FINANCIAL ADVICE AND INVESTOR BELIEFS:
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ACTIVE VS. PASSIVE STRATEGIES

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ABSTRACT

Using a randomized controlled trial we test how retail investors assess and update their priors based on different types of financial advice, which either aligns with their priors or goes against it. We compare advice that emphasizes either the benefits of passive investment strategies (such as diversification and low fees) or active strategies (such as stock picking and market timing). We find that participants rate advice significantly higher when it aligns with their priors rather than contradicts them. But people update their beliefs about investment strategies in the direction of the advice they receive, independent of their priors. At the same time, there is significant heterogeneity based on the subjects' financial literacy. Financially more literate subjects positively update in response to seeing passive advice, but most do not update (and rate the advice negatively) when exposed to active advice. In contrast, financially less literate subjects are strongly influenced by both types of advice. Finally, subjects rate the advice lower if the advisor is perceived to have misaligned incentives compared to when they are more aligned.

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1 Introduction

Households in the U.S. and other developed economies regularly face complex financial choices, from allocating their retirement savings to insuring against health shocks and beyond. To help consumers with these decisions, a large and almost equally complex market for financial advice has developed alongside. This financial advice can take many forms, from traditional in-person advice by individual advisors, technology-aided (robo) advice tools, to increasingly online financial education resources and videos.

While a large and growing literature has analyzed the factors that shape the supply of financial advice, there is very limited evidence on how the demand side receives and processes the advice.[1] In this paper we address this gap by conducting a randomized control trial (RCT) to investigate how investors process different types of advice, how individuals' perceptions of financial advice are influenced by their prior beliefs about investment strategies, their financial literacy and their self-assessed financial knowledge. We further evaluate the extent to which advice can successfully change people's posterior beliefs and whether people act upon financial advice when making portfolio choices.

We focus the advice on two of the most prominent investment strategies that are available to retail investors: active versus passive investment strategies.[2] These strategies represent one of the oldest debate in the asset management literature. Most of the academic finance literature suggests that passive strategies dominate active strategies for retail investors who have limited time and knowledge to monitor their portfolios. However, active investment strategies still command a significant market share. In 2022, passive strategies held 46% of all fund assets, up from 13% in 2005 (ICI 2022).[3] Our context allows us to analyze how investors assess the quality of advice and update their beliefs when receiving "textbook" advice, i.e., passive investment advice, compared to active management advice.

We document four main results. First, the perception of advice is influenced by individuals' prior

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1. Gomes, Haliassos, and Ramadorai 2021 carefully reviews the distortions and benefits of financial advice focusing on the supply side. Reuter and Schoar 2024 highlights the interaction between supply-side and demand-side constraints.

2. Active strategies aim to outperform a benchmark index through stock selection and market timing, while passive strategies replicate the performance of the index, see for instance, Gruber 1996 and French 2008.

3. Wealthier and more sophisticated investors might have access to other strategies, but we want to capture the type of broad advice that is available to a typical middle class investor.

beliefs. While the passive advice on average is rated higher than the active advice, any advice that contradicts a person's prior beliefs is rated lower than when it aligns with the recipient's existing views. Second, despite this perception, advice that contradicts a person's prior beliefs prompts significantly more updating than advice that is aligned with their priors. Results from an incentivized portfolio choice question also reveal that the advice significantly impacts participants' choices. However, there is important heterogeneity in how people update in response to advice depending on their financial literacy. More financially literate participants positively revise their beliefs after watching the passive video but show no change following the active advice. In contrast, those with lower financial literacy are strongly influenced by either type of advice. Third, our results suggest that individuals who are more confident in their financial knowledge place less weight on financial advice. Finally, individuals seem to be concerned with the incentives of the advisors, since they update more in the direction of the advice if the advisor has lower perceived financial conflicts, i.e. they are paid via a flat fee rather than commission-based compensation.

Our experiment is set up to emulate a typical (online) financial advice session, which usually presents retail investors with a set of relevant financial information and a narrative to make sense of this information. We thus define financial advice as the combination of this narrative with supporting data. For example, advisors who want to promote passive strategies over active ones might provide a narrative of efficient markets and explain the distribution of fund returns and the importance of minimizing fees. Alternatively, financial advisors who want to convince investors that active strategies are better might provide a narrative that highlights the benefit of market timing and point out that there are more active funds in the upper tail of the distribution of fund returns.

Ideally, consumers should evaluate the advice by weighing it against all available information to determine which narrative is most convincing, as suggested by, for example, Eliaz and Spiegler 2020 and Schwartzstein and Sunderam 2021. In practice, however, most retail investors face constraints such as limited financial knowledge, time, and attention. Moreover, their priors may only consist of a vague understanding of good investment strategies. For such consumers, it is impractical to teach them detailed finance or statistics in a single advisory setting, which is also beyond the scope of our study. Instead, we choose an advice format that follows closely the existing practices in the financial advice industry, offering concise narratives with supporting data, and observe how these

narratives are evaluated and adopted by consumers.[4]

We conduct a randomized controlled trial (RCT) that is akin to a lab-in-the-field study. To present both active and passive investment advice, we worked with real financial advisors to develop a set of scripts. These scripts use representative industry language to recommend either a strategy of diversification and low-fee passive index investing (which we call *Pro-Passive*), or a strategy of active management focused on identifying "hot" industries (which we call *Pro-Active*). We recorded these scripts as short videos with trained actors. Both types of videos are fully scripted. The setup, content and language of the videos mirrors those of online investor education videos.

We recruited participants by advertising through a large number of employers in the Boston and Cambridge area. Participants were invited to a lab setting, where they first answered a survey about their demographics, as well as their pre-existing beliefs regarding financial markets and the best investment strategies. From these answers, we classify subjects into *"Pro-Active"* and *"Pro-Passive"* types: investors who came into the study believing a good investment strategy is to identify promising industries or firms and time the market, versus those who believed one should hold a diversified low-fee portfolio. We also assessed the subjects' financial literacy levels before the video, but participants were randomized independent of their literacy.

The focus of our experiment is a 2-by-2 assignment, where investors are randomly assigned to view a video that either aligns with or contradicts their existing investment beliefs. Independent of being classified as *Pro-Active* or *Pro-Passive*, both sets of subjects are randomly assigned to either an *Active Video* or a *Passive Video*, each promoting the corresponding strategy.[5] Following the videos, participants rate the quality of the advice as well as the advisor. We also reassess participants' beliefs on the two investment strategies. After the post-video survey, each participant watches a comprehensive debriefing video, which provides academic insights into good investment strategies, designed to mitigate any potentially misleading effects of the original video treatments.

We begin by analyzing the participants' post-video ratings of the advice presented. The results show that passive advice is rated higher than the active advice, and advice contradicting participants'

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4. It is important to note that we did not provide participants with false information but provided data that selectively highlight the benefits of either active or passive strategies, which is what is typical in the industry. At the end we debriefed all participants in a detail financial literacy session to ensure that people did not leave the experiment with wrong information.

5. This randomization leaves us with four groups (1) Pro-Active, saw Active Video, (2) Pro-Active, saw Passive Video (3) Pro-Passive, saw Active Video, and (4) Pro-Passive, saw Passive Video.

prior beliefs receives lower ratings compared to advice aligning with their existing views. On a 1-to-9 scale, both effects are about 0.6 points, roughly one-third of the standard deviation of advice ratings. To ensure that the difference in raw ratings is not driven by varying literacy levels among people with different prior beliefs, we estimate the effects of all treatment groups in regressions that control for differential responses to the videos by literacy levels. The regressions confirm that lower ratings were given in the two groups where the videos contradicted participants' prior beliefs, however, among all groups, people with a pro-passive prior and watch the active advice gave the lowest ratings.

When separating the sample into high- and low-literacy sub-groups, we find that those with high financial literacy showed distinct rankings across the treatment groups, but people with low literacy rate any advice similarly. This suggests that the financially less literate may be unable to effectively evaluate the quality of financial advice. We also find that participants who are more confident about their own financial knowledge tend to give lower ratings if the advice conflicts with their prior beliefs.

Interestingly, subjects in all groups and literacy levels rank the "likability" of the advisor at a similar level, and these ratings do not depend on whether the advice confirms priors or not. This implies that participants in the experiment are able to focus on the content of the advice and differentiating between the quality of the advice (where we see strong differences) and the personality of the advisor in the video. This focus on content highlights a potentially distinct evaluation process for video-based advice compared to in-person interactions.

Moving on to beliefs, we find a sizable treatment effect of the videos on the subjects' ex post beliefs. On average, people who watch the video with the active advice become more pro-active in their posterior beliefs, and vice versa for people who watch the passive advice. We estimate the effects of the treatments on belief shifts in regressions that control for how individuals with varying literacy levels respond to the two types of videos. The results show asymmetric impacts of the two videos: In terms of the belief measure which we construct – a score that ranges from -4 (highly pro-active) to +4 (highly pro-passive) – beliefs are moved by 3.4 points toward more pro-passive beliefs for ex ante pro-active participants who watched the passive video, and 1.6 points toward more pro-active for pro-passive individuals who watched the active video. These effects are

measured relative to the reference group which represents pro-active individuals watching the active video. In addition, beliefs of the pro-passive participants watching the passive video were moved 0.9 point more pro-passive, suggesting that the two groups where advice confirms prior beliefs are further polarized.

We find notable variation in how participants with different levels of financial literacy respond to financial advice. The asymmetric effect between the passive and active videos mentioned above is entirely driven by the high literacy group. Financially literate individuals find the passive advice to be higher quality and demonstrate a strong ability to differentiate their responses to different types of advice. They appear resistant to being persuaded by the active narrative. In contrast, less financially literate subjects struggle to make this distinction and respond with similar magnitudes to both types of advice. This susceptibility potentially makes them vulnerable to lower quality financial advice.[6]

At the end of the session participants were prompted to make a portfolio choice from six portfolios as if they were to invest with their own money. We incentivized the choices: Subjects could win a $3,000 award, set up as a lottery prize for participating in this experiment, which would be received in the form of the portfolio they picked in this question. The six funds are three pairs, where each pair consists of an index fund and an actively managed fund that have approximately equal risk and net-of-fee return. We find that both pre-existing beliefs and the advice received matter for people's portfolio choices. Further, the advice that recommends active management has a strong effect on the portfolio choices of the low-literacy subjects.

Lastly, we investigate how individuals process information about advisors' incentives, particularly whether they pay attention to potential conflicts of interest and understand that incentive misalignment may affect the quality of the advice. To this end, we embed sub-treatments within the introductory sections of the videos where the advisor explains their compensation structure – either flat fees, which do not depend on sales generated, or commissions, which do. We randomize this compensation sub-treatment in the videos, with some videos omitting the compensation information altogether. We then examine the effects of these compensation sub-treatments while controlling for the main

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6. Some prior studies have shown that low financial literacy also leads to low take-up of financial advice (Bhattacharya et al. 2012; Gaudecker 2015; Chang and Szydlowski 2020)

treatment effects.

We find that, all else being equal, participants rate advice as higher quality when the advisor is compensated by a flat fee rather than a commission, with a rating difference of about 0.55 on a 9-point scale. Moreover, individuals update their beliefs by 0.77 point more (on the -4 to +4 scale) toward the recommendation in the advice for flat-fee advisors than for commission-based advisors. These effects are present across different levels of financial literacy but are stronger for those with low financial literacy, possibly due to their awareness of their limited ability to evaluate the quality of the advice.

Related Literature   A large and growing literature has examined the effects of financial advice on the portfolios of advisees. The effects include under-performance relative to self-directed portfolios (e.g., Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano 2009; Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli 2012; Kramer 2012; Del Guercio and Reuter 2014; Egan, Ge, and Tang 2022), favoring active funds (e.g., Linnainmaa, Melzer, and Previtero 2021), excessive turnovers and risk-taking (e.g., Bluethgen et al. 2008; Del Guercio and Reuter 2014), and high commissions (e.g., Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto 2013; Egan 2019; Chalmers and Reuter 2020).[7]

These portfolio outcomes are frequently attributed to supply-side frictions, most notably conflicts of interest between advisors and their clients, e.g., Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec 2012; Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto 2013; Gurun, Stoffman, and Yonker 2021. Several studies have found widespread violations of fiduciary duty among financial advisors (Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham 2018; Charoenwong, Kwan, and Umar 2019) and persistent misconduct (Qureshi and Sokobin 2015; Egan, Matvos, and Seru 2019). Other supply-side limitations include advisors' own beliefs and/or incompetence (Foerster et al. 2017; Linnainmaa et al. 2020; Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar 2017). But the literature has also highlighted that financial advisors can provide valuable services even in the presence of conflicts of interests between advisers and their clients, as shown in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015) and Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012).[8] For a review of the potential value added by financial advice, see Reuter and Schoar (2024).

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7. Beyond individual portfolios, research also suggests that financial advice can influence aggregate asset allocations and returns (e.g., Da et al. 2018; Parker, Schoar, and Sun 2023; Aldunate et al. 2023; Andonov, Eiling, and Xu 2024).

8. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) discuss this general type of information problems in markets for experts' services.

Several papers use audit studies and online experiments to analyze the quality of financial advice offered by advisors. In an audit study, Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar (2012) show that U.S. financial advisors often provide advice biased toward active investment and only correct advisees' misconceptions about financial markets if it benefits the advisors financially. Similarly, Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar (2017) present evidence of low-quality advice in the Indian life insurance market. Bhattacharya et al. (2024) find that female subjects in Hong Kong receive worse financial advice. Bucher-Koenen et al. (2023) confirms this statistical discrimination using administrative data from a German bank.

