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PEOPLE'S UNDERSTANDING OF INFLATION

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ABSTRACT

This paper studies people's understanding of inflation—their perceived causes, consequences, trade-offs—and the policies supported to mitigate its effects. We design a new, detailed online survey based on the rich existing literature in economics with two experimental components—a conjoint experiment and an information experiment—to examine how well public views align with established economic theories. Our key findings show that the major perceived causes of inflation include government actions, such as increased foreign aid and war-related expenditures, alongside rises in production costs attributed to recent events like the COVID-19 pandemic, oil price fluctuations, and supply chain disruptions. Respondents' anticipate many negative consequences of inflation but the most noted one is the increased complexity and difficulty in household decision-making. Partisan differences emerge distinctly, with Republicans more likely to attribute inflation to government policies and foresee broader negative outcomes, whereas Democrats anticipate greater inequality effects. Inflation is perceived as an unambiguously negative phenomenon without any potential positive economic correlates. Notably, there is a widespread belief that managing inflation can be achieved without significant trade-offs, such as reducing economic activity or increasing unemployment. These perceptions are hard to move experimentally. In terms of policy responses, there is resistance to monetary tightening, consistent with the perceived absence of trade-offs and the belief that it is unnecessary to reduce economic activity to fight inflation. The widespread misconception that inflation rises following increases in interest rates even leads to support for rate cuts to reduce inflation. There is a clear preference for policies that are perceived to have other benefits, such as reducing government debt in progressive ways or increasing corporate taxes, and for support for vulnerable households, despite potential inflationary effects.

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1 Introduction

Inflation is a complex phenomenon that is still being actively researched in economics. It affects people's daily lives deeply, often causing stress and strong emotional reactions (Stantcheva, 2024). Media coverage during the current inflationary episode highlights that it is also a salient policy issue.

This paper aims to understand how people think about inflation—what they believe causes it, what consequences it has, and how it impacts different groups of people. It studies whether people understand the effects of various economic shocks and the trade-offs involved in anti-inflationary economic policies. It also examines what policies people support to fight inflation.

To do this, we conducted a large online survey with a representative group of people from the US. The questions in our survey build on the rich theoretical and empirical literatures in macroeconomics that propose models of inflation and its impacts, which helps us see how well people's views align with them. We ask about a broad range of policies, including traditional monetary and fiscal tools and less direct instruments, as well as redistributive policies to dampen the impacts of inflation on less well-off households. Furthermore, we carried out two experiments. The first is a conjoint experiment to estimate people's preferences over inflation and unemployment, i.e., how they balance their concerns about inflation against unemployment. The second is an information experiment that provided information about the trade-offs between inflation and economic activity, and the limitations policymakers face in managing these issues.

Our main findings are as follows. First, the main perceived causes of inflation by respondents are government actions, particularly increased foreign assistance including war-related expenditures, and rises in production costs due to the COVID-19 pandemic, oil price volatility, and supply chain disruptions.

Respondents indicate that inflation significantly complicates household decision-making, which is seen as its most critical consequence. This complexity affects daily economic choices, along with other impacts such as shoe leather costs and heightened economic uncertainty. This cognitive cost has not been at the forefront of the economics literature relative to other efficiency costs, yet it plays a predominant role in people's minds. Respondents also anticipate negative adverse distributional effects and that lower-income groups are more likely to lose from inflation.

Notably, there are significant partisan differences in how these aspects of inflation are perceived. Democrats tend to blame the government less and businesses more for inflation. Republicans anticipate overall more negative consequences of inflation, including on growth, the value of the dollar, resource misallocation, firms' decisions, trust in government, and national prestige. However, Democrats are more likely to anticipate negative inequality impacts from inflation.

Our findings also highlight a general perception of inflation as unequivocally negative, rarely

associated with positive economic indicators or developments. In that sense, there is no perceived trade-off between inflation and economic activity or unemployment among respondents. There also appears to be a widespread belief that managing inflation does not require significant trade-offs, such as reducing economic activity or increasing unemployment.

Our information experiment aimed at explaining some potential trade-offs slightly improved understanding that inflation could result from positive developments, yet it failed to alter perceptions about the constraints faced by policymakers or to shift support for specific anti-inflationary policies. One interpretation of our findings is that there is a deeply ingrained perception among respondents that inflation is inherently negative, occurring concurrently with other adverse events. This belief is coupled with the expectation that inflation should be combated through policy measures that do not incur additional economic costs.

Furthermore, inflation is considered a high policy priority by respondents. In our conjoint experiment designed to estimate preferences over inflation and unemployment, the weight given to inflation by respondents is double that assigned to unemployment. Despite this focus on inflation, there is little support for monetary tightening measures, consistent with the perceived absence of trade-offs and the belief that it is unnecessary to reduce economic activity to combat inflation. This is also in line with the widespread misconception that inflation rises following increases in interest rates, leading to a preference for *rate cuts* as a measure to combat inflation. Instead, there is considerable support for policies targeting firms, such as as increasing corporate taxes or tightening anti-trust regulation, as well as for freezing the prices of essentials. Finally, there is also support for reducing government debt by taxing top incomes, but not by reducing social spending. It is likely that these policies are considered to have additional benefits, other than reducing inflation. There is also strong backing for policies that assist vulnerable households in coping with inflation, even though such policies might themselves be inflationary.

What are the implications for economics research and policy-making from these results? First, in many economic models and empirical studies, beliefs shape behaviors, which in turn have real implications for people's lives and policies. [Stantcheva \(2024\)](#), for instance, shows that people's views on inflation translate into costly adjustments and behavioral changes. Second, diving into how people think and reason helps us better understand the concerns and constraints they face. Policymakers and researchers modeling the economy might consider some of these as fundamental "political economy" constraints to take into account in optimal policies. Third, in some cases, we identify clear misperceptions and misunderstandings, which would be beneficial to address, including by those who teach economics and provide public commentary.

Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, our survey aims to elicit in detail people's perceptions of inflation's causes, consequences, distributional impacts, and induced

trade-offs. Our survey questions are motivated by the rich theoretical and empirical literatures in macroeconomics. We will discuss these papers in each of the relevant sections below, instead of here. Whenever applicable, we also compare our findings on people's perceptions to the empirical findings from different papers, also presented in the corresponding sections.

In addition, our work relates to studies on attitudes towards inflation or policies to combat price increases, primarily using survey methods. Shiller (1997) and Stantcheva (2024) study why people dislike inflation, the latter focusing on people's personal impacts from and reactions to inflation. Inflation aversion is also documented in van Lelyveld (1999), Easterly and Fischer (2001), Scheve (2003), Scheve (2004), Howarth and Rommerskirchen (2016), Aklin et al. (2022). Closely related are Andre et al. (2022) who study how people think about macroeconomic shocks, which we also ask about to assess people's knowledge of the dynamics of inflation. Andre et al. (2021) study people's narratives about the recent inflation episode. We focus specifically on people's underlying understanding of the causes, consequences, and distributional impacts of inflation and the (lack of) perceived trade-offs, complementing the descriptive evidence with two experiments.

Our paper also relates to the literature on people's preferences over inflation and unemployment. Di Tella et al. (2001) correlate reported well-being with realized values of inflation and unemployment. They find that people report being happier when inflation and unemployment are low, and that at the margin, unemployment depresses reported well-being more than does inflation. This stands in contrast to the findings in our conjoint experiment, where the weight people put on inflation is larger than that on unemployment. Hofstetter and Rosas (2021) and Jayadev (2006) focus on preference heterogeneity across the income distribution, showing that lower-income respondents have a higher distaste for unemployment relative to inflation than higher-income ones. Other papers exploring inflation preferences are Coles and Chen (1990), Wolfers (2003), Jayadev (2008), Gandelman and Hernandez-Murillo (2009), Ruprah and Luengas (2011), Blanchflower et al. (2014), and Hübner and Klemm (2015). We do not use well-being or other indirect survey measures but instead a conjoint experiment to quantify people's preferences over inflation and unemployment.

Although we cover inflation expectations only briefly in this paper, there is a large literature on inflation expectations, reviewed in Weber et al. (2022) (see also Coibion et al. (2018), Angelico and Giacomo (2019), Cavallo et al. (2017), D'Acunto et al. (2019), D'Acunto et al. (2021), Bruine de Bruin et al. (2011), Goldfayn-Frank and Wohlfart (2020), Malmendier and Nagel (2015), Binder et al. (2023), Binder et al. (2022), and Kim and Binder (2023)).

Finally, our paper adds to the body of work using surveys to understand how people think about key economic phenomena and policies such as taxation (Stantcheva, 2021), climate change policies (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022), and trade policy (Stantcheva, 2022).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our sample and survey. Section 3 discusses people’s perceptions of inflation’s dynamics, causes, consequences, distributional impacts, and induced trade-offs. Section 4 presents respondents’ preferences over inflation and unemployment, their policy views, and the results from the information experiment. Section 5 concludes.

2 Sample and Survey

2.1 Data collection and sample

We collected responses online between March and May 2024 via the survey platform Lucid.¹ These respondents are compensated based on their agreements with their respective survey panels, receiving rewards such as points, perks for partnering programs with hotels, stores, or airlines, or cash incentives. The survey took on average 33 minutes to complete, with a median time of 29 minutes (see Appendix Figure A1 for the distribution of survey duration).

We obtained 3,055 responses in total. We drop from the sample those who misreport their age or gender relative to the information provided by the survey company (359 respondents). Moreover, we manually check responses to open-ended questions and drop respondents providing bot-like or nonsensical answers. We also drop respondents providing identical values to the perception and expectation of both inflation and unemployment. Finally, we drop respondents saying that they want to both increase and decrease interest rates to combat inflation, leaving us with a final sample size of 2,264. We established specific quotas, for age, income, gender, and race. We also included screening questions at the beginning of the survey to identify and filter out inattentive respondents. Individuals failing the screening check were promptly removed from the survey and were not permitted to continue. We also excluded respondents who did not reside in the United States.

Table 5 presents a comparison between the characteristics of our sample and those of the US population. Our sample closely mirrors the targeted criteria by construction. Along non-targeted criteria, such as education status, family structure, employment status, political affiliations (Republicans, Independent, and Democrats), and voting preferences in the 2020 election (Biden vs. Trump), our sample aligns well with the US population. However, it is worth noting that, like most online surveys, there is a slight overrepresentation of unemployed respondents, as discussed in *Stantcheva (2023)*. Additionally, the proportion of Democrat respondents in our sample is relatively higher compared to Independents than in the overall US population, although the voting

¹Lucid functions as a survey marketplace that aggregates respondents from diverse panels.

behavior in the 2020 election closely matches.

2.2 Survey structure

Figure 1 summarizes the survey structure. The full questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.4. The survey questions are designed to avoid priming respondents. For example, even if economic theory or evidence clearly indicates the direction of an effect, our survey questions include a bilateral scale that enables respondents to express their perspective on the direction of that effect. We now provide more details on each survey block. The survey starts with a consent form and basic demographic information that includes age, gender, income, and race.

1. Perceptions and expectations about inflation and unemployment. We collected information on the respondents' perceptions and expectations of inflation and unemployment in the US. To avoid variation in answers simply coming from a different understanding of the concepts of inflation and unemployment, in both cases we first provided a precise definition of these variables. This is important because there is a widespread confusion between unemployment rates and the share of people not working (which includes the unemployed and those out of the labor force, see Alesina et al. (2023)). To ensure comparability with previous work on inflation, we used the formulation of the Survey of Consumer Expectations.²

2. Conjoint experiment: eliciting preferences over inflation and unemployment. We used a conjoint experiment to study the respondents' preferences for inflation and unemployment, i.e., how they trade them off. We describe this in detail in Section 4.3.


3. Understanding of inflation

3.1 Perceived conditional correlations between inflation and unemployment. We elicited the respondents' perceived conditional correlations between inflation and unemployment. Specifically, we asked them whether inflation and unemployment would increase, stay the same, or decrease following an increase in: interest rates, government spending, oil prices, productivity (technological improvements), and wages.

3.2. Perceived causes of inflation. In this section, respondents were asked about the causes of inflation using both open- and closed-ended questions about specific events or economic phenom-

²The SCE questionnaire can be found [here](#).

FIGURE 1: SURVEY FLOW



ena traditionally viewed as inflationary. We discuss these questions and our elicitation methods in greater detail in Section 3.2.

3.3. Perceived distributional impacts of inflation This survey block asks people about the extent to which different socio-economic groups and firm types gain or lose from inflation. Specifically, we asked about income groups, age groups, occupation groups, groups defined by assets (savings and debt), and firms of different sizes.

3.4. Perceived consequences of inflation. We also ask respondents open- and closed-ended questions on the consequences of inflation on the US economy. We cover standard efficiency effects, effects on households or firms, and other effects on the US economy and discuss these questions in greater detail in Section 3.4.

4. Experimental information treatment. Half of the respondents were randomly shown a short video emphasizing the potential tradeoffs between the two objectives of price stability and output stabilization. This video is described in detail in Section 4.3 with screenshots in Figure 4 and the full script in Appendix A.4.6.

5. Perceived tradeoffs between inflation and unemployment. In this section, we study whether respondents perceive a trade-off between the two policy objectives of output and price stabilization. For instance, how necessary is it for policy makers to induce a decrease in households spending, or an increase in unemployment, in order to reduce inflation? How do policies designed to reduce unemployment typically affect inflation?

6. Policy views. This section investigates whether inflation is an important policy objective in people’s minds and what their preferred policy instruments are. Specifically, respondents were asked about: (i) the importance of price stability relative to other economic and social objectives, such as low unemployment, economic growth, civil rights, and affordable healthcare, among others; (ii) their preferred policy tools to combat inflation, including standard monetary and fiscal policy tools, but also price or wage controls, trade policy, and anti-trust policy; (iii) their support for policies aimed at helping households deal with inflation.³

³To avoid priming respondents about the importance of inflation we randomize the order in which we ask policy questions and the rest of the survey blocks. The results were not affected by this randomization.

7. Background socioeconomic questions. Finally, we collected additional detailed information about the respondents’ background socioeconomic characteristics, including: employment, education, family situation, political views, media exposure, and financial assets.

3 Understanding of Inflation

This section discusses people’s understanding of inflation ranging from basic knowledge to perceived causes, distributional impacts, and other consequences. For this section and the next ones, the main text presents figures with raw averages for groups along three dimensions (political leaning, income, and age). Appendix Table A.2 reports detailed regression results, correlating these beliefs and perceptions with the full array of individual characteristics.

3.1 Knowledge of Inflation

To first assess respondents’ knowledge of inflation, we ask them questions on the impacts of a series of aggregate macroeconomic shocks (increases in government spending, interest rates, productivity, etc.) on inflation and unemployment.

Figure 5 shows the perceived impacts on inflation and unemployment of different shocks. We can compare these answers to those that would be predicted by a standard textbook model (e.g., Galí (2015)), bearing in mind that we are eliciting a perceived “empirical” link here rather than a clean model-simulated one.⁴

Perhaps the most striking finding is that almost 57% of respondents believe that inflation will increase following an increase in interest rates, and 44% believe unemployment will rise as well. The fraction of respondents who are accurate according to a textbook New-Keynesian model is only 13%. The share who believe that higher government spending used to finance support for low-income households will decrease unemployment and increase inflation is 14%.

However, 40% of respondents believe that both inflation and unemployment will increase following an oil shock. For technological improvements, one fifth of respondents believe this will result in higher inflation and 43% that it will increase unemployment. This shock is perhaps hardest to map in a clean way to a textbook TFP shock. Finally, 54% of respondents perceive wage increases (caused by changes in labor regulation and laws) to be inflationary, and 40% think they

⁴Questions related to the impacts of interest rates, oil prices, and government spending shocks were also asked in Andre et al. (2022), in a slightly different way: *i*) they specified the intensity of the shocks, *ii*) their increase in government spending was to finance a defense program, while ours is used to finance more support for low-income households. Appendix Table A2 reports a detailed comparison of our results with theirs.

will increase unemployment. Around 26% of the respondents think both inflation and unemployment will increase.

Overall, Republican respondents are more likely to think that these shocks are inflationary and will increase unemployment, although the effects are significant mainly for the interest rate, government spending, and wage increases shocks. A similar pattern holds for Fox News viewers, even conditional on being Republican.

3.2 Perceived Causes of Inflation

We also ask respondents about their perceived causes of inflation. Given that there are many potential causes, we adopt a more sophisticated elicitation strategy, illustrated in Figure 2 and described next.⁵

3.2.1 Survey methodology

Respondents were presented with a list of seven broad economic phenomena that are potentially inflationary drivers, according to the economics literature or public discourse. They were then asked to indicate whether or not these phenomena are important or unimportant causes of inflation.⁶ We briefly outline and provide the rationale for each item on the list:

“Government spending, debt, and taxation, e.g., spending on social security, national defense, and healthcare, increases in government debt, or changes in the tax system.” In a textbook New-Keynesian model, expansionary fiscal policies can result in inflation if they push output above potential (Galí, 2015). The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level has also underlined the fundamental role of fiscal policy (Cochrane, 2022; Sims, 2011). Empirically, the evidence on the effects of fiscal policy on prices and inflation has been mixed (Fatás et al., 1999; Canzoneri et al., 2001; Perotti, 2004; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Jørgensen and Ravn, 2022; D’Alessandro et al., 2019; Edelberg et al., 1999; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014; Ben Zeev and Pappa, 2017; Caldara and Kamps, 2017; Ferrara et al., 2021). However, recent studies have re-emphasized the role of demand factors and fiscal stimulus packages for the increase in prices (di Giovanni et al., 2023; Blanchard and Bernanke, 2023; Bergholt et al., 2023; Eickmeier and Hofmann, 2022; Ascari et al., 2023; Rubbo, 2024).

⁵We started by asking an open-ended question concerning the primary causes of inflation: *“In your opinion, what are the primary causes of inflation?”*

⁶Specifically, we inquired: *“We will now list various events and economic phenomena. For each of them, please indicate whether you consider them an important cause of inflation or not. [Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]”*

“Actions by the Federal Reserve Bank, such as printing money, changing interest rates, or making announcements about future inflation and rates.” Since the seminal works of Fisher (1913), Friedman (1956) and Lucas (1980), the “quantity theory of money” - the proposition that long-run inflation is related one-for-one with long-run money growth - has been centerstage in explaining the (long-run) relation between the growth rate of money and inflation. McCallum and Nelson (2010), Sargent and Surico (2011), and Teles et al. (2016) provide recent analyses of the theory.⁷ In recent New-Keynesian models with nominal rigidities, monetary policy shapes economic activity and inflation in the short-to-medium term through interest rates (Galí, 2015; Kaplan et al., 2018; Woodford, 2003). There is a vast empirical literature on the effects of monetary policy (shocks) on output and inflation and on whether they are important quantitatively e.g., (Christiano et al., 1996; Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Romer and Romer, 2004; Uhlig, 2005; Coibion, 2012). Christiano et al. (1999) and Ramey (2016) provide extensive reviews of this and other work. McKay et al. (2016) focus on the effectiveness of Forward Guidance. More recently, Gagliardone and Gertler (2023) emphasize the role of more lenient monetary policy (coupled with oil shocks) for the Pandemic-era inflation surge. There is widespread consensus that monetary policy exerts an important role on inflation through the management of expectations and can generally have large effects; yet, it is not (or no longer) in itself a source of macroeconomic instability (Ramey, 2016).⁸

“Increases in the costs of production, due to e.g., increases in oil prices, energy prices, or to increases in the costs of inputs due to large-scale events in other countries, like wars or natural disasters, or to new laws and regulations.” A new theoretical literature on cost-push shocks emphasizes the important recessionary effects of energy price shocks in a heterogeneous agents New-Keynesian (HANK) open-economy model (Auclert et al., 2023), as compared to previous theoretical work featuring complete markets or permanent-income behavior (Blanchard and Galí, 2007b; Medina and Soto, 2005; Bodenstein et al., 2011). A series of papers considers the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks on inflation, including, among others, Hamilton (1983), Barsky and Kilian (2004), Kilian (2009), Baumeister and Hamilton (2019), and Känzig (2021). Related to the causes of the recent inflation surge, Blanchard and Bernanke (2023) emphasize the strong aggregate demand and constraints on supply for the first part of the pandemic; Gagliardone and Gertler (2023) highlight the role of oil shocks, while di Giovanni et al. (2022), Ascari et al. (2024), and Bai et al. (2024) underline the importance of shocks abroad and global supply chain bottlenecks or disruptions.

“Changes in the labor market, such as increases in unions’ bargaining power or wage increases.”

⁷Interestingly, according to a 2011 survey of AEA members, most economists broadly agree with the statement that “Inflation is caused primarily by too much growth in the money supply” (Fuller and Geide-Stevenson, 2014)

⁸Paradoxically, Ramey (2016) concludes that because monetary policy is now much more systematic and based on more information, there are fewer true monetary policy “shocks” to identify its effects in a causal sense.

Recent theoretical work by [Lorenzoni and Werning \(2023a\)](#) and [Lorenzoni and Werning \(2023b\)](#) has brought wage-price spirals and the role of disagreement over relative prices as a cause of inflation to the forefront. [Ball et al. \(2022\)](#), [Benigno and Eggertsson \(2023\)](#), [Crump et al. \(2024\)](#), [Domash and Summers \(2022\)](#) argue that the labor market did play a role in the recent surge of inflation.

“Politicians and political interests, e.g., politicians catering to special interest and lobby groups.” [Weise \(2012\)](#) looks at FOMC statements from the 70s and shows how political pressures contributed to rising inflation in that period.⁹ [Aisen and Veiga \(2006\)](#) use panel data methods from 1960 to 1999 to show that higher political instability is associated with higher inflation.

“Households spending more, due to optimism about the economy, impatience, or expectations about future price increases.” [Coibion et al. \(2023\)](#) study how consumption responds to exogenous variation in inflation expectations, finding that Dutch households significantly increase their durable spending in response to a decrease in inflation expectations. On the other hand, [Burke and Ozdagli \(2023\)](#) find that higher inflation expectations are associated with an increase in spending on durable groups for specific demographic groups, while [Duca-Radu et al. \(2021\)](#) report that households increase their readiness to spend when they expect inflation to be higher in the future. [Bachmann et al. \(2015\)](#) find little impact of higher inflation expectations on households’ readiness to spend on durables using microdata from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. [Beaudry et al. \(2024\)](#) show that changes in inflation expectations induced by supply shocks play an important role.¹⁰

“Actions by firms and businesses.” The press and social media discourse uses the term “greedflation,” which also appears as a dominant concern among respondents in answers to open-ended questions about the causes of inflation in [Stantcheva \(2024\)](#). In standard models, firms might simply be optimizing, taking into account expectations about future increases in prices. For instance, [Werning \(2022\)](#) studies the causal effects of higher inflation expectations on current inflation in a series of theoretical canonical firm-pricing models. The empirical evidence on the issue is more mixed. [Rosolia \(2021\)](#) finds that firms that are experimentally informed about inflation revise their inflation expectations but do not change their pricing or hiring decisions.¹¹

As shown in [Figure 2](#), we also asked respondents to select the two most important causes of

⁹This is the “political pressure hypothesis” ([Weise, 2012](#)), stemming from Burn’s argument that, during the 70s, the Fed did not want to frustrate “the will of Congress to which it was responsible.”

¹⁰[Jamilov et al. \(2024\)](#) explores the role played by granular sentiments, i.e., fluctuations in optimism and pessimism towards a small number of firms, in driving business cycles. Their granular sentiment index is positively associated with inflation.

¹¹[Gali and Gertler \(1999\)](#) find an important role for forward-looking behavior, but they do not use data on actual expectations but rather future realized inflation.

inflation from the previous list. For each of these groups, we then presented them with a more detailed list of causes. For example, if a respondent chose “Government spending, debt, and taxation” as one of the two most important causes of inflation from the previous list, they were asked to assess whether tax cuts, increases in social security spending, increases in debt, or higher government spending were important factors contributing to inflation. Finally, respondents were asked to specify their top cause of inflation from this more specific list.

3.2.2 Results

Table 1 summarizes the key results.

Most important broad causes of inflation. Focusing on the broad sets of causes first, Figure 6 shows that the two most commonly reported ones are “Government spending, debt, and taxation,” (for around 67% of respondents) and “increases in the costs of production” (for around 43% of respondents).¹² The Federal Reserve is also relatively frequently mentioned (by around 31% of respondents). In order of importance, the remaining causes are ranked as: Politics and politicians (22%), businesses (15%), the labor market (13%), and households (10%).

Perceived causes are somewhat divided along partisan lines, with Republican respondents more likely to attribute inflation to government and the Fed’s policies, and less likely to mention actions by firms as a top cause. Democrats tend to blame the government and the Fed less and businesses much more than Republicans do. Labor market forces and household demand are not considered key causes by any political group. While there are no major heterogeneities in perceived causes by income, when controlling for other individual characteristics, older people are significantly less likely to mention the government or changes in the labor market as top causes of inflation, while more likely to mention politicians and actions of firms and businesses as major causes of inflation compared to young people.

Figure 17 shows that respondents’ main source of news is associated with their perceived causes of inflation, even conditional on the full array of individual characteristics. Thus, Fox News viewers are significantly more likely to blame the government and less likely to blame firms and businesses, even among Republicans. The opposite holds for NPR listeners.

Most important specific causes of inflation. Figure 7 dives into the more specific causes within each category by depicting the share of respondents selecting each cause as the most important one, conditional on previously having selected the broader group as one of the top two.

