wage job, a casual wage job, a job in agriculture, a job in some other sector; head is paid monthly, fortnightly, weekly; head is a dual job holder, and In the last column) the number of women aged 60 or above (n60f) and the number of men aged 65 or above (n65m). The *F*-statistics for these instruments in the first-stage regressions of non-pension income are 46.9 when n60f and n65m are included, and 53.7 when they are excluded. For pension income, the corresponding figures are 263.2 and 12.1.

Chi-square test is an over-identification test for the correlation between errors in the second-stage regression and the number of women and men age-eligible for a social pension (n60f, n65m) which are used as instruments in the first stage.

Table VI: Pension income and the disposition of incomes among African households

	food	clothing	housing	alcohol & tobacco	school- ing	transport	health	enter- tainment	remit- tances	insur- ance	other	formal saving	residual & other saving
<i>OLS regression:</i>													
non-pension income	0.093 (22.6)	0.027 (29.3)	0.106 (26.1)	0.004 (4.0)	0.026 (16.0)	0.064 (26.9)	0.004 (12.0)	0.006 (15.8)	0.022 (12.7)	0.032 (25.6)	0.052 (31.3)	0.045 (21.6)	0.521 (56.3)
pension income	0.030 (1.2)	0.016 (3.0)	0.042 (1.7)	-0.004 (0.7)	-0.004 (0.4)	0.007 (0.5)	0.007 (3.4)	0.002 (0.9)	0.011 (1.1)	0.006 (0.8)	0.015 (1.6)	0.026 (2.1)	0.846 (15.5)
<i>2SLS regression:</i>													
non-pension income	0.117 (8.2)	0.033 (10.2)	0.092 (6.5)	0.005 (1.5)	0.016 (2.8)	0.061 (7.4)	0.002 (1.7)	0.002 (1.6)	0.056 (8.9)	0.038 (8.9)	0.052 (9.0)	0.038 (5.3)	0.488 (15.1)
pension income	0.107 (2.4)	0.026 (2.6)	0.066 (1.5)	-0.002 (0.2)	-0.011 (0.6)	0.020 (0.8)	0.004 (1.1)	-0.004 (0.9)	0.038 (2.0)	0.020 (1.5)	0.015 (0.8)	0.047 (2.1)	0.673 (6.7)
# females 50+	5.56 (0.5)	-5.34 (2.0)	7.08 (0.6)	-5.87 (2.2)	-5.73 (1.2)	-15.6 (2.3)	-1.37 (1.4)	0.16 (0.2)	-6.46 (1.3)	4.69 (1.3)	6.48 (1.4)	-8.89 (1.5)	25.3 (1.0)
# males 50+	-0.09 (0.0)	-5.11 (1.9)	-5.51 (0.5)	-7.95 (2.9)	-7.00 (1.5)	-13.7 (2.0)	-0.15 (0.2)	-1.63 (1.6)	-0.69 (0.1)	-1.26 (0.4)	-9.08 (1.9)	-11.9 (2.0)	64.1 (2.4)
female head	-2.83 (0.2)	0.76 (0.3)	-20.6 (1.8)	-23.4 (8.8)	-6.66 (1.4)	-15.5 (2.3)	-0.02 (0.0)	-0.72 (0.7)	-9.67 (1.9)	1.78 (0.5)	-7.06 (1.5)	-9.99 (1.7)	93.8 (3.6)
head's education	3.21 (2.0)	1.81 (5.0)	10.6 (6.7)	-0.47 (1.3)	3.19 (5.0)	2.77 (3.0)	0.46 (3.5)	0.39 (2.8)	-2.74 (3.9)	1.97 (4.1)	3.28 (5.1)	1.29 (1.6)	-25.7 (7.1)
<i>t</i> -value (equality)	0.25	0.77	0.62	0.64	1.63	1.71	0.58	1.53	0.98	1.48	2.20	0.44	1.97
χ^2 (OID)	0.00	4.26	6.93	0.39	2.17	2.64	0.73	1.86	1.38	6.53	7.15	0.92	4.29

Notes: The OLS regressions in the top panel and the 2SLS regressions in the bottom panel contain, in addition to the variables shown, the number of household members, the numbers of people aged 0 to 5, 6 to 15, 16 to 18, 19 to 21, 22 to 24, head's age, head's age squared, province and urbanization dummies. The instruments for the first stage regressions are indicators of whether the head is present, is employed, holds a regular job, a casual wage job, a job in agriculture, a job in some other sector, is paid monthly, fortnightly, or weekly, and is a dual job holder, together with the number of people in the household who are age-qualified for the pension. The *t*-test is a test of equality of the coefficients on pension and non-pension income in the 2SLS regression, and the OID test of the validity of excluding from the main regression the numbers of age-qualified pensioners, conditional on the validity of the other instruments. In the first stage regressions for non-pension income and pension income, the *F*-statistics for the instruments are 48.47 and 238.33, respectively. There are 5,243 observations.

Figure 1: Estimated income densities, with and without pensions




Figure 2: Empirical cdfs of income with and without pensions, Africans






Figure 3: Potential and reported pensions and income



Notes: Locally weighted regressions, Fan (1992), with quartic kernels and bandwidths of 1.0 for African households and 1.5 for white households. The solid line is the regression function of household pension receipts conditional on the logarithm of household income (excluding pensions) per capita. The broken line is the corresponding regression for potential pension receipts, where potential receipts are 370 rand times the number of age qualified people in the household.

Figure 4: Fractions of children in households with at least one pensioner, African households



Notes: Locally weighted regressions, Fan (1992), with quartic kernels and a bandwidth of 1.0. The lines are the regression functions of a dummy that is unity if the child is in a pension household and zero otherwise conditional on the logarithm of the child's per capita income, defined as the per capita income of the household in which the child lives.