Studies on the demand side of financial advice have mainly focused on factors influencing the uptake of advice. The literature shows that confidence in financial advisers can boost advice-taking (Bhattacharya et al. 2012; Agnew et al. 2018; Gurun, Stoffman, and Yonker 2021; Burke and Hung 2021; see also theory by Georgarakos and Inderst 2014 and Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 2015). However, reliance on simple default options can discourage more individualized advice (Reuter and Richardson 2022). Regarding financial literacy, Chang and Szydlowski (2020) demonstrate that unsophisticated investors should seek more financial advice in a rational world, but Bhattacharya et al. (2012) and Gaudecker (2015) find that in fact high financial literacy is associated with increased use of financial advice. Further, Kim, Maurer, and Mitchell (2019) conducted an experiment in the 2016 Health and Retirement Study to study the relationship between cognitive ability, financial literacy and the demand for advice. Their findings indicate that financial literacy enhances the quality, but not the quantity, of the advice sought.

Methodologically two papers are most closely related to our study. First, our paper is complementary to Agnew et al. (2018), who conduct an RCT to test how subjects react to financial advisors. This earlier paper investigates how investors develop trust with different financial advisors, varying the personal characteristics and credentials of advisors. In contrast, our analysis abstracts from the personal characteristics of the advisors by controlling for advisor fixed effects in all specifications, which allows us to focus on the effects of different narratives of advice. A second related paper is Barron and Fries (2023) which conducts an online experiment to focus on the supply side of advice. The paper tests how subjects, acting as advisors, endogenously generate advice when presented with financial returns and a set of randomized incentives. The advice generated by the subjects is in

the form of statistical parameters not financial narratives that are inspired by what is used in the industry (as in our paper). The paper finds that advisees are influenced by the parameters presented by advisors, even if the advisor has no informational advantage.

2 Experimental Design and Data Collection

2.1 Subject Recruitment and Setup

We conducted an experiment in which we invited people from the greater Boston area to watch financial advice videos. The experiment was run at the MIT and Harvard experimental labs to allow participants more convenient access to different sites. The general setup consists of three parts. First, we elicit people's priors about investment via a pre-video survey. Independent of their prior beliefs, we then randomly assign people to watch two types of videos of financial advice. Lastly, we use a post-video survey to measure people's perceptions of financial advice and any changes in their beliefs about investment strategies.

To attract residents, particularly employees in the greater Boston area, we contacted a number of local employers to advertise our recruiting materials via their internal email lists and blackboards in public areas such as workplace cafeterias. In addition, we circulated recruiting materials on Craigslist, the Harvard Decision Science Lab and the MIT Behavioral Research Lab websites, and school newsletters and emails. We advertised the chance of getting a $3,000 award in the form of fund portfolios from this experiment to provide a monetary incentive.

The stated objective of the experiment was to study how retail investors perceive different retirement saving strategies and to understand how they evaluate various types of financial advice. There was no implication regarding the quality of the advice, and receiving "free advice" was not promoted as a benefit of participating in the study.

Participants must physically come to our research laboratory. Once people show up at the lab, we confirm their IDs and eligibility. This check-in step differentiates our study from online survey experiments. We did not collect names or any personally identifiable information from the participants. Each of them was assigned a randomly generated number for identification purposes throughout the experiment process.

2.2 Financial Advice Videos

The advice videos are central to our experiment design. We aimed for these videos to emulate pre-recorded (instead of live or customized) professional financial advice, which is common in online investor advice or educational programs, including resources provided by large asset management companies, robo-advisors or even social media. We then screened and hired four actors, two females and two males, to perform in our videos as financial advisors. We provided the actors with a full script to memorize and trained them to act as advisors. They strictly followed the scripts with the help of a teleprompter and with the natural emotions that advisors would normally present.

In each video, a professionally-dressed advisor talks about investment strategies and financial advice in front of a plain white background. We keep the screen cuts, camera angles, and lighting the same across the videos. Each video lasts for approximately 4 to 6 minutes. In order to keep the viewers' attention and pass on messages more effectively in a few minutes, we divided the whole video into several sections. Between each section, there was a 3-second black transition screen with the topic of the next section showing on the screen in white.

We wrote scripts that recommend either a passive or an active investment strategy to the audience, providing the most common supporting arguments for each recommendation. To ensure these scripts represent professional advice, we consulted with several local financial advisors to incorporate their typical language. In the *Passive Video*, the advisor argues that no active fund manager can always beat the market and recommends low-cost well-diversified index funds. The supporting arguments highlight that diversification can help reduce risk exposure to any one stock or sector, and the lower cost of index funds makes a large difference at long time horizon. In the *Active Video*, the advisor emphasizes the importance of outperforming the market benchmark and recommends funds managed by competent portfolio managers with a good track record. The advisor further argues that by paying for the professional managers and market research, actively managed funds can assist investors in identifying stocks and sectors that are most promising for high returns, and timing the market to better seize opportunities.

In the first section of every video, the presenter gives a brief self-introduction, highlighting their qualifications. This introductory script is the same in all videos. The second section provides a general overview of what index funds and actively managed funds are and the average annual

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fees for each. The third section recommends either a passive or active investment strategy. The fourth section supports the recommended strategy with arguments and a histogram. The active investment video underscores the importance of stock selection and market timing, presenting the narrative that market research adds value, and that top-performing funds are often actively managed. In contrast, the passive investment video stresses the benefits of diversification and low fees. The passive narrative explains that no one can predict the market (an argument following the efficient market hypothesis) and that, on average, index funds outperform actively managed funds. While both videos explain in the second segment that actively managed funds generally incur higher fees than index funds, they diverge in the fourth segment: the video promoting passive investment cautions against high fees, whereas the one on active investment argues that higher fees are justified by better management quality.

In addition to the two types of investment strategies, we cross the advice treatment with a sub-treatment related to the incentive of the advice provider: Advisors in the videos either state that they are compensated via a "flat fee", "commission fee" or do not mention how they are compensated, "skip fee". We refer to these sub-treatment groups as "incentive treatments", designed to assess how participants' awareness of advisors' potential conflicts of interest influences their perception of financial advice.[9] This variation in incentives is inserted into the first section of the video. Following the self-introduction, the financial advisor in both the "flat fee" and "commission fee" videos describes how they are compensated via a flat fee or through commission, respectively. Then these two types of videos continue to the second section. The "skip fee" videos, however, exclude the part in which the advisor talks about their compensation. After the opening part, the "skip fee" videos jump to the second section of describing index funds and active funds. The treatment arms are tabulated in Table 1 and Appendix A provides the full scripts of the videos.

The main focus of our study is the 2-by-2 treatment groups combining the pro-active and pro-passive priors with the active and passive video treatments. We report most results for only these four groups, thus merging the incentive sub-treatments. Analysis of the incentive treatments is

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9. The flat fee sub-treatment emphasizes that the advisor's compensation is independent of sales, which promotes unbiased advice. The commission fee sub-treatment states that the advisor's compensation (commission) is based on the amount of sales they generate for the fund company and fees paid by customers into the mutual funds. This compensation structure can lead to conflict of interest, as advisors might prefer selling higher-fee funds to increase their earnings.

presented at the end.

2.3 Pre- and Post-Video Surveys, and Post-Experiment Debrief

Our pre-video survey starts with collecting a standard set of demographic information, including age, gender, marital status, job status, annual income, etc., from the participants. We also asked them to give a self-assessment of financial literacy on a 7-point scale and on a percentile scale. In order to measure how people think about investment strategies, we asked the subjects to rank seven potential components of investment strategies in the order of importance. This pre-video ranking question is designed to elicit people's prior beliefs on passive versus active investment strategies. The seven components we used in this question are: *Diversification*, *Picking Good Fund Managers*, *Picking Good Stocks*, *Timing the Market*, *Minimizing Risks*, *Minimizing Fees*, and *Selling Funds That Had Bad Performance Last Year*. We construct belief measures from the answers to these questions, which is discussed in the next section. After these belief questions, we ask people eight questions that are intended to test their financial literacy levels. These knowledge questions range from relatively easy ones, for example, about the meaning of owning stock, to harder ones that need some calculations or college-level financial knowledge.

After watching the financial advice videos, people filled out a post-video survey. First we asked them to rate the quality of the advice and the advisor, and report how much they agree with what they just saw. We then gave them the same investment strategy ranking question as that in the pre-video survey, which required ranking the seven components of investment strategies in the order of importance. This question serves to elicit people's post-video belief on passive versus active investments. Further, we asked the subjects whether they believe it is possible or impossible to beat the market in the long term.

Finally, the subjects were invited to choose one portfolio from six hypothetical portfolios if they were to invest with their own money. No fund names were given. Graphs displaying the historical annual returns of the six portfolios were shown on screen. The portfolios varied in risk and average returns, with three labeled as actively managed portfolios and the other three as passive. Each actively managed portfolio had the same net-of-fee return and risk as a corresponding passive portfolio.[10] People were also informed that if they were selected to receive the $3,000 award, they

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10. By matching the pairs of portfolios on net-of-fee returns, we ensure that participants' decisions to choose an active or passive

would receive it in the fund portfolio which they picked in this question.

After the subjects completed the post-video survey and before they left the lab, we showed them a "debrief" video that was designed to neutralize any potentially misleading information presented by the "advisor". The debrief videos were recorded by the same actors as those in the treatment videos, and had two scripts depending on whether the advice was passive or active. The debrief highlighted the conflicts of interest facing advisors who are employed by fund companies or compensated by commissions, how the agency conflict can lead them to recommend actively managed funds, and that academic research found only limited merit of active management.

3 Measurement and Random Assignment

3.1 Answers to Pre-Video Investment Strategy Ranking Question

We extract people's prior beliefs about active versus passive management from their answers to the pre-video ranking question. This question asked people to rank seven different components of investment strategy in the order of importance. These components were carefully selected to represent a mix of goals and features related to passive investment, active investing, and some that are neutral or irrelevant. The components were presented in a random order. The post-video ranking question is identical to the pre-video ranking question, and the post-video beliefs are assessed in the same way.

We show the summary statistics of answers to the pre-video ranking question on the seven investment strategies in Table 2. The ranking answers for each strategy range from the lowest importance 1 to the highest importance 7. The *Diversification* strategy has the highest average rank of 5.07, and the *Selling Funds That Had Bad Performance Last Year* strategy has the lowest average rank of 2.10. The reason could be that many people heard about praises of diversification, possibly from school or financial media, but could not see the value of selling losing positions.[11]

[Table 2 About Here]

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portfolio were not influenced solely by fee considerations.

11. For example, due to loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).

3.2 Construction of "*Pro-Passive*" Score

We use these rankings to construct an ex-ante belief score on the passive-active spectrum. Based on academic theory, we expect *Diversification*, *Minimizing Risk*, and *Minimizing Fees* to correlate with passive beliefs; *Picking Good Stocks*, *Picking Good Fund Managers*, and *Timing the Market* to associate with active management; and *Selling Poorly Performed Funds* to be uncorrelated with either. However, investors' beliefs may not align with this classification, thus, we first examine the revealed correlations among people's rankings.

Table 3 presents the pair-wise correlations between the component rankings, as well as their correlations both with the financial knowledge score (to be explained in the next sub-section), and with the self-ranked financial literacy. Our goal is to identify the belief components that are more inclined toward active or passive investment strategies, which we will refer to as "pro-active" and "pro-passive" beliefs in the rest of this paper.

The rank of *Diversification* has a significant negative relationship with *Picking Good Fund Managers*, *Picking Good Stocks*, *Timing the Market*, and *Selling Poorly Performed Funds*, all of which are representative of the philosophy of active management, suggesting *Diversification* be categorized as a pro-passive belief component. For the same reason, *Minimizing Fees* is a clear indicator for the pro-passive belief, though *Diversification* and *Minimizing Fees* appear to be uncorrelated with each other.

Picking Good Stocks and *Timing the Market* are strongly negatively correlated with both *Diversification* and *Minimizing Fees*, and we count for them as pro-active beliefs. *Picking Good Fund Managers* is potentially a component of pro-active beliefs, but it appears negatively correlated with both passive and active beliefs, and in particular has a strong negative correlation with *Timing the Market*. In the same vein, *Minimizing Risk* and *Selling Poorly Performed Funds* are also irrelevant to beliefs on whether passive or active management is important, because they are ambiguously related to more clearly narrated strategies like *Timing the Market* and *Minimizing Fees*.

Together, Table 3 suggests that the following four components are the most central to beliefs on passive versus active investments, and we use them to construct our main belief score: *Diversification* and *Minimizing Fees* for pro-passive, and *Picking Good Stocks* and *Timing the Market* for pro-active.

[Table 3 About Here]

We define a 4-point classification scheme to measure investment beliefs on the active-passive spectrum. Starting with an initial value of zero, we add 1 if *Diversification* is ranked among the top three most important components, and subtract 1 if it is among the bottom three. We repeat this step for the ranking of *Minimizing Fees*. Conversely, we add 1 if *Picking Good Stocks* is among the bottom three components, and subtract 1 if it is among the top three. This is repeated for the ranking of *Timing the Market*. We call the resulting metric the "*Pro-Passive Score*" of a participant. The largest possible Pro-Passive Score is 4, which indicates that the participant has strong preference for passive management in their pre-video belief. The smallest possible value -4 indicates the opposite extreme that the participant has a strong prior preference for active management.