¹²More detailed regression results are in Appendix Table A3.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF RESULTS ON THE PERCEIVED CAUSES OF INFLATION

| Economics Literature | Our Findings |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Phenomena with an inflationary potential emphasized by the economics literature: • changes in fiscal policy (e.g., government spending, debt, and taxation); • monetary policy actions (e.g., increasing money supply, changing interest rates, and managing inflation expectations); • increases in the costs of production (i.e., cost-push shocks); • changes in the labor market (e.g., increases in labor market tightness, increase in union power, wage-price spirals); • politicians and political interests (e.g., political pressures on central banks, political instability, politicians catering to special interest); • increases in household demand (e.g., due to sentiment or inflation expectations changes); • firms' pricing decisions (e.g., in response to inflation expectation changes). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceived as most important causes • Government spending, debt, and taxation (67%), increases in the costs of production (43%), actions by the Federal Reserve (31%), politics and politicians (22%), actions by firms and businesses (15%), changes in the labor market (13%), households spending more (10%). • Relevant heterogeneity • Republicans: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * blame the Government and Fed more; * blame firms and businesses less. • Older respondents: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * more likely to blame politicians and political interests and actions of firms and businesses; * less likely to blame the government or changes in the labor market. • Fox News viewers (opposite holds for NPR listeners): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * blame the Government more; * blame firms and businesses less. |

Under the header of government policies, increases in foreign assistance has played a major role according to people. Some partisan patterns emerge here too (see Appendix Tables A4 and A5): Republicans are more likely to perceive redistributive-type spending, such as on social security, to be the most important cause of inflation, while Democrats are more likely to attribute it to tax cuts and other types of spending (on defense and infrastructure). Within monetary policy causes, people generally believe that top causes are increases in money supply (especially among Republican respondents), *increases* in interest rates, and wrong actions by the Federal Reserve Bank (especially among Democrat respondents).

Among those who mention increases in the cost of production, the top reasons are supply chain disruptions, the pandemic, and increases in oil prices. Few respondents believe household demand is responsible for inflation, and among that group, it is by far increases in inflation expectations that are mentioned as the main cause rather than optimism. In the category of labor-market related causes, labor shortages and wage-price spirals are the most commonly chosen top causes, ahead of

wage increases due to unions or labor rights.¹³ A very polarized category by type of news source is the (less frequently selected) one of actions by firms and businesses. Republican respondents (and Fox News viewers) believe that firms increase prices due to higher inflation expectations rather than to increase profits, while the opposite is true for Democrat respondents (and CNN viewers).

The top perceived causes are broadly consistent with empirical studies on the recent surge in inflation that have highlighted the impact of aggregate demand and stimulus packages, supply chain bottlenecks, and war-related increases in the costs of production (di Giovanni et al., 2023; Blanchard and Bernanke, 2023; Bergholt et al., 2023; Eickmeier and Hofmann, 2022; Ascari et al., 2023; Rubbo, 2024; di Giovanni et al., 2022; Ascari et al., 2024; Bai et al., 2024) as well as with textbook models where government spending that pushes output above potential or cost-push shocks are inflationary (e.g., Galí (2015)).

3.3 Perceived Distributional Impacts of Inflation

3.3.1 Survey Methodology

Inflation potentially affects all parts of households' budget constraints, including consumption prices, nominal savings and debt positions, assets prices, and labor income. Households are differentially exposed to the effects of inflation based on their specific circumstances.

The recent literature has focused on different channels through which inflation might amplify inequalities. First, the relative consumption channel (heterogeneous consumption baskets) suggests that inflation will affect households differently because of the basket of goods they consume, leading to a potential “inflation inequality” (Atkin et al., 2024; Argente and Lee, 2020; Beck and Jaravel, 2020; Cavallo, 2023; Collyer et al., 2019; Jaravel and Olivi, 2021; Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2017). Jaravel (2021) provides a literature review on inflation inequality. Second, the debt devaluation (or Fisher) channel highlights that existing debt positions will matter (Doepke and Schneider, 2006; Adam and Zhu, 2016; Auclert, 2019). Third, the labor income channel arises because the incomes of different households might be adjusted for inflation to different extents, so that there will be differential impacts on their real income (Cardoso et al., 2022).

¹³Tight labor markets have been recently emphasized as an important driver of inflation (Blanchard and Bernanke, 2023; Benigno and Eggertsson, 2023).




FIGURE 2: SURVEY FLOW TO ELICIT THE PERCEIVED CAUSES OF INFLATION

Fourth, asset prices and dividend streams in response to inflationary shocks can evolve differentially and have heterogeneous impacts on households based on their portfolio composition (Del Canto et al., 2023). Cardoso et al. (2022) and Del Canto et al. (2023) compare the relative importance of the different channels and find that the consumption channel appears less important. Motivated by the above literature, we ask respondents about the differential impacts of inflation on households with different incomes, ages, occupations, and assets, and on firms of different sizes.

3.3.2 Results

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF RESULTS RELATED TO THE PERCEIVED DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF INFLATION

| Economics Literature | Our Findings |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Channels through which inflation or inflationary shocks might have unequal impacts • Relative consumption channel (or “inflation inequality”): households with different consumption baskets experience heterogeneous inflation rates. • Debt devaluation (or “Fisher”) channel: inflation redistributes real wealth from lenders to borrowers. • Labor income channel: inflation erodes nominal income and, if wages are sticky, inflation will have larger % impact on higher-incomes. • Asset channel: heterogeneous responses of asset prices and dividends to various types of inflation shocks affect households differently based on their portfolio composition. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceived distributional impacts of inflation within specific groups • <u>Income groups</u>: low-income people thought to lose more (84%) than high-income people (25%). • <u>Age groups</u>: perceived to lose uniformly. • <u>Retirees/employed/unemployed</u>: perceived to lose uniformly. • <u>Asset position groups</u>: people without savings perceived to lose more than those with savings; people with little/no debt perceived to lose less than those with debt. • <u>Firm size groups</u>: small firms thought to lose more (75%) than big corporations (25%). • Relevant heterogeneity • Republicans: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * more likely to think some groups lose from inflation (high-income people, people with savings in cash, people with flexible-rate mortgages, big firms). • High-income respondents: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * systematically perceive more adverse impacts across different groups. • Fox News viewers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * less likely to perceive adverse distributional impacts (even conditional on political leaning). |

Figure 8 summarizes the key findings (with the full regressions presented in Appendix Tables

A6-A8). Respondents believe that low-income people are much more likely to lose from inflation as compared to high-income people. 84% believe low-income people lose, while only 25% believe that high income people will. Interestingly, this is true even among high-income respondents. These perceptions can be rationalized by (at least) two different hypotheses. On the one hand, they are consistent with the literature on inflation inequality going through the consumption channel. For instance, [Jaravel \(2018\)](#) shows that between 2004 and 2015, inflation rates declined linearly across income deciles using CEX-CPI data. [Orchard \(2022\)](#), [Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl \(2017\)](#), and [Argente and Lee \(2020\)](#) also show that inflation rates have been lower for higher-income households than lower-income ones.¹⁴ On the other hand, these beliefs are also consistent with people appraising winners and losers from inflation based on (pre-existing) *levels* of, rather than *changes* in, welfare.

Respondents do not believe that inflation impacts different age groups heterogeneously. Similarly, they do not perceive retirees, the employed, and the unemployed to be affected differently. However, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that inflation affects older and younger people differentially. [Del Canto et al. \(2023\)](#) find substantial heterogeneity in welfare effects across the age distribution in response to oil-shock supply contractions. For Spain, [Cardoso et al. \(2022\)](#) also find strong heterogeneous exposure of age groups to the aforementioned channels. Older people are more exposed because they are more likely to have a positive net nominal position, so that inflation tends to redistribute wealth from the older to the young via the Fisher channel. Furthermore, older people who work have on average higher wages which, if sticky, imply that the income channel also works in the direction of hurting older people more.

Respondents believe that those without savings suffer more than others from inflation and perceive those with more cash savings as losing a little bit more than those with financial assets. Inconsistent with the debt-devaluation channel (Fisher channel), they also perceive that those with no or low debt are less likely to lose from inflation. They correctly perceive that flexible-rate mortgage owners are more negatively affected than fixed-rate ones and that credit-card debt owners might be particularly affected.

Finally, the perceived impacts on large and small firms are quite distinct. Around 20% of respondents believe that big firms will lose from inflation (in fact, 56% believe that these firms will benefit from inflation), while around 75% say small firm lose out of inflation.

There are some partisan gaps in the perceived impacts on households and firms: Republican respondents are generally more likely to believe that different groups lose from inflation, particularly so when considering the impacts on high-income people, people with savings in cash and

¹⁴It is less clear whether these unequal impacts are consistent with the other channels, depending on, for instance, how wages adjust for different income groups.

with flexible rate mortgages, and big firms. They are also less likely to think that the unemployed lose from inflation. Even conditional on political leaning, Fox News viewers are less likely to think that inflation has adverse distributional impacts (see Figure 17). Older respondents and (to a less extent) respondents out of the labor force also systematically perceive more adverse impacts from inflation across different groups. These results are summarized in Table 2.

3.4 Perceived Consequences

3.4.1 Survey Methodology

To elicit respondents' perceived consequences from inflation, we ask an open ended question¹⁵ and a series of closed-ended ones, motivated by the theoretical and empirical literatures. As for the causes of inflation, we ask respondents to both rate the importance of different consequences and then to select their most important one. We selected the list of consequences we ask about based on the literature and briefly discuss our choices here.

Shoe-leather costs. The traditional neoclassical costs or “shoe-leather costs” of inflation capture the need for and opportunity cost of more cash. These costs are generally estimated to be small (Lucas, 2000; Ireland, 2009), or moderate in the presence of market power (Kurlat, 2019; Lagos and Wright, 2005).

Resource misallocation. When prices are sticky and the economy is hit by inflationary shocks misallocation of resources arises because relative prices are distorted relative to the first best. In standard New Keynesian models, price stickiness is usually modeled à la Calvo or by assuming menu costs (Burstein and Hellwig, 2008; Galí, 2015; Woodford, 2018; Mankiw, 1985; Akerlof and Yellen, 1985).

Uncertainty and unpredictability. Inflation might impact the uncertainty and unpredictability households need to deal with (Friedman, 1977; Dibooglu and Kenc, 2009).

Complexity. Closely related but distinct are cognitive costs due to complexity such as confusion, difficulty budgeting, and costly information processing. These have been emphasized by Shiller (1997) and Stantcheva (2024).¹⁶

Broader social and economic costs. We also ask households about broader social and economic costs, which are mentioned both in the media and in earlier work on perceived costs in Shiller (1997) and Stantcheva (2024) (see also Crowe (2004)). These include decreases in trust in government, social cohesion, the value of the dollar, national prestige, GDP growth, and increases in

¹⁵“If prices increased by 10% over the next year, what would the major consequences for the US economy be?”

¹⁶The survey question asks “Does inflation make it simpler or more complicated for households to take daily economic decisions such as spending and saving? [Much more complicated; More complicated; Neither simpler nor more complicated; Simpler; Much simpler]”

inequality.

3.4.2 Results

TABLE 3: COMPARING OUR RESULTS TO THE ECONOMICS LITERATURE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF INFLATION

| Economics Literature | Our Findings |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most-studied consequences: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • shoe-leather costs; • resource misallocation. • Less-studied consequences: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • uncertainty and unpredictability; • decision-making complexity; • broader social and economic costs (decreases in trust in government, social cohesion, the value of the dollar, national prestige, GDP growth, and increases in inequality). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Top 5 most-perceived consequences: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • complexity in economic decisions (85%), shoe-leather costs (80%), decreased trust in government (70%), lower GDP growth (70%), uncertainty for households (70%). • Relevant heterogeneity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Republicans: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * perceive more adverse effects for households and businesses, and broader economic costs; * perceive less increases in inequality. • High-income respondents: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * perceive more increases in inequality and a decrease in trust for government. |

Figure 9 shows the share of respondents who consider each consequence to be important or very important and Figure 10 shows the share that rank each consequence as the most important one.¹⁷

Around 85% of respondents perceive shoe-leather costs and complexity in daily economic decisions to be major consequences of inflation. Around 70% of respondents think that inflation leads to a decreased trust in the government and that it leads to lower GDP growth. Households generally also worry about the other listed consequences.

The most important perceived consequence is by far (35%) the increased complexity in daily economic decisions (see Figure 10). This is perhaps a cost that has received relatively less attention in the economics literature, yet is first-order in people’s minds. Linking to the results in Stantcheva (2024), it is likely that the increased complexity comes in part from households’ perceived decline in living standards, which forces them to rethink economic decisions and deal with tougher budgeting choices. The second most important perceived consequence of inflation is a decrease in

¹⁷For the full regression tables, see Appendix Tables A9-A12.

social cohesion (15%).

Tables A9 and A10 show that Republican respondents appear more concerned with adverse effects for households and businesses, such as more difficult decision-making for households and firms, and with the broader economic consequences. They are significantly less likely to perceive increases in inequality as important (consistent with their lower likelihood of perceiving adverse distributional consequences from inflation).

High-income respondents are more likely to mention increases in inequality and a decrease in trust for the government. Overall, lower-income respondents are less likely to perceive negative impacts from inflation, which may a priori seem puzzling. But Stantcheva (2024) finds that when it comes to personal impacts, lower-income respondents report many more negative consequences.

3.5 Perceived Trade-offs

3.5.1 Survey Methodology

What is the relation between inflation and economic activity? Does policy face a tradeoff between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing unemployment and economic activity? These issues have been at the core of macroeconomic research for a long time and it is important to study how people understand these trade-offs.

The perceived link between inflation and unemployment or economic activity. We ask respondents a series of qualitative questions on the relation between inflation and economic activity. Specifically: “*How do you think policies designed to reduce unemployment typically affect inflation?*,” “*Do you think that inflation is most often a sign of a good, a bad economy, or neither?*,” “*In general, do you think inflation occurs more frequently during times of economic growth (booms) or economic downturns (recessions)?*,” and “*To what extent do you agree with the statement that inflation is an unfortunate side effect of positive economic developments, like higher employment and increased economic activity?*”

In the theoretical macroeconomic literature, the relation between inflation and unemployment (or economic activity) has been formalized by the Phillips curve (hereafter, PC), which has become a fundamental building block of forecasting and monetary policy. According to a standard textbook version of the PC, inflation is determined in equilibrium by inflation expectations, the output gap (or some measure of economic slack), and cost-push shocks. A large literature has estimated the slope of the PC, which represents the sensitivity of inflation to the output gap (or to deviations of unemployment from its natural rate) (see Phillips (1958), Samuelson and Solow (1960), Friedman

(1968), and Phelps (1967)).¹⁸ The findings have been mixed, ranging from very steep to essentially flat slopes. This is partly due to strong identification challenges, including the identification of exogenous variation in economic activity uncorrelated with cost-push supply shocks and with inflation expectations (Mavroeidis et al. (2014), Fitzgerald and Nicolini (2024) and McLeay and Tenreyro (2020)). Recently, leveraging regional variation in the US, Hazell et al. (2022) obtain estimates pointing towards a very flat PC, a finding echoed by Beaudry et al. (2024).

Our specific aforementioned survey questions ask people about their “reduced-form view” of the link between inflation and unemployment or economic activity (in contrast with the questions asking about the conditional impacts of specific shocks explored in Section 3.1). As is clear from the textbook version of the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), realized inflation depends not only on unemployment or other measures of economic slack, but also on inflation expectations and cost-push shocks. Respondents’ answers will reflect their views about these other factors and capture their generally perceived “empirical link.”

Policy tradeoffs. Respondents were also asked a series of questions about the tradeoffs faced by policymakers when trying to decrease inflation, specifically the extent to which it is “necessary,” when trying to reduce inflation, to (i) reduce household spending, (ii) reduce GDP growth, (iii) reduce government debt, or (iv) increase unemployment.

Recent years have witnessed changes in the perceived trade-offs by both academics and policymakers. Indeed, rather than thinking that “*managing inflation is about moving up and down a steep Phillips curve*” (Hazell et al., 2022), there has been an emphasis on the importance of alternative, complementary instruments, such as managing long-run inflation expectations (Coibion et al., 2020).¹⁹

Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement that combating inflationary pressures can be costly for policymakers, especially when price increases are caused by cost-push shocks (Blanchard and Galí, 2007a). In such cases, policymakers might have to trade off lower inflation for costly decreases in output and employment, which can be achieved through standard (demand-side) monetary and fiscal policy instruments analyzed by the macroeconomics literature (see, e.g., Galí (2015)). Supply-side interventions in response to such shocks, which might imply different types of trade-offs, have been less studied in this context. However, both public discourse and the media have recently emphasized a series of non-conventional policies, including supply-side ones, that might be salient to the general public (e.g., in the context of “greedflation”). For this reason, we

¹⁸Other important work includes Gordon (1981), Roberts (1995), Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Galí and Gertler (1999), and Sbordone (2002), Ball and Mazumder (2019), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), Stock and Watson (2020), Barnichon and Mesters (2020), Jorgensen and Lansing (2019), and Chen et al. (2020).

¹⁹See also an IMF summary of the role of expectations in the history of policy making <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/05/15/sp-role-inflation-expectations-monetary-policy-tobias-adrian>.

also asked respondents about their support for non-standard policies, discussed in Section 4.2.

3.5.2 Results

TABLE 4: COMPARING OUR RESULTS TO THE ECONOMICS LITERATURE ON THE RELATION BETWEEN INFLATION AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

| Economics Literature | Our Findings |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relation between inflation and economic activity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equilibrium relation between inflation and economic activity formalized by the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve. In equilibrium, inflation determined by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * inflation expectations; * economic slack (e.g. output gap, gap between current and potential level of unemployment); * cost-push shocks. • Policy tradeoffs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When confronted with high inflation, policy-makers can: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * induce a slowdown in economic activity (e.g., increase interest rates, announce future increases in interest rates, decrease spending/debt, increase taxes); * manage inflation expectations. • Supply side interventions in response to adverse supply shocks less studied in this context. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceived reduced-form relation between inflation and economic activity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Few respondents believe that inflation happens more often in booms than in recessions (30%), that it might be a side effect of positive economic developments (32%), or that it can be associated with a good economy (10%). • Few respondents believe policies designed to reduce unemployment increase inflation (35%). • Perceived policy tradeoffs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A minority of respondents believe it is necessary for policy makers to induce slow downs in economic activity to decrease inflation (30-40%). • A majority of respondents (62%) believe it is necessary to reduce government debt to reduce inflation. • Relevant heterogeneity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Republicans: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * less likely to think inflation can be a side effects of positive economic development. • NYT readers and CNN viewers (opposite for Fox News viewers): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * more likely to consider inflation a potential by-product of a good economy. |

Perceived link between inflation and economic activity. Figure 11 shows that 30% of respondents believe that inflation happens more often in a boom than in a recession, 32% believe that inflation is a side effect of positive economic developments, and only 10% associate inflation with a good economy. Democrats are more likely to believe that inflation can be a side effect of positive economic developments. Even conditional on political leaning, New York Times readers and CNN viewers are more likely to consider inflation a potential by-product of a good economy while Fox

News viewers are less likely to believe this (see Figure 17). 35% of respondents believe that policies designed to reduce unemployment may increase inflation. These perceptions are consistent with a generally more “stagflation”-oriented view of inflation, as also shown in Shiller (1997) and Stantcheva (2024).

Overall, we capture a nuanced view of inflation: some people do believe that inflation *can* be associated with positive economic developments, but it is not generally perceived to be a sign of a good economy.

Policy tradeoffs. Consistent with these findings, only a minority of respondents (between 30% and 40%) think that it is necessary for policy makers to induce a slowdown in economic activity to keep the inflation rate under control. Thus, respondents do not seem to think that policymakers face sharp tradeoffs when dealing with inflation. The one exception appears to be government debt, with around 62% of respondents think it is necessary to reduce government debt to reduce inflation.²⁰

3.6 (Mis-)Perceived and Expected Inflation and Unemployment

To study the correlation between inflation and unemployment perceptions and expectations and personal characteristics and beliefs, we use Huber (1964) robust regressions and different censoring levels. Appendix Table A16 shows the results for personal characteristics and Appendix Table A17 the correlations with underlying beliefs.

Older, higher-income respondents, NPR listeners, and NYT readers perceive and expect lower inflation; female respondents, Republican respondents, Fox News viewers, and those with children perceive and expect higher inflation. There is a positive correlation between expected inflation and unemployment, and the groups that perceive higher inflation also generally perceive and expect higher unemployment. Note that, although we provide the correct definition to all respondents as described in Section 2, they still substantially overestimate current unemployment (the average perceived unemployment rate is 19%). Respondents who believe the government to be one of the most important causes of inflation both perceive and expect inflation to be higher (Appendix Table A17).

²⁰Appendix Table A14 shows that those who believe that the government is among the most important causes of inflation are much more likely to perceive an inflation-debt tradeoff (column 4). The construction of the variables in the Table is explained in Section 4.2, while Appendix Table A15 reports the Romano Wolf adjusted p-value for each regressor.

4 Policy Views

4.1 Preferences over Inflation and Unemployment

We elicit people’s preferences over inflation and unemployment using a conjoint experiment. This exercise provides us with the “social indifference curves” reflecting the preferences over economic states for each given respondent or groups of respondents.

The conjoint experiment. Figure 3 provides a screenshot of a typical survey page from this experiment. Each respondent saw five questions, each describing two hypothetical economic scenarios characterized by a pair of values of inflation and unemployment. Respondents were then asked which of the scenarios they would prefer (“If you had to pick, which of the following scenarios would you prefer to live in for the next year in the US?”). We randomized the order in which we presented information about the values of inflation and the unemployment rate for each economic scenario and always control for this order in the analysis below. The values of inflation and unemployment were chosen from the universe of monthly realized values for each variable from the 1970s to today to ensure meaningful comparisons were asked.²¹

Given the misperceptions about the levels of inflation and, especially unemployment that we will document, we might wonder whether providing respondents with the actual levels of these variables would matter. Therefore, we randomly provided half of the respondents with the true values of inflation and unemployment before the conjoint experiment.

FIGURE 3: EXAMPLE QUESTION OF THE CONJOINT EXPERIMENT



²¹In the experiment, we randomize the unemployment rate between multiples of 2 in the interval [2, 16] and the inflation rate between multiples of two in the interval [0, 16]. Pairs are drawn fully randomly to allow for accurate identification, which means that some respondents can see choices where one economy is strictly dominated by the other one, i.e., has both higher unemployment and higher inflation.

Estimating the weight on inflation relative to unemployment. To analyze the responses, our level of observation is each economy within a pair shown to a respondent. Denote by p a pair of two economies e and e' . We then run the following regression:

$$Y_{e,p,i} = \psi_i + \beta_1 \Delta(\pi)_{e,e',p} + \beta_2 \Delta(u)_{e,e',p} + \varepsilon_{e,p,i}$$

where $Y_{e,p,i}$ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if economy e in pair p was chosen by individual i , $\Delta(\pi)_{e,e',p}$ ($\Delta(u)_{e,e',p}$) is the difference in inflation (unemployment) between e and e' in p , and ψ_i are individual fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the individual level. β_1 (β_2) identifies, within the same individual, the effect that a one-unit increase in inflation (unemployment) has on the probability of choosing economy e in the pair, while keeping fixed the level of unemployment (inflation). This specification is similar to the one used in [Saez and Stantcheva \(2016\)](#).

If respondents interpret both inflation and unemployment as “bads,” then we would expect $\beta_1 < 0, \beta_2 < 0$. Assuming linear preferences, the ratio of the two coefficients $\lambda = \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_2}$ identifies the marginal rate of substitution between inflation and unemployment. $\lambda > 1$ implies that respondents put more weight on inflation than on unemployment, and a higher λ captures a higher weight on inflation.

Findings: how do people weight inflation relative to unemployment? Figure 12 plots the estimated λ for the full sample and various subsamples. In the overall sample, the average weight on inflation is slightly more than twice that on unemployment. Thus, every percentage decrease in inflation seems to be worth more to respondents than a percentage decrease in unemployment. Some groups of respondents put an even higher weight on inflation relative to unemployment. These are Republican, lower income, and older respondents. Providing information on the current levels of inflation or unemployment seems to slightly decrease the weight on inflation (consistent with the fact that people tend to vastly overestimate current unemployment rates).

Appendix Figures A2-A4 report the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) for different groups, which represents by how much the probability of choosing an economy would change on average if one of the economy’s attributes switched levels. It is interpreted as the direct causal effect of a single attribute on the outcome of interest, while averaging over the distribution of other features (here, inflation or unemployment). These figures confirm the findings on inflation preferences shown in Figure 12.

4.2 Preferred Policies

Priority of inflation over other issues. Figure 13 shows the share of respondents who rank various economic and social issues as the most important policy priority. Inflation is consistently ahead of other issues, including healthcare, growth, and low unemployment. This is consistent with the results of our conjoint experiment. Interestingly, gaps between different groups appear when thinking about social issues. Thus, Democrats will tend to rank inflation as a lower priority than Republicans among social issues (but not among economic ones) and younger respondents will tend to rank it lower than older ones.

One might worry that if respondents see these questions after answering multiple questions on inflation, they might simply answer that inflation is important because the issue has been made salient to them through the survey. Therefore, we randomized the order in which respondents were asked these questions. The subsample that was asked policy views questions at the start of the survey and the subsample who was asked towards the end had very similar rankings.

Open-ended question about preferred policies to fight inflation. Before we ask respondents closed-ended questions about their support for various policies to fight inflation, we included an open-ended question to get a sense of what is top of mind for them. We group answers in topics, defined by a set of keywords. For instance, answers that belong to the *Expansionary monetary policy* topic include “Decrease interest rates” and “Print more money out perhaps”. *Contractionary fiscal policy* answers include “reduce spending and increase taxes” and “Cut down on social programs that provide money, food and housing assistance to people that are able to work but just will not.” Figure 14 shows the distribution of topics. Appendix Section A.3 shows example answers for all topics.