Figure 1 Panel A plots the distribution of the 4-point Pro-Passive Score. Based on the distribution, we categorize the participants with positive scores as the *Pro-Passive* type and those with non-positive points as the *Pro-Active* type. In robustness checks, we single out the participants with zero point as the *Unclear* belief group, while leaving the positive-scored participants in the Pro-Passive group and negative participants in the Pro-Active group, and the results remain unchanged. We explore alternative approaches to measure beliefs and obtain similar results. These alternative measures are discussed in Appendix B.

[Figure 1 About Here]

3.3 Financial Knowledge Score

In the pre-video survey, we use eight questions that are designed to test the participant's knowledge on financial investments. Details of each question are shown in Table 4 Panel A. These eight questions are shown to people in a random order in our pre-video survey. If we sort the eight questions by the percentage of right answers in our sample, one question about the meaning of owning stock turns out to be the easiest one, five questions cluster at the medium level, and two questions are the hardest (Table 4 Panel B).

These eight questions were mainly derived from the questions widely used in the existing literature of measuring financial literacy. For example, the "risk diversification" question (Q5) was taken from one of the three questions, which are later known as the "Big Three", piloted in the 2004

Health and Retirement Study (HRS) by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007). The "compound interest" question (Q2) was adapted from interest compounding question from the "Big Three". The "time value of money" question (Q3) is the same as one of the five *Basic Literacy Questions* in van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2007). Three other questions (Q4, Q6, Q8) are from the *Advanced Literacy Questions* in van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011). The remaining two questions are relatively new. The "percentage changes" question (Q1) aims to test the numeracy of how percentage changes are calculated, and the "mutual fund fees" question (Q7) is designed to test people's basic knowledge of how annual management fees are charged.

[Table 4 About Here]

In order to check whether our knowledge questions reasonably measure the financial literacy level (i.e., whether the three-level classification of knowledge questions is reasonable), we test whether participants act consistently given the three-level grouping by difficulties. In Panel C of Table 4, we show the results of consistency checks. First, for people who answered the two hard-level questions (Q4 and Q6) right, they indeed perform better on average (i.e., higher right %) in lower-level questions than the whole sample. For example, the average correct rate among the sub-sample who answered the hard questions right is 87.27% for the easiest question about the meaning of owning stock, while the whole sample average is 79.27%. Second, for people who answered at least three out of the five medium-level questions (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q5, and Q7) right, on average they have higher correctness in answering the easy question (Q8) than the whole sample (i.e., 88.58% versus 79.27%). Third, for people who answered the easy question right but got at least three out of the five medium-level questions wrong, they perform much worse (i.e., lower right %) in hard questions than the whole sample average right % .[12]

Summary statistics of the knowledge score can be found in Table 2. The minimum of knowledge score is 0, which means the participant gets no knowledge question right; the maximum is 8, which means the participant gives right answers to all of the questions. Correlation between the knowledge score and the self-ranked financial literacy can be found in Table 3. Figure 1 Panel C plots the distribution of the knowledge score among the Pro-Passive and Pro-Active subjects. Pro-Passive

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12. We also compare the rates at which subjects answer correctly in our sample with those in the literature. The details are presented in Appendix C.

people on average have higher financial knowledge scores, however, the two distributions have substantial overlap and imply that the groups based on prior beliefs are not purely an approximation for financial literacy. Table IA.1 reports the correlation between prior beliefs and participants' characteristics. In addition to the *Knowledge Score*, pro-passive beliefs are also associated with having a retirement account and a college degree, both of which are linked to higher financial literacy.

3.4 Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge

The ability to make personal financial decisions relies not only on actual financial knowledge but also on an individual's self-perception and confidence in their own knowledge. To gauge this confidence we included two questions in the pre-video survey. The first question asked participants to rate their overall knowledge of investing on a scale from 1 (not knowledgeable) to 7 (very knowledgeable). The second question requested participants to estimate their percentile rank among U.S. individual investors. Summary statistics for both measures are presented in Table 2. These two variables exhibit a high correlation of 0.88, but a significant number of participants did not answer the percentile rank question (which was arguably harder). Therefore, we choose the 7-point self-assessment as the primary measure of confidence.

We expect that self-assessment of financial knowledge should have a positive correlation with our more objective measure of *Knowledge Score*. This is confirmed by the strong correlation shown in Table 3. Additionally, we plot the distribution of self-assessed financial knowledge for each level of actual knowledge score in Figure 2. In addition to re-confirming the correlation, this figure also suggests there is significant variation in self-assessment within each level of actual knowledge. Nonetheless, extreme over- or under-confidence is relatively uncommon among the experiment participants.

[Figure 2 About Here]

Confidence can potentially affect the outcomes of our experiment in two ways. First, confidence influences the expected precision of both the prior belief and the advice, thereby affecting the weights individuals assign to each when forming their posterior beliefs. More confident individuals

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may place relatively more weight on their prior beliefs and less on the advice provided. Second, confidence may interact with how people perceive the quality of the two types of advice. Specifically, more confident individuals might find active management more attractive because they feel capable of selecting top fund managers. In contrast, less confident individuals might prefer passive management to avoid the additional decisions involved in choosing managers.

In our empirical analysis we focus on the variation in confidence that is orthogonal to actual financial knowledge to isolate its own effects. To do so, we perform an OLS regression of self-assessed financial knowledge on the actual knowledge score and use the residuals from this regression. These residuals represent the component of confidence conditional on actual knowledge and have a mean of zero. For ease of interpretation, we further normalize this confidence measure to have a standard deviation of one.

3.5 Verification of Random Assignment

Independent of their answers to the pre-video ranking question that captures the prior beliefs on passive versus active management, we randomly assigned participants into treatment arms that show the subjects a video where an advisor recommends either a passive or an active investment strategy. The pre- and post-video surveys are the same for all of them. A total of 521 valid responses were obtained from our experiment,[13] in which 265 were assigned to be in the active investment advice group ("*Active Video*"), and 256 in the passive investment advice group ("*Passive Video*"). [14] The random assignment of people into the two types of investment advice treatment videos, combined with our classifications of Pro-Passive and Pro-Active prior beliefs, leads to a 2-by-2 division of our whole sample. Table 1 Panel B shows the sizes of the treatment cells.

To assess the quality of random assignment, we examine the observed differences between individuals assigned to watch the two types of videos. We test the differences in means which are presented in columns 1-2 of Table 5. Some variables, such as gender and age, are directly from pre-video survey responses, while others, like knowledge score and prior belief, are constructed from answers to pre-video questions. The number of observations for some variables is less than 265 for

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13. In order to screen out those participants who are not paying attention when answering the questions, we set out screener questions in several positions in the survey and dropped the invalid responses.

14. The video recorded by the two male advisors are watched by 101 and 161 participants respectively; the video recorded by the two female advisors are watched by 97 and 162 participants respectively.

the active investment advice group or less than 256 for the passive investment advice group due to some individuals choosing "I do not know" or "I do not want to answer" for certain survey questions. Column 3 shows the p-value of the t-test for each variable. None of the p-values is statistically significant, indicating that all co-variates are balanced between the two groups. This suggests effective randomization of the subjects at least according to their observable characteristics.[15]

[Table 5 About Here]

4 Perception of Advice

4.1 Differences in Advice Ratings Across Treatment Groups and Financial Literacy

We begin by examining whether the different treatments affect how the subjects evaluate the quality of the advice. The main outcome variable comes from the post-video survey asking: "In general, do you agree with what the advisor recommended?" People were required to choose from a Likert scale for these question, which ranges from 1 (strongly disagree/not very believable) to 9 (strongly agree/very believable). The mean rating is 6.44 and the standard deviation is 1.71 (see Table 2).[16]

Our baseline regression analysis follows an OLS specification:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \, Prior \, Belief \, \& \, Video \, Treatment \, Dummies_i + Advisor \, FE_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

The dependent variable Y_i represents participants' evaluations of the advice in this section. The main independent variables of interest are dummy variables representing the 2-by-2 treatment groups, categorized based on participants' prior beliefs and the type of advice video they watched. We also estimate variations of this equation where the dummy variables represent specific subsets of the four treatment groups, such as those grouped by the type of advice or by whether the advice contradicts pre-existing beliefs. Importantly we include advisor fixed effects in all regressions,

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15. We repeat the balance test on the two treatment groups conditional on people's prior beliefs and present the results in Tables IA.2 and IA.3 in Appendix D. Although a few variables are not perfectly balanced within the sub-samples, our results remain consistent regardless of whether these imbalanced variables are included as controls.

16. Similarly, we collected the subjects' opinions on whether the advice was convincing, whether the advisor was likable, and whether they would return to the advisor in the video with their own money. Analyses of these other measures are discussed later.

which allows us to single out the effect of the advice content from the characteristics of the advisor. α is a constant and ε_i is an error term.[17]

Table 6 column 1 shows that, on average, participants perceive the passive advice as higher quality (0.64 point higher on a 9-point scale). Thus, although the passive narrative may lack an appeal of active decision-making and out-performance, this "textbook" recommendation is well-received by the experiment participants. Column 2 indicates that advice contradicting prior beliefs is rated lower, indicating that people tend to evaluate financial advice against their existing beliefs. These magnitudes are about one third of the standard deviation of the dependent variable.

Columns 3-4 examine the effects of all four treatment groups. The regressions replace the treatment dummies with three of the groups and omit Pro-Active subjects watching the Active Video as the baseline group. Given the correlation between pro-passive beliefs and financial literacy, we control for the direct effects of financial literacy on the responses to both videos by including the interaction between the *High Literacy* dummy variable with the two types of videos in equation 2 below. *High Literacy* is an indicator for whether the *Knowledge Score* is six or above.[18] This ensures that the estimated effects of the 2-by-2 treatment groups are not simply driven by difference in financial literacy.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \ Prior \ Belief \ \& \ Video \ Treatment \ Dummies_i + \eta \ High \ Literacy_i \times Video \ Treatment \ Dummies_i$$
$$+ \delta \ Controls_i + Advisor \ FE_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$(2)$$

Estimation of this equation is presented in columns 3. Consistent with column 2 we observe that people agree less with advice that is opposite to their prior beliefs. Both pro-active individuals watching the passive video and those pro-passive watching the active video exhibit negative coefficients relative to the omitted group (pro-active individuals watching the active video). In contrast, pro-passive individuals watching passive video tend to give slightly higher ratings. There is also some asymmetry in the disagreement, with the pro-passive group showing particularly strong

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17. We drop one of the advisor dummy in the advisor fixed effects, so the constant can be estimated.

18. This classification results in two sub-samples (*High Literacy* and *Low Literacy*) that are almost equal in size. Moreover, 94% of the *High Literacy* subjects answered at least one "hard" question (as indicated in Table 4) correctly, and 48% answered both hard questions correctly in the financial literacy test, so the *High Literacy* dummy seems to correlate with a high degree of financial knowledge.

disagreement with the active advice video. Further, as shown by the coefficients on the interaction terms, people with high financial literacy are significantly less likely to agree with the active video. Nevertheless, the pro-passive group's low rating of the active video persists even after accounting for the potentially higher literacy level of the pro-passive participants.

Although including control variables is not strictly necessary in a randomized controlled experiment, we include participant characteristics as control variables in column 4 as they may improve the precision of our estimates. These control variables include continuous measures of actual and self-perceived financial literacy (ranging from 0 to 8 and 1 to 7, respectively), as well as measures of experience with the financial sector, such as indicators of having a retirement account, investing in stocks, having a financial advisor, and a rating of the degree of trust in financial institutions (1 to 7). Moreover, we include demographic variables, such as gender, age, whether they have a college degree and employment status. We find that the main coefficients change little when controls are introduced, confirming the effectiveness of our randomization, and some become more precisely estimated. The estimated constant is lower, as the covariates explain part of the outcome variable for the omitted group. The coefficients on the control variables (unreported) indicate a strong correlation between trusting financial institutions and agreeing with the advice.

[Table 6 About Here]

In columns 5 and 6, we split the sample by high and low financial literacy. Individuals with high literacy may be better positioned to assess the logic of the advice and its fit with the data which is either provided as part of the advice or informed by the individual's prior experiences. In contrast, those with low financial literacy may lack the ability to adequately evaluate the advice. The results indicate an important difference: The high-literacy group shows clear and distinct reactions across treatment groups. In contrast, the low-literacy group does not exhibit significant variation in responses. This finding suggests that less sophisticated investors may have difficulty evaluating financial advice, generally agreeing with any advice presented to them.

We present the same analyses in Table IA.4 using the rating on *Advice Convincing* as the dependent variable. This question, also part of the post-video survey, asked participants to rate how convincing they found the advice on a scale from 1 to 9. The results are qualitatively and

quantitatively similar to those in Table 6, suggesting robustness under an alternative framing of the survey question.