Monetary, fiscal, and other policies. We ask respondents about their support for a variety of policies to fight inflation. It is important to note that we explicitly repeated that respondents should pick policies they believe will reduce inflation. Therefore, the support stated also informs us about respondents’ perceived effectiveness of these policies to reduce inflation. Figure 15 summarizes the findings, grouping policies into different categories.²²

First, consistent with the misunderstanding of the effects of interest rates documented in Section 3.5, 50% of all respondents support *decreasing* interest rates to fight inflation. The share supporting increases in interest rates is significantly lower, below 20%. Support for announcing interest rate increases is somewhat higher than that for outright rate increases. Decreasing money

²²For detailed regression tables, see Appendix Tables A19-A20.

supply is supported by around 30% of all respondents. Contractionary monetary policy is significantly less supported among low-income respondents and, to a lesser extent, among Republican respondents.

Second, 60% of respondents support reducing government debt by increasing taxes on high incomes. As one might expect, there are clear partisan gaps along these dimensions, with Democrats significantly more supportive of tax increases on high-incomes to finance debt reductions. While most respondents do not support reducing spending on social programs to finance reductions in government debt, the dislike is particularly pronounced among Democrats. Republican respondents and Fox News viewers are more supportive of such cuts. Nevertheless, even among Republican respondents support is higher in absolute terms for financing debt reductions by taxes on high incomes than by reducing spending on social programs (which include Medicare).

Third, policies that target companies, such as by tightening anti-trust rules or increasing corporate taxes generate high support among Democrats and have just around majority support among Republicans too. Freezing the prices of essentials garners relatively bipartisan support. There is significantly less support for regulating wage growth. Restricting imports to curb inflation is supported by only one-third of Democrat respondents but close to one-half of Republican ones.

One policy with high support is noteworthy – increasing taxes on high-incomes to fund transfers to lower-incomes. Respondents seem to consider this policy to be anti-inflationary, perhaps because they think that higher-income people spend more. This policy garners 55% of overall support (69% among Democrats, and 44% among Republicans), but lower support among Fox News viewers.

The overall finding is that respondents support policies that are perceived to have incidental benefits such as, for instance, reducing government debt or redistributing income (by increasing taxes on high-incomes). They are much less supportive of monetary policies that directly tackle inflation such as increasing interest rates or reducing money supply. These policies perhaps appear costly to respondents and, in light of the fact that few acknowledge policy trade-offs, probably not very beneficial.

Redistributive policies. An important pillar of policies to tackle inflation are measures to dampen its impacts on households and its redistributive effects. We ask respondents about five policies to “help the most vulnerable groups after a rise in the cost of living:” (i) increasing the minimum wage, (ii) providing more vouchers for fuel, gas, and electricity to low-income people, (iii) providing vouchers for fuel, gas, and electricity to middle-income people, (iv) expanding the food stamps program, and (v) increasing cash transfers to low-income families. Figure 16 presents the

key findings.²³ There is consistently at least majority support for these policies but support is significantly higher among Democrat and lower-income respondents and, to a lesser extent, among younger respondents. It is an open empirical question how inflationary these policies are.

Policy support and beliefs about inflation. We now investigate which underlying beliefs about inflation are most strongly associated with policy support. To do so, we correlate policy support with perceived causes, consequences, distributional impacts, trade-offs, and knowledge. We capture the strength of perceived consequences in three categories: *i*) efficiency and economic costs (lower dollar value, lower GDP growth, more resource misallocation, menu costs, shoe leather costs, difficult firm decisions), *ii*) broader social and economic costs (lower trust in government, social cohesion, national prestige, and higher inequality), and *iii*) cognitive costs (higher uncertainty and complexity for households). Following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007), for each category we take the average of the z-scores of all the underlying dummy variables, and further standardize this sum to have a standard deviation of one. We similarly create two additional indices to capture people's perceived trade-offs, namely whether they perceive inflation as a by-product of a good economy and whether it is necessary for policy to reduce economic activity to fight inflation. We also construct a new variable proxying for knowledge about inflation that counts how many questions respondents answer correctly when asked about the effects of specific shocks on unemployment and inflation (according to the standard textbook models discussed in Section 3.1), excluding the productivity shock which is more ambiguous. Finally, we build an index measuring a respondent's asset exposure to inflation as captured by (a proxy of) their net nominal position. The index uses information about a respondent's short term savings, house value, assets invested in mutual funds, checking accounts, mortgages, and rent.

Tables 6-7 show the correlation between policy views and underlying beliefs about inflation.²⁴ Respondents with better knowledge of inflation (i.e., those who are better able to answer the questions on how specific shocks affect inflation and unemployment according to a textbook New-Keynesian model) are more supportive of policies that reduce money supply, increase interest rates, or increase taxes on high- and middle-income people, and less supportive of policies such as decreasing interest rates, price controls on essentials, and overall redistributive policies. Perceiving more costly consequences of inflation is generally associated with higher support for policies to reduce it (even with likely misguided ones, such as reducing interest rates). Perceived cognitive, social, and political costs seem to be more strongly linked to policy views than efficiency costs.

Respondents who believe that inflation has inequality impacts because it hurts lower-income people more than higher-income ones are generally more supportive of all redistributive policies,

²³The more detailed regressions are in Appendix Table A21.

²⁴Appendix Tables A22-A23 report the Romano Wolf adjusted p-value.

including of debt reductions financed in progressive ways (e.g., taxing higher-incomes). Regarding the perceived causes of inflation, there seems to be some logical link to policy views, although it is not very clear-cut. For instance, respondents who blame inflation on firms and businesses support increasing corporate taxes, imposing price controls, and increasing anti-trust.

Importantly, respondents who perceive inflation as a by-product of a good economy are generally more supportive of a variety of policies, such as increasing interest rates (and do not support decreasing interest rates), reducing money supply, reducing government debt through taxes on high-incomes and the middle class, increasing corporate taxes, imposing wage controls, and increasing anti-trust. They are also more supportive of redistributive policies to compensate for the effects of inflation. Respondents who believe that policy faces trade-offs between reducing inflation and maintaining economic activity are also more supportive of all the policies to fight inflation, but they support decreasing instead of increasing interest rates.

4.3 Experimental Effects of Highlighting Trade-offs

As the previous sections have shown, respondents do not generally perceive stark trade-offs between reducing inflation and hurting the economy. On the contrary, only a minority views inflation as a sign of a good economy. Those who perceive the trade-offs more starkly are more supportive of a broad range of policies to fight inflation. But this link is merely a correlation. Therefore, we implement an experimental information treatment to inform a randomly selected 50% of respondents about potential trade-offs.

Information treatment. Respondents saw a video explaining, in simple terms, that inflation could arise as a byproduct of positive economic developments, or as a result of policies aimed at boosting economic activity. More broadly, we emphasized that it might not always be easy for policy-makers to combat inflation and unemployment at the same time. Figure 4 shows some screenshot from the video, the full script for which is in Appendix A.4.6. We can then study whether knowledge of these tradeoffs actually influenced people's perceptions and beliefs about the relation between inflation and other macroeconomic variables, as well as their preferences regarding economic policies to combat inflation and its redistributive effects.

First-stage effects: Does the treatment shift respondents' perceptions of the trade-offs? Figure 18 examines whether the treatment shifts respondents' perceptions of the trade-offs (i.e., the first-stage results). Respondents who saw the treatment are significantly more likely to believe that inflation happens more often in booms, is a side-effect of positive economic developments, and that it might be increased by policies to reduce unemployment and, to a lesser extent (at the



FIGURE 4: VIDEO ON THE TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

5% significance level) that inflation is often the sign of a good economy. However, the treatment does not change respondents' beliefs about policy constraints: they are not more likely to believe that it is necessary to reduce unemployment, debt, growth, or spending to reduce inflation. Thus, while respondents might be more likely to acknowledge inflation as a by-product of positive economic outcomes, they still believe it is possible for policymakers to reduce it without jeopardizing economic activity.

Second-stage effects: Does the treatment shift policy views? The treatment does not significantly shift people's policy views on policies to reduce inflation. This is consistent with the treatment not shifting people's perceptions that policy trade-offs are strictly *necessary* and the strong belief that policy makers should be able to reduce inflation without compromising unemployment or economic activity. Even though the treatment shifts people's perceptions (first-stage effects) of inflation as more of a by-product of a good economy, this shift does not seem strong enough to move policy views.²⁵ There is a mild decline in support for some redistributive policies, which seems consistent with the video shifting respondent's perceptions that inflation can be the

²⁵In that sense, the correlation documented above between perceptions of inflation as a by-product of positive economic outcomes and stronger support for policies to reduce it seems to be a correlation.

by-product of otherwise beneficial policies.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we explore people’s understanding of inflation in the United States using a new large-scale survey. We elicit in detail people’s perceptions of the causes, consequences, and distributional impacts of inflation. The main drivers of inflation identified by respondents are actions by the government, specifically increases in foreign assistance (including for war) and increases in production costs related to the COVID-19 pandemic, oil prices, and supply chain disruptions.

The perceived consequences of inflation are extensive. The most important one according to respondents is the added complexity inflation introduces to household decision-making, making “daily economic decisions more complicated.” Other significant perceived impacts include shoe-leather costs and increased economic uncertainty for households. Respondents also anticipate adverse distributional impacts of inflation, with lower-income individuals expected to bear more significant losses. We identify substantial partisan gaps in the perceptions of all these aspects of inflation.

Importantly, our findings indicate a lack of perceived trade-offs regarding inflation. Respondents view inflation as an unambiguously bad thing and very rarely as a sign of a good economy or as a by-product of positive developments. They also do not believe that policymakers face trade-offs such as having to reduce economic activity or increase unemployment to control inflation. We conducted an information experiment to explain some potential trade-offs between unemployment, economic activity, and inflation. To some extent it enhanced participants’ understanding that inflation can be a by-product of positive economic developments. However, it did not significantly shift perceptions regarding the constraints policymakers face, nor did it influence support for anti-inflationary policy measures.

Moreover, inflation is seen as a high policy priority by respondents. Our conjoint experiment to elicit people’s preferences over inflation and unemployment shows that the weight given to inflation by respondents is double that assigned to unemployment. Despite the aversion to inflation, there is scant backing for monetary tightening measures. This is consistent with the perceived lack of trade-offs and the belief that policies that reduce economic activity are not necessary to fight inflation. Instead, there is much more support for policies such as increasing corporate taxes or taxing top incomes, which are seen to also provide other benefits. There is also strong support for policies to help vulnerable households cope with inflation, even if those policies might themselves be inflationary.

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TABLE 5: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

| | Survey | US population |
|---|--------|---------------|
| Targeted quotas | | |
| Male | 0.48 | 0.49 |
| Female | 0.51 | 0.51 |
| 18-29 years old | 0.23 | 0.23 |
| 30-39 years old | 0.20 | 0.21 |
| 40-49 years old | 0.19 | 0.19 |
| 50-59 years old | 0.19 | 0.19 |
| 60-69 years old | 0.18 | 0.18 |
| \$0-\$19,999 | 0.14 | 0.13 |
| \$20,000-\$39,999 | 0.16 | 0.16 |
| \$40,000-\$69,999 | 0.21 | 0.20 |
| \$70,000-\$99,999 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| \$100,000-\$124,999 | 0.09 | 0.09 |
| \$125,000+ | 0.26 | 0.26 |
| White | 0.68 | 0.6 |
| African-American/Black | 0.13 | 0.13 |
| Hispanic/Latino | 0.10 | 0.19 |
| Asian/Asian-American | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| Non-targeted characteristics | | |
| Married | 0.46 | 0.52 |
| Single | 0.37 | 0.35 |
| Separated/Divorced | 0.13 | 0.12 |
| Widowed | 0.04 | 0.02 |
| Has children | 0.59 | 0.40 |
| Less than 4-year college | 0.62 | 0.64 |
| 4-year college/Master's | 0.34 | 0.32 |
| Professional degree | 0.04 | 0.03 |
| Employed | 0.66 | 0.70 |
| Unemployed | 0.10 | 0.03 |
| Republican | 0.28 | 0.26 |
| Democrat | 0.36 | 0.25 |
| Independent & others | 0.36 | 0.47 |
| Voted in 2020 presidential election | 0.74 | 0.61 |
| Voted for Biden in 2020 presidential election | 0.47 | 0.51 |
| Voted for Trump in 2020 presidential election | 0.43 | 0.47 |
| Sample size | 2264 | |

Notes. The table displays statistics for the overall U.S. population, as compared to the samples of respondents for the survey. Summary statistics for the U.S. population are constructed using IPUMS-CPS-ASEC data for 2022.

TABLE 6: CORRELATION BETWEEN MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY VIEWS AND BELIEFS ABOUT INFLATION

| | Monetary policy: | | | | Ways to reduce debt: | | |
|---|-------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|--|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| | Increase interest rate (1) | Reduce interest rates (2) | Reduce money supply (3) | Announce future plans for interest rate (4) | Tax high income (5) | Tax high/mid income (6) | Reduce spending on social programs (7) |
| Perceived causes of inflation | | | | | | | |
| Changes in the labor market (e.g., wage-price spirals, labor shortages) | 0.050* (0.028) | -0.040 (0.036) | 0.055* (0.033) | -0.002 (0.035) | 0.055 (0.034) | 0.007 (0.032) | 0.005 (0.032) |
| Actions by the Federal Reserve (e.g., decrease interest rate, increase money supply) | 0.019 (0.026) | 0.009 (0.031) | 0.007 (0.029) | 0.002 (0.031) | 0.069** (0.029) | -0.062** (0.027) | -0.071*** (0.026) |
| Politicians and political interests | -0.008 (0.025) | -0.036 (0.034) | -0.006 (0.030) | -0.058* (0.033) | 0.043 (0.031) | -0.007 (0.029) | -0.086*** (0.027) |
| Households spending more (e.g., because of optimism, because of increases in inflation expectations) | 0.050 (0.032) | -0.051 (0.039) | 0.039 (0.035) | -0.053 (0.037) | 0.086** (0.037) | 0.013 (0.033) | -0.109*** (0.030) |
| Actions by firms and businesses (e.g., decrease in competition, increase prices to increase profits) | -0.017 (0.024) | -0.013 (0.032) | -0.006 (0.029) | -0.002 (0.032) | 0.162*** (0.028) | 0.000 (0.029) | -0.139*** (0.024) |
| Increases in costs of production (e.g., supply chain disruptions, increases in oil prices) | 0.025 (0.023) | -0.038 (0.029) | -0.048* (0.027) | -0.051* (0.028) | 0.084*** (0.027) | 0.002 (0.025) | -0.112*** (0.024) |
| Perceived consequences of inflation | | | | | | | |
| Cognitive costs (uncertainty & complex budgeting) | 0.003 (0.009) | 0.069*** (0.012) | 0.029*** (0.011) | 0.031*** (0.012) | 0.069*** (0.012) | 0.009 (0.011) | -0.000 (0.010) |
| Political & social costs (trust in govt, social cohesion, inequality, lower natl. prestige) | 0.030*** (0.010) | 0.018 (0.013) | -0.002 (0.012) | 0.066*** (0.013) | 0.080*** (0.012) | 0.019* (0.011) | -0.001 (0.011) |
| Efficiency & economic costs (dollar value, GDP growth, resource misalloc., menu & shoeleather costs, firms daily decisions) | -0.004 (0.010) | 0.039*** (0.013) | 0.011 (0.012) | 0.045*** (0.013) | 0.002 (0.012) | -0.025** (0.012) | 0.021* (0.011) |
| Perceived distributional impacts of inflation | | | | | | | |
| Low income lost more than high income | -0.005 (0.022) | 0.055* (0.028) | -0.040 (0.026) | 0.063** (0.027) | 0.173*** (0.028) | 0.021 (0.024) | -0.107*** (0.026) |
| Knowledge of inflation | | | | | | | |
| Number of correct answers to conditional correlations | 0.032*** (0.010) | -0.022* (0.012) | 0.050*** (0.011) | 0.028** (0.012) | -0.018 (0.011) | 0.020** (0.010) | 0.020* (0.010) |
| Perceived trade-offs | | | | | | | |
| Inflation perceived as by-product of a good economy (e.g., more often in a boom) | 0.059*** (0.009) | -0.024** (0.011) | 0.042*** (0.010) | 0.039*** (0.011) | 0.053*** (0.010) | 0.026*** (0.009) | 0.005 (0.009) |
| Policy needs to reduce economic activity to fight inflation (e.g., reduce growth) | 0.001 (0.009) | 0.039*** (0.011) | 0.066*** (0.010) | 0.055*** (0.011) | 0.024** (0.010) | 0.065*** (0.010) | 0.052*** (0.010) |
| Asset exposure | | | | | | | |
| Net nominal position (in hundreds of thousands) | 0.008*** (0.002) | -0.007** (0.003) | 0.000 (0.003) | -0.001 (0.003) | -0.001 (0.003) | -0.001 (0.002) | 0.005** (0.002) |
| Observations | 2249 | 2248 | 2249 | 2249 | 2247 | 2248 | 2249 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.100 | 0.053 | 0.099 | 0.100 | 0.168 | 0.071 | 0.101 |
| ℰ(Dependent variable) | 0.180 | 0.502 | 0.307 | 0.456 | 0.598 | 0.251 | 0.238 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.384 | 0.500 | 0.461 | 0.498 | 0.491 | 0.434 | 0.426 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of the sections (causes first vs. policy views first), order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, assignment to additional information before the conjoint, treatment assignment, gender, age, political affiliation, education, income, employment status, marital status, and having kids. The omitted category for the perceived causes of inflation is “government spending, debt, and taxation”. We drop respondents who support both increasing and decreasing interest rates. The sample means are calculated only on the sample of respondents that did not see the video. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE 7: CORRELATION BETWEEN OTHER POLICY VIEWS AND BELIEFS ABOUT INFLATION

| | Policies to combat inflation: | | | | | |
|---|--|--------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Tax high income to fund low income transfers | Increase corporate taxes | Price controls on essentials | Wage controls | Limit imports | Increase antitrust |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Perceived causes of inflation | | | | | | |
| Changes in the labor market (e.g., wage-price spirals, labor shortages) | 0.097*** (0.034) | 0.036 (0.034) | 0.007 (0.036) | 0.039 (0.033) | 0.015 (0.035) | 0.052 (0.035) |
| Actions by the Federal Reserve (e.g., decrease interest rate, increase money supply) | 0.057* (0.030) | 0.059** (0.028) | 0.036 (0.030) | -0.071*** (0.027) | -0.069** (0.030) | 0.118*** (0.030) |
| Politicians and political interests | 0.029 (0.032) | 0.051* (0.031) | 0.061* (0.031) | -0.030 (0.028) | -0.018 (0.032) | 0.048 (0.032) |
| Households spending more (e.g., because of optimism, because of increases in inflation expectations) | 0.106*** (0.037) | 0.031 (0.035) | 0.046 (0.037) | 0.015 (0.034) | -0.025 (0.036) | 0.026 (0.034) |
| Actions by firms and businesses (e.g., decrease in competition, increase prices to increase profits) | 0.179*** (0.028) | 0.172*** (0.026) | 0.104*** (0.030) | -0.025 (0.027) | -0.099*** (0.030) | 0.194*** (0.030) |
| Increases in costs of production (e.g., supply chain disruptions, increases in oil prices) | 0.084*** (0.027) | 0.065** (0.026) | 0.065** (0.027) | -0.000 (0.025) | -0.082*** (0.027) | 0.101*** (0.027) |
| Perceived consequences of inflation | | | | | | |
| Cognitive costs (uncertainty & complex budgeting) | 0.069*** (0.012) | 0.068*** (0.012) | 0.070*** (0.012) | 0.010 (0.011) | 0.008 (0.012) | 0.027** (0.012) |
| Political & social costs (trust in govt, social cohesion, inequality, lower natl. prestige) | 0.059*** (0.012) | 0.054*** (0.012) | 0.022* (0.013) | -0.021* (0.011) | 0.000 (0.012) | 0.075*** (0.012) |
| Efficiency & economic costs (dollar value, GDP growth, resource misalloc., menu & shoeleather costs, firms daily decisions) | -0.001 (0.012) | 0.003 (0.012) | 0.016 (0.013) | -0.005 (0.011) | 0.030** (0.013) | 0.012 (0.013) |
| Perceived distributional impacts of inflation | | | | | | |
| Low income lost more than high income | 0.219*** (0.027) | 0.162*** (0.028) | 0.140*** (0.029) | -0.018 (0.026) | -0.039 (0.028) | 0.078*** (0.026) |
| Knowledge of inflation | | | | | | |
| Number of correct answers to conditional correlations | -0.016 (0.011) | -0.008 (0.011) | -0.036*** (0.012) | 0.016 (0.010) | 0.003 (0.012) | 0.018 (0.012) |
| Perceived trade-offs | | | | | | |
| Inflation perceived as by-product of a good economy (e.g., more often in a boom) | 0.041*** (0.010) | 0.032*** (0.010) | -0.010 (0.011) | 0.023** (0.010) | -0.011 (0.011) | 0.033*** (0.010) |
| Policy needs to reduce economic activity to fight inflation (e.g., reduce growth) | 0.047*** (0.010) | 0.039*** (0.010) | 0.058*** (0.011) | 0.096*** (0.010) | 0.070*** (0.011) | 0.056*** (0.011) |
| Asset exposure | | | | | | |
| Net nominal position (in hundreds of thousands) | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.003) | -0.005* (0.003) | 0.004 (0.002) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004* (0.003) |
| Observations | 2249 | 2248 | 2248 | 2248 | 2249 | 2249 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.171 | 0.147 | 0.088 | 0.100 | 0.069 | 0.165 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 0.554 | 0.651 | 0.618 | 0.252 | 0.354 | 0.483 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.497 | 0.477 | 0.486 | 0.434 | 0.478 | 0.500 |


Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of the sections (causes first vs. policy views first), order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, assignment to additional information before the conjoint, treatment assignment, gender, age, political affiliation, education, income, employment status, marital status, and having kids. The omitted category for the perceived causes of inflation is “government spending, debt, and taxation”. We drop respondents who support both increasing and decreasing interest rates. The sample means are calculated only on the sample of respondents that did not see the video. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE 8: CORRELATION BETWEEN REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY VIEWS AND BELIEFS ABOUT INFLATION

| | Policies to combat redistributive impact of inflation: | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | Increase minimum wage (1) | Increase vouchers for low income (2) | Increase vouchers for mid income (3) | Increase food stamps (4) | Increase low income transfers (5) |
| Perceived causes of inflation | | | | | |
| Changes in the labor market (e.g., wage-price spirals, labor shortages) | 0.015 (0.034) | 0.046 (0.033) | 0.057 (0.036) | 0.067** (0.034) | 0.041 (0.035) |
| Actions by the Federal Reserve (e.g., decrease interest rate, increase money supply) | -0.031 (0.029) | 0.056** (0.028) | 0.029 (0.030) | 0.048* (0.028) | 0.034 (0.030) |
| Politicians and political interests | 0.012 (0.029) | 0.043 (0.030) | 0.085*** (0.032) | 0.072** (0.029) | 0.061* (0.031) |
| Households spending more (e.g., because of optimism, because of increases in inflation expectations) | 0.054 (0.036) | 0.073** (0.035) | 0.075* (0.039) | 0.132*** (0.035) | 0.072* (0.038) |
| Actions by firms and businesses (e.g., decrease in competition, increase prices to increase profits) | 0.106*** (0.028) | 0.080*** (0.029) | 0.104*** (0.031) | 0.092*** (0.028) | 0.120*** (0.030) |
| Increases in costs of production (e.g., supply chain disruptions, increases in oil prices) | 0.051* (0.026) | 0.106*** (0.026) | 0.097*** (0.028) | 0.102*** (0.025) | 0.084*** (0.027) |
| Perceived consequences of inflation | | | | | |
| Cognitive costs (uncertainty & complex budgeting) | 0.046*** (0.011) | 0.076*** (0.012) | 0.048*** (0.012) | 0.060*** (0.011) | 0.055*** (0.012) |
| Political & social costs (trust in govt, social cohesion, inequality, lower natl. prestige) | 0.032*** (0.012) | 0.025** (0.012) | 0.018 (0.013) | 0.034*** (0.012) | 0.005 (0.012) |
| Efficiency & economic costs (dollar value, GDP growth, resource misalloc., menu & shoeleather costs, firms daily decisions) | -0.017 (0.012) | -0.015 (0.012) | -0.005 (0.013) | 0.000 (0.012) | -0.001 (0.013) |
| Perceived distributional impacts of inflation | | | | | |
| Low income lost more than high income | 0.109*** (0.027) | 0.176*** (0.027) | 0.100*** (0.028) | 0.187*** (0.027) | 0.171*** (0.027) |
| Knowledge of inflation | | | | | |
| Number of correct answers to conditional correlations | -0.048*** (0.011) | -0.026** (0.011) | -0.050*** (0.012) | -0.015 (0.011) | -0.011 (0.012) |
| Perceived trade-offs | | | | | |
| Inflation perceived as by-product of a good economy (e.g., more often in a boom) | 0.050*** (0.010) | 0.041*** (0.010) | 0.019* (0.011) | 0.048*** (0.010) | 0.050*** (0.011) |
| Policy needs to reduce economic activity to fight inflation (e.g., reduce growth) | 0.051*** (0.010) | 0.058*** (0.010) | 0.062*** (0.011) | 0.043*** (0.010) | 0.066*** (0.011) |
| Asset exposure | | | | | |
| Net nominal position (in hundreds of thousands) | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.006** (0.003) | -0.002 (0.003) | -0.007*** (0.002) | -0.003 (0.003) |
| Observations | 2249 | 2249 | 2249 | 2249 | 2249 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.161 | 0.148 | 0.093 | 0.167 | 0.144 |
| Ɛ(Dependent variable) | 0.656 | 0.664 | 0.570 | 0.674 | 0.567 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.475 | 0.472 | 0.495 | 0.469 | 0.496 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of the sections (causes first vs. policy views first), order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, assignment to additional information before the conjoint, treatment assignment, gender, age, political affiliation, education, income, employment status, marital status, and having kids. The omitted category for the perceived causes of inflation is “government spending, debt, and taxation”. We drop respondents who support both increasing and decreasing interest rates. The sample means are calculated only on the sample of respondents that did not see the video. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


FIGURE 5: CONDITIONAL PERCEIVED CORRELATIONS BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION
 SHARE OF RESPONDENTS SAYING THAT AFTER AN INCREASE IN ...