4.2   Role of Confidence

In Table 7 we explore how confidence influences people's evaluation of financial advice. This analysis is particularly relevant when the narrative in the video contradicts one's prior belief, as confidence can then affect the relative weight given to prior beliefs versus the advice. In columns 1-3, we interact the indicator for advice contradicting priors with our measure of confidence, based on self-assessed financial knowledge, and examine the full, high-literacy, and low-literacy samples, respectively. The dependent variable is the rating on agreeing with the financial advice. The *Confidence* measure, as explained in Section 3.4, is the residual of the self-assessment after accounting for true financial literacy, thus, it is uncorrelated with true financial literacy. The measure has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The results indicate that when faced with advice that contradicts their prior beliefs, individuals with higher confidence are less likely to agree with the advice. This effect is especially pronounced among those with higher financial literacy.

In columns 4-6, we examine how confidence interacts with the treatment effects across the 2-by-2 groups. Within the high-literacy sub-sample, the coefficients on the interaction terms between the treatment groups and *Confidence* relatively large coefficients, reinforcing that financially literate and confident individuals tend to rate advice that contradicts their prior beliefs more negatively. However, these effects are not statistically significant. Confidence has little influence among low-literacy participants, indicating that these individuals may struggle to form clear evaluations of the advice they receive. Furthermore, our data does not show that less financially literate but over-confident individuals (those who self-rank their knowledge higher than it actually is) are particularly resistant to advice that challenges their prior beliefs.

4.3   Ratings of "Advisors"

While we focus on how people respond to the financial advice content, we also examine whether they form assessments of the characteristics of the advisor featured in the video. Table 8 shows the effects of the treatment groups on whether the subject finds the advisor to be likable (columns 1-3), and whether they would return to the advisor with their own money (columns 4-6). Both dependent

variables are again on a 9-point Likert scale.

The estimated treatment effects on the advisor's likability are small and insignificant. In addition, there is no difference between the high- and low-Literacy sub-samples. This suggests experiment participants did not mix the content of the advice with the personality traits of the advisor, This suggests that experiment participants did not confuse the content of the advice with the advisor's personality traits, indicating that they evaluated the advice content in an objective, arms-length context.[19]

When examining whether subjects would return to the advisor with their own money - a proxy for their "trust" in the advisor - we find that financially literate individuals are less likely to return to the advisor recommending the active strategy, consistent with their rating of the advice. Another finding is that although pro-passive subjects rated the passive advice significantly higher compared with the reference group, they are not more likely to return to the advisor who recommends the passive strategy. If generalized, this result implies that recommending passive funds is unlikely to be profitable for financial advisors.

5   Update of Investment Beliefs

5.1   Shifts in the Pro-Passive Score

We now examine the changes in people's beliefs about active versus passive management following the video treatment, starting with the *Pro-Passive Score*. From the post-video ranking question (identical to the pre-video question), we create a *Posterior Pro-Passive Score*, which again ranges from -4 (strongly pro-active) to +4 (strongly pro-passive), and compute the difference between the posterior and the prior. A positive change means a subject's belief becomes more pro-passive, and vice versa.

Figure 3 offers graphical evidence of how beliefs shifted. Panel A plots the levels of the posterior beliefs, showing a marked divergence among people who shared the same prior but watched different videos: beliefs shifted toward the strategy recommended in the corresponding video. The asymmetric effects of the two types of videos are also evident: after the passive video, a large

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19. We also see no effect when using the subject's rating of the advisor's competency as the dependent variable. Those results are omitted.

portion of the subjects adopted a strong pro-passive belief. In contrast, those who watched the active video exhibited more varied posterior beliefs.

Panel B plots the distributions of changes in pro-passive scores. In the top row, representing treatment groups where the advice video aligned with people's prior beliefs, changes cluster around zero, implying that beliefs respond little when financial advice confirms existing views. This result is consistent with the prediction of Schwartzstein and Sunderam (2021). The bottom row indicates that when the advice in the video contradicts prior beliefs, both videos generally shift beliefs toward the video's narrative, with the passive video having a stronger impact.

[Figure 3 About Here]

Figure 4 illustrates the changes in beliefs among participants with different financial literacy levels, with Panel A and Panel B displaying high- and low-literacy sub-samples, respectively. As discussed earlier, individuals with high financial literacy may update their beliefs based on their evaluation of the advice. In contrast, low-literacy participants, with weaker prior beliefs or limited external knowledge, may be more easily swayed by the advice. Alternatively, they might disregard it entirely due to a lack of understanding, or if they are overconfident in their own abilities.

In Panel A, the bottom two charts reveal that high-literacy individuals responded differently to the two types of videos. After watching the passive video, high-literacy participants originally inclined toward active management shifted their beliefs by +2.8 toward a pro-passive stance (bottom left). Conversely, those with pro-passive beliefs who watched the active advice video shifted only 0.85 toward pro-active (bottom right). 30% of the group had zero change in their beliefs.

Panel B, particularly the bottom row, reveals that the low-literacy subjects are strongly swayed by both types of advice. The mean shifts in beliefs after the passive and active advice are +3.3 and -2.3, respectively, indicating a high and almost unconditional receptivity to advice. This is consistent with the earlier result that this group rates advice similarly regardless of its content and their prior beliefs. This finding contrasts with prior literature, which suggests that low-literacy individuals may be less inclined to adopt financial advice. However, at the same time, their lack of financial sophistication puts them at a disadvantage when it comes to discerning the quality of advice.

[Figure 4 About Here]

Table 9 presents the regression analysis. The dependent variable is the change in the four-point *Pro-Passive Score*. We first estimate the model specified in Equation (2) both without and with controls for subject characteristics. The group with pro-active priors who watched the active video is omitted.[20] Column 1 shows that relative to this reference group, those with pro-active priors who viewed the passive video show a significant 3.4-point shift toward pro-passive beliefs. The coefficient for the pro-passive group who watched the passive video group is much smaller, suggesting less updating when the advice confirms prior beliefs. However, it is significantly different from zero, implying that the pro-passive and pro-active groups' beliefs became more polarized after watching videos that support their existing views. For individuals with pro-passive priors who watched the active video, the coefficient shows a 1.6-point shift toward pro-active beliefs, which is less than the effect of passive advice on the pro-active group. Including control variables in column 2 results in minimal changes to the estimates.

[Table 9 About Here]

We break down the sample by the level of financial literacy in columns 3-6. The main differences between the two sub-samples based on financial literacy are the coefficients for the Pro-Passive, Active Video treatment group. Column 3 shows that the active video does not influence high-literacy individuals with pro-passive beliefs, but column 5 shows that it substantially changes the beliefs of low-literacy participants with the same initial view. The magnitudes of the coefficients 3.03 and 2.57 are not statistically different, leading us to fail to reject the null hypothesis that the low-literacy subjects respond equally to the two types of financial advice.

We allow the treatment effects to vary by confidence in columns 4 and 6. Interestingly, although financially literate individuals generally responded positively to the passive video, even if they held pro-active prior beliefs, the coefficient on the interaction term of *Pro-Active, Passive Video* with *Confidence* is significantly negative. This implies that confidence reduces the openness of these individuals to the passive advice. On the contrary, the coefficients on the opposite treatment – *Pro-Passive, Active Video* – and its interaction with *Confidence* suggest that confidence may actually increase the impact of the active video on pro-passive and high-literacy individuals. These results

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20. We obtain a small and insignificant effect on the treatment group of Pro-Active, watching the Active Video, if the regression includes all four treatment group dummies and suppress the constant term.

suggest that confidence may contribute to receptivity to the active management narrative, possibly because the individual may feel capable of selecting outperforming fund managers.

In Table 10 we present the same analysis using the level of the posterior *Pro-Passive Score* as the dependent variable. The main conclusions remain the same, and both prior beliefs and financial advice significantly impact the posterior beliefs. When financial advice aligns with pre-existing beliefs, it results in the most extreme ex-post beliefs. In contrast, those who change their views due to opposing advice tend to adopt more moderate beliefs. In addition, we present several robustness tests of the belief shifts in Table IA.5, with motivations discussed in Section 3.2 and measure construction detailed in Appendix B. All alternative measures show similar effects.

5.2   Shifts in Beliefs about Beating the Market

In the previous section we focused on our primary metric, the *Pro-Passive Score*, which evaluates beliefs regarding various components of investment strategies. Now we shift our focus to participants' beliefs about the capital market, specifically whether it is possible to consistently outperform it. This aspect of belief was not included in the ranking question used to construct the pro-passive score because it is not strictly an investment strategy. Nevertheless, it is crucial to the distinction between active and passive investment approaches. Investors who believe in a higher likelihood of beating the market should be more inclined to prefer active management. This alternative belief measure complements the pro-passive score by providing insight into whether participants truly adopt a narrative or if they adjust their rankings of strategy components based on perceived expectations of experimenters.

To measure the belief about beating the market, our post-video survey includes a question asking respondents to rate their agreement with the statement, "It is possible to always beat the market," on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The analysis of answers to this question is presented in Table 11. The results from the full sample indicate that participants with a pro-passive prior who watched the passive video were the least likely to believe in the possibility of beating the market, while the omitted group (pro-active individuals who watched the active video) expressed the strongest beliefs in outperforming the market. The other two groups' posterior beliefs are similar and lean towards skepticism about beating the market. However, this pattern does not hold for

participants with low financial literacy. Despite some holding pro-passive beliefs initially, after watching the active video they adopted the narrative that it is possible to beat the market, aligning their views with those who were pro-active from the start.[21] Confidence does not appear to play a significant role in this analysis.

6 Portfolio Choice

In the post-video questionnaire, participants were asked to select one from six portfolios as if they were to invest their own money. They were informed that the $3,000 prize money they might win would be invested in their chosen portfolio. Each portfolio's historical annual returns were displayed in a bar chart, with three portfolios labeled as actively managed and the other three as passive. The fund names were not provided. These portfolios displayed different risk-return profiles to appeal to various risk preferences. Each passive portfolio was chosen to match the average historical returns of a corresponding actively managed portfolio after fees.

Figure 5 presents participants' portfolio selections. The results reflect the influence of both prior beliefs and financial advice. Those with pro-active priors were more likely to choose an actively managed fund compared to those with pro-passive priors (70% vs. 49% among those who watched the active advice, and 94% vs. 81% among those who watched the passive advice). In addition, the passive video increased the likelihood of selecting a passive index fund (81% vs. 25% for those with pro-active priors and 94% vs. 49% for those with pro-passive priors). Interestingly, despite the combination of a pro-active prior belief and the active video fostering the strongest pro-active beliefs, a quarter of that group still chose a passive fund. This might point to a disconnect between beliefs and actions.

[Figure 5 About Here]

Figure 6 breaks down the fund choices by financial literacy levels. While the main patterns of Figure 5 remain, we note that when the advice and the prior belief conflicted (the middle two bars), individuals with high financial literacy were more likely to choose a passive fund than those with low literacy. This observation reinforces the earlier findings regarding their post-treatment beliefs.

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21. This finding echoes Gruber (1996) and French (2008) and suggests that the clientele of actively managed funds may be influenced by financial advisors or marketing materials to believe in stock-picking.

[Figure 6 About Here]

Table 12 estimates the effects of the treatment groups in a linear probability model.[22] The dependent variable equals one (zero) if the subject chose a passive index fund (actively managed fund). Subjects who replied "Do not want to answer" are dropped from this regression analysis. The treatment effects mirror the patterns in Table 10, suggesting that portfolio choices are generally consistent with post-treatment beliefs. In addition, columns 1-2 suggest that priors appear to have less influence than the advice on portfolio choices. Watching the passive video increases the likelihood of choosing an index fund by 58% for people with pro-active priors and by 47% (71%-24%) for those with pro-passive priors. In contrast, the effects of the priors are 24% and 71%-58%=13% for the active and passive video treatments.

We divide the sample by high- and low financial literacy. Comparing columns 3 and 5 shows that financially sophisticated subjects are strongly influenced by the passive advice: after the passive video, their portfolio selections become similar regardless of prior beliefs: in column 3, the difference between the first two groups *Pro-Active, Passive Video* and *Pro-Passive, Passive Video* is insignificant. However, column 5 reveals that for the financially unsophisticated people, the influence of priors is eliminated after the active video: the third group *Pro-Passive, Active Video* is statistically indistinguishable from the omitted group *Pro-Active, Active Video* while the first two groups are significantly different (p-value<0.01).

Columns 4 and 6 examine the effect of confidence and uncover a few nuanced findings. Among financially literate individuals, higher confidence makes them more susceptible to the narrative of active management. This is evidenced by the negative coefficients on the three interaction terms with *Confidence*, suggesting more confident individuals are less likely to choose an index fund. Conversely, among the low-literacy sub-sample, the coefficients on the interaction terms with Confidence are positive and statistically significant for the groups with pro-passive priors. This suggests that while low-literacy individuals are generally influenced by both types of advice, higher confidence in pro-passive beliefs increases the likelihood of adhering to those beliefs. Thus, confidence appears to manifest differently between high- and low-literacy groups: It is associated with confidence in actively managing investment portfolios in the former and strengths of prior

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22. The results remain similar with a Probit model.

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beliefs in the latter.

[Table 12 About Here]

7   Perceived Conflict of Interest

In this final section, we analyze the sub-treatment groups that provide different information about advisor compensation, as outlined in Table 1. We study whether the compensation types affect people's perceptions of advice quality and the impact of the advice on beliefs. Specifically we estimate effects of dummy variables for two sub-treatments – flat fee and commission – while the omitted category merges the groups that provide no compensation information and those that skip both the compensation information and the overview of the two types of funds. As no significant differences were found between those two groups, we combine them into a single baseline group to simplify comparisons.

Table 13 columns 1-3 examine the rating of agreement with the advice as the dependent variable. We regress this variable on the stated compensation types and the regressions account for the primary 2-by-2 treatments. Results are shown for the full sample as well as sub-samples segmented by financial literacy levels. Across the columns we consistently find positive coefficients for *Flat Fee* conditional on the advice content and people's prior beliefs. This suggests that advice from incentive-aligned advisors is perceived as higher quality compared to the baseline. On average, advice from flat-fee advisors is rated 0.55 point higher than advice from commission-based advisors.

When we break down the effects by financial literacy in columns 2 and 3, we find that although both groups value flat-fee compensated advisors, the difference between flat-fee and commission is larger and only statistically significant for the low literacy group. Column 2 reaffirms that individuals with high literacy assess advice based on its content and how well it aligns with their prior beliefs. In contrast, column 3 indicates that low literacy participants primarily evaluate advice based on the advisor's compensation. These imply that individuals lacking financial literacy can still recognize incentives. Moreover, because they may lack the expertise to assess advice content, low literacy individuals place greater weight on incentives to gauge advice quality.

In columns 4-6, we test whether people are more likely to update their beliefs based on financial advice when it is perceived to be free of conflicts of interest. In column 4 we regress the dependent

variable on an indicator (*Video Direction* = ±1) that represents the direction of the video: +1 for the passive advice video and -1 for the active advice video. The coefficient estimates the magnitude of belief shift in the direction of the video. We further interact this variable with different types of advisor compensation.

The results in column 4 suggest that, on average, participants update their beliefs by 1.37 points toward the recommended strategy in the video. Point estimates suggest that this effect increases to 1.7 points when the advisor in the video discloses flat fee compensation, implying minimal conflict of interest. In contrast, the magnitude shrinks to 0.94 when the advice is offered by a commission-based advisor. The difference between the effects of the flat-fee and commission sub-treatments is 0.77 points, which is statistically significant with a p-value less than 0.01. Columns 5 and 6 indicate similar results within the high-literacy and low-literacy sub-samples, with the effects being more pronounced among financially less literate individuals.

[Table 13 About Here]

8 Conclusion

Financial advice can significantly enhance the welfare of investors who struggle to make sound financial decisions on their own. While research has made considerable progress in understanding factors influencing the supply of financial advice, demand-side questions—such as how people are influenced by advice—remain relatively under-explored.

This paper investigates the demand side of financial advice through a randomized lab experiment, focusing on advice that recommends either an active or passive investment strategy. The experiment captures participants' prior beliefs and then randomly assigns them to watch pre-recorded financial advice videos that either confirm or challenge their prior beliefs. We analyze the treatment effects on perceptions of the financial advice, changes in beliefs, and incentivized portfolio choices.

One takeaway from our study is that experiment participants, especially those lacking financial literacy, are receptive to financial advice and willing to let it shape their investment beliefs. Although previous literature indicates that low financial literacy may prevent individuals from seeking financial advice, our findings suggest that this reluctance may stem from a lack of awareness about the need

for advice than from resistance to utilizing it. Once financial advice is presented, these individuals are open to incorporating it into their beliefs and actions.

Further, a large portion of our participants are amenable to textbook principles such as holding passive funds, diversification, and minimizing fees, even if these concepts may initially seem counter-intuitive. In contrast, many remain skeptical of popular notions associated with actively managed funds, such as market timing or outperforming benchmarks. However, we acknowledge that our experiment occurred in a context where passive investing is already widely known, and that our participants had higher-than-average financial literacy compared to the general population.

Our study highlights that high- and low-literacy individuals process financial advice differently. Financially sophisticated investors tend to assess the quality of advice first, updating their beliefs only if they perceive the advice as high quality. On the contrary, unsophisticated investors seem unable to evaluate advice quality. They readily adjust their beliefs according to any advice given, leaving them susceptible to potentially unsuitable advice. Therefore, a policy implication of our paper is the need to protect unsophisticated investors by improving the quality of financial advice that is accessible to them.

Our findings also suggest that transparency of the incentives behind the financial advice is important to many investors, particularly the ones with low financial literacy, whose emphasis on incentive alignment possibly arises from their awareness of their limited ability to evaluate the quality of the advice. Our study also explores the role of investor confidence, defined as the aspect of self-assessed financial knowledge not explained by actual financial literacy. We find some evidence that among individuals with higher financial literacy, increased confidence leads to greater receptivity to the narrative of active management. In contrast, within the low-literacy sub-sample, while it is possible that some may exhibit overconfidence and thus may be less receptive to sound advice, our study does not find evidence of this. However, instead of rejecting this possibility, this lack of evidence may be simply due to the limited occurrence of overconfidence within our sample.

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Figure 1: **Distribution of Prior Beliefs and Financial Literacy**

Panel (a) plots the distribution of the pre-video *Pro-Passive 4-Point Score* ranging from -4 to 4. This score is calculated based on participants' rankings of seven investment strategy components. Starting at zero, 1 point is added if *Diversification* is in the top three components and 1 point is subtracted if it is in the bottom three. The same process is applied to *Minimizing Fees*. Additionally, 1 point is added if *Picking Good Stocks* is in the bottom three and 1 point is subtracted if it is in the top three, with the same steps for *Timing the Market*. Panel (b) shows the distribution of the *Knowledge Score*, which counts the correct answers to eight financial literacy questions. Participants whose *Pro-Passive Score* is one or above are classified as pro-passive, indicated by the blue bars. Participants whose *Pro-Passive Score* is zero or below are classified as pro-active and indicated by the green bars.

(a) *Pro-Passive 4-Point Score*

(b) Knowledge Score

34

Figure 2: **Distribution of Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge**

This figure illustrates the distribution of participants' self-assessed financial knowledge levels across different actual financial literacy scores. The x-axis represents the *Knowledge Score*, ranging from 0 to 8, indicating the number of correctly answered questions in the 8-question financial literacy test. This score reflects the participants' actual financial literacy. The y-axis shows the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* levels, representing how participants perceive their own financial knowledge on a scale of 1 to 7.

Figure 3: **Posterior Beliefs and Changes in Beliefs about Investment Strategy**

Panel A plots the distributions of the post-video *Pro-Passive Scores* for the two-by-two treatment groups. Panel B plots the changes in the *Pro-Passive Scores* from before to after the video treatment. The posterior scores range from -4 (strongly pro-active) to +4 (strongly pro-passive). The changes range from -8 to +8.

(a) Posterior Pro-Passive Score

(b) Change in Pro-Passive Score

Figure 4: **Changes in Beliefs about Investment Strategy by Financial Literacy**

Panel A plots distributions of the changes in the *Pro-Passive Scores* from before to after the video treatment for the two-by-two treatment groups for the sub-sample of high-literacy subjects whose knowledge score is 6 or above out of 8. Panel B plots the changes for the sub-sample of low-literacy subjects whose knowledge score is below 6. The changes of beliefs range from -8 to +8.

(a) High Literacy Sub-Sample

(b) Low Literacy Sub-Sample

Figure 5: **Choice of Fund: Full Sample**

This figure shows by the four treatment groups the fractions of subjects choosing an index fund, an actively managed fund, or answering "Do not want to answer" in the post-video portfolio choice question.

Figure 6: **Choice of Fund: by Financial Literacy**

Panels (a) and (b) show in sub-samples of high- and low financial literacy by the four treatment groups the fractions of subjects choosing an index fund, an actively managed fund, or answering "Do not want to answer" in the portfolio choice question post-video. The high-literacy sub-sample contains subjects who correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions. The low-literacy sub-sample contains those who answered 5 or fewer questions correctly.

(a) High Literacy Sub-Sample

(b) Low Literacy Sub-Sample

Table 1: Structure and Size of Treatment Arms

Panel A outlines the structure of the main investment strategy treatment arms and the sub-treatments related to advisor compensation in our financial advice videos. A check mark indicates that the video includes a certain content, whereas a cross mark indicates its absence. Panel B reports the numbers of participants in each of the main 2-by-2 treatment cells and each sub-treatment cell.

Panel A: Video Structure		**Section 1**		**Section 2**	**Section 3**	**Section 4**
		Self-intro	Compen-sation	Basics of strategies	Recommend one strategy	Reasons for recommendation
Active Video	Flat Fee	✓	Flat	✓	Active	✓
	Commission	✓	Commission	✓	Active	✓
	Skip Fee	✓	×	✓*	Active	✓
Passive Video	Flat Fee	✓	Flat	✓	Passive	✓
	Commission	✓	Commission	✓	Passive	✓
	Skip Fee	✓	×	✓*	Passive	✓

Panel B: Size of Treatment Cells

	Total	Active Video	Index Video
Pro-Active Prior	**253**	**125**	**128**
Commission	59	30	29
Flat	69	35	34
Skip fee	125	60	65
Pro-Index Prior	**248**	**128**	**120**
Commission	64	32	32
Flat	59	31	28
Skip fee	125	65	60

* Some "skip fee" videos also omit section 2 (basics of strategies). Our analysis shows skipping section 2 has no effect, so we have merged these treatments with the rest of the "skip fee" group.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

This table reports the summary statistics of participants' answers to the pre- and post-video questionnaires. The pre-video ranking question on investment strategies is about ranking the seven randomly ordered potential components of an investment strategy in the order of importance. 1 indicates the least important, and 7 indicates the most important. *Knowledge Score* is the number of correct answers out of the 8 financial literacy questions. *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* is on a scale of 1 (not knowledgeable) to 7 (very knowledgeable). *Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge* is a subject's rank of their investment knowledge as a percentile among individual investors in the U.S. and is on a scale of 0 (bottom) to 1 (top). Post-video perception of advice includes rating questions about the quality of the advice and the advisor on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 9 (highest). *Choosing Index Fund* equals one if a participant chooses an index fund in the post-video portfolio choice question.

Summary Statistics	N	mean	s.d.	min	p25	p50	p75	max
Pre-video ranking question on investment strategies								
Diversification	501	5.07	1.84	1	4	5	7	7
Picking Good Stocks	501	4.81	1.70	1	4	5	6	7
Picking Good Fund Managers	501	4.35	1.89	1	3	4	6	7
Minimizing Risk	501	4.33	1.77	1	3	4	6	7
Minimizing Fees	501	4.05	1.84	1	2	4	6	7
Timing the Market	501	3.29	1.84	1	2	3	5	7
Selling Poorly Performed Funds	501	2.10	1.45	1	1	2	3	7
Pre-video knowledge score and confidence								
Knowledge Score	501	4.91	2.08	0	3	5	6	8
Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge	500	3.74	1.56	1	3	4	5	7
Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge	436	0.44	0.23	0	0.25	0.45	0.61	0.98
Post-video perception of advice								
Agree with Recommendation	500	6.44	1.71	1	5	7	7	9
Advice Convincing	501	6.45	1.78	1	5	7	7	9
Advisor Likable	501	6.59	1.64	1	6	7	8	9
Advisor Competent	498	6.92	1.45	1	6	7	8	9
Advisor Convincing	501	6.44	1.76	1	5	7	7	9
Will Return	499	5.47	1.94	1	4	5	7	9
Post-video portfolio choice								
Choosing Index Fund	484	0.64	0.48	0	0	1	1	1

Table 3: Pearson Correlations

This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between *Knowledge Score*, *Self-Assessed Financial Knolwedge* and the pre-video rankings of components of investment strategies. p-values are reported in parentheses.

	Knowledge Score	Self-Assessed Knowledge	Diversification	Picking Good Stocks	Picking Good Fund Managers	Minimizing Risk	Minimizing Fees	Timing the Market
Knowledge Score	1.000							
	-							
Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge	0.444	1.000						
	(0.000)	-						
Diversification	0.340	0.189	1.000					
	(0.000)	(0.000)	-					
Picking Good Stocks	-0.069	-0.025	-0.288	1.000				
	(0.122)	(0.605)	(0.000)	-				
Picking Good Fund Managers	0.079	-0.032	-0.105	-0.084	1.000			
	(0.077)	(0.503)	(0.018)	(0.060)	-			
Minimizing Risk	-0.087	-0.024	-0.200	-0.247	-0.232	1.000		
	(0.051)	(0.616)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	-		
Minimizing Fees	0.040	0.039	-0.064	-0.335	-0.265	0.081	1.000	
	(0.375)	(0.423)	(0.156)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.071)	-	
Timing the Market	-0.108	-0.081	-0.198	0.107	-0.199	-0.283	-0.370	1.000
	(0.016)	(0.091)	(0.000)	(0.017)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	-
Selling Poorly Performed Funds	-0.261	-0.087	-0.220	-0.106	-0.199	-0.117	-0.081	-0.072
	(0.000)	(0.069)	(0.000)	(0.017)	(0.000)	(0.009)	(0.072)	(0.108)

Table 4: Knowledge Questions Consistency

Panel A: Knowledge Questions

Q1: Imagine you invested $1,000 in a stock two years ago. The stock's price declined 40% the first year and rose 40% the next year. As a result, you have: Lost money / Made money / Just broken even / Do not know / Do not want to answer.

Q2: Let's say you have 200 dollars in a savings account. The account earns 10 percent interest per year. How much would you have in the account at the end of two years? $210 / $220 / $240 / $242 / $264 / Do not know / Do not want to answer.

Q3: Assume a friend inherits $10,000 today and his sibling inherits $10,000 3 years from now. Who is richer because of the inheritance? My friend / His sibling / They are equally rich / Do not know / Do not want to answer.