Notes: Each dot represents the share of respondents saying that either inflation or unemployment increase or increase a lot after the corresponding shock, alongside 95% confidence intervals.

FIGURE 6: PERCEIVED CAUSES OF INFLATION

SHARE OF RESPONDENTS WHO RANK THE FOLLOWING AMONG THE TOP TWO CAUSES OF INFLATION



Notes: Each dot represents the share of respondents choosing a given cause as being among the top two causes of inflation, alongside 95% confidence intervals.


FIGURE 7: MOST IMPORTANT CAUSES OF INFLATION

SHARE OF RESPONDENTS WHO RANK THE FOLLOWING AS THE TOP CAUSE OF INFLATION FOR EACH CATEGORY



Notes: Each dot represents the share of respondents choosing a given specific cause as the most important cause of inflation in the sub-category, conditional on having selected the cause in the header as one of the two most important ones, alongside 95% confidence intervals. Respondents were shown only the two subcategories they selected before as most important (see Figure 2).


FIGURE 8: PERCEIVED DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF INFLATION
 SHARE OF RESPONDENTS SAYING THAT THE FOLLOWING GROUPS LOSE FROM INFLATION



Notes: Each dot represents the share of respondents saying that that group lost a lot or somewhat because of inflation, alongside 95% confidence intervals.

FIGURE 9: PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCES OF INFLATION


SHARE OF RESPONDENTS SAYING THESE ARE IMPORTANT OR VERY IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES OF INFLATION



Notes: Each dot represents the share of respondents whose answers are aligned with the statement listed, alongside 95% confidence intervals. “Makes budgeting harder for households” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that inflation makes daily economic decisions more complicated or much more complicated. “Increases households uncertainty” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that inflation significantly or somewhat increases households uncertainty. “forces households to have cash” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that having more cash as a consequence of inflation is a moderate or very big inconvenience. “Makes setting prices harder” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that inflation makes setting prices more difficult or much more difficult. “Makes firms decisions harder” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that inflation makes these decisions more difficult or much more difficult. “Increases resource misallocation” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that differential prices among firms slightly or greatly worsens resource use in the economy. “Slows down GDP growth” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that inflation makes the economy grow more slowly or much more slowly. “Decreases value of the dollar” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that the value of the dollar decreases or decreases a lot relative to other countries with lower inflation. “Decrease national prestige” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that inflation decreases somewhat or a lot national prestige. “Increases inequality” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that inflation is associated with a higher or much higher level of inequality. “Decreases social cohesion” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that inflation decreases somewhat or a lot social cohesion. “Decrease trust in government” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that inflation decreases somewhat or a lot trust in the government.

FIGURE 10: MOST IMPORTANT PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCES OF INFLATION




SHARE OF RESPONDENTS WHO RANK THE FOLLOWING AS THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE OF INFLATION



Notes: Each dot represents the share of respondents saying that the consequence on the row is the most important consequence of inflation, alongside 95% confidence intervals. Respondents were shown only consequences that, in earlier questions, they stated were important.


FIGURE 11: PERCEIVED TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN INFLATION AND OTHER ECONOMICS OUTCOMES

SHARE OF RESPONDENTS WHO AGREE THAT...



Notes: Each dot represents the share of respondents who agree with the statement on the corresponding row, alongside 95% confidence intervals. “Inflation happens more often in booms” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that inflation happens mostly or slightly more often in booms. “Policies to reduce unemployment may increase inflation” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent says that these policies increase or significantly increase inflation. “Inflation is a side effect of positive economic development” is an indicator equal to one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement. All the variables in the second panel are indicators equal to one if the respondent says that the trade-off listed in the row is very or extremely necessary. The sample includes only respondents who were not shown the video on the trade-offs between inflation and unemployment.


FIGURE 12: CONJOINT EXPERIMENT: IMPLIED WEIGHT ON INFLATION RELATIVE TO UNEMPLOYMENT



Notes: Each dot represents the ratio of the coefficient of the difference of inflation between two economies and the difference in unemployment between two economies, alongside 95% confidence intervals. Each regression was estimated separately for the subsamples described in the rows.


FIGURE 13: MOST IMPORTANT POLICY PRIORITY

SHARE OF RESPONDENTS WHO RANK THE FOLLOWING AS THE MOST IMPORTANT POLICY PRIORITY




Notes: Each dot represents the share of respondents saying that the element on the row is the most important policy priority, alongside 95% confidence intervals. To avoid order effects, the order in which answer options were shown to the respondent was randomized. The sample includes only respondents who were not shown the video on the trade-offs between inflation and unemployment.

FIGURE 14: “THE MOST IMPORTANT POLICY TO FIGHT INFLATION IS...”
 [OPEN-ENDED QUESTION]



Notes: Each dot represents the share of respondents who mention in the open-ended question the policy listed in the row, alongside 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes only respondents who were not shown the video on the trade-offs between inflation and unemployment.




FIGURE 15: VIEWS ON POLICIES TO COMBAT INFLATION
 SHARE OF RESPONDENTS WHO SUPPORT THE FOLLOWING



Notes: Each dot represents the share of respondents who support or support a lot the policy listed in the row, alongside 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes only respondents who were not shown the video on the trade-offs between inflation and unemployment.


FIGURE 16: VIEWS ON POLICIES TO COMBAT THE REDISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT OF INFLATION

SHARE OF RESPONDENTS WHO SUPPORT THE FOLLOWING




Notes: Each dot represents the share of respondents who support or support a lot the policy listed in the row, alongside 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes only respondents who were not shown the video on the trade-offs between inflation and unemployment.

FIGURE 17: NEWS, UNDERSTANDING, AND POLICY VIEWS




Notes: Each dot represents the coefficient of the corresponding news source for the outcome on the corresponding row, alongside 95% confidence intervals. Coefficients for the same outcome are estimated jointly in a regression including demographic controls, treatment indicators, order indicators, and controls for the news sources not listed in the figure. See Appendix A.4 for the questions.

FIGURE 18: FIRST STAGE OF TREATMENT: SHIFTING PERCEPTIONS OF TRADE-OFFS



Notes: Each dot represents the coefficient of the treatment in a regression where the outcome is described in each row, demographic controls are included, and errors are robust, alongside 95% confidence intervals.

FIGURE 19: SECOND STAGE OF TREATMENT: SHIFTING POLICY PREFERENCES



Notes: Each dot represents the coefficient of the treatment in a regression where the outcome is described in each row, demographic controls are included, and errors are robust, alongside 95% confidence intervals.

ONLINE APPENDIX

for

“People’s Understanding of Inflation”

by Alberto Binetti, Francesco Nuzzi, and Stefanie Stantcheva

A.1 Survey Time Distribution






FIGURE A1: TIME DISTRIBUTION OF SURVEY ANSWERS

A.2 Additional Results




(A) FULL SAMPLE




(B) BY INCOME

FIGURE A2: AMCE ESTIMATION



(A) BY POLITICAL LEANING



(B) BY AGE

FIGURE A3: AMCE ESTIMATION




FIGURE A4: AMCE ESTIMATION BY INFORMATION EXPOSURE

TABLE A1: IMPACT OF DIFFERENT SHOCKS ON INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

| | Interest rate increases Inflation (1) | increase Unemployment (2) | Government spending increases Inflation (3) | for low income transfers increase Unemployment (4) | Oil prices increases Inflation (5) | increase Unemployment (6) | Technological improvement Inflation (7) | decreasing costs increase Unemployment (8) | Wage increases Inflation (9) | increase Unemployment (10) |
|------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|---|--|--|---------------------------------|---|--|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Female | 0.072*** (0.022) | -0.059*** (0.022) | -0.053*** (0.022) | -0.003 (0.021) | -0.003 (0.018) | 0.014 (0.022) | 0.054*** (0.018) | -0.060*** (0.022) | -0.063*** (0.022) | -0.067*** (0.021) |
| 30-49 years old | -0.011 (0.030) | 0.001 (0.031) | 0.023 (0.031) | -0.015 (0.029) | 0.018 (0.027) | -0.015 (0.031) | 0.011 (0.026) | -0.059* (0.030) | -0.004 (0.031) | 0.025 (0.029) |
| 50-69 years old | -0.080** (0.035) | 0.032 (0.036) | 0.112*** (0.035) | 0.004 (0.034) | 0.115*** (0.029) | 0.021 (0.036) | -0.049* (0.029) | 0.012 (0.035) | 0.104*** (0.035) | 0.120*** (0.034) |
| Independent | 0.058** (0.025) | 0.047* (0.026) | 0.095*** (0.026) | 0.016 (0.024) | 0.017 (0.021) | 0.023 (0.026) | 0.047** (0.021) | 0.081*** (0.026) | 0.053** (0.026) | 0.089*** (0.024) |
| Republican | 0.070** (0.028) | 0.090*** (0.029) | 0.150*** (0.028) | 0.094*** (0.027) | 0.041* (0.022) | 0.021 (0.029) | 0.014 (0.023) | 0.064** (0.028) | 0.113*** (0.028) | 0.115*** (0.027) |
| College Degree | -0.082*** (0.026) | 0.021 (0.026) | 0.017 (0.025) | -0.032 (0.024) | -0.005 (0.019) | -0.059** (0.026) | -0.071*** (0.020) | 0.024 (0.026) | 0.028 (0.026) | 0.055** (0.025) |
| Studied economics | 0.005 (0.027) | 0.063** (0.028) | 0.043 (0.027) | 0.009 (0.026) | 0.009 (0.021) | 0.045 (0.028) | -0.026 (0.022) | -0.071*** (0.027) | 0.016 (0.027) | -0.010 (0.026) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | -0.039 (0.026) | -0.073*** (0.027) | 0.102*** (0.027) | 0.020 (0.025) | 0.061*** (0.021) | -0.010 (0.027) | -0.004 (0.022) | 0.053** (0.027) | 0.066** (0.027) | -0.007 (0.025) |
| Income >125k | -0.029 (0.034) | -0.045 (0.035) | 0.106*** (0.034) | -0.005 (0.033) | 0.079*** (0.026) | 0.031 (0.034) | 0.003 (0.028) | 0.047 (0.035) | 0.093*** (0.034) | 0.077** (0.033) |
| Has children | 0.003 (0.025) | -0.003 (0.025) | 0.012 (0.025) | 0.004 (0.024) | 0.008 (0.020) | 0.012 (0.026) | -0.018 (0.021) | -0.031 (0.026) | 0.020 (0.025) | -0.046* (0.024) |
| Unemployed | -0.008 (0.037) | -0.014 (0.037) | 0.051 (0.038) | -0.084** (0.033) | -0.002 (0.032) | -0.055 (0.037) | -0.001 (0.030) | -0.080** (0.036) | 0.003 (0.039) | -0.038 (0.034) |
| Out of labor force | 0.027 (0.027) | -0.018 (0.028) | 0.050* (0.027) | -0.004 (0.026) | 0.054*** (0.020) | -0.011 (0.028) | -0.026 (0.022) | -0.004 (0.028) | -0.000 (0.028) | 0.013 (0.027) |
| CNN | 0.016 (0.026) | 0.004 (0.027) | -0.041 (0.026) | -0.011 (0.025) | 0.007 (0.021) | -0.019 (0.027) | 0.024 (0.021) | 0.014 (0.026) | 0.010 (0.027) | -0.015 (0.025) |
| Fox News | 0.024 (0.024) | 0.044* (0.025) | 0.087*** (0.024) | 0.104*** (0.024) | -0.043** (0.019) | 0.067*** (0.025) | 0.062*** (0.020) | -0.028 (0.025) | 0.005 (0.025) | 0.061*** (0.024) |
| Social media | 0.021 (0.025) | 0.037 (0.025) | 0.029 (0.025) | 0.009 (0.024) | 0.016 (0.019) | 0.047* (0.025) | 0.013 (0.019) | 0.032 (0.025) | 0.025 (0.025) | -0.001 (0.024) |
| NPR | -0.089*** (0.031) | 0.021 (0.032) | -0.001 (0.032) | -0.010 (0.029) | 0.022 (0.024) | 0.031 (0.032) | 0.017 (0.025) | 0.042 (0.032) | 0.046 (0.031) | -0.015 (0.031) |
| NYT | -0.007 (0.031) | -0.044 (0.032) | -0.040 (0.031) | -0.039 (0.030) | -0.030 (0.026) | 0.010 (0.032) | 0.026 (0.025) | 0.005 (0.031) | -0.032 (0.031) | -0.016 (0.029) |
| WSJ | -0.060* (0.032) | 0.070** (0.032) | 0.040 (0.031) | 0.051 (0.031) | -0.020 (0.026) | 0.029 (0.032) | 0.053** (0.026) | -0.010 (0.032) | 0.027 (0.032) | 0.070** (0.031) |
| Observations | 2248 | 2248 | 2248 | 2248 | 2247 | 2248 | 2248 | 2247 | 2248 | 2248 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.061 | 0.017 | 0.053 | 0.022 | 0.051 | 0.010 | 0.040 | 0.029 | 0.030 | 0.044 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 0.571 | 0.446 | 0.545 | 0.329 | 0.810 | 0.441 | 0.207 | 0.434 | 0.545 | 0.355 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.628 | 0.458 | 0.462 | 0.305 | 0.767 | 0.417 | 0.218 | 0.393 | 0.477 | 0.311 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.528 | 0.476 | 0.588 | 0.324 | 0.835 | 0.486 | 0.194 | 0.457 | 0.600 | 0.439 |
| Mean democrat | 0.528 | 0.403 | 0.455 | 0.283 | 0.792 | 0.425 | 0.196 | 0.385 | 0.489 | 0.290 |
| Mean republican | 0.599 | 0.490 | 0.649 | 0.411 | 0.847 | 0.466 | 0.196 | 0.455 | 0.619 | 0.415 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.605 | 0.445 | 0.489 | 0.347 | 0.719 | 0.430 | 0.256 | 0.451 | 0.507 | 0.306 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.576 | 0.444 | 0.523 | 0.324 | 0.772 | 0.439 | 0.235 | 0.405 | 0.515 | 0.330 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.545 | 0.448 | 0.602 | 0.324 | 0.903 | 0.451 | 0.147 | 0.455 | 0.600 | 0.410 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.495 | 0.497 | 0.498 | 0.470 | 0.393 | 0.497 | 0.405 | 0.496 | 0.498 | 0.478 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A2: IMPACT OF DIFFERENT SHOCKS ON INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT: COMPARISON WITH [ANDRE ET AL. \(2022\)](#)

| | Decreases | Stays the same | Increases |
|--|-----------|----------------|-----------|
| Increase in oil prices | | | |
| Inflation | | | |
| Andre et al. (2022) | 21% | 9% | 71% |
| Our estimate | 7% | 12% | 81% |
| Unemployment | | | |
| Andre et al. (2022) | 25% | 14% | 62% |
| Our estimate | 13% | 43% | 44% |
| <hr/> | | | |
| Increase in interest rate | | | |
| Inflation | | | |
| Andre et al. (2022) | 30% | 13% | 55% |
| Our estimate | 27% | 16% | 57% |
| Unemployment | | | |
| Andre et al. (2022) | 33% | 16% | 51% |
| Our estimate | 17% | 39% | 44% |
| <hr/> | | | |
| Increase in government spending | | | |
| Inflation | | | |
| Andre et al. (2022) | 29% | 16% | 55% |
| Our estimate | 19% | 26% | 54% |
| Unemployment | | | |
| Andre et al. (2022) | 43% | 18% | 39% |
| Our estimate | 30% | 37% | 33% |

TABLE A3: CAUSES: TOP CAUSES OF INFLATION

| | Among 2 most important cause of inflation: | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--|----------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| | Government | Fed | Changes in labor market | Politics | Households | Firms | Increases in costs |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Female | 0.042** (0.020) | -0.081*** (0.021) | -0.009 (0.015) | 0.023 (0.019) | 0.011 (0.013) | -0.028* (0.016) | 0.043* (0.022) |
| 30-49 years old | -0.032 (0.028) | 0.027 (0.029) | -0.016 (0.022) | 0.007 (0.025) | -0.006 (0.018) | 0.027 (0.021) | -0.006 (0.031) |
| 50-69 years old | -0.074** (0.033) | 0.052 (0.033) | -0.058** (0.024) | 0.055* (0.030) | -0.000 (0.021) | 0.053** (0.024) | -0.027 (0.036) |
| Independent | 0.055** (0.025) | -0.001 (0.024) | -0.016 (0.018) | 0.030 (0.022) | 0.000 (0.016) | -0.061*** (0.020) | -0.008 (0.026) |
| Republican | 0.111*** (0.027) | 0.069** (0.027) | -0.025 (0.019) | -0.005 (0.024) | -0.013 (0.017) | -0.131*** (0.019) | -0.007 (0.029) |
| College Degree | -0.029 (0.024) | 0.051** (0.024) | -0.032* (0.017) | -0.021 (0.022) | -0.002 (0.015) | 0.009 (0.018) | 0.025 (0.026) |
| Studied economics | 0.011 (0.026) | 0.021 (0.027) | 0.006 (0.019) | -0.020 (0.022) | -0.028* (0.016) | 0.014 (0.020) | -0.005 (0.028) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | -0.041 (0.025) | 0.005 (0.024) | 0.042** (0.018) | 0.018 (0.024) | -0.012 (0.017) | 0.023 (0.019) | -0.035 (0.027) |
| Income >125k | -0.059* (0.032) | 0.022 (0.032) | 0.036 (0.024) | -0.015 (0.029) | -0.021 (0.021) | 0.016 (0.024) | 0.021 (0.035) |
| Has children | 0.034 (0.024) | -0.055** (0.024) | 0.013 (0.017) | 0.016 (0.022) | -0.003 (0.016) | -0.010 (0.018) | 0.005 (0.025) |
| Unemployed | -0.031 (0.034) | -0.008 (0.034) | -0.010 (0.024) | 0.025 (0.033) | -0.004 (0.022) | 0.014 (0.026) | 0.014 (0.038) |
| Out of labor force | -0.047* (0.026) | -0.044* (0.026) | 0.016 (0.019) | 0.001 (0.024) | 0.022 (0.018) | 0.008 (0.019) | 0.043 (0.028) |
| CNN | -0.030 (0.025) | -0.003 (0.025) | 0.028 (0.018) | -0.010 (0.023) | -0.016 (0.017) | -0.005 (0.020) | 0.035 (0.027) |
| Fox News | 0.156*** (0.022) | 0.003 (0.023) | -0.019 (0.017) | 0.014 (0.022) | -0.013 (0.015) | -0.094*** (0.016) | -0.046* (0.025) |
| Social media | 0.016 (0.024) | -0.007 (0.024) | 0.007 (0.016) | 0.025 (0.022) | -0.004 (0.015) | 0.005 (0.019) | -0.042* (0.025) |
| NPR | -0.087*** (0.031) | -0.045 (0.029) | -0.016 (0.022) | 0.015 (0.027) | 0.038* (0.020) | 0.098*** (0.026) | -0.003 (0.032) |
| NYT | -0.037 (0.030) | -0.027 (0.030) | 0.052** (0.024) | -0.025 (0.026) | 0.025 (0.019) | -0.004 (0.022) | 0.016 (0.032) |
| WSJ | -0.001 (0.031) | 0.056* (0.030) | -0.005 (0.024) | -0.025 (0.027) | -0.008 (0.019) | -0.015 (0.022) | -0.002 (0.032) |
| Observations | 2238 | 2238 | 2238 | 2238 | 2238 | 2238 | 2238 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.062 | 0.020 | 0.006 | 0.007 | -0.002 | 0.060 | 0.004 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 0.664 | 0.307 | 0.127 | 0.223 | 0.097 | 0.152 | 0.429 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.705 | 0.267 | 0.100 | 0.241 | 0.112 | 0.145 | 0.430 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.611 | 0.351 | 0.137 | 0.179 | 0.085 | 0.161 | 0.476 |
| Mean democrat | 0.588 | 0.288 | 0.144 | 0.203 | 0.105 | 0.217 | 0.454 |
| Mean republican | 0.749 | 0.359 | 0.110 | 0.224 | 0.083 | 0.065 | 0.410 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.737 | 0.257 | 0.157 | 0.207 | 0.104 | 0.120 | 0.418 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.666 | 0.310 | 0.143 | 0.204 | 0.092 | 0.151 | 0.433 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.618 | 0.333 | 0.092 | 0.253 | 0.099 | 0.172 | 0.432 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.472 | 0.461 | 0.333 | 0.417 | 0.297 | 0.359 | 0.495 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A4: TOP CAUSES OF INFLATION FOR GOVERNMENT AND FEDERAL RESERVE

| | Government | | | | | Federal reserve | | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Income tax cuts | Increases in foreign assistance | Increases in government spending | Increases in assistance for tough times | Increases in social security | Decreases in interest rates | Increases in interest rates | Increases in money supply | Wrong actions | Unclear announcements |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
| Female | -0.043*** (0.016) | 0.099*** (0.027) | -0.013 (0.021) | -0.019 (0.020) | -0.024* (0.015) | -0.007 (0.023) | 0.092** (0.037) | -0.147*** (0.040) | 0.049 (0.034) | 0.012 (0.015) |
| 30-49 years old | 0.031 (0.022) | 0.011 (0.037) | -0.002 (0.030) | -0.016 (0.027) | -0.023 (0.019) | -0.044 (0.033) | 0.075 (0.049) | -0.105* (0.058) | 0.044 (0.047) | 0.030 (0.025) |
| 50-69 years old | -0.020 (0.023) | 0.014 (0.044) | -0.039 (0.035) | -0.003 (0.030) | 0.048* (0.025) | -0.058* (0.034) | 0.089 (0.056) | -0.086 (0.065) | 0.043 (0.050) | 0.012 (0.028) |
| Independent | -0.025 (0.022) | 0.010 (0.033) | -0.010 (0.027) | 0.007 (0.023) | 0.018 (0.017) | -0.024 (0.025) | -0.058 (0.046) | 0.128*** (0.047) | -0.056 (0.041) | 0.011 (0.018) |
| Republican | -0.054** (0.022) | 0.040 (0.035) | -0.046* (0.026) | 0.024 (0.026) | 0.036* (0.020) | 0.000 (0.026) | -0.025 (0.047) | 0.126** (0.049) | -0.110*** (0.042) | 0.008 (0.021) |
| College Degree | -0.040** (0.018) | -0.030 (0.033) | 0.001 (0.024) | 0.012 (0.023) | 0.056*** (0.020) | 0.022 (0.025) | 0.051 (0.042) | -0.033 (0.044) | -0.038 (0.037) | -0.002 (0.015) |
| Studied economics | -0.010 (0.020) | -0.094*** (0.035) | 0.053* (0.028) | 0.032 (0.026) | 0.018 (0.020) | -0.022 (0.023) | 0.027 (0.046) | 0.019 (0.049) | -0.004 (0.040) | -0.021 (0.016) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | 0.026 (0.020) | -0.026 (0.033) | -0.035 (0.026) | 0.018 (0.022) | 0.016 (0.017) | 0.010 (0.025) | -0.016 (0.048) | 0.067 (0.050) | -0.047 (0.044) | -0.014 (0.022) |
| Income >125k | 0.046* (0.025) | -0.014 (0.043) | -0.033 (0.034) | 0.003 (0.030) | -0.002 (0.023) | 0.029 (0.032) | 0.010 (0.059) | 0.101 (0.063) | -0.096* (0.052) | -0.044* (0.023) |
| Has children | -0.030 (0.019) | 0.052* (0.031) | -0.035 (0.024) | 0.006 (0.023) | 0.007 (0.016) | -0.005 (0.023) | 0.046 (0.043) | -0.022 (0.043) | -0.009 (0.038) | -0.010 (0.016) |
| Unemployed | 0.032 (0.029) | -0.109** (0.046) | 0.027 (0.039) | 0.064* (0.035) | -0.014 (0.021) | -0.007 (0.034) | 0.055 (0.069) | -0.144** (0.065) | 0.069 (0.062) | 0.028 (0.033) |
| Out of labor force | 0.012 (0.020) | 0.022 (0.035) | -0.047* (0.026) | 0.011 (0.024) | 0.002 (0.020) | -0.002 (0.028) | 0.002 (0.049) | -0.030 (0.050) | -0.030 (0.042) | 0.025 (0.024) |
| CNN | 0.008 (0.019) | 0.020 (0.033) | -0.020 (0.026) | -0.014 (0.023) | 0.006 (0.018) | 0.007 (0.029) | -0.000 (0.043) | -0.027 (0.048) | 0.030 (0.042) | -0.010 (0.017) |
| Fox News | -0.016 (0.016) | -0.021 (0.030) | 0.007 (0.023) | 0.009 (0.021) | 0.021 (0.016) | -0.021 (0.024) | -0.025 (0.042) | -0.033 (0.044) | 0.080** (0.037) | -0.000 (0.018) |
| Social media | -0.013 (0.019) | 0.016 (0.032) | -0.003 (0.025) | -0.004 (0.021) | 0.003 (0.017) | 0.003 (0.020) | -0.022 (0.043) | 0.072 (0.044) | -0.054 (0.038) | 0.000 (0.020) |
| NPR | 0.011 (0.027) | -0.012 (0.043) | -0.028 (0.034) | 0.010 (0.030) | 0.019 (0.024) | 0.019 (0.035) | -0.084 (0.053) | 0.024 (0.058) | 0.065 (0.054) | -0.024 (0.023) |
| NYT | 0.061** (0.025) | -0.061 (0.039) | -0.038 (0.035) | -0.036 (0.029) | -0.001 (0.020) | 0.012 (0.029) | 0.005 (0.049) | 0.008 (0.056) | -0.002 (0.047) | -0.022 (0.021) |
| WSJ | -0.051** (0.025) | -0.021 (0.039) | 0.012 (0.035) | 0.056* (0.030) | 0.005 (0.023) | 0.017 (0.029) | -0.102** (0.049) | -0.004 (0.056) | 0.079* (0.044) | 0.010 (0.024) |
| Observations | 1487 | 1487 | 1487 | 1487 | 1487 | 686 | 686 | 686 | 686 | 686 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.026 | 0.032 | 0.022 | 0.010 | 0.033 | -0.011 | 0.030 | 0.042 | 0.017 | 0.005 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 0.100 | 0.500 | 0.179 | 0.141 | 0.080 | 0.071 | 0.299 | 0.373 | 0.217 | 0.039 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.080 | 0.531 | 0.204 | 0.129 | 0.056 | 0.045 | 0.307 | 0.324 | 0.267 | 0.057 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.128 | 0.472 | 0.165 | 0.139 | 0.097 | 0.099 | 0.307 | 0.406 | 0.173 | 0.015 |
| Mean democrat | 0.135 | 0.475 | 0.209 | 0.131 | 0.051 | 0.086 | 0.349 | 0.280 | 0.259 | 0.026 |
| Mean republican | 0.068 | 0.537 | 0.132 | 0.155 | 0.108 | 0.071 | 0.283 | 0.420 | 0.177 | 0.049 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.097 | 0.459 | 0.213 | 0.157 | 0.073 | 0.098 | 0.203 | 0.489 | 0.180 | 0.030 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.131 | 0.487 | 0.193 | 0.136 | 0.053 | 0.070 | 0.300 | 0.359 | 0.222 | 0.048 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.067 | 0.545 | 0.139 | 0.135 | 0.114 | 0.060 | 0.343 | 0.332 | 0.230 | 0.035 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.299 | 0.500 | 0.383 | 0.348 | 0.271 | 0.258 | 0.458 | 0.484 | 0.413 | 0.195 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). For each category of cause, regressions are estimated only for respondents selecting that category as one of the top two most important causes of inflation. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A5: TOP CAUSES OF INFLATION FOR INCREASES IN COSTS, INCREASES IN HOUSEHOLD SPENDING, LABOR MARKET, AND FIRMS