Q4: Considering a long time period (for example 30 years), which asset has historically generated the highest return? Savings accounts / Bonds / Stocks / Do not know / Do not want to answer.

Q5: Do you think that the following statement is true or false? "Buying a single company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund." True / False / Do not know / Do not want to answer.

Q6: If the interest rate rises, what should happen to bond prices? They should Rise / Fall / Stay the same / None of the above / Do not know / Do not want to answer.

Q7: If a mutual fund charges management fees of 2% per year this means that: As an investor you receive only 98% of the returns of the fund every year / 2% of the current value of your investment in the fund is paid in management fees every year / Do not know / Do not want to answer.

Q8: Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys the stock of firm B in the stock market: He owns a part of firm B / He has lent money to firm B / He is liable for firm B's debts / None of the above / Do not know / Do not want to answer.

Panel B: Summary Statistics of the Correctness of Knowledge Questions

	N	Mean	Level	Frac. "I do not know"
Q1 (percentage changes)	521	0.64	Medium	2.98%
Q2 (compound interest)	521	0.61	Medium	1.38%
Q3 (time value of money)	521	0.64	Medium	8.26%
Q4 (long horizon returns)	521	0.52	Hard	16.97%
Q5 (risk diversification)	521	0.70	Medium	23.17%
Q6 (interest rate and bond price)	521	0.34	Hard	34.17%
Q7 (mutual fund fees)	521	0.60	Medium	21.79%
Q8 (meaning of owning stocks)	521	0.79	Easy	6.88%

Panel C: Consistency

	Question Level	Sub-sample right %	Whole sample right %
For people who answered the two hard questions right			
Q8 (meaning of owning stocks)	Easy	87.27%	79.27%
Q5 (risk diversification)	Medium	82.61%	70.44%
Q7 (mutual fund fees)	Medium	65.84%	59.50%
Q1 (percentage changes)	Medium	75.16%	64.49%
Q2 (compound interest)	Medium	69.57%	61.04%
Q3 (time value of money)	Medium	71.43%	64.30%
For people who answered at least three of the medium level questions right			
Q8 (meaning of owning stocks)	Easy	88.58%	79.27%
For people who answered the easy questions right but at least three medium level questions wrong			
Q4 (long horizon returns)	Hard	30.53%	51.63%
Q6 (interest rate and bond price)	Hard	18.95%	33.78%

Table 5: Balance Table

This table reports results of the balance tests on subject characteristics and demographics between the groups watching the active and passive videos. Columns (1) and (2) report the means (standard deviations) for each group, respectively. Column 3 reports the p-values from two-sample t-tests on the differences of means between active and passive video treatment groups. *Knowledge Score* is the number of correct answers out of the 8 financial literacy questions. *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* is the participant's self-rating on a scale of 1 (not knowledgeable) to 7 (very knowledgeable). *Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge* is a subject's self-rank of their investment knowledge as a percentile among individual investors in the U.S. and is on a scale of 0 (bottom) to 1 (top). *Use Financial Advisor* equals one if the participant indicates they obtain financial advice from an advisor, financial planner, or accountant. *Willingness to Take Investment Risk, Trust Financial Institutions,* and *Trust People* are participants' answers ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high). *Pro-Active* equals one if the prior *Pro-Passive Score* is zero or below.

	(1) Active Video	(2) Passive Video	(3) p-value (1)-(2)
Gender (1=Male)	0.50	0.56	0.16
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Age	38.25	39.84	0.15
	(11.78)	(12.82)	
Marital Status (1=Married)	0.27	0.30	0.53
	(0.45)	(0.46)	
Country of Birth (1=US)	0.83	0.85	0.52
	(0.38)	(0.36)	
Citizenship (1=US)	0.92	0.94	0.24
	(0.28)	(0.23)	
Have a Full-Time Job	0.45	0.45	0.88
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Unemployed	0.08	0.06	0.34
	(0.28)	(0.24)	
Income under 35k	0.43	0.43	0.92
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Save at Least 50% of Income	0.02	0.03	0.75
	(0.15)	(0.17)	
Have Retirement Account	0.53	0.60	0.13
	(0.50)	(0.49)	
Invest in Stocks	0.32	0.29	0.41
	(0.47)	(0.45)	
College Degree	0.81	0.83	0.56
	(0.40)	(0.38)	
Knowledge Score (0-8)	4.88	4.94	0.76
	(2.08)	(2.10)	
Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge (1-7)	3.76	3.72	0.75
	(1.62)	(1.50)	
Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge (0-1)	0.45	0.43	0.34
	(0.23)	(0.24)	
Use Financial Advisor	0.21	0.22	0.82
	(0.41)	(0.41)	
Willingness to Take Investment Risk (1-7)	4.09	4.04	0.72
	(1.44)	(1.46)	
Trust Financial Institutions (1-7)	3.74	3.64	0.43
	(1.47)	(1.55)	
Trust People (1-7)	3.54	3.48	0.69
	(1.65)	(1.62)	
Prior Belief (1=Pro-Active)	0.49	0.52	0.62
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Observations	253	248	501

Table 6: Assessments of Advice

The dependent variable is the subject's rating of how much they agree with the recommendation of the video on a scale of 1 to 9. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *Contradict* equals 1 if the recommendation in the video contradicts a subject's prior belief. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Control variables, whose coefficients are omitted, include knowledge score, self-assessed financial knowledge, whether the subject has a retirement account, invests in stocks, uses a financial advisor, rating of how much they trust financial institutions, gender, age, college education, and employment status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Agree with Recommendation			
			Likert scale: 1(Strongly Disagree) ∼ 9(Strongly Agree)			
Sample			Full		High Lit	Low Lit
Passive Video	0.639***					
	(0.149)					
Contradict		-0.641***				
		(0.149)				
Pro-Active, Passive Video			-0.252	-0.370*	-0.177	0.062
			(0.216)	(0.210)	(0.346)	(0.231)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video			0.335	0.262	0.898***	0.320
			(0.219)	(0.218)	(0.331)	(0.242)
Pro-Passive, Active Video			-0.610***	-0.573***	-1.075***	-0.231
			(0.219)	(0.213)	(0.371)	(0.253)
High Literacy × Passive Video			-0.175	0.033		
			(0.191)	(0.287)		
High Literacy × Active Video			-0.799***	-0.750***		
			(0.228)	(0.282)		
Constant	6.122***	6.765***	6.807***	4.751***	6.282***	6.629***
	(0.115)	(0.098)	(0.154)	(0.928)	(0.267)	(0.161)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	500	500	500	493	231	269
R-squared	0.051	0.051	0.115	0.184	0.171	0.046

Table 7: Role of Confidence in Advice Evaluation

The dependent variable is the subject's rating of how much they agree with the recommendation of the video on a scale of 1 to 9. *Contradict* equals 1 if the recommendation in the video contradicts a subject's prior belief. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Agree with Recommendation					
	Likert scale: 1(Strongly Disagree) ∼ 9(Strongly Agree)					
Sample	Full	High Lit	Low Lit	Full	High Lit	Low Lit
Contradict	-0.644***	-1.198***	-0.213			
	(0.148)	(0.234)	(0.171)			
Contradict × Confidence	-0.138	-0.506**	0.074			
	(0.150)	-0.247	(0.164)			
Pro-Active, Passive Video				-0.019	-0.258	-0.027
				(0.199)	(0.351)	(0.225)
Pro-Active, Passive Video × Confid.				0.005	-0.470	0.178
				(0.184)	(0.342)	(0.209)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video				0.550***	0.899***	0.331
				(0.196)	(0.335)	(0.243)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video × Confid.				0.011	0.131	-0.065
				(0.212)	(0.335)	(0.280)
Pro-Passive, Active Video				-0.720***	-1.020***	-0.177
				(0.222)	(0.366)	(0.248)
Pro-Passive, Active Video × Confid.				-0.255	-0.194	-0.136
				(0.222)	(0.373)	(0.231)
Confidence	0.183*	0.073	0.259*	0.178	-0.013	0.289*
	(0.107)	(0.173)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.241)	(0.167)
Constant	6.777***	6.798***	6.789***	6.508***	6.279***	6.651***
	(0.100)	(0.160)	(0.121)	(0.147)	(0.271)	(0.161)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	499	231	268	499	231	268
R-squared	0.055	0.141	0.085	0.093	0.186	0.101

Table 8: Advisor Likability and Trust

The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the rating of the advisor's likability, and in columns 4-6 is the likelihood that the subject would want to return to the advisor. Both variables are from responses to post-video survey questions, on a scale of 1 to 9. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero, and 0 otherwise. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Control variables, whose coefficients are omitted, include knowledge score, self-assessed financial knowledge, whether the subject has a retirement account, invests in stocks, uses a financial advisor, rating of how much they trust financial institutions, gender, age, college education, and employment status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Advisor Likable			*Will Return*		
	Likert scale: 1(Not at All/Never) ∼ 9(Extremely/Certainly)					
Sample	Full	High Lit	Low Lit	Full	High Lit	Low Lit
Pro-Active, Passive Video	0.223	-0.177	0.119	-0.299	-0.237	-0.073
	(0.213)	(0.305)	(0.244)	(0.267)	(0.411)	(0.297)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video	0.320	0.046	0.114	0.070	0.144	-0.003
	(0.228)	(0.282)	(0.266)	(0.286)	(0.379)	(0.335)
Pro-Passive, Active Video	-0.105	0.102	-0.501	-0.394	-0.681*	-0.336
	(0.222)	(0.304)	(0.339)	(0.244)	(0.398)	(0.319)
High Literacy × Passive Video	-0.372			-0.413		
	(0.285)			(0.343)		
High Literacy × Active Video	0.012			-0.719**		
	(0.295)			(0.334)		
Constant	3.701***	6.429***	6.771***	4.534***	5.276***	5.906***
	(0.886)	(0.224)	(0.186)	(1.131)	(0.307)	(0.208)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	494	231	270	492	229	270
R-squared	0.171	0.085	0.108	0.134	0.039	0.020

Table 9: Shifts in *Pro-Passive Scores*

This table shows the effects of the treatments on changes in beliefs. The dependent variable is the change in a subject's *Pro-Passive Score* from before to after the video treatment. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. Control variables, whose coefficients are omitted, include knowledge score, self-assessed financial knowledge, whether the subject has a retirement account, invests in stocks, uses a financial advisor, rating of how much they trust financial institutions, gender, age, college education, and employment status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Change in Pro-Passive Score			
Sample	Full		High Lit		Low Lit	
Pro-Active, Passive Video	3.425***	3.462***	3.178***	3.046***	3.030***	2.982***
	(0.313)	(0.309)	(0.376)	(0.364)	(0.352)	(0.349)
Pro-Active, Passive Video × Confidence				-1.000***		-0.363
				(0.369)		(0.301)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video	0.940***	0.929***	0.818***	0.798***	0.566	0.424
	(0.310)	(0.309)	(0.286)	(0.284)	(0.345)	(0.341)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video × *Confidence*				-0.244		-0.950***
				(0.319)		(0.301)
Pro-Passive, Active Video	-1.644***	-1.645***	-0.574	-0.646*	-2.570***	-2.621***
	(0.279)	(0.277)	(0.370)	(0.389)	(0.396)	(0.399)
Pro-Passive, Active Video × *Confidence*				-0.214		-0.138
				(0.426)		(0.339)
High Literacy × *Passive Video*	-0.435*	-0.509				
	(0.243)	(0.377)				
High Literacy × *Active Video*	0.367	0.363				
	(0.279)	(0.396)				
Confidence				0.422*		0.439**
				(0.237)		(0.183)
Constant	-0.126	-1.448	-0.397*	-0.378	0.275	0.313
	(0.224)	(1.213)	(0.240)	(0.236)	(0.245)	(0.240)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Observations	493	487	229	229	264	263
R-squared	0.421	0.441	0.372	0.394	0.475	0.492

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Table 10: Posterior *Pro-Passive Scores*

This table shows the effects of the treatments on posterior beliefs. The dependent variable is a subject's *Pro-Passive Score* after the video treatment. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. Control variables, whose coefficients are omitted, include gender, age, unemployment, and college education. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Posterior Pro-Passive Score			
Sample	Full		High Lit		Low Lit	
Pro-Active, Passive Video	3.015***	3.093***	2.977***	2.810***	2.569***	2.548***
	(0.277)	(0.278)	(0.403)	(0.385)	(0.303)	(0.302)
Pro-Active, Passive Video × Confidence				-1.397***		-0.372
				(0.361)		(0.273)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video	4.322***	4.252***	4.444***	4.413***	3.792***	3.693***
	(0.266)	(0.277)	(0.296)	(0.283)	(0.276)	(0.280)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video × Confidence				-0.711**		-0.674**
				(0.309)		(0.275)
Pro-Passive, Active Video	1.704***	1.666***	2.925***	2.850***	0.573	0.536
	(0.268)	(0.272)	(0.370)	(0.366)	(0.363)	(0.369)
Pro-Passive, Active Video × Confidence				-0.552		-0.165
				(0.389)		(0.324)
High Literacy × Passive Video	-0.086	-0.318				
	(0.226)	(0.356)				
High Literacy × Active Video	0.578**	0.424				
	(0.270)	(0.381)				
Confidence				0.716***		0.311*
				(0.233)		(0.164)
Constant	-1.398***	-3.278***	-1.553***	-1.519***	-0.902***	-0.875***
	(0.193)	(1.140)	(0.255)	(0.241)	(0.198)	(0.193)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Observations	493	487	229	229	264	263
R-squared	0.384	0.397	0.451	0.485	0.381	0.392