| | Increases in costs | | | | Households | | | Labor market | | | Firms | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|--|--------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|--|---|---------------------------------|
| | Increases in oil prices (1) | Increases in energy prices (2) | Disruptions in other countries (3) | Supply chain disruptions (4) | The pandemic (5) | Increases in inflation expectations (6) | Optimism (7) | wage increases due to unions (8) | Labor shortages (9) | Wage-price spirals (10) | Increases in prices due to increases in inflation expectations (11) | Increases in prices to increase profits (12) | Decrease in competition (13) |
| Female | 0.040 (0.029) | -0.045* (0.024) | -0.004 (0.030) | -0.045 (0.030) | 0.054* (0.029) | 0.073 (0.073) | -0.073 (0.073) | -0.082 (0.056) | -0.028 (0.062) | 0.111* (0.060) | 0.052 (0.053) | -0.044 (0.053) | -0.008 (0.036) |
| 30-49 years old | 0.096** (0.040) | 0.076** (0.031) | -0.086** (0.037) | -0.056 (0.042) | -0.030 (0.042) | -0.219** (0.104) | 0.219** (0.104) | 0.066 (0.076) | -0.039 (0.087) | -0.027 (0.084) | 0.027 (0.069) | 0.066 (0.083) | -0.093* (0.056) |
| 50-69 years old | 0.121** (0.049) | 0.034 (0.033) | -0.138*** (0.042) | 0.043 (0.046) | -0.059 (0.050) | -0.214* (0.115) | 0.214* (0.115) | 0.153 (0.097) | -0.168 (0.110) | 0.015 (0.107) | 0.051 (0.074) | 0.052 (0.089) | -0.103* (0.060) |
| Independent | -0.011 (0.032) | 0.029 (0.028) | 0.021 (0.026) | 0.000 (0.035) | -0.040 (0.033) | -0.030 (0.087) | 0.030 (0.087) | 0.017 (0.065) | -0.088 (0.075) | 0.071 (0.075) | -0.027 (0.049) | -0.016 (0.058) | 0.044 (0.039) |
| Republican | 0.070* (0.037) | 0.006 (0.030) | 0.026 (0.029) | -0.047 (0.036) | -0.055 (0.039) | 0.025 (0.096) | -0.025 (0.096) | 0.083 (0.082) | -0.107 (0.082) | 0.025 (0.085) | 0.124 (0.082) | -0.126 (0.089) | 0.003 (0.051) |
| College Degree | 0.009 (0.031) | 0.058** (0.028) | -0.011 (0.027) | -0.002 (0.035) | -0.054 (0.035) | -0.180** (0.091) | 0.180** (0.091) | 0.086 (0.076) | -0.128* (0.069) | 0.042 (0.075) | -0.043 (0.054) | 0.011 (0.062) | 0.032 (0.039) |
| Studied economics | -0.014 (0.036) | -0.026 (0.029) | 0.035 (0.029) | 0.001 (0.037) | 0.005 (0.035) | 0.043 (0.090) | -0.043 (0.090) | -0.022 (0.073) | -0.012 (0.080) | 0.034 (0.080) | -0.009 (0.050) | -0.078 (0.064) | 0.087 (0.053) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | -0.017 (0.036) | 0.008 (0.027) | -0.014 (0.030) | 0.020 (0.039) | 0.004 (0.034) | 0.096 (0.082) | -0.096 (0.082) | 0.051 (0.067) | -0.013 (0.083) | -0.039 (0.081) | 0.040 (0.050) | -0.037 (0.060) | -0.003 (0.034) |
| Income >125k | -0.012 (0.044) | -0.055* (0.032) | -0.030 (0.038) | 0.109** (0.048) | -0.013 (0.046) | 0.159 (0.110) | -0.159 (0.110) | 0.033 (0.086) | 0.093 (0.103) | -0.126 (0.126) | 0.071 (0.069) | -0.118 (0.081) | 0.047 (0.047) |
| Has children | -0.061* (0.036) | -0.032 (0.028) | 0.023 (0.026) | 0.037 (0.036) | 0.033 (0.031) | -0.024 (0.078) | 0.024 (0.078) | -0.006 (0.066) | -0.012 (0.079) | 0.018 (0.073) | 0.041 (0.046) | -0.028 (0.059) | -0.014 (0.040) |
| Unemployed | -0.045 (0.046) | -0.024 (0.037) | 0.041 (0.050) | 0.058 (0.046) | -0.029 (0.053) | 0.076 (0.111) | -0.076 (0.111) | 0.042 (0.116) | -0.099 (0.116) | 0.057 (0.116) | 0.058 (0.070) | -0.058 (0.082) | 0.001 (0.050) |
| Out of labor force | 0.018 (0.035) | -0.014 (0.029) | 0.029 (0.039) | 0.014 (0.039) | -0.047 (0.036) | -0.055 (0.084) | 0.055 (0.084) | -0.039 (0.077) | -0.057 (0.084) | 0.096 (0.086) | 0.058 (0.054) | -0.077 (0.067) | 0.019 (0.046) |
| CNN | 0.047 (0.037) | 0.011 (0.030) | -0.002 (0.028) | -0.015 (0.038) | -0.041 (0.038) | 0.054 (0.083) | -0.054 (0.083) | 0.063 (0.070) | -0.105 (0.085) | 0.042 (0.078) | -0.103** (0.047) | 0.139** (0.047) | -0.036 (0.034) |
| Fox News | 0.102*** (0.035) | 0.001 (0.027) | -0.041 (0.026) | -0.057* (0.034) | -0.005 (0.034) | 0.008 (0.083) | -0.008 (0.083) | 0.095 (0.072) | 0.125 (0.072) | -0.220*** (0.073) | 0.199*** (0.072) | -0.130* (0.072) | -0.069* (0.039) |
| Social media | 0.037 (0.033) | -0.039 (0.026) | 0.009 (0.027) | -0.037 (0.033) | 0.030 (0.047) | -0.093 (0.081) | 0.093 (0.081) | -0.059 (0.076) | 0.035 (0.086) | 0.024 (0.079) | -0.046 (0.042) | -0.005 (0.052) | 0.051 (0.035) |
| NPR | -0.038 (0.038) | -0.030 (0.033) | -0.022 (0.033) | 0.043 (0.042) | 0.047 (0.041) | 0.141 (0.101) | -0.141 (0.101) | -0.002 (0.087) | 0.003 (0.087) | -0.001 (0.091) | -0.010 (0.044) | 0.036 (0.057) | -0.026 (0.043) |
| NYT | 0.004 (0.041) | 0.006 (0.033) | 0.022 (0.032) | -0.043 (0.043) | 0.010 (0.043) | -0.019 (0.105) | 0.019 (0.105) | -0.051 (0.071) | 0.025 (0.086) | 0.027 (0.078) | 0.065 (0.070) | -0.134 (0.090) | 0.069 (0.068) |
| WSJ | 0.002 (0.043) | 0.089** (0.036) | -0.081** (0.033) | 0.007 (0.046) | -0.017 (0.042) | -0.033 (0.116) | 0.033 (0.116) | -0.014 (0.083) | -0.038 (0.088) | 0.052 (0.083) | 0.038 (0.071) | 0.004 (0.084) | -0.042 (0.053) |
| Observations | 961 | 961 | 961 | 961 | 961 | 218 | 218 | 283 | 283 | 340 | 340 | 340 | 340 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.016 | 0.014 | 0.018 | 0.034 | 0.017 | -0.061 | -0.061 | -0.019 | 0.027 | 0.022 | 0.048 | 0.025 | 0.006 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 0.225 | 0.142 | 0.131 | 0.275 | 0.228 | 0.720 | 0.280 | 0.251 | 0.389 | 0.360 | 0.171 | 0.747 | 0.082 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.215 | 0.109 | 0.162 | 0.257 | 0.257 | 0.676 | 0.324 | 0.197 | 0.439 | 0.364 | 0.146 | 0.802 | 0.052 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.234 | 0.142 | 0.102 | 0.197 | 0.197 | 0.755 | 0.245 | 0.269 | 0.410 | 0.321 | 0.204 | 0.656 | 0.140 |
| Mean democrat | 0.216 | 0.137 | 0.115 | 0.287 | 0.246 | 0.741 | 0.259 | 0.235 | 0.417 | 0.348 | 0.149 | 0.783 | 0.069 |
| Mean republican | 0.279 | 0.132 | 0.132 | 0.256 | 0.202 | 0.769 | 0.231 | 0.319 | 0.377 | 0.304 | 0.366 | 0.585 | 0.049 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.185 | 0.083 | 0.222 | 0.241 | 0.269 | 0.833 | 0.167 | 0.136 | 0.481 | 0.383 | 0.210 | 0.661 | 0.129 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.238 | 0.183 | 0.124 | 0.225 | 0.230 | 0.688 | 0.312 | 0.266 | 0.411 | 0.323 | 0.174 | 0.750 | 0.076 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.234 | 0.134 | 0.084 | 0.346 | 0.202 | 0.679 | 0.321 | 0.346 | 0.256 | 0.397 | 0.151 | 0.781 | 0.068 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.418 | 0.349 | 0.338 | 0.447 | 0.420 | 0.450 | 0.450 | 0.434 | 0.488 | 0.481 | 0.377 | 0.435 | 0.275 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). For each category of cause, regressions are estimated only for respondents selecting that category as one of the top two most important causes of inflation. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A6: DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS: INCOME AND AGE

| | Lose from inflation | | | | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | Low income | Medium income | High income | 18-30 yrs old | 30-65 yrs old | 65+ yrs old |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Female | -0.031** (0.016) | -0.031 (0.019) | -0.032* (0.019) | -0.023 (0.020) | 0.014 (0.019) | 0.020 (0.019) |
| 30-49 years old | 0.058** (0.025) | 0.001 (0.028) | -0.023 (0.027) | -0.088*** (0.029) | 0.098*** (0.029) | 0.183*** (0.030) |
| 50-69 years old | 0.131*** (0.026) | 0.151*** (0.030) | -0.001 (0.031) | 0.001 (0.033) | 0.200*** (0.032) | 0.343*** (0.032) |
| Independent | 0.025 (0.018) | 0.010 (0.022) | 0.013 (0.022) | 0.038 (0.024) | 0.006 (0.023) | -0.013 (0.023) |
| Republican | 0.013 (0.021) | 0.027 (0.025) | 0.075*** (0.025) | 0.037 (0.026) | 0.029 (0.025) | 0.028 (0.024) |
| College Degree | 0.069*** (0.018) | 0.025 (0.021) | -0.019 (0.022) | 0.067*** (0.023) | 0.030 (0.022) | 0.026 (0.022) |
| Studied economics | -0.039* (0.020) | -0.003 (0.023) | 0.034 (0.025) | -0.000 (0.025) | -0.024 (0.025) | 0.010 (0.024) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | 0.036* (0.020) | 0.113*** (0.023) | 0.020 (0.022) | 0.107*** (0.025) | 0.091*** (0.024) | 0.050** (0.024) |
| Income >125k | 0.027 (0.024) | 0.119*** (0.029) | 0.051* (0.030) | 0.109*** (0.031) | 0.095*** (0.030) | 0.040 (0.030) |
| Has children | -0.028 (0.017) | -0.023 (0.021) | 0.007 (0.022) | 0.002 (0.023) | -0.012 (0.022) | 0.000 (0.022) |
| Unemployed | 0.026 (0.027) | 0.058* (0.032) | -0.032 (0.030) | 0.030 (0.034) | 0.056* (0.032) | 0.003 (0.033) |
| Out of labor force | 0.064*** (0.019) | 0.033 (0.023) | 0.027 (0.025) | 0.047* (0.025) | 0.085*** (0.023) | 0.040* (0.023) |
| CNN | 0.000 (0.019) | -0.006 (0.023) | -0.055** (0.023) | -0.022 (0.025) | -0.019 (0.024) | 0.007 (0.024) |
| Fox News | -0.057*** (0.018) | -0.048** (0.021) | 0.047** (0.022) | -0.077*** (0.023) | -0.024 (0.022) | -0.050** (0.022) |
| Social media | 0.003 (0.017) | 0.032 (0.020) | 0.035 (0.022) | 0.040* (0.023) | 0.020 (0.022) | -0.007 (0.021) |
| NPR | -0.006 (0.022) | 0.034 (0.027) | 0.025 (0.027) | 0.005 (0.029) | -0.016 (0.029) | 0.020 (0.028) |
| NYT | -0.007 (0.024) | -0.019 (0.027) | 0.050* (0.028) | 0.015 (0.028) | -0.025 (0.029) | -0.043 (0.029) |
| WSJ | -0.024 (0.024) | -0.076*** (0.028) | -0.015 (0.028) | -0.047 (0.029) | -0.067** (0.029) | -0.069** (0.029) |
| Observations | 2245 | 2247 | 2247 | 2247 | 2246 | 2246 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.056 | 0.069 | 0.016 | 0.031 | 0.068 | 0.132 |
| ℰ(Dependent variable) | 0.842 | 0.741 | 0.242 | 0.692 | 0.719 | 0.694 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.833 | 0.684 | 0.212 | 0.634 | 0.679 | 0.659 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.839 | 0.761 | 0.277 | 0.718 | 0.728 | 0.702 |
| Mean democrat | 0.833 | 0.724 | 0.208 | 0.668 | 0.699 | 0.691 |
| Mean republican | 0.840 | 0.774 | 0.305 | 0.701 | 0.761 | 0.742 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.763 | 0.661 | 0.254 | 0.715 | 0.588 | 0.455 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.814 | 0.679 | 0.226 | 0.636 | 0.688 | 0.664 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.920 | 0.855 | 0.250 | 0.736 | 0.832 | 0.870 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.365 | 0.438 | 0.428 | 0.462 | 0.450 | 0.461 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A7: DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS: LABOR MARKET AND SAVINGS

| | Lose from inflation | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| | Employed | Unemployed | Retirees | Savings in cash | Savings in financial assets | No savings |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Female | -0.019 (0.019) | -0.016 (0.020) | 0.005 (0.019) | -0.040* (0.022) | 0.060*** (0.022) | 0.056*** (0.020) |
| 30-49 years old | 0.006 (0.028) | 0.023 (0.028) | 0.141*** (0.029) | 0.003 (0.031) | 0.021 (0.031) | 0.043 (0.030) |
| 50-69 years old | 0.157*** (0.031) | 0.034 (0.032) | 0.302*** (0.031) | 0.153*** (0.035) | 0.115*** (0.036) | 0.124*** (0.033) |
| Independent | 0.019 (0.023) | -0.010 (0.022) | 0.004 (0.022) | 0.015 (0.025) | 0.028 (0.026) | -0.003 (0.023) |
| Republican | 0.032 (0.025) | -0.092*** (0.026) | 0.021 (0.024) | 0.071** (0.028) | 0.051* (0.029) | -0.037 (0.026) |
| College Degree | -0.010 (0.022) | 0.060*** (0.023) | 0.033 (0.022) | 0.034 (0.025) | -0.028 (0.026) | 0.017 (0.023) |
| Studied economics | -0.027 (0.024) | 0.005 (0.024) | -0.012 (0.024) | 0.009 (0.027) | -0.023 (0.028) | 0.013 (0.026) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | 0.116*** (0.024) | 0.005 (0.024) | 0.079*** (0.023) | 0.041 (0.027) | 0.043 (0.027) | 0.023 (0.024) |
| Income >125k | 0.097*** (0.030) | 0.034 (0.030) | 0.065** (0.029) | 0.025 (0.034) | 0.054 (0.034) | -0.015 (0.031) |
| Has children | -0.042* (0.022) | 0.026 (0.023) | -0.030 (0.021) | -0.029 (0.025) | -0.027 (0.026) | 0.027 (0.023) |
| Unemployed | -0.002 (0.033) | 0.040 (0.033) | 0.016 (0.032) | 0.010 (0.038) | -0.053 (0.037) | 0.033 (0.034) |
| Out of labor force | 0.004 (0.024) | 0.050* (0.025) | 0.039* (0.022) | 0.009 (0.027) | -0.036 (0.029) | 0.046* (0.025) |
| CNN | -0.003 (0.024) | 0.069*** (0.024) | 0.009 (0.023) | -0.008 (0.026) | 0.005 (0.027) | 0.030 (0.024) |
| Fox News | -0.036 (0.022) | -0.055** (0.022) | -0.056*** (0.021) | -0.068*** (0.024) | 0.003 (0.025) | -0.065*** (0.023) |
| Social media | 0.054** (0.022) | 0.011 (0.022) | 0.038* (0.020) | 0.034 (0.025) | 0.014 (0.026) | 0.030 (0.023) |
| NPR | 0.066** (0.027) | 0.016 (0.027) | 0.027 (0.026) | 0.054* (0.030) | -0.021 (0.032) | 0.019 (0.029) |
| NYT | -0.017 (0.029) | -0.030 (0.029) | -0.039 (0.028) | 0.027 (0.031) | -0.019 (0.031) | -0.051* (0.030) |
| WSJ | -0.029 (0.029) | 0.025 (0.028) | -0.053* (0.029) | 0.007 (0.032) | -0.074** (0.032) | -0.017 (0.030) |
| Observations | 2247 | 2247 | 2246 | 2247 | 2246 | 2245 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.056 | 0.025 | 0.108 | 0.025 | 0.024 | 0.036 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 0.731 | 0.729 | 0.737 | 0.607 | 0.481 | 0.699 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.678 | 0.723 | 0.696 | 0.573 | 0.460 | 0.705 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.727 | 0.760 | 0.739 | 0.619 | 0.474 | 0.671 |
| Mean democrat | 0.703 | 0.769 | 0.730 | 0.585 | 0.455 | 0.708 |
| Mean republican | 0.761 | 0.652 | 0.769 | 0.651 | 0.530 | 0.682 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.680 | 0.696 | 0.550 | 0.551 | 0.411 | 0.612 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.671 | 0.733 | 0.699 | 0.552 | 0.443 | 0.672 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.823 | 0.746 | 0.890 | 0.698 | 0.564 | 0.781 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.444 | 0.445 | 0.440 | 0.489 | 0.500 | 0.459 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A8: DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS: DEBT AND FIRMS

| | Lose from inflation | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | Credit card debt | Fixed rate mortgage | Flexible rate mortgage | Low debt | Big firms | Small firms |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Female | 0.064*** (0.020) | 0.041* (0.022) | -0.019 (0.019) | -0.009 (0.022) | 0.013 (0.018) | 0.001 (0.019) |
| 30-49 years old | 0.039 (0.029) | 0.076** (0.031) | 0.108*** (0.030) | 0.038 (0.030) | 0.030 (0.025) | 0.014 (0.028) |
| 50-69 years old | 0.149*** (0.032) | 0.028 (0.036) | 0.254*** (0.031) | 0.085** (0.035) | 0.085*** (0.030) | 0.114*** (0.030) |
| Independent | 0.020 (0.023) | 0.023 (0.025) | 0.049** (0.023) | 0.016 (0.025) | 0.022 (0.020) | -0.019 (0.023) |
| Republican | 0.014 (0.025) | 0.059** (0.028) | 0.061** (0.025) | 0.031 (0.028) | 0.086*** (0.024) | 0.027 (0.025) |
| College Degree | 0.023 (0.022) | -0.053** (0.025) | 0.040* (0.022) | -0.039 (0.025) | -0.006 (0.021) | 0.049** (0.021) |
| Studied economics | -0.036 (0.025) | -0.017 (0.027) | -0.018 (0.024) | -0.026 (0.027) | 0.051** (0.024) | -0.027 (0.024) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | 0.040* (0.024) | -0.038 (0.027) | 0.100*** (0.024) | -0.010 (0.027) | -0.004 (0.021) | 0.086*** (0.024) |
| Income >125k | 0.048 (0.031) | -0.034 (0.034) | 0.074** (0.030) | 0.012 (0.034) | 0.017 (0.028) | 0.075** (0.030) |
| Has children | -0.036 (0.022) | -0.019 (0.026) | -0.028 (0.021) | -0.040 (0.025) | 0.012 (0.021) | -0.029 (0.022) |
| Unemployed | 0.024 (0.034) | 0.002 (0.037) | 0.001 (0.035) | -0.014 (0.037) | -0.032 (0.029) | 0.027 (0.033) |
| Out of labor force | 0.075*** (0.024) | -0.024 (0.028) | 0.050** (0.023) | 0.010 (0.028) | -0.015 (0.024) | 0.044* (0.023) |
| CNN | 0.019 (0.024) | 0.062** (0.027) | -0.019 (0.024) | -0.010 (0.026) | -0.024 (0.021) | -0.009 (0.023) |
| Fox News | -0.019 (0.022) | 0.030 (0.025) | -0.047** (0.021) | -0.019 (0.024) | 0.054** (0.021) | -0.046** (0.022) |
| Social media | 0.021 (0.022) | 0.025 (0.025) | 0.034 (0.021) | 0.054** (0.025) | 0.023 (0.021) | 0.062*** (0.022) |
| NPR | 0.018 (0.028) | 0.028 (0.032) | -0.009 (0.027) | 0.014 (0.032) | -0.004 (0.027) | 0.031 (0.027) |
| NYT | -0.032 (0.028) | -0.025 (0.031) | -0.030 (0.028) | 0.025 (0.031) | -0.013 (0.026) | -0.024 (0.028) |
| WSJ | -0.060** (0.029) | 0.027 (0.032) | -0.015 (0.028) | -0.029 (0.031) | 0.026 (0.028) | -0.075*** (0.028) |
| Observations | 2247 | 2246 | 2247 | 2246 | 2246 | 2246 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.045 | 0.013 | 0.087 | 0.001 | 0.023 | 0.041 |
| ℰ(Dependent variable) | 0.720 | 0.412 | 0.723 | 0.386 | 0.221 | 0.747 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.707 | 0.443 | 0.660 | 0.398 | 0.194 | 0.697 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.718 | 0.385 | 0.735 | 0.388 | 0.253 | 0.760 |
| Mean democrat | 0.717 | 0.399 | 0.686 | 0.374 | 0.187 | 0.741 |
| Mean republican | 0.733 | 0.436 | 0.773 | 0.400 | 0.293 | 0.787 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.632 | 0.391 | 0.561 | 0.355 | 0.174 | 0.678 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.673 | 0.444 | 0.684 | 0.372 | 0.214 | 0.710 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.822 | 0.392 | 0.862 | 0.418 | 0.258 | 0.828 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.449 | 0.492 | 0.448 | 0.487 | 0.415 | 0.435 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A9: IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES OF INFLATION I

| | Important consequence of inflation: | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| | Makes budgeting harder | Makes households more uncertain | Shoe-leather cost | Makes firms decisions harder | Causes resource misallocation | Slows down GDP growth | Menu costs |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Female | -0.008 (0.016) | -0.014 (0.020) | 0.020 (0.017) | 0.012 (0.022) | -0.025 (0.021) | -0.014 (0.020) | -0.007 (0.022) |
| 30-49 years old | 0.025 (0.024) | 0.042 (0.030) | 0.046* (0.026) | 0.009 (0.031) | 0.052* (0.030) | 0.062** (0.030) | 0.039 (0.031) |
| 50-69 years old | 0.091*** (0.026) | 0.121*** (0.033) | 0.123*** (0.028) | 0.112*** (0.035) | 0.149*** (0.034) | 0.166*** (0.033) | 0.070** (0.035) |
| Independent | 0.037** (0.019) | 0.016 (0.024) | -0.011 (0.020) | 0.036 (0.026) | 0.050** (0.025) | 0.033 (0.024) | 0.003 (0.026) |
| Republican | 0.035* (0.020) | 0.035 (0.026) | 0.001 (0.022) | 0.131*** (0.028) | 0.063** (0.027) | 0.076*** (0.026) | 0.104*** (0.028) |
| College Degree | 0.036** (0.017) | 0.090*** (0.023) | 0.060*** (0.019) | 0.062** (0.025) | 0.017 (0.024) | 0.057** (0.023) | 0.047* (0.026) |
| Studied economics | 0.003 (0.019) | 0.015 (0.025) | -0.045** (0.022) | -0.014 (0.027) | 0.034 (0.026) | -0.018 (0.025) | 0.009 (0.027) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | 0.051** (0.020) | 0.059** (0.025) | 0.034 (0.022) | 0.035 (0.027) | 0.023 (0.026) | 0.024 (0.025) | 0.048* (0.027) |
| Income >125k | 0.068*** (0.025) | 0.093*** (0.031) | 0.022 (0.027) | 0.104*** (0.034) | 0.025 (0.033) | 0.018 (0.032) | 0.067* (0.034) |
| Has children | 0.003 (0.018) | 0.006 (0.024) | 0.001 (0.020) | -0.011 (0.025) | 0.015 (0.025) | 0.045* (0.023) | -0.010 (0.025) |
| Unemployed | 0.060** (0.026) | 0.033 (0.035) | 0.040 (0.029) | -0.052 (0.038) | 0.026 (0.037) | -0.034 (0.036) | 0.007 (0.038) |
| Out of labor force | 0.016 (0.020) | 0.024 (0.025) | 0.022 (0.021) | -0.000 (0.027) | 0.039 (0.026) | 0.015 (0.025) | 0.035 (0.028) |
| CNN | 0.021 (0.019) | 0.000 (0.025) | -0.006 (0.021) | 0.051* (0.026) | 0.015 (0.026) | -0.004 (0.025) | -0.010 (0.027) |
| Fox News | -0.000 (0.017) | -0.055** (0.023) | -0.041** (0.019) | 0.050** (0.024) | 0.004 (0.023) | -0.065*** (0.022) | 0.053** (0.025) |
| Social media | 0.043** (0.017) | 0.022 (0.023) | 0.007 (0.019) | 0.051** (0.025) | 0.067*** (0.024) | 0.031 (0.023) | 0.062** (0.025) |
| NPR | -0.001 (0.022) | 0.035 (0.028) | 0.061*** (0.023) | 0.010 (0.031) | 0.086*** (0.029) | 0.014 (0.029) | -0.013 (0.032) |
| NYT | -0.042* (0.023) | -0.058** (0.030) | -0.042* (0.025) | 0.021 (0.031) | 0.017 (0.030) | -0.082*** (0.030) | 0.038 (0.032) |
| WSJ | -0.011 (0.023) | -0.002 (0.030) | -0.006 (0.025) | -0.005 (0.032) | -0.080*** (0.031) | -0.009 (0.030) | 0.005 (0.032) |
| Observations | 2247 | 2247 | 2247 | 2247 | 2247 | 2247 | 2247 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.027 | 0.036 | 0.046 | 0.044 | 0.039 | 0.050 | 0.023 |
| ̐(Dependent variable) | 0.849 | 0.696 | 0.819 | 0.584 | 0.644 | 0.692 | 0.552 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.811 | 0.638 | 0.791 | 0.505 | 0.611 | 0.661 | 0.484 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.877 | 0.751 | 0.830 | 0.675 | 0.671 | 0.711 | 0.607 |
| Mean democrat | 0.825 | 0.683 | 0.823 | 0.550 | 0.615 | 0.660 | 0.531 |
| Mean republican | 0.872 | 0.719 | 0.833 | 0.675 | 0.686 | 0.746 | 0.637 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.790 | 0.599 | 0.724 | 0.514 | 0.538 | 0.566 | 0.503 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.834 | 0.678 | 0.802 | 0.557 | 0.622 | 0.671 | 0.557 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.901 | 0.773 | 0.894 | 0.655 | 0.730 | 0.792 | 0.577 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.358 | 0.460 | 0.385 | 0.493 | 0.479 | 0.462 | 0.497 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A10: IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES OF INFLATION II

| | Important consequence of inflation: | | | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Decreases value of the dollar | Decreases national prestige | Increases inequality | Decreases social cohesion | Decreases trust in government |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Female | -0.035* | -0.023 | -0.014 | -0.061*** | -0.020 |
| | (0.021) | (0.021) | (0.022) | (0.022) | (0.020) |
| 30-49 years old | 0.102*** | 0.026 | -0.054* | 0.046 | 0.046 |
| | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.029) |
| 50-69 years old | 0.246*** | 0.215*** | -0.061* | 0.141*** | 0.141*** |
| | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.035) | (0.035) | (0.032) |
| Independent | 0.060** | 0.053** | -0.047* | -0.019 | 0.008 |
| | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.023) |
| Republican | 0.123*** | 0.066** | -0.089*** | -0.010 | 0.034 |
| | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.025) |
| College Degree | 0.049** | 0.077*** | 0.121*** | 0.103*** | 0.030 |
| | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.026) | (0.022) |
| Studied economics | 0.002 | -0.039 | 0.036 | 0.024 | -0.008 |
| | (0.025) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.024) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | 0.066*** | 0.066** | 0.057** | 0.039 | 0.071*** |
| | (0.025) | (0.027) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.024) |
| Income >125k | 0.056* | 0.061* | 0.132*** | 0.068** | 0.107*** |
| | (0.032) | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.034) | (0.030) |
| Has children | -0.018 | -0.038 | -0.060** | -0.032 | -0.018 |
| | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.023) |
| Unemployed | -0.052 | -0.023 | 0.118*** | 0.010 | 0.063* |
| | (0.037) | (0.037) | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.034) |
| Out of labor force | 0.038 | -0.004 | 0.067** | 0.030 | 0.034 |
| | (0.025) | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.024) |
| CNN | -0.018 | 0.009 | 0.044* | 0.005 | -0.012 |
| | (0.025) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.024) |
| Fox News | -0.069*** | -0.009 | -0.077*** | -0.054** | -0.070*** |
| | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.022) |
| Social media | 0.035 | 0.051** | -0.016 | 0.066*** | 0.026 |
| | (0.023) | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.022) |
| NPR | 0.054* | 0.060** | 0.144*** | 0.121*** | 0.060** |
| | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.028) |
| NYT | -0.021 | -0.070** | 0.023 | -0.041 | -0.059** |
| | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.029) |
| WSJ | -0.033 | -0.013 | 0.037 | -0.009 | 0.027 |
| | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.029) |
| Observations | 2247 | 2247 | 2247 | 2247 | 2247 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.088 | 0.061 | 0.074 | 0.050 | 0.045 |
| ̅(Dependent variable) | 0.637 | 0.585 | 0.475 | 0.481 | 0.720 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.584 | 0.522 | 0.405 | 0.416 | 0.667 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.657 | 0.616 | 0.583 | 0.557 | 0.763 |
| Mean democrat | 0.578 | 0.541 | 0.540 | 0.502 | 0.710 |
| Mean republican | 0.722 | 0.641 | 0.395 | 0.480 | 0.749 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.480 | 0.472 | 0.497 | 0.374 | 0.611 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.596 | 0.524 | 0.474 | 0.466 | 0.693 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.776 | 0.716 | 0.463 | 0.562 | 0.815 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.481 | 0.493 | 0.500 | 0.500 | 0.449 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A11: MOST IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES OF INFLATION I

| | Most important consequence of inflation: | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--|---------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| | Makes budgeting harder | Makes households more uncertain | Shoe-leather cost | Makes firms decisions harder | Causes resource misallocation | Slows down GDP growth | Menu costs |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Female | 0.072*** (0.022) | -0.004 (0.006) | 0.012 (0.011) | 0.000 (0.008) | -0.020 (0.014) | 0.010 (0.014) | -0.009 (0.011) |
| 30-49 years old | 0.007 (0.030) | 0.011 (0.007) | -0.036** (0.017) | -0.003 (0.013) | -0.012 (0.019) | 0.003 (0.021) | 0.008 (0.017) |
| 50-69 years old | 0.042 (0.035) | 0.015 (0.010) | -0.030 (0.021) | -0.014 (0.014) | 0.016 (0.022) | -0.032 (0.023) | -0.007 (0.018) |
| Independent | -0.018 (0.026) | 0.006 (0.007) | 0.027** (0.012) | 0.008 (0.010) | 0.003 (0.016) | -0.011 (0.016) | -0.028* (0.015) |
| Republican | -0.002 (0.029) | -0.010 (0.007) | 0.038*** (0.014) | 0.009 (0.011) | 0.005 (0.019) | -0.007 (0.018) | -0.057*** (0.014) |
| College Degree | 0.039 (0.026) | 0.006 (0.007) | 0.003 (0.012) | -0.007 (0.009) | 0.014 (0.016) | -0.035** (0.016) | 0.013 (0.014) |
| Studied economics | 0.002 (0.028) | -0.000 (0.008) | -0.014 (0.013) | 0.013 (0.012) | 0.000 (0.018) | -0.011 (0.017) | 0.006 (0.015) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | 0.018 (0.027) | 0.002 (0.006) | -0.005 (0.014) | 0.007 (0.010) | 0.004 (0.018) | -0.021 (0.018) | 0.016 (0.014) |
| Income >125k | 0.031 (0.034) | -0.010 (0.008) | -0.002 (0.016) | -0.005 (0.011) | -0.008 (0.023) | -0.020 (0.022) | 0.035* (0.019) |
| Has children | -0.003 (0.026) | -0.013* (0.007) | 0.023* (0.012) | 0.015 (0.011) | -0.001 (0.017) | -0.001 (0.017) | -0.012 (0.013) |
| Unemployed | -0.041 (0.037) | -0.018*** (0.005) | 0.030 (0.022) | -0.011 (0.013) | 0.020 (0.026) | -0.016 (0.024) | 0.040* (0.022) |
| Out of labor force | -0.049* (0.029) | 0.002 (0.007) | 0.000 (0.014) | -0.014 (0.009) | -0.010 (0.018) | -0.005 (0.017) | 0.043*** (0.016) |
| CNN | 0.017 (0.027) | 0.012* (0.007) | 0.003 (0.013) | 0.011 (0.011) | -0.028 (0.017) | 0.019 (0.017) | -0.006 (0.014) |
| Fox News | -0.046* (0.025) | -0.001 (0.006) | 0.005 (0.013) | -0.000 (0.009) | 0.005 (0.016) | -0.003 (0.015) | -0.019 (0.013) |
| Social media | -0.003 (0.026) | 0.007 (0.008) | -0.007 (0.014) | 0.004 (0.009) | 0.011 (0.016) | -0.012 (0.015) | -0.009 (0.014) |
| NPR | -0.011 (0.032) | 0.009 (0.009) | -0.016 (0.014) | 0.005 (0.013) | 0.012 (0.022) | -0.040** (0.019) | 0.050** (0.021) |
| NYT | -0.030 (0.030) | -0.006 (0.006) | 0.024 (0.016) | -0.007 (0.012) | 0.008 (0.021) | 0.014 (0.020) | 0.023 (0.018) |
| WSJ | -0.023 (0.031) | -0.003 (0.005) | -0.034** (0.016) | 0.014 (0.013) | 0.002 (0.022) | 0.004 (0.022) | -0.008 (0.018) |
| Observations | 2054 | 2054 | 2054 | 2054 | 2054 | 2054 | 2054 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.010 | 0.001 | 0.006 | 0.008 | -0.003 | 0.005 | 0.025 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 0.339 | 0.015 | 0.061 | 0.034 | 0.109 | 0.100 | 0.067 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.303 | 0.014 | 0.073 | 0.028 | 0.104 | 0.115 | 0.061 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.365 | 0.009 | 0.051 | 0.029 | 0.107 | 0.092 | 0.087 |
| Mean democrat | 0.353 | 0.016 | 0.043 | 0.031 | 0.104 | 0.111 | 0.094 |
| Mean republican | 0.342 | 0.005 | 0.077 | 0.037 | 0.116 | 0.095 | 0.028 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.293 | 0.008 | 0.080 | 0.045 | 0.099 | 0.118 | 0.070 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.335 | 0.016 | 0.046 | 0.042 | 0.097 | 0.113 | 0.073 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.373 | 0.017 | 0.064 | 0.018 | 0.127 | 0.076 | 0.058 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.473 | 0.120 | 0.239 | 0.181 | 0.311 | 0.300 | 0.250 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A12: MOST IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES OF INFLATION II

| | Most important consequence of inflation: | | | | |
|------------------------------|--|-----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Decreases value of the dollar | Decreases national prestige | Increases inequality | Decreases social cohesion | Decreases trust in government |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Female | 0.005 (0.008) | 0.002 (0.007) | -0.010 (0.012) | -0.052*** (0.017) | -0.006 (0.005) |
| 30-49 years old | -0.031*** (0.012) | -0.012 (0.011) | 0.002 (0.017) | 0.055** (0.022) | 0.008 (0.008) |
| 50-69 years old | -0.036*** (0.013) | -0.008 (0.013) | -0.011 (0.020) | 0.066** (0.026) | 0.000 (0.008) |
| Independent | 0.004 (0.009) | 0.005 (0.008) | -0.010 (0.014) | 0.018 (0.018) | -0.002 (0.006) |
| Republican | -0.008 (0.009) | 0.010 (0.009) | -0.019 (0.016) | 0.042** (0.020) | -0.000 (0.007) |
| College Degree | -0.007 (0.009) | -0.010 (0.007) | 0.000 (0.014) | -0.002 (0.020) | -0.016*** (0.005) |
| Studied economics | 0.001 (0.010) | 0.014 (0.010) | 0.004 (0.016) | -0.017 (0.019) | 0.000 (0.006) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | -0.024** (0.011) | 0.011 (0.008) | -0.015 (0.014) | 0.008 (0.021) | -0.001 (0.007) |
| Income >125k | -0.016 (0.013) | -0.007 (0.009) | -0.001 (0.018) | 0.004 (0.027) | 0.000 (0.010) |
| Has children | 0.002 (0.009) | 0.009 (0.007) | -0.000 (0.012) | -0.006 (0.020) | -0.014** (0.006) |
| Unemployed | -0.037*** (0.010) | 0.018 (0.014) | 0.001 (0.021) | 0.009 (0.029) | 0.006 (0.011) |
| Out of labor force | -0.009 (0.010) | 0.002 (0.008) | -0.015 (0.015) | 0.061*** (0.023) | -0.006 (0.005) |
| CNN | 0.001 (0.010) | 0.009 (0.009) | -0.028* (0.015) | -0.014 (0.020) | 0.003 (0.007) |
| Fox News | 0.015 (0.010) | 0.009 (0.008) | 0.026** (0.013) | 0.007 (0.019) | 0.002 (0.006) |
| Social media | 0.002 (0.008) | 0.013** (0.006) | -0.007 (0.013) | -0.003 (0.020) | 0.005 (0.005) |
| NPR | -0.002 (0.009) | 0.017 (0.011) | -0.014 (0.019) | -0.010 (0.021) | 0.001 (0.007) |
| NYT | 0.018 (0.014) | 0.023* (0.012) | -0.032** (0.016) | -0.029 (0.023) | -0.007 (0.007) |
| WSJ | -0.013 (0.014) | 0.000 (0.011) | 0.025 (0.018) | 0.016 (0.023) | 0.019** (0.009) |
| Observations | 2054 | 2054 | 2054 | 2054 | 2054 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.020 | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.017 | 0.014 |
| √E(Dependent variable) | 0.027 | 0.022 | 0.069 | 0.146 | 0.012 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.042 | 0.019 | 0.066 | 0.160 | 0.016 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.024 | 0.013 | 0.085 | 0.130 | 0.009 |
| Mean democrat | 0.027 | 0.017 | 0.078 | 0.114 | 0.012 |
| Mean republican | 0.018 | 0.026 | 0.063 | 0.181 | 0.012 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.060 | 0.037 | 0.064 | 0.109 | 0.016 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.022 | 0.019 | 0.079 | 0.141 | 0.017 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.010 | 0.016 | 0.062 | 0.175 | 0.004 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.161 | 0.146 | 0.254 | 0.353 | 0.110 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A13: PERCEIVED TRADEOFFS

| | Necessary policy tradeoff to reduce inflation: | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--|----------------------------------|--|--|
| | Increase unemployment | Reduce spending | Reduce growth | Reduce debt | Inflation happens more often in a boom | Inflation sign of a good economy | Policies to reduce unemployment increase inflation | Inflation is a side effect of positive economic developments |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Female | -0.019 (0.020) | -0.019 (0.021) | 0.012 (0.021) | -0.009 (0.022) | -0.063*** (0.021) | -0.029** (0.014) | -0.003 (0.022) | -0.043** (0.021) |
| 30-49 years old | 0.041 (0.029) | -0.018 (0.030) | 0.027 (0.030) | 0.011 (0.030) | -0.006 (0.028) | -0.031 (0.019) | -0.048 (0.031) | -0.058** (0.029) |
| 50-69 years old | -0.050 (0.033) | -0.101*** (0.033) | -0.107*** (0.034) | 0.035 (0.035) | 0.002 (0.032) | -0.003 (0.022) | -0.024 (0.035) | -0.048 (0.033) |
| Independent | -0.047** (0.023) | -0.074*** (0.024) | -0.058** (0.024) | 0.003 (0.025) | -0.032 (0.024) | -0.007 (0.016) | -0.013 (0.025) | -0.102*** (0.024) |
| Republican | -0.004 (0.026) | -0.017 (0.027) | -0.012 (0.027) | 0.083*** (0.027) | -0.030 (0.026) | -0.009 (0.018) | 0.016 (0.028) | -0.062** (0.028) |
| College Degree | -0.052** (0.023) | -0.048** (0.023) | -0.057** (0.024) | 0.019 (0.025) | 0.015 (0.024) | 0.030* (0.016) | 0.050** (0.026) | -0.001 (0.025) |
| Studied economics | -0.016 (0.025) | 0.010 (0.026) | 0.019 (0.026) | -0.030 (0.027) | 0.042 (0.026) | -0.003 (0.018) | 0.024 (0.028) | 0.003 (0.026) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | -0.037 (0.024) | -0.074*** (0.026) | -0.059** (0.026) | -0.012 (0.027) | 0.028 (0.024) | -0.008 (0.016) | 0.062** (0.026) | 0.013 (0.026) |
| Income >125k | 0.004 (0.032) | -0.078** (0.033) | -0.046 (0.033) | 0.025 (0.034) | 0.031 (0.032) | 0.022 (0.021) | 0.058* (0.034) | 0.043 (0.033) |
| Has children | 0.020 (0.023) | 0.071*** (0.023) | 0.014 (0.024) | 0.000 (0.025) | -0.018 (0.023) | -0.001 (0.016) | -0.037 (0.025) | 0.024 (0.024) |
| Unemployed | 0.012 (0.035) | -0.022 (0.036) | -0.036 (0.035) | -0.028 (0.037) | -0.014 (0.034) | 0.066*** (0.025) | -0.017 (0.037) | 0.046 (0.036) |
| Out of labor force | -0.032 (0.024) | -0.085*** (0.025) | -0.061** (0.025) | -0.022 (0.028) | -0.019 (0.025) | -0.001 (0.016) | -0.012 (0.027) | -0.009 (0.027) |
| Video information treatment | -0.020 (0.019) | 0.013 (0.019) | -0.027 (0.019) | -0.013 (0.020) | 0.070*** (0.019) | 0.030** (0.013) | 0.125*** (0.021) | 0.268*** (0.020) |
| Exact values treatment | 0.001 (0.019) | 0.014 (0.020) | 0.007 (0.020) | 0.010 (0.020) | 0.005 (0.019) | 0.004 (0.013) | 0.028 (0.021) | -0.018 (0.020) |
| Policy first | -0.054** (0.022) | -0.074*** (0.023) | -0.118*** (0.022) | -0.026 (0.024) | 0.021 (0.023) | 0.007 (0.015) | -0.005 (0.024) | 0.045* (0.023) |
| Unemployment first in conjoint | -0.024 (0.019) | -0.045** (0.020) | -0.002 (0.020) | -0.014 (0.020) | 0.012 (0.019) | -0.018 (0.013) | -0.020 (0.021) | 0.001 (0.020) |
| CNN | -0.000 (0.024) | 0.010 (0.025) | 0.049* (0.026) | -0.010 (0.026) | 0.034 (0.025) | 0.015 (0.017) | 0.032 (0.026) | 0.090*** (0.026) |
| Fox News | 0.041* (0.023) | 0.063*** (0.024) | 0.036 (0.024) | 0.081*** (0.024) | -0.100*** (0.023) | -0.008 (0.015) | 0.007 (0.025) | -0.017 (0.024) |
| Social media | 0.035 (0.022) | 0.019 (0.023) | 0.033 (0.023) | 0.062** (0.025) | 0.039* (0.023) | -0.001 (0.015) | 0.045* (0.025) | 0.005 (0.024) |
| NPR | -0.026 (0.028) | -0.020 (0.030) | -0.079*** (0.029) | -0.074** (0.030) | 0.009 (0.031) | 0.048** (0.023) | -0.027 (0.032) | 0.008 (0.030) |
| NYT | 0.021 (0.029) | 0.046 (0.031) | 0.112*** (0.030) | 0.015 (0.031) | 0.050 (0.031) | 0.027 (0.021) | -0.008 (0.032) | 0.047 (0.030) |
| WSJ | 0.066** (0.030) | 0.091*** (0.031) | 0.023 (0.031) | 0.058* (0.031) | 0.064** (0.031) | 0.003 (0.022) | 0.043 (0.032) | 0.023 (0.030) |
| Observations | 2247 | 2247 | 2247 | 2246 | 2246 | 2246 | 2246 | 2248 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.066 | 0.084 | 0.081 | 0.028 | 0.033 | 0.014 | 0.030 | 0.129 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 0.315 | 0.353 | 0.372 | 0.618 | 0.280 | 0.092 | 0.345 | 0.318 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.312 | 0.361 | 0.390 | 0.585 | 0.238 | 0.074 | 0.292 | 0.394 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.356 | 0.366 | 0.363 | 0.644 | 0.331 | 0.113 | 0.387 | 0.531 |
| Mean democrat | 0.344 | 0.407 | 0.424 | 0.578 | 0.340 | 0.122 | 0.356 | 0.531 |
| Mean republican | 0.327 | 0.352 | 0.376 | 0.682 | 0.230 | 0.067 | 0.388 | 0.422 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.335 | 0.424 | 0.432 | 0.658 | 0.292 | 0.121 | 0.366 | 0.478 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.384 | 0.402 | 0.443 | 0.598 | 0.281 | 0.081 | 0.362 | 0.464 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.234 | 0.261 | 0.266 | 0.615 | 0.273 | 0.088 | 0.315 | 0.424 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.465 | 0.478 | 0.483 | 0.486 | 0.449 | 0.290 | 0.475 | 0.466 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, whether the respondent has seen information before the conjoint, race, marital status, treatment assignment, order of sections, interaction of order of sections and treatment assignment, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). The sample means are calculated only on the sample of respondents that did not see the video. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A14: CORRELATION BETWEEN PERCEIVED TRADEOFFS AND BELIEFS ABOUT INFLATION

| | Necessary policy tradeoff to reduce inflation: | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|----------------------------------|--|--|
| | Increase unemployment | Reduce spending | Reduce growth | Reduce debt | Inflation happens more often in a boom | Inflation sign of a good economy | Policies to reduce unemployment increase inflation | Inflation is a side effect of positive economic developments |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Perceived causes of inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Changes in the labor market (e.g., wage-price spirals, labor shortages) | 0.022 (0.034) | 0.040 (0.034) | -0.024 (0.034) | -0.112*** (0.036) | 0.048 (0.035) | 0.053** (0.024) | 0.026 (0.036) | 0.042 (0.035) |
| Actions by the Federal Reserve (e.g., decrease interest rate, increase money supply) | -0.111*** (0.028) | -0.056* (0.029) | -0.050* (0.030) | -0.178*** (0.031) | 0.073** (0.030) | 0.037* (0.021) | 0.005 (0.031) | 0.003 (0.030) |
| Politicians and political interests | -0.039 (0.030) | -0.034 (0.031) | -0.050 (0.031) | -0.119*** (0.033) | -0.054* (0.030) | -0.007 (0.021) | -0.040 (0.033) | -0.094*** (0.032) |
| Households spending more (e.g., because of optimism, because of increases in inflation expectations) | -0.051 (0.035) | 0.108*** (0.038) | 0.021 (0.037) | -0.166*** (0.038) | 0.108*** (0.038) | 0.085*** (0.028) | -0.059 (0.037) | 0.123*** (0.037) |
| Actions by firms and businesses (e.g., decrease in competition, increase prices to increase profits) | -0.102*** (0.029) | -0.031 (0.030) | -0.025 (0.030) | -0.227*** (0.032) | 0.036 (0.031) | 0.044** (0.022) | -0.060* (0.031) | -0.046 (0.031) |
| Increases in costs of production (e.g., supply chain disruptions, increases in oil prices) | -0.074*** (0.025) | -0.032 (0.027) | -0.055** (0.027) | -0.158*** (0.028) | 0.050* (0.027) | 0.042** (0.019) | -0.014 (0.028) | 0.073*** (0.028) |
| Perceived consequences of inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Cognitive costs (uncertainty & complex budgeting) | -0.034*** (0.012) | -0.036*** (0.012) | -0.042*** (0.012) | 0.009 (0.012) | 0.002 (0.012) | -0.008 (0.009) | 0.023* (0.012) | 0.011 (0.012) |
| Political & social costs (trust in govt, social cohesion, inequality, lower natl. prestige) | -0.033*** (0.012) | -0.030** (0.012) | -0.032*** (0.012) | 0.009 (0.013) | -0.000 (0.013) | 0.001 (0.008) | 0.003 (0.013) | -0.015 (0.012) |
| Efficiency & economic costs (dollar value, GDP growth, resource misalloc., menu & shoelather costs, firms daily decisions) | -0.021* (0.012) | -0.020 (0.012) | 0.003 (0.013) | 0.041*** (0.013) | 0.000 (0.013) | -0.006 (0.009) | 0.020 (0.013) | -0.011 (0.012) |
| Perceived distributional impacts of inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Low income lost more than high income | -0.026 (0.027) | -0.064** (0.028) | -0.065** (0.028) | -0.027 (0.027) | -0.016 (0.027) | -0.009 (0.019) | 0.051* (0.028) | 0.014 (0.027) |
| Knowledge of inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Number of correct answers to conditional correlations | 0.042*** (0.011) | 0.039*** (0.011) | 0.035*** (0.011) | 0.038*** (0.012) | 0.055*** (0.011) | 0.014* (0.008) | 0.065*** (0.012) | 0.021* (0.011) |
| Asset exposure | | | | | | | | |
| Net nominal position (in hundreds of thousands) | 0.005* (0.002) | 0.004 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.003) | 0.005** (0.003) | 0.004* (0.002) | 0.008*** (0.003) | 0.008*** (0.003) |
| Observations | 2249 | 2249 | 2249 | 2248 | 2249 | 2249 | 2249 | 2250 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.078 | 0.093 | 0.077 | 0.051 | 0.044 | 0.021 | 0.057 | 0.133 |
| SD(Dependent variable) | 0.315 | 0.350 | 0.371 | 0.621 | 0.283 | 0.094 | 0.348 | 0.319 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.465 | 0.477 | 0.483 | 0.485 | 0.451 | 0.292 | 0.477 | 0.466 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of the sections (causes first vs. policy views first), treatment assignment, gender, age, political affiliation, education, income, employment status. The omitted category for the perceived causes of inflation is “government spending, debt, and taxation”. The sample means are calculated only on the sample of respondents that did not see the video. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A15: MULTIPLE HYPOTHESIS TESTING FOR LINK BETWEEN PERCEIVED TRADE-OFFS AND BELIEFS ABOUT INFLATION