Table 11: Beliefs about Beating the Market

The dependent variable is the post-video assessment of "It is possible to always beat the market" (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree). *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. Control variables, whose coefficients are omitted, include knowledge score, self-assessed financial knowledge, whether the subject has a retirement account, invests in stocks, uses a financial advisor, rating of how much they trust financial institutions, gender, age, college education, and employment status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Posterior Possibility to Beat the Market					
	*Likert scale: 1(Strongly Disagree) $\sim$ 7(Strongly Agree)*					
Sample	Full		High Lit		Low Lit	
Pro-Active, Passive Video	-0.945***	-0.980***	-1.125***	-1.071**	-0.692**	-0.623**
	(0.270)	(0.281)	(0.412)	(0.415)	(0.295)	(0.291)
Pro-Active, Passive Video × Confidence				0.203		-0.427
				(0.356)		(0.267)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video	-1.457***	-1.452***	-1.705***	-1.725***	-1.198***	-1.162***
	(0.293)	(0.302)	(0.357)	(0.360)	(0.324)	(0.323)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video × Confidence				-0.249		0.182
				(0.363)		(0.329)
Pro-Passive, Active Video	-0.870***	-0.916***	-1.485***	-1.682***	-0.253	-0.322
	(0.259)	(0.265)	(0.373)	(0.370)	(0.358)	(0.358)
Pro-Passive, Active Video × Confidence				0.416		-0.189
				(0.337)		(0.337)
High Literacy × Passive Video	0.035	-0.121				
	(0.251)	(0.381)				
High Literacy × Active Video	-0.099	-0.266				
	(0.261)	(0.364)				
Confidence				0.237		0.122
				(0.223)		(0.198)
Constant	4.841***	3.523***	5.111***	5.128***	4.566***	4.560***
	(0.201)	(1.148)	(0.264)	(0.265)	(0.218)	(0.217)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Observations	453	447	225	225	228	227
R-squared	0.074	0.079	0.102	0.134	0.067	0.083

Table 12: Post-Video Portfolio Choice

This table shows the effects of the treatments on subjects' selection of a fund portfolio at the end of the experiment. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the subject chooses an index portfolio and 0 if they choose an actively managed portfolio. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. Control variables, whose coefficients are omitted, include knowledge score, self-assessed financial knowledge, whether the subject has a retirement account, invests in stocks, uses a financial advisor, rating of how much they trust financial institutions, gender, age, college education, and employment status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Choose Index Fund			
Sample	Full		High Lit		Low Lit	
Pro-Active, Passive Video	0.626***	0.648***	0.628***	0.624***	0.559***	0.570***
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.066)
Pro-Active, Passive Video × Confidence				-0.198**		0.034
				(0.084)		(0.056)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video	0.746***	0.732***	0.668***	0.677***	0.731***	0.733***
	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video × Confidence				-0.189**		0.083*
				(0.082)		(0.045)
Pro-Passive, Active Video	0.210***	0.196***	0.335***	0.379***	0.093	0.083
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.082)	(0.079)
Pro-Passive, Active Video × Confidence				-0.283***		0.201***
				(0.097)		(0.066)
High Literacy × Passive Video	0.039	-0.118*				
	(0.036)	(0.066)				
High Literacy × Active Video	0.162***	0.031				
	(0.061)	(0.082)				
Confidence				0.137*		-0.089**
				(0.073)		(0.040)
Constant	0.199***	0.185	0.282***	0.276***	0.249***	0.246***
	(0.046)	(0.221)	(0.068)	(0.066)	(0.050)	(0.049)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Observations	484	478	225	225	259	258
R-squared	0.346	0.381	0.314	0.356	0.382	0.418

Table 13: Effects of Perceived Conflict of Interest

The dependent variable in columns 1-3 measures the subject's agreement with the recommendation on a scale of 1-9 and in columns 4-6 measures the change in the four-point *Pro-Passive Score* from before to after the video. *Flat Fee* equals 1 if the advisor in the video explains that they are compensated with a flat fee which does not depend on the amount of business generated. *Commission* equals 1 if the advisor says they are compensated by sales commissions. The baseline reference sub-treatment group merges the skip-fee and skip-fee-and-basics groups, both of which do not mention the advisors' incentives. *Video Direction* equals +1 if the subject watched the passive advice video -1 if they watched the active advice video. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. Differences in coefficients and their standard errors are calculated using the delta method. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Control variables, whose coefficients are omitted, include knowledge score, self-assessed financial knowledge, whether the subject has a retirement account, invests in stocks, uses a financial advisor, rating of how much they trust financial institutions, gender, age, college education, and employment status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Agree with Recommendation			*Change in Pro-Passive Score*		
Sample	Full	High Lit	Low Lit	Full	High Lit	Low Lit
Flat Fee (A)	0.395**	0.192	0.626***	0.417	-0.104	0.843**
	(0.179)	(0.293)	(0.188)	(0.261)	(0.351)	(0.387)
Commission (B)	-0.156	-0.179	0.094	0.059	-0.066	0.203
	(0.184)	(0.299)	(0.220)	(0.245)	(0.332)	(0.367)
(A)-(B)	0.551***	0.371	0.532**			
	(0.197)	(0.314)	(0.227)			
Video Direction				1.370***	1.149***	1.476***
				(0.149)	(0.211)	(0.207)
Video Direction × Flat Fee (C)				0.339	0.140	0.752*
				(0.261)	(0.322)	(0.411)
Video Direction × Commission (D)				-0.426*	-0.509	-0.284
				(0.239)	(0.327)	(0.372)
(C)-(D)				0.766***	0.649*	1.036**
				(0.290)	(0.340)	(0.479)
Pro-Active, Passive Video	-0.063	-0.062	0.002			
	(0.192)	(0.339)	(0.213)			
Pro-Passive, Passive Video	0.645***	1.287***	0.287			
	(0.200)	(0.344)	(0.235)			
Pro-Passive, Active Video	-0.641***	-0.798**	-0.083			
	(0.211)	(0.360)	(0.236)			
Constant	4.656***	9.092***	1.840*	-1.508	-2.586	-1.961
	(0.900)	(1.657)	(1.101)	(1.210)	(1.718)	(1.981)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	493	230	263	487	228	259
R-squared	0.181	0.278	0.244	0.298	0.291	0.363

Internet Appendix of

"Financial Narratives and Investor Beliefs:
Experimental Evidence on Active vs. Passive Advice"

by Antoinette Schoar and Yang Sun

September 2024

Appendix A: Full Video Scripts

Section 1

<div align="center">[self-intro]</div>

Good morning! My name is Cynthia Johnson (Thomas Jenkins) and I've been a financial adviser for eight years, and I'm a certified financial planner, which is the most widely recognized and demanding set of requirements for technical knowledge and ethical standards in the industry.

<div align="center">[fee] - flat</div>

My investment advisory services extend to a broad range of products with different fees, so it's important to provide you with information you need to make well-informed investment decisions. Part of this information is how I am paid. My company charges a flat fee for all of its financial advisory services, and I am compensated on either a meeting-by-meeting or yearly basis. This means, my compensation does not depend on the amount of business I generate, or the specific funds I recommend to my clients, and I have no financial incentive to recommend a particular product to my clients. For example, if you want to invest $10,000, the up-front costs would be $300 per visit to cover all financial advisory services. In addition, you only pay the management fee of the funds that applies to all investors.

<div align="center">[fee] - commission</div>

My investment advisory services extend to a broad range of products with different fees, so it's important to provide you with information you need to make well-informed investment decisions. Part of this information is how I am paid. My company works with a number of select mutual fund families from which we receive compensation. We are paid a commission based on the amount of investments we generate for the mutual fund firm and on the fees that the customers pay. For example, if you want to invest $10,000, the up-front cost would be 3 percent or $300, a fraction of which goes to my firm for advising investors to put their money into this fund.

Section 2

<div align="center">[basics of strategies]</div>

(The transition slide between section 1 and section 2 shows: "Introduction to Investment Strategies".)
In general, you should know there are two types of mutual funds. The first set is called index funds, which are funds that track the market or part of the market, hence the name. That means they hold a maximally diversified portfolio of stocks across all the firms in the market, and they aim to meet average market returns. These funds have an average fee of about 0.2 percent per year since they require little intervention from the fund's manager. The second set of mutual funds is called actively managed funds. These funds are run by portfolio managers who pick specific companies they invest in based on their market research and investment philosophy. This means they try to set up a balanced portfolio which aims to beat average market returns. These funds have an average fee of about 1.6 percent per year to cover the costs of the managers and market research.

Section 3

<p align="center">[recommend one strategy] - Passive Investment Strategy</p>

(The transition slide between section 2 and section 3 shows: "Which Strategy to Choose?")

The investment strategy that I recommend to all the clients I work with is to build a well-diversified portfolio of stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. I focus on funds with low fees and turnover. This approach will allow you to capture a larger percentage of the total returns and minimize exposure to any one investment. The aim is to meet the average return of the market and not to be exposed to the ups and downs of any one stock or sector. So how do you implement the strategy? Optimally, diversify your investments with index funds.

<p align="center">[recommend one strategy] - Active Investment Strategy</p>

(The transition slide between section 2 and section 3 shows: "Which Strategy to Choose?")

The investment strategy that I recommend to all the clients I work with is to build a well-balanced portfolio of stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. I focus on funds that are managed by experienced portfolio managers with a great track record. This approach will allow you to generate the highest returns on your investments and minimize exposure to the movements of the market. The aim is to beat the market and not just to mimic the ups and downs of average market returns. So how do you implement the strategy? Focus your investments on actively managed funds.

Section 4

<p align="center">[reasons for the recommendation] - Passive Investment Strategy</p>

(The transition slide between section 3 and section 4 shows: "Why Index Funds?")

What are the benefits of this strategy? Savvy investors say: "it's not timing the market, it's time in the market". These investors know that no one has a crystal ball, and that not even the best managers can predict the future. So they seek to reduce their risk exposure to any one stock or sector by diversifying, rather than trying to predict the market and picking individual stocks or sectors. Also, they benefit from profitable upswings in the market by keeping their money invested when most other investors are pulling out of the market. In fact, research highlights the importance of picking diversified funds since on average well-diversified portfolios consistently deliver higher returns in the long run. Let me give you the numbers. When you look at short or long-time horizons, more than half of U.S. index funds performed above the median or middle performance of their respective categories. What this means is that by investing in funds that aim to meet the average return on the market, you're likely to have a better than average mutual fund. In addition, index funds cost less than actively managed funds, since diversification is a simple yet effective strategy that doesn't require a manager picking stocks and timing the market. This way you benefit from the long-term growth of the overall market while more of the returns go to you instead of the fund manager. Over time, even a small difference in costs can make a huge difference in your overall portfolio. Let's look at an example. Over the 20-year time period ending in 2009, the average returns of index funds and actively managed funds were close to the same while the average yearly fee was under 0.5 percent for index funds and around 1.5 percent for actively managed funds. Why should you pay so much attention to fees? While it may seem that a small difference in fees shouldn't matter, even a one percent difference in fees makes a huge difference in the long run. The data is clear. If you want your investment to have the strongest performance in the long run, you need to invest in low-cost well-diversified index funds. In a nutshell, if you want to build wealth by investing, make sure you work with advisers who recommend low-cost well-diversified index funds. Thank you for your time, and good luck investing.

<p align="center">[reasons for the recommendation] - Active Investment Strategy</p>

(The transition slide between section 3 and section 4 shows: "Why Actively Managed Funds?")
What are the benefits of this strategy? Savvy investors say: "The wise man puts all his eggs in one basket and watches the basket." These investors know that no one builds wealth with plain vanilla funds and that even large or popular stocks can vary greatly in their returns from year to year. So they seek to reduce their exposure to underperforming stocks and to market movements in down periods rather than just sitting through them. Also, they take advantage of the opportunities that arise in boom periods by focusing on sectors that have the most promise for high returns. In fact, research highlights the importance of picking the right fund, since there are many funds that actually underperform the market, while others consistently outperform the market over long periods of time. Let me give you the numbers. When you look at the U.S. mutual fund industry over the last 3 years, for example, data shows that over 80 percent of large-cap value funds outperform their index after fees. So, by actively picking stocks in trying to time the market, these funds to better than their benchmark. When you invest in an actively managed fund, what you pay for is the unique advantages of detailed market research, experience, and the skill of the portfolio managers. Actively managed funds also have the flexibility and tools to react to the movements of the market, allowing them to seize opportunities in the moment as they arise. Over time, even a small difference in returns can make a huge difference in your portfolio. Let's look at an example. Over the 20-year period ending in 2007, every one of the 20 top performing funds was actively managed. Why should you pay so much attention to returns? Well, it might seem that small difference in returns shouldn't matter. In fact, even a one percent difference in returns makes a huge difference in the long run. The data is clear: if you want your investments to have superior performance you need to invest in high performing well managed funds. In a nutshell, if you want to build wealth by investing, make sure you work with advisers who recommend high-performing well-managed mutual funds. Thank you for your time and good luck investing.