| | Necessary policy tradeoff to reduce inflation: | | | | | | | |
|--|--|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---|---|---|---|
| | Increase unemployment (1) | Reduce spending (2) | Reduce growth (3) | Reduce debt (4) | Inflation happens more often in a boom (5) | Inflation sign of a good economy (6) | Policies to reduce unemployment increase inflation (7) | Inflation is a side effect of positive economic developments (8) |
| Perceived causes of inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Changes in the labor market (e.g., wage-price spirals, labor shortages) | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.158 | 0.997 | 0.827 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Actions by the Federal Reserve (e.g., decrease interest rate, increase money supply) | 0.011 | 0.947 | 0.985 | 0.001 | 0.592 | 0.960 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Politicians and political interests | 0.999 | 1.000 | 0.990 | 0.033 | 0.966 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.184 |
| Households spending more (e.g., because of optimism, because of increases in inflation expectations) | 0.996 | 0.273 | 1.000 | 0.002 | 0.273 | 0.182 | 0.989 | 0.090 |
| Actions by firms and businesses (e.g., decrease in competition, increase prices to increase profits) | 0.042 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.001 | 1.000 | 0.924 | 0.947 | 0.995 |
| Increases in costs of production (e.g., supply chain disruptions, increases in oil prices) | 0.234 | 1.000 | 0.909 | 0.001 | 0.954 | 0.816 | 1.000 | 0.412 |
| Perceived consequences of inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Cognitive costs (uncertainty & complex budgeting) | 0.246 | 0.180 | 0.050 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.950 | 1.000 |
| Political & social costs (trust in govt, social cohesion, inequality, lower natl. prestige) | 0.282 | 0.532 | 0.420 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Efficiency costs (dollar value, GDP growth, resource misalloc., menu & shoeleather costs, firms daily decisions) | 0.985 | 0.990 | 1.000 | 0.134 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.995 | 1.000 |
| Perceived distributional impacts of inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Low income lost more than high income | 1.000 | 0.708 | 0.701 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.954 | 1.000 |
| Knowledge of inflation | | | | | | | | |
| Number of correct answers to conditional correlations | 0.016 | 0.071 | 0.133 | 0.128 | 0.002 | 0.985 | 0.001 | 0.954 |
| Number of correct answers to unconditional correlations | 0.016 | 0.071 | 0.133 | 0.128 | 0.002 | 0.985 | 0.001 | 0.954 |
| Asset exposure | | | | | | | | |
| Net nominal position (in hundreds of thousands) | 0.954 | 0.995 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.935 | 0.982 | 0.131 | 0.128 |

Notes: Each cell reports the Romano-Wolf adjusted p-value obtained with the `rwo1f2` package from Clarke (2021) for the estimates of Table A14. 1000 bootstrap iterations, seed 15112001.

TABLE A16: CORRELATES OF PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

| | Perceived inflation (1) | Perceived unemployment (2) | Expected inflation (3) | Expected unemployment (4) |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| Female | 1.229*** (0.294) | 4.529*** (0.613) | 1.002*** (0.297) | 3.979*** (0.639) |
| 30-49 years old | -0.166 (0.429) | -5.261*** (0.853) | -0.933** (0.430) | -4.234*** (0.889) |
| 50-69 years old | -1.218** (0.483) | -10.684*** (0.985) | -1.532*** (0.485) | -9.257*** (1.026) |
| Independent | 0.808** (0.340) | 1.806** (0.711) | 0.998*** (0.344) | 2.377*** (0.742) |
| Republican | 1.077*** (0.379) | 1.752** (0.789) | 1.412*** (0.383) | 1.780** (0.822) |
| College Degree | -0.346 (0.333) | -3.295*** (0.713) | -0.324 (0.338) | -3.663*** (0.742) |
| Studied economics | 0.187 (0.365) | -0.650 (0.770) | -0.045 (0.372) | 0.222 (0.803) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | -1.418*** (0.371) | -5.698*** (0.747) | -1.276*** (0.377) | -4.798*** (0.779) |
| Income >125k | -1.858*** (0.460) | -5.243*** (0.953) | -2.068*** (0.466) | -4.696*** (0.993) |
| Has children | 0.789** (0.346) | 1.091 (0.707) | 0.822** (0.348) | 1.055 (0.737) |
| Unemployed | -1.599*** (0.521) | 1.682 (1.040) | -0.636 (0.526) | 1.050 (1.085) |
| Out of labor force | -0.785** (0.367) | -2.167*** (0.778) | -0.271 (0.372) | -1.945** (0.812) |
| CNN | -0.645* (0.354) | -1.751** (0.740) | -0.378 (0.361) | -1.477* (0.772) |
| Fox News | 1.086*** (0.333) | 3.046*** (0.687) | 1.302*** (0.337) | 2.884*** (0.716) |
| Social media | 0.715** (0.337) | 0.054 (0.704) | 0.907*** (0.338) | 0.716 (0.734) |
| NPR | -0.840** (0.416) | -2.834*** (0.882) | -0.858** (0.423) | -2.996*** (0.919) |
| NYT | -1.069** (0.421) | 1.426 (0.873) | -0.809* (0.426) | 2.646*** (0.910) |
| WSJ | -0.094 (0.426) | -2.809*** (0.891) | 0.393 (0.431) | -3.310*** (0.928) |
| Observations | 1763 | 2240 | 1781 | 2239 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.069 | 0.219 | 0.081 | 0.180 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 8.113 | 18.419 | 6.547 | 18.918 |
| Mean income <40 | 9.179 | 24.897 | 7.810 | 25.333 |
| Mean income >125k | 7.177 | 13.889 | 5.349 | 14.578 |
| Mean democrat | 7.325 | 16.836 | 5.460 | 16.581 |
| Mean republican | 8.711 | 18.646 | 7.456 | 18.887 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 8.986 | 27.267 | 8.003 | 27.997 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 8.358 | 18.764 | 6.485 | 19.326 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 7.464 | 12.633 | 5.870 | 12.955 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 5.899 | 18.253 | 6.213 | 19.203 |

Notes: Controls not reported in the regression are race, marital status. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status), all other news sources not reported in the table. Inflation expectations are censored at -10 and +25. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A17: INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND PERCEIVED CAUSES OF INFLATION

| | Perceived inflation | Expected inflation | Perceived inflation | Expected inflation | Perceived inflation | Expected inflation |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Actions by the Federal Reserve | -1.846*** (0.547) | -0.689 (0.527) | -0.799* (0.415) | -0.606 (0.421) | -0.095 (0.274) | -0.450 (0.332) |
| Changes in the labor market | -1.450** (0.635) | -0.271 (0.611) | -0.915* (0.486) | -0.488 (0.491) | -0.749** (0.327) | -0.464 (0.388) |
| Politicians and political interests | 0.492 (0.582) | 0.476 (0.561) | 0.394 (0.449) | 0.304 (0.459) | 0.285 (0.302) | -0.002 (0.365) |
| Households spending more | -1.635** (0.671) | -1.089* (0.646) | -1.039** (0.517) | -1.661*** (0.531) | -0.849** (0.346) | -1.332*** (0.419) |
| Actions by firms and businesses | -1.562*** (0.561) | -1.360** (0.540) | -1.192*** (0.418) | -1.150*** (0.425) | -0.738*** (0.278) | -0.964*** (0.331) |
| Increases in costs of production | -1.165** (0.499) | -1.272*** (0.480) | -0.677* (0.380) | -0.910** (0.387) | -0.125 (0.252) | -0.742** (0.305) |
| Observations | 2252 | 2252 | 1768 | 1786 | 1414 | 1532 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.072 | 0.059 | 0.065 | 0.072 | 0.049 | 0.045 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 15.216 | 11.682 | 8.104 | 6.542 | 5.697 | 4.663 |
| Mean income <40 | 19.186 | 15.687 | 9.161 | 7.820 | 6.137 | 5.193 |
| Mean income >125k | 12.109 | 8.874 | 7.189 | 5.384 | 5.250 | 3.988 |
| Mean democrat | 13.814 | 9.214 | 7.301 | 5.462 | 5.231 | 3.937 |
| Mean republican | 16.572 | 13.892 | 8.722 | 7.427 | 6.100 | 5.278 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 19.462 | 15.352 | 8.986 | 8.003 | 6.090 | 4.927 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 16.184 | 11.836 | 8.351 | 6.468 | 5.752 | 4.648 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 11.662 | 9.302 | 7.454 | 5.879 | 5.478 | 4.563 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 21.897 | 22.965 | 5.889 | 6.209 | 3.577 | 4.358 |
| Sample | Full | Full | (-10,25) | (-10,25) | (-10,15) | (-10,15) |

Notes: Controls not reported in the regression are: gender, age, political affiliation, education, income, employment status, marital status, and having kids. The omitted category for the perceived causes of inflation is “government spending, debt, and taxation”. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the results on the whole sample, columns 3 and 4 censoring at (-10,25), and columns 5 and 6 censoring at (-10,15). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A18: CONJOINT EXPERIMENT: HETEROGENEITIES

| | Probability of being chosen | |
|---|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| Δu | -0.014*** (0.002) | -0.014*** (0.002) |
| $\Delta \pi$ | -0.028*** (0.002) | -0.028*** (0.002) |
| $\Delta u \times 30\text{-}49$ years old | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.002) |
| $\Delta \pi \times 30\text{-}49$ years old | 0.000 (0.002) | 0.000 (0.002) |
| $\Delta u \times 50\text{-}69$ years old | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) |
| $\Delta \pi \times 50\text{-}69$ years old | -0.009*** (0.002) | -0.009*** (0.002) |
| $\Delta u \times$ Independent | 0.002 (0.002) | 0.002 (0.002) |
| $\Delta \pi \times$ Independent | -0.002 (0.001) | -0.002 (0.001) |
| $\Delta u \times$ Republican | 0.004** (0.002) | 0.004** (0.002) |
| $\Delta \pi \times$ Republican | -0.003* (0.002) | -0.003* (0.002) |
| $\Delta u \times$ Income between 40k and 125k | 0.000 (0.002) | 0.000 (0.002) |
| $\Delta \pi \times$ Income between 40k and 125k | -0.004*** (0.001) | -0.004*** (0.001) |
| $\Delta u \times$ Income more than 125k | -0.004** (0.002) | -0.004** (0.002) |
| $\Delta \pi \times$ Income more than 125k | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.001 (0.002) |
| $\Delta u \times$ Exposure to unemployment | -0.005 (0.003) | -0.005 (0.003) |
| $\Delta \pi \times$ Exposure to unemployment | 0.003 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.003) |
| $\Delta u \times$ Exact values treatment | -0.002 (0.001) | -0.002 (0.001) |
| $\Delta \pi \times$ Exact values treatment | -0.000 (0.001) | -0.000 (0.001) |
| Individual FE | | ✓ |
| Observations | 22626 | 22626 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.336 | 0.262 |
| $\mathbb{E}(\text{Dependent variable})$ | 0.500 | 0.500 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.500 | 0.500 |

Notes: Errors are clustered at the individual level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A19: POLICY VIEWS: MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY

| | Monetary policy: | | | | Ways to reduce debt: | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Increase interest rate | Decrease interest rate | Reduce money supply | Announce future plans for interest rate | Tax high income | Tax high/mid income | Reduce spending on social programs |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Female | -0.105*** (0.017) | 0.052** (0.022) | -0.107*** (0.020) | -0.083*** (0.022) | -0.044** (0.021) | 0.006 (0.018) | -0.070*** (0.019) |
| 30-49 years old | -0.007 (0.023) | 0.036 (0.031) | -0.015 (0.028) | -0.004 (0.031) | 0.080*** (0.030) | -0.010 (0.028) | -0.008 (0.027) |
| 50-69 years old | 0.048* (0.028) | 0.046 (0.036) | -0.021 (0.033) | 0.010 (0.035) | 0.054 (0.034) | -0.122*** (0.030) | -0.004 (0.031) |
| Independent | -0.024 (0.020) | 0.003 (0.026) | -0.052** (0.023) | -0.077*** (0.026) | -0.134*** (0.024) | -0.083*** (0.023) | 0.045** (0.021) |
| Republican | -0.028 (0.022) | 0.032 (0.029) | -0.048* (0.026) | -0.038 (0.028) | -0.159*** (0.027) | -0.070*** (0.024) | 0.090*** (0.025) |
| College Degree | 0.055*** (0.021) | -0.034 (0.026) | 0.062*** (0.024) | 0.028 (0.026) | 0.015 (0.024) | -0.053** (0.021) | 0.044** (0.022) |
| Studied economics | -0.003 (0.023) | -0.024 (0.028) | -0.003 (0.026) | -0.027 (0.028) | -0.071*** (0.026) | -0.027 (0.023) | 0.044* (0.024) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | 0.036* (0.019) | -0.025 (0.027) | 0.018 (0.024) | 0.069*** (0.027) | 0.067** (0.026) | -0.018 (0.024) | -0.004 (0.021) |
| Income > 125k | 0.060** (0.027) | -0.009 (0.035) | 0.027 (0.032) | 0.102*** (0.034) | 0.003 (0.033) | -0.040 (0.029) | 0.038 (0.029) |
| Has children | -0.013 (0.019) | 0.026 (0.026) | 0.001 (0.023) | -0.011 (0.025) | -0.008 (0.024) | -0.007 (0.021) | -0.025 (0.021) |
| Unemployed | -0.010 (0.025) | -0.075** (0.038) | -0.003 (0.033) | -0.007 (0.037) | 0.062* (0.036) | 0.020 (0.032) | -0.060** (0.028) |
| Out of labor force | -0.001 (0.020) | 0.001 (0.028) | -0.043* (0.024) | -0.015 (0.028) | 0.057** (0.027) | 0.039* (0.023) | -0.080*** (0.022) |
| Video information treatment | 0.017 (0.016) | -0.017 (0.021) | -0.001 (0.019) | -0.001 (0.021) | -0.001 (0.020) | -0.014 (0.018) | 0.001 (0.018) |
| Exact values treatment | 0.030* (0.016) | -0.007 (0.021) | 0.052*** (0.019) | -0.003 (0.021) | 0.010 (0.020) | -0.004 (0.018) | 0.024 (0.018) |
| Policy first | 0.046** (0.020) | -0.002 (0.025) | -0.053** (0.022) | 0.022 (0.025) | -0.024 (0.024) | -0.046** (0.020) | 0.005 (0.021) |
| Unemployment first in conjoint | -0.005 (0.016) | 0.011 (0.021) | 0.016 (0.019) | 0.014 (0.021) | 0.005 (0.020) | 0.013 (0.018) | -0.007 (0.018) |
| CNN | 0.008 (0.022) | -0.002 (0.027) | 0.060** (0.025) | 0.030 (0.027) | 0.080*** (0.025) | 0.048** (0.023) | -0.003 (0.023) |
| Fox News | -0.037* (0.019) | 0.036 (0.025) | 0.055** (0.023) | -0.009 (0.025) | -0.144*** (0.024) | -0.024 (0.021) | 0.074*** (0.022) |
| Social media | 0.038** (0.019) | -0.006 (0.026) | 0.026 (0.023) | 0.067*** (0.025) | 0.004 (0.024) | 0.027 (0.020) | -0.002 (0.021) |
| NPR | -0.000 (0.027) | -0.065** (0.032) | -0.041 (0.030) | 0.004 (0.032) | 0.083*** (0.029) | 0.023 (0.028) | -0.057** (0.026) |
| NYT | -0.005 (0.026) | 0.005 (0.031) | 0.022 (0.029) | 0.011 (0.032) | 0.016 (0.030) | 0.084*** (0.028) | -0.038 (0.027) |
| WSJ | 0.096*** (0.027) | -0.056* (0.032) | 0.041 (0.030) | 0.059* (0.032) | -0.066** (0.031) | 0.011 (0.028) | 0.057** (0.028) |
| Observations | 2246 | 2245 | 2246 | 2246 | 2244 | 2245 | 2246 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.064 | 0.011 | 0.064 | 0.036 | 0.077 | 0.068 | 0.070 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 0.180 | 0.500 | 0.307 | 0.456 | 0.595 | 0.250 | 0.239 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.097 | 0.516 | 0.238 | 0.384 | 0.586 | 0.255 | 0.192 |
| Mean income > 125k | 0.271 | 0.465 | 0.380 | 0.521 | 0.574 | 0.208 | 0.299 |
| Mean democrat | 0.192 | 0.506 | 0.361 | 0.499 | 0.698 | 0.321 | 0.194 |
| Mean republican | 0.173 | 0.536 | 0.309 | 0.442 | 0.518 | 0.215 | 0.306 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.163 | 0.424 | 0.280 | 0.436 | 0.494 | 0.307 | 0.241 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.175 | 0.494 | 0.337 | 0.494 | 0.640 | 0.294 | 0.270 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.194 | 0.550 | 0.293 | 0.430 | 0.608 | 0.171 | 0.207 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.384 | 0.500 | 0.462 | 0.498 | 0.491 | 0.433 | 0.427 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, race, marital status, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). The sample means are calculated only on the sample of respondents that did not see the video. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A20: POLICY VIEWS: OTHER POLICIES

| | Policies to combat inflation: | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|--------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | Tax high income to fund low income transfers | Increase corporate taxes | Price controls on essentials | Wage controls | Limit imports | Increase antitrust |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Female | -0.056*** (0.021) | -0.006 (0.021) | 0.030 (0.022) | -0.003 (0.019) | -0.031 (0.021) | -0.120*** (0.022) |
| 30-49 years old | 0.050 (0.030) | 0.101*** (0.030) | 0.032 (0.031) | 0.014 (0.027) | 0.054* (0.029) | 0.042 (0.030) |
| 50-69 years old | 0.011 (0.034) | 0.060* (0.034) | 0.021 (0.035) | -0.056* (0.030) | 0.131*** (0.034) | 0.082** (0.034) |
| Independent | -0.174*** (0.024) | -0.143*** (0.023) | -0.108*** (0.025) | -0.084*** (0.022) | -0.008 (0.024) | -0.146*** (0.025) |
| Republican | -0.224*** (0.027) | -0.166*** (0.027) | -0.114*** (0.028) | -0.021 (0.025) | 0.123*** (0.028) | -0.134*** (0.028) |
| College Degree | -0.011 (0.024) | 0.026 (0.024) | -0.016 (0.025) | 0.035 (0.022) | 0.022 (0.025) | 0.078*** (0.026) |
| Studied economics | -0.038 (0.026) | -0.051* (0.026) | -0.080*** (0.027) | -0.046* (0.024) | 0.002 (0.027) | 0.047* (0.027) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | 0.030 (0.027) | 0.050** (0.025) | -0.018 (0.026) | -0.036 (0.023) | 0.021 (0.026) | 0.086*** (0.026) |
| Income >125k | -0.027 (0.034) | 0.000 (0.032) | -0.058* (0.034) | -0.060** (0.028) | -0.012 (0.033) | 0.080** (0.034) |
| Has children | 0.014 (0.025) | 0.014 (0.024) | 0.017 (0.025) | -0.027 (0.022) | 0.027 (0.024) | -0.044* (0.025) |
| Unemployed | 0.051 (0.037) | 0.072** (0.034) | 0.029 (0.036) | 0.047 (0.032) | -0.004 (0.035) | -0.004 (0.037) |
| Out of labor force | 0.050* (0.027) | 0.014 (0.026) | 0.007 (0.027) | 0.040* (0.023) | 0.053** (0.026) | -0.021 (0.027) |
| Video information treatment | 0.004 (0.020) | -0.025 (0.020) | -0.013 (0.020) | 0.005 (0.018) | 0.013 (0.020) | -0.005 (0.020) |
| Exact values treatment | -0.005 (0.020) | -0.010 (0.020) | -0.014 (0.020) | 0.048*** (0.018) | 0.007 (0.020) | 0.003 (0.020) |
| Policy first | -0.009 (0.024) | -0.002 (0.023) | -0.016 (0.024) | -0.022 (0.021) | -0.007 (0.023) | -0.013 (0.024) |
| Unemployment first in conjoint | 0.019 (0.020) | 0.010 (0.020) | -0.004 (0.020) | 0.032* (0.018) | 0.031 (0.020) | 0.015 (0.020) |
| CNN | 0.055** (0.026) | 0.033 (0.024) | -0.005 (0.026) | 0.042* (0.024) | -0.003 (0.025) | 0.015 (0.026) |
| Fox News | -0.115*** (0.024) | -0.109*** (0.024) | -0.053** (0.024) | 0.055** (0.022) | 0.075*** (0.024) | -0.066*** (0.024) |
| Social media | 0.021 (0.024) | 0.023 (0.023) | 0.036 (0.025) | 0.038* (0.020) | 0.041* (0.024) | 0.055** (0.025) |
| NPR | 0.076** (0.030) | 0.075*** (0.028) | -0.030 (0.031) | -0.034 (0.028) | -0.021 (0.030) | 0.052* (0.031) |
| NYT | 0.045 (0.030) | -0.007 (0.029) | 0.011 (0.031) | 0.023 (0.027) | -0.011 (0.030) | 0.022 (0.031) |
| WSJ | -0.049 (0.031) | 0.008 (0.030) | -0.026 (0.032) | 0.038 (0.029) | 0.027 (0.030) | -0.035 (0.031) |
| Observations | 2246 | 2245 | 2246 | 2245 | 2246 | 2246 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.085 | 0.079 | 0.032 | 0.075 | 0.048 | 0.093 |
| E(Dependent variable) | 0.551 | 0.648 | 0.617 | 0.252 | 0.353 | 0.481 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.547 | 0.630 | 0.650 | 0.241 | 0.318 | 0.361 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.553 | 0.657 | 0.549 | 0.271 | 0.373 | 0.574 |
| Mean democrat | 0.689 | 0.752 | 0.672 | 0.300 | 0.319 | 0.578 |
| Mean republican | 0.436 | 0.555 | 0.591 | 0.264 | 0.461 | 0.458 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.482 | 0.560 | 0.576 | 0.249 | 0.237 | 0.366 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.620 | 0.689 | 0.636 | 0.309 | 0.339 | 0.524 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.520 | 0.658 | 0.622 | 0.196 | 0.435 | 0.505 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.498 | 0.478 | 0.486 | 0.434 | 0.478 | 0.500 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, race, marital status, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). The sample means are calculated only on the sample of respondents that did not see the video. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A21: POLICY VIEWS: REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES

| | Policies to combat redistributive impact of inflation: | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Increase minimum wage | Increase vouchers for low income | Increase vouchers for mid income | Increase food stamps | Increase low income transfers |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Female | 0.065*** (0.020) | 0.004 (0.021) | 0.064*** (0.022) | -0.014 (0.021) | -0.001 (0.021) |
| 30-49 years old | 0.035 (0.029) | 0.019 (0.029) | 0.066** (0.031) | 0.023 (0.029) | 0.038 (0.031) |
| 50-69 years old | -0.068** (0.033) | -0.055 (0.034) | -0.041 (0.035) | -0.027 (0.033) | -0.044 (0.035) |
| Independent | -0.198*** (0.023) | -0.147*** (0.024) | -0.108*** (0.025) | -0.165*** (0.023) | -0.174*** (0.025) |
| Republican | -0.232*** (0.026) | -0.179*** (0.026) | -0.121*** (0.028) | -0.203*** (0.026) | -0.215*** (0.027) |
| College Degree | -0.030 (0.024) | -0.031 (0.024) | -0.061** (0.025) | 0.002 (0.024) | -0.053** (0.024) |
| Studied economics | -0.032 (0.026) | -0.014 (0.026) | -0.013 (0.027) | -0.043* (0.026) | -0.017 (0.026) |
| Income between 40k and 125k | -0.067*** (0.025) | -0.087*** (0.025) | -0.039 (0.027) | -0.099*** (0.025) | -0.100*** (0.027) |
| Income >125k | -0.065** (0.032) | -0.121*** (0.032) | -0.108*** (0.034) | -0.185*** (0.032) | -0.176*** (0.033) |
| Has children | 0.031 (0.024) | 0.040* (0.024) | 0.036 (0.025) | 0.091*** (0.024) | 0.072*** (0.025) |
| Unemployed | 0.087*** (0.033) | 0.118*** (0.034) | 0.060 (0.038) | 0.096*** (0.034) | 0.030 (0.037) |
| Out of labor force | -0.014 (0.026) | 0.019 (0.027) | -0.057** (0.027) | 0.002 (0.026) | -0.010 (0.027) |
| Video information treatment | -0.035* (0.019) | -0.031 (0.019) | -0.055*** (0.020) | -0.042** (0.019) | -0.028 (0.020) |
| Exact values treatment | -0.003 (0.019) | 0.019 (0.019) | -0.003 (0.021) | 0.003 (0.019) | 0.004 (0.020) |
| Policy first | 0.039* (0.023) | -0.060** (0.023) | -0.022 (0.024) | -0.017 (0.023) | -0.010 (0.024) |
| Unemployment first in conjoint | 0.006 (0.019) | -0.022 (0.019) | 0.002 (0.020) | -0.028 (0.019) | -0.011 (0.020) |
| CNN | 0.045* (0.024) | 0.065*** (0.025) | 0.077*** (0.026) | 0.050** (0.025) | 0.063** (0.026) |
| Fox News | -0.087*** (0.023) | -0.053** (0.023) | -0.021 (0.024) | -0.073*** (0.023) | -0.043* (0.024) |
| Social media | 0.048** (0.023) | 0.038 (0.024) | 0.055** (0.025) | 0.036 (0.024) | 0.016 (0.024) |
| NPR | 0.078*** (0.027) | -0.010 (0.030) | 0.021 (0.031) | 0.032 (0.029) | 0.003 (0.031) |
| NYT | 0.062** (0.029) | 0.038 (0.030) | 0.028 (0.031) | 0.077*** (0.029) | 0.039 (0.031) |
| WSJ | 0.000 (0.028) | 0.027 (0.030) | -0.033 (0.032) | 0.002 (0.029) | 0.030 (0.031) |
| Observations | 2246 | 2246 | 2246 | 2246 | 2246 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.124 | 0.081 | 0.062 | 0.095 | 0.096 |
| ℰ(Dependent variable) | 0.653 | 0.661 | 0.570 | 0.671 | 0.564 |
| Mean income <40k | 0.699 | 0.745 | 0.619 | 0.745 | 0.645 |
| Mean income >125k | 0.616 | 0.599 | 0.500 | 0.599 | 0.500 |
| Mean democrat | 0.803 | 0.773 | 0.653 | 0.799 | 0.705 |
| Mean republican | 0.503 | 0.542 | 0.509 | 0.536 | 0.448 |
| Mean 18-29 years old | 0.677 | 0.681 | 0.591 | 0.689 | 0.572 |
| Mean 30-49 years old | 0.715 | 0.712 | 0.640 | 0.712 | 0.629 |
| Mean 50-69 years old | 0.577 | 0.599 | 0.486 | 0.619 | 0.493 |
| Dependent variable std. dev. | 0.476 | 0.473 | 0.495 | 0.470 | 0.496 |