Appendix B: Alternative Belief Measures

In addition to the main 4-point belief score defined in Section 3.2 which we use throughout the paper, we also create an *"Intensity Score"* of beliefs, which is a more granular measure. The calculation still sets the initial value at zero for each participant. Based on the ranking answers which range from 1 (the least important) to 7 (the most important), we apply the adding and subtracting rules as follows. Given the ranking of *Diversification* being X, we add X-4 to the score. For example, if the person ranks *Diversification* as the second most important component so that X equals 6, we add 2 to the his or her current value of intensity score. We repeat this step with the ranking of *Minimizing Fees*. Next, if the ranking answer to *Picking Good Stocks* is Y, we add 4-Y to the score. For example, if the person ranks *Picking Good Stocks* as the third most important component so that Y equals 5, we add -1 to the current value of intensity score. We repeat this with the ranking of *Timing the Market*. In the end, the largest possible value for intensity score is 10, which means the person is very pro-passive in the pre-video ranking answers. The smallest possible value is -10, which means the person is very pro-active.

Figure IA.1 plots the distribution of the *Pro-Passive Intensity Score*, and shows that our classification of the subjects into the two prior types based on the 4-point score discussed above naturally separates the two modes in the distribution of the intensity score.

Since the revealed correlations between the components could be affected by noise in people's beliefs, we consider two alternative ways of categorizing the belief components. The first alternative simply follows the ex ante classification and counts *Diversification*, *Minimizing Fees*, and *Minimizing Risk* as passive components, and *Picking Stocks*, *Timing the Market*, and *Picking Fund Managers* as active components, resulting in a 6-point score. The second alternative considers the fact that *Diversification* tends to be ranked highly by both pro-passive and pro-active investors, and replaces it with *Minimizing Risk* in the 4-point score calculation. Our results are robust under these alternative measures. We present the results Appendix D and discuss them briefly in Section 5.

Appendix C: Comparison of Financial Literacy Levels of Experiment Participants with Earlier Studies

The correctness rates of some questions in our sample are comparable to those in literature whose surveys were fielded in the U.S.. For example, the 2012 NFCS [1] reported that only 28% of their respondents answered the "interest rate and bond price" question (same to our Q6) correctly, close to the 34% in our results. We classify this question into the *Hard* level among our eight questions, while it was also the literacy question that the least people could correctly answer in the 2012 NFCS (FINRA Foundation 2013). Similarly, the "long horizon returns" question has a correct answer rate of 52% in our sample, while in van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011)[2] the number is 47.2% for the same question.[3]

Discrepancies do exist for some correct rates between our sample and that in van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011). For example, the "meaning of owning a stock" question has only a 62.2% correct rate in van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011), but more than 79% of our participants answered it right. Nevertheless, the ordinal ranks of the questions' difficulty level are similar and comparable. The only exception is the "risk diversification" question. In our sample, about 70% of people answered the "risk diversification" question (Q5) correctly. But in van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011), the number is only 48.2%. In sum, our consistency analysis on the answers of financial knowledge questions suggests that, by simply adding up the number of right answers across the eight knowledge questions for each participant, we get a reasonably good measure of the participant's knowledge level of finance.

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1. The 2012 National Financial Capability Study (NFCS) is a survey online from July to October 2012 among a nationally-representative sample of 25,509 American Adults. It is a project of the FINRA Investor Education Foundation (FINRA Foundation). See https://www.usfinancialcapability.org.

2. They fielded the questions in the 2005–2006 De Nederlandsche Bank's Household Survey (DHS). The DHS contains a nationally-representative sample of over 2,000 Dutch households and is an online survey.

3. Notice that there are minor differences in the wording between our Q5 and the "risk diversification question" in van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2007). Our wording is: "Considering a long time period **(for example 30 years)**, which asset **has historically generated** the highest return?" The wording in van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) is: "Considering a long time period **(for example 10 or 20 years)**, which asset **normally gives** the highest return?"

Appendix D: Additional Tables and Figures

Figure IA.1: **Alternative Belief Measure: Pro-Passive Intensity Score**

This figure plots the distribution of the pre-video *Pro-Passive Intensity Score*, an alternative belief measure described in Appendix B and ranging from -10 to 10. Blue represents subjects classified as "pro-passive". Green represents subjects classified as "pro-active".

Table IA.1: Determinants for Prior Beliefs

This table reports the regression coefficients showing the relationships between the prior *Pro-Passive Score* and various participant characteristics. *Knowledge Score* is the number of correct answers out of the 8 financial literacy questions. *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* is the participant's self-rating on a scale of 1 (not knowledgeable) to 7 (very knowledgeable). *Use Financial Advisor* equals one if the participant indicates they obtain financial advice from an advisor, financial planner, or accountant. *Trust Financial Institutions* is how much the participant agrees with the statement that financial institutions are trustworthy, ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Prior Pro-Passive Score		
Knowledge Score (0-8)	0.211***	0.153***	0.107*
	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge (1-7)	0.000	-0.015	-0.000
	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.073)
Have Retirement Account		0.766***	0.631***
		(0.208)	(0.214)
Invest in Stocks		-0.007	0.052
		(0.237)	(0.237)
Use Financial Advisor		0.404*	0.270
		(0.241)	(0.245)
Trust Financial Institutions (1-7)		-0.089	-0.076
		(0.064)	(0.064)
Gender (1=Male)			-0.185
			(0.204)
ln (Age)			0.432
			(0.321)
College Degree			0.951***
			(0.261)
Unemployed			0.559
			(0.343)
Constant	-0.620**	-0.446	-2.515**
	(0.280)	(0.371)	(1.182)
Observations	500	496	494
R-squared	0.041	0.078	0.107

Table IA.2: Balance Table Conditional on *Pro-Active* Beliefs

This table reports the results of balance tests on subject characteristics and demographics between the groups watching the active and passive videos, conditional on people having *Pro-Active* prior beliefs. p-values are from two-sample t-tests on the differences of mean values between the active and passive video treatment groups.

	(1) Active Video	(2) Passive Video	(3) p-value (1)-(2)
Gender (1=Male)	0.44	0.62	0.00***
	(0.50)	(0.49)	
Age	37.60	38.37	0.61
	(11.34)	(12.08)	
Marital Status (1=Married)	0.27	0.26	0.80
	(0.45)	(0.44)	
Country of Birth (1=US)	0.79	0.82	0.50
	(0.41)	(0.38)	
Citizenship (1=US)	0.89	0.93	0.27
	(0.32)	(0.26)	
Have a Full-Time Job	0.43	0.39	0.46
	(0.50)	(0.49)	
Unemployed	0.06	0.09	0.37
	(0.25)	(0.29)	
Income under 35k	0.45	0.53	0.18
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Save at Least 50% of Income	0.04	0.02	0.24
	(0.20)	(0.12)	
Have Retirement Account	0.47	0.45	0.67
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Invest in Stocks	0.26	0.23	0.69
	(0.44)	(0.43)	
College Degree	0.76	0.76	0.97
	(0.43)	(0.43)	
Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge (1-7)	3.54	3.64	0.60
	(1.63)	(1.51)	
Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge (0-1)	0.40	0.41	0.61
	(0.24)	(0.24)	
Willingness to Take Investment Risk (1-7)	4.05	4.13	0.67
	(1.33)	(1.52)	
Knowledge Score (0-8)	4.59	4.55	0.88
	(1.99)	(2.05)	
Use Financial Advisor	0.18	0.21	0.58
	(0.38)	(0.41)	
Trust Financial Institutions (1-7)	3.80	3.78	0.92
	(1.48)	(1.59)	
Trust People (1-7)	3.56	3.51	0.80
	(1.58)	(1.61)	
Observations	125	128	253

Table IA.3: Balance Table Conditional on *Pro-Passive* Beliefs

This table reports the results of balance tests on subject characteristics and demographics between the groups watching the active and passive videos, conditional on people having *Pro-Passive* prior beliefs. p-values are from two-sample t-tests on the differences of mean values between the active and passive video treatment groups.

	(1) Active Video	(2) Passive Video	(3) p-value (1)-(2)
Gender (1=Male)	0.55	0.50	0.39
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Age	38.87	41.41	0.12
	(12.21)	(13.44)	
Marital Status (1=Married)	0.27	0.34	0.25
	(0.45)	(0.48)	
Country of Birth (1=US)	0.87	0.88	0.81
	(0.34)	(0.32)	
Citizenship (1=US)	0.94	0.96	0.60
	(0.23)	(0.20)	
Have a Full-Time Job	0.46	0.53	0.32
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Unemployed	0.10	0.03	0.01**
	(0.30)	(0.16)	
Income under 35k	0.42	0.31	0.10*
	(0.49)	(0.47)	
Save at Least 50% of Income	0.01	0.04	0.09*
	(0.09)	(0.20)	
Have Retirement Account	0.59	0.76	0.00***
	(0.49)	(0.43)	
Invest in Stocks	0.39	0.35	0.51
	(0.49)	(0.48)	
College Degree	0.85	0.90	0.25
	(0.36)	(0.30)	
Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge (1-7)	3.98	3.80	0.35
	(1.59)	(1.48)	
Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge (0-1)	0.51	0.45	0.05*
	(0.21)	(0.23)	
Willingness to Take Investment Risk (1-7)	4.13	3.95	0.35
	(1.54)	(1.40)	
Knowledge Score (0-8)	5.16	5.35	0.49
	(2.13)	(2.08)	
Use Financial Advisor	0.23	0.23	0.86
	(0.43)	(0.42)	
Trust Financial Institutions (1-7)	3.69	3.48	0.28
	(1.46)	(1.49)	
Trust People (1-7)	3.52	3.45	0.76
	(1.71)	(1.63)	
Observations	128	120	248

Table IA.4: Assessments of Advice

The dependent variable is the subject's rating of how convincing the advice was on a scale of 1 to 9. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *Contradict* equals 1 if the recommendation in the video contradicts a subject's prior belief. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Control variables, whose coefficients are omitted, include knowledge score, self-assessed financial knowledge, whether the subject has a retirement account, invests in stocks, uses a financial advisor, rating of how much they trust financial institutions, gender, age, college education, and employment status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Advice Convincing			
			Likert scale: 1(Not a All) $\sim$ 9(Extremely)			
					High Lit	Low Lit
			Full Sample			
Passive Video	0.653***					
	(0.156)					
Contradict		-0.487***				
		(0.158)				
Pro-Active, Passive Video			-0.011	-0.020	-0.050	0.251
			(0.237)	(0.230)	(0.383)	(0.261)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video			0.443*	0.414*	0.871**	0.346
			(0.245)	(0.249)	(0.353)	(0.272)
Pro-Passive, Active Video			-0.479**	-0.374	-0.804**	-0.253
			(0.232)	(0.228)	(0.389)	(0.286)
High Literacy $\times$ Passive Video			-0.471**	-0.048		
			(0.206)	(0.297)		
High Literacy $\times$ Active Video			-0.879***	-0.581*		
			(0.238)	(0.311)		
Constant	6.128***	6.700***	6.784***	4.295***	6.087***	6.676***
	(0.121)	(0.110)	(0.183)	(0.948)	(0.288)	(0.205)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	501	501	501	494	231	270
R-squared	0.037	0.023	0.096	0.182	0.113	0.028

Table IA.5: Robustness of Belief Shift Result

This table shows the robustness of the main results in Table 9 under alternative sample selection and measures. Panel A columns 1-3 exclude the subjects with a prior *Pro-Passive Score* of zero and columns 4-6 examine the change in a subject's *Pro-Passive Intensity Score*. Panel B examine changes in alternative belief score constructions using a 4-point or 6-point scheme. Constructions of the alternative measures and their motivations are described in Appendix C. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Change in Pro-Passive Belief			
Panel A.		*Excl. Zero Prior*			Δ *Intensity Score*	
Sample	Full	High Lit	Low Lit	Full	High Lit	Low Lit
Pro-Active, Passive Video	3.332***	3.439***	2.726***	6.874***	6.658***	6.218***
	(0.363)	(0.440)	(0.414)	(0.634)	(0.788)	(0.713)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video	0.552	0.790***	-0.034	2.102***	2.218***	1.413**
	(0.349)	(0.279)	(0.389)	(0.607)	(0.618)	(0.666)
Pro-Passive, Active Video	-2.005***	-0.589	-3.143***	-2.997***	-1.195	-4.584***
	(0.303)	(0.366)	(0.437)	(0.564)	(0.725)	(0.814)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
High Literacy $\times$ Video Types	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	422	199	223	493	229	264
R-squared	0.446	0.372	0.515	0.423	0.406	0.455

Panel B.		Δ *Alt. 6-Point Score*			Δ *Alt. 4-Point Score*	
Pro-Active, Passive Video	4.667***	4.362***	4.226***	3.419***	3.033***	3.097***
	(0.391)	(0.449)	(0.439)	(0.347)	(0.385)	(0.398)
Pro-Passive, Passive Video	2.254***	1.978***	1.944***	1.438***	1.028***	1.184***
	(0.397)	(0.357)	(0.454)	(0.345)	(0.285)	(0.399)
Pro-Passive, Active Video	-1.466***	-0.274	-2.389***	-1.237***	-0.407	-1.904***
	(0.342)	(0.450)	(0.492)	(0.291)	(0.360)	(0.439)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
High Literacy $\times$ Video Types	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	501	231	270	501	231	270
R-squared	0.410	0.394	0.445	0.349	0.334	0.374