Notes: Errors are heteroskedasticity robust. Controls not reported in the regression are: order of inflation and unemployment in the conjoint section, race, marital status, all other news sources not reported in the table. Omitted categories are: male (for gender), 18-29 years old (for age), Democrat (for political affiliation), no college (for education), income below 40k (for income), employed (for employment status). The sample means are calculated only on the sample of respondents that did not see the video. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A22: MULTIPLE HYPOTHESIS TESTING FOR LINK BETWEEN MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY VIEWS AND BELIEFS ABOUT INFLATION

| | Monetary policy: | | | | Ways to reduce debt: | | |
|---|-------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|--|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| | Increase interest rate (1) | Reduce interest rates (2) | Reduce money supply (3) | Announce interest rate increase in 6 months (4) | Tax high income (5) | Tax high/mid income (6) | Reduce spending on social programs (7) |
| Perceived causes of inflation | | | | | | | |
| Changes in the labor market (e.g., wage-price spirals, labor shortages) | 0.976 | 1.000 | 0.989 | 1.000 | 0.992 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Actions by the Federal Reserve (e.g., decrease interest rate, increase money supply) | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.664 | 0.731 | 0.327 |
| Politicians and political interests | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.974 | 0.999 | 1.000 | 0.095 |
| Households spending more (e.g., because of optimism, because of increases in inflation expectations) | 0.994 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.999 | 0.690 | 1.000 | 0.023 |
| Actions by firms and businesses (e.g., decrease in competition, increase prices to increase profits) | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.001 | 1.000 | 0.001 |
| Increases in costs of production (e.g., supply chain disruptions, increases in oil prices) | 1.000 | 0.999 | 0.969 | 0.966 | 0.097 | 1.000 | 0.001 |
| Perceived consequences of inflation | | | | | | | |
| Cognitive costs (uncertainty & complex budgeting) | 1.000 | 0.001 | 0.428 | 0.480 | 0.001 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Political & social costs (trust in govt, social cohesion, inequality, lower natl. prestige) | 0.173 | 0.999 | 1.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.978 | 1.000 |
| Efficiency costs (dollar value, GDP growth, resource misalloc., menu & shoelather costs, firms daily decisions) | 1.000 | 0.199 | 1.000 | 0.032 | 1.000 | 0.824 | 0.937 |
| Perceived distributional impacts of inflation | | | | | | | |
| Low income lost more than high income | 1.000 | 0.939 | 0.997 | 0.695 | 0.001 | 1.000 | 0.003 |
| Knowledge of inflation | | | | | | | |
| Number of correct answers to conditional correlations | 0.095 | 0.965 | 0.001 | 0.673 | 0.990 | 0.914 | 0.939 |
| Perceived trade-offs | | | | | | | |
| Inflation perceived as by-product of a good economy (e.g., more often in a boom) | 0.001 | 0.816 | 0.003 | 0.019 | 0.001 | 0.311 | 1.000 |
| Policy needs to reduce economic activity to fight inflation (e.g., reduce growth) | 1.000 | 0.032 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.731 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Asset exposure | | | | | | | |
| Net nominal position (in hundreds of thousands) | 0.048 | 0.656 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.854 |

Notes: Each cell reports the Romano-Wolf adjusted p-value obtained with the `rwolf2` package from [Clarke \(2021\)](#) for the estimates of Table 6. 1000 bootstrap iterations, seed 15112001.

TABLE A23: MULTIPLE HYPOTHESIS TESTING FOR LINK BETWEEN OTHER POLICY VIEWS AND BELIEFS ABOUT INFLATION

| | Policies to combat inflation: | | | | | |
|--|--|--------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|
| | Tax high income to fund low income transfers | Increase corporate taxes | Price controls on essentials | Wage controls | Limit imports | Increase antitrust |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Perceived causes of inflation | | | | | | |
| Changes in the labor market (e.g., wage-price spirals, labor shortages) | 0.252 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Actions by the Federal Reserve (e.g., decrease interest rate, increase money supply) | 0.925 | 0.827 | 1.000 | 0.379 | 0.629 | 0.004 |
| Politicians and political interests | 1.000 | 0.975 | 0.904 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Households spending more (e.g., because of optimism, because of increases in inflation expectations) | 0.184 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Actions by firms and businesses (e.g., decrease in competition, increase prices to increase profits) | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.030 | 1.000 | 0.050 | 0.001 |
| Increases in costs of production (e.g., supply chain disruptions, increases in oil prices) | 0.097 | 0.501 | 0.568 | 1.000 | 0.141 | 0.009 |
| Perceived consequences of inflation | | | | | | |
| Cognitive costs (uncertainty & complex budgeting) | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.572 |
| Political & social costs (trust in govt, social cohesion, inequality, lower natl. prestige) | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.964 | 0.925 | 1.000 | 0.001 |
| Efficiency costs (dollar value, GDP growth, resource misalloc., menu & shoeleather costs, firms daily decisions) | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.568 | 1.000 |
| Perceived distributional impacts of inflation | | | | | | |
| Low income lost more than high income | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 1.000 | 0.993 | 0.160 |
| Knowledge of inflation | | | | | | |
| Number of correct answers to conditional correlations | 0.993 | 1.000 | 0.129 | 0.992 | 1.000 | 0.992 |
| Perceived trade-offs | | | | | | |
| Inflation perceived as by-product of a good economy (e.g., more often in a boom) | 0.004 | 0.083 | 1.000 | 0.572 | 1.000 | 0.097 |
| Policy needs to reduce economic activity to fight inflation (e.g., reduce growth) | 0.001 | 0.007 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Asset exposure | | | | | | |
| Net nominal position (in hundreds of thousands) | 1.000 | 1.000 | 0.964 | 0.986 | 0.994 | 0.966 |

Notes: Each cell reports the Romano-Wolf adjusted p-value obtained with the `rwo1f2` package from Clarke (2021) for the estimates of Table 7. 1000 bootstrap iterations, seed 15112001.

TABLE A24: MULTIPLE HYPOTHESIS TESTING FOR LINK BETWEEN REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICY VIEWS AND BELIEFS ABOUT INFLATION

| | Policies to combat redistributive impact of inflation: | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | Increase minimum wage (1) | Increase vouchers for low income (2) | Increase vouchers for mid income (3) | Increase food stamps (4) | Increase low income transfers (5) |
| Perceived causes of inflation | | | | | |
| Changes in the labor market (e.g., wage-price spirals, labor shortages) | 0.999 | 0.929 | 0.880 | 0.705 | 0.961 |
| Actions by the Federal Reserve (e.g., decrease interest rate, increase money supply) | 0.974 | 0.679 | 0.984 | 0.808 | 0.964 |
| Politicians and political interests | 0.999 | 0.922 | 0.229 | 0.348 | 0.707 |
| Households spending more (e.g., because of optimism, because of increases in inflation expectations) | 0.902 | 0.643 | 0.707 | 0.011 | 0.713 |
| Actions by firms and businesses (e.g., decrease in competition, increase prices to increase profits) | 0.011 | 0.177 | 0.052 | 0.053 | 0.009 |
| Increases in costs of production (e.g., supply chain disruptions, increases in oil prices) | 0.705 | 0.004 | 0.032 | 0.009 | 0.082 |
| Perceived consequences of inflation | | | | | |
| Cognitive costs (uncertainty & complex budgeting) | 0.009 | 0.001 | 0.011 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Political & social costs (trust in govt, social cohesion, inequality, lower natl. prestige) | 0.207 | 0.598 | 0.929 | 0.145 | 0.999 |
| Efficiency costs (dollar value, GDP growth, resource misalloc., menu & shoelather costs, firms daily decisions) | 0.929 | 0.943 | 0.999 | 0.999 | 0.999 |
| Perceived distributional impacts of inflation | | | | | |
| Low income lost more than high income | 0.007 | 0.001 | 0.023 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Knowledge of inflation | | | | | |
| Number of correct answers to conditional correlations | 0.002 | 0.480 | 0.002 | 0.929 | 0.984 |
| Perceived trade-offs | | | | | |
| Inflation perceived as by-product of a good economy (e.g., more often in a boom) | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.775 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Policy needs to reduce economic activity to fight inflation (e.g., reduce growth) | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Asset exposure | | | | | |
| Net nominal position (in hundreds of thousands) | 0.984 | 0.348 | 0.984 | 0.229 | 0.001 |

Notes: Each cell reports the Romano-Wolf adjusted p-value obtained with the `rwo1f2` package from Clarke (2021) for the estimates of Table 8. 1000 bootstrap iterations, seed 15112001.

A.3 Examples of open-ended answers by topic

- **Protectionist policies:** “Make companies produce in America”, “Pump our own oil”.
- **Price caps:** “Put a price level on certain things”, “Put a national freeze on raising rent. Every state would not be able to charge a certain amount according to sections”.
- **Expansionary monetary policy:** “Decrease interest rates”, “Print more money out perhaps”.
- **Contractionary monetary policy:** “Raise interest rates”, “Stop printing money”.
- **Reduce immigration:** “Stop illegal immigration!”, “Get rid of illegal immigrants and drill out own oil”.
- **Help low income:** “Lower income taxes on the working class so we can save some money to get passed the struggle we are in daily”, “Raise the minimum wage”.
- **Fight greedflation:** “They should make companies crack down on overcharging on products so they can be more affordable”, “The single most important thing the government should do to reduce inflation is take away a company's ability to increase prices on goods”.
- **Stimulate the economy:** “Create more jobs”, “Probably get the economy growing back up again so prices are cheaper”.
- **Contractionary fiscal policy:** “reduce spending and increase taxes”, “Cut down on social programs that provide money, food and housing assistance to people that are able to work but just will not”.
- **Change President:** “Take Biden out of office and elect Trump”, “Put trump in office”.

A.4 Full Questionnaire Survey: [link here](#)

A.4.1 Introduction, background questions, and screening

A.4.1.1 Consent

1. This is a survey for academic research purposes. It will take approximately **25 minutes to complete**.

The purpose of this non-partisan survey is to understand how you think about economic policies in the US. To this end, we will ask you questions about your household's circumstances and about some hypothetical policy scenarios.

You will be **compensated** for this interview conditional **upon completing** the survey **and passing our survey quality checks**, which use sophisticated statistical control methods to detect incoherent and rushed responses. Responding without adequate effort may result in your response being flagged for low quality and you may not receive your payment. Please note that it is very important for the success of our research that you answer honestly and read the questions very carefully before answering.

You should know the following: you may not be told everything or may be misled. As part of this research design, you may not be told or may be misled about the purpose or procedures of this research. However, the purpose or procedures of the research will be disclosed to you following your participation.

Whether or not you participate is up to you. Your **participation** is completely **voluntary**. You can choose not to take part. You can agree to take part and later change your mind. Your decision will not be held against you. Your refusal to participate will not result in any consequences or any loss of benefits that you are otherwise entitled to receive. You can ask all the questions you want before you decide.

If you have questions, concerns, or complaints, or think the research has hurt you, contact the research team at social.economics.research2020@gmail.com.

All of the answers you provide will remain **anonymous** and be treated with absolute **confidentiality**. The data are only used for research purposes.

Do you agree to participate to the survey?

[No, I do not agree to participate; Yes, I agree to participate]

A.4.1.2 Pre-screening background questions

1. What is your **gender**?

[Male; Female; Other (Please Specify)]

2. What is your **age**?

[From 17 or younger to 66 or older]

If age is less than 18 or more than 65 the respondent is excluded.

3. Do you currently live in the U.S.?

[Yes; No]

Non U.S. residents are excluded

4. Which **ZIP code** do you currently live in?

[Text box]

5. How would you describe your **ethnicity/race**?

[White; African American/Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian/Asian American; Mixed race; Other (please specify)]

6. What was your **total household income** from all sources in **2023, before taxes and other deductions**?

Total household income is defined as the sum of: wages, salary and tips, business / self-employment / farm income and loss, taxable interest and dividends, taxable social security benefits, alimony payments you receive, capital gains and losses, rental / schedule K1 income and losses, unemployment compensation, taxable amount from pensions and individual retirement arrangements, taxable state refunds, other income not exempted from the income tax.

[15 non-overlapping brackets from \$0-\$9,999 to \$200,000+]

7. We're interested in where you might have heard **news about the economy in the past week**.

Have you seen or heard news about the economy on the **following outlets** in the past week?

[Social media; CNN; MSNBC; Fox News; Network News; Local TV; NPR; AM talk radio station; The New York Times; The Wall Street Journal; Local Newspapers; Other (please specify)]

8. On average, would you say you **trust or distrust** these outlets you follow to **report accurate news about the economy**?

[Completely trust; Somewhat trust; Neither trust nor distrust; Somewhat distrust; Completely distrust]

- Only outlets selected before

A.4.1.3 Attention Screen #1

1. *Captcha*

2. It is very important for us that you do not get distracted throughout the survey. This question is to check whether you are not getting distracted. To proceed, please select the definition of dog from the following options:

[A yellow and black flying insect that makes honey and can sting you; A large, strong bird with a curved beak that eats meat and can see very well; A large wild animal of the cat family with yellowish-orange fur with black lines; A common animal with four legs, especially kept by people as a pet, or to hunt, or guard things; A very large sea mammal that breathes air through a hole at the top of his head]

A.4.2 Perceived and expected inflation and unemployment

We will ask you some questions about inflation later on. First, we need to define what the **inflation rate** actually is.

The inflation rate measures the percentage increase in prices over a given period of time. It represents **how much more expensive the basket of goods and services generally consumed by US households has become over a certain period**, most commonly a year.^{A1}

For instance, an yearly inflation rate of 10% means that, on average, a basket of goods and services costing 100\$ at the beginning of a year will cost 110\$ at the end of the year.

If the inflation rate is **negative**, it is referred to as **deflation**. This means that goods and services become less expensive over time.

1. The next few questions are about inflation.^{A2}

Over the **last 12 months**, do you think that there was inflation or deflation? (Note: deflation is the opposite of inflation).

[Inflation; Deflation (the opposite of inflation)]

2. What was the rate of [inflation/deflation] over the **last 12 months**? Please give your best guess.

Over the **last 12 months**, the rate of [inflation/deflation] was *[Text box]* %

3. Over the **next 12 months**, do you think that there will be inflation or deflation? (Note: deflation is the opposite of inflation).

[Inflation; Deflation (the opposite of inflation)]

4. What do you expect the rate of [inflation/deflation] to be over the **next 12 months**? Please give your best guess.

^{A1}Definition from <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/Series/Back-to-Basics/Inflation>

^{A2}Verbatim from: <https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/sce/sce/downloads/data/frbny-sce-survey-core-module-public-questionnaire.pdf>

Over the **next 12 months**, I expect the rate of [inflation/deflation] to be [Text box] %

We will also ask you some questions about the unemployment rate in the US.^{A3} Although this is a widely talked about number, the unemployment rate is actually not an easy concept to understand. People often believe that the unemployment rate is simply the share of people not working. But that is not true!

The unemployment rate represents the **percentage of the US labor force** (defined as the sum of the employed and the unemployed) **that is not working but looking for a job and available to work.**

Importantly, **people who are NOT looking for a job or available to work, like students, retirees, or stay-at-home parents are NOT counted as “unemployed” and they do not enter official calculations of the unemployment rate.**

5. What do you think the **current unemployment rate** is in the US?

The **current unemployment rate** in the US is [Text Box] %

6. What do you think the unemployment rate will be **12 months from now** in the US?

12 months from now, the unemployment rate in the US will be [Text Box] %

A.4.3 Conjoint Experiment: Preferences for inflation and unemployment

In the next questions, we will present you with pairs of “scenarios” that are different in terms of inflation and unemployment. For each pair, please pick the one you would prefer to live in.

For information, the current unemployment rate in the US is around 4%, while the current annual inflation rate is around 3%.

If you had to pick, which of the following scenarios would you prefer to live in for the next year in the US?

Scenario 1: Inflation is X1, Unemployment is Y1

Scenario 2: Inflation is X2, Unemployment is Y2

[Scenario 1; Scenario 2]

^{A3}https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/consumer_exp_survey/results/html/ecb.ces_results_december_2023_labour_market_growth.en.html#_Current_unemployment_rate

A.4.3.1 Attention Screen #2

1. This is a question to check whether you are reading the questions carefully. Please select both "slightly concerned" and "extremely concerned" to continue.

[Not at all concerned; Slightly concerned; Moderately concerned; Very concerned; Extremely concerned]

A.4.4 Conditional correlations between inflation and unemployment

What do you think would happen to inflation and unemployment in the following scenarios?

1. **(Increase in interest rates)** An **increase in interest rates** by the Federal Reserve Bank would cause inflation to
[Decrease a lot; Decrease; Stay the same; Increase; Increase a lot]
and the unemployment rate to
[Decrease a lot; Decrease; Stay the same; Increase; Increase a lot]
2. **(Increase government spending)** An **increase in government spending** to finance more income support for lower-income families would cause inflation to
[Decrease a lot; Decrease; Stay the same; Increase; Increase a lot]
and the unemployment rate to
[Decrease a lot; Decrease; Stay the same; Increase; Increase a lot]
3. **(Increase in oil prices)** An **increase in oil prices** due to events in other countries such as wars or natural disasters, would cause inflation in the US to
[Decrease a lot; Decrease; Stay the same; Increase; Increase a lot]
and the unemployment rate in the US to
[Decrease a lot; Decrease; Stay the same; Increase; Increase a lot]
4. **(Increase in productivity)** **Technological improvements** making the production process more efficient would cause inflation to
[Decrease a lot; Decrease; Stay the same; Increase; Increase a lot]
and the unemployment rate to
[Decrease a lot; Decrease; Stay the same; Increase; Increase a lot]
5. **(Wage increases)** An **overall increase in wages** due to labor laws and bargaining by unions would cause inflation to
[Decrease a lot; Decrease; Stay the same; Increase; Increase a lot]
and the unemployment rate to

[Decrease a lot; Decrease; Stay the same; Increase; Increase a lot]

A.4.5 Understanding of inflation

A.4.5.1 Causes of inflation

1. In your view, what are the main **causes of inflation**?

[Text Box]

1. We will now list various events and economic phenomena. For each of them, please tell us whether or not you think that they are an **important cause of inflation**.

[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]

- (a) **Government spending, debt, and taxation**, e.g., spending on social security, national defense, and healthcare, increases in government debt, or changes in the tax system
 - (b) **Actions by the Federal Reserve**, such as printing money, changing interest rates, or making announcements about future inflation and rates
 - (c) **Increases in the costs of production** due to e.g., increases in oil prices, energy prices, or to increases in the costs of inputs due to large-scale events in other countries, like wars or natural disasters, or to new laws and regulations
 - (d) **Changes in the labor market** such as increases in unions' bargaining power or wage increases
 - (e) **Politicians and political interests**, e.g., politicians catering to special interest and lobby groups
 - (f) **Households spending more** due to optimism about the economy, impatience, or expectations about future price increases
 - (g) **Actions by firms and businesses**
2. Please select from the previous list the **two most important causes of inflation**. Write 1 in the box corresponding to the most important cause, and 2 in the box corresponding to the second most important cause of inflation.

[\[Conditional on selecting “Government policies”\]](#). You said that government spending, debt, and taxation are an important cause of inflation. Below, we list some more detailed causes in that category. For each of them, please tell us whether or not you think it is an important cause of inflation.

1. **(Decreases in income taxes) Income tax cuts**
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
2. **(Increase in govt debt) Increases in government debt** to provide aid and financial assistance to a foreign country during a war or natural disaster
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
3. **(Increase in spending for infrastructure and national defense) Increases in government spending**, financed by government debt, to build infrastructure and for national defense
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
4. Government spending, financed by government debt, to help households during difficult times, such as the stimulus checks (“Economic impact payments”) during COVID-19.
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
5. **(Increase in social spending for healthcare and social security) Increases in government spending on social programs, such as Medicare and social security, financed by government debt**
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
6. Among the following, please select the most important cause of inflation

[Income tax cuts; Increase government debt for foreign assistance; Increase spending for infrastructure and defense; Increase spending to assist households during hard times; Increase spending in social programs]

[\[Conditional on selecting “Federal reserve policies”\]](#). You said that actions by the Federal Reserve are an important cause of inflation. Below, we list some more detailed causes in that category. For each of them, please tell us whether or not you think it is an important cause of inflation.

1. **(Decreases in interest rates) Decreases in interest rates**
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
2. **(Increases in interest rates) Increases in interest rates**
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
3. **(Increase in money supply) Increases in the money** the Federal Reserve Bank provides to the economy.
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]

4. **(Wrong monetary policy) The Federal Reserve Bank not taking appropriate action** when it should

[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]

5. **(Unclear announcements about future actions) The Federal Reserve Bank making unclear announcements** about its future intentions

[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]

6. Among the following, please select the most important cause of inflation

[Decreases in interest rates; Increases in interest rates; Increases in money printed; The Federal Reserve not taking appropriate actions when it should; The Federal Reserve making unclear announcements]

[Conditional on selecting “Increases in the costs of production”, nothing asked, cost-push shocks have their own category]. You said that increases in the costs of production are an important cause of inflation. Below, we list some more detailed causes in that category. For each of them, please tell us whether or not you think it is an important cause of inflation.

1. **(Increases in oil prices) Increases in oil prices**

[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]

2. **(Increases in energy prices) Increases in energy prices**

[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]

3. **(Large-scale events in other countries raising the cost of inputs like wars or natural disasters) Wars, natural disasters, or other large-scale disruptions in other countries**

[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]

4. **(Supply chain disruptions) Disruptions in international supply chains**

[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]

5. Increases in costs because of the pandemic.

[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]

6. Among the following, please select the most important cause of inflation

[Increases in oil prices; Increases in energy prices; Large-scale disruptions in other countries; Disruptions in international supply-chains; Increases in costs because of the pandemic]

[Conditional on selecting “Labor market dynamics”]. You said that changes in the labor market are an important cause of inflation. We will now list a number of labor market dynamics. Below, we list some more detailed causes in that category. For each of them, please tell us whether or not you think it is an important cause of inflation.

1. **(Increases in wages)** An overall **increase in wages due to more labor rights or unionization**
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
2. An increase in wages because of a labor shortage.
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
3. **(Wage-price spirals)** Workers asking for pay increases in light of the rise in cost of living.
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
4. Among the following, please select the most important cause of inflation
[Wage increases due to labor rights or unionization; Wage increases due to labor shortages; Workers asking for pay increases in light of the rise in the cost of living]

[Conditional on selecting “Households higher willingness to spend in the present”]. You said that households spending more is an important cause of inflation. Below, we list some more detailed causes in that category. For each of them, please tell us whether or not you think it is an important cause of inflation.

1. **(Expectations by HHs)** **Increases in households spending** in the present due to **expected price increases in the future**
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
2. **(Optimism)** **Increases in households spending** in the present due to **optimism about the economy or their economic status**
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
3. Among the following, please select the most important cause of inflation
[Increase household spending due to expecting higher prices; Increase household spending due to optimism]

[Conditional on selecting “Firms’ business decisions and industrial dynamics”]. You said that are an important cause of inflation. Below, we list some more detailed causes in that category. For each of them, please tell us whether or not you think it is an important cause of inflation.

1. **(Expectations by firms) Firms increasing their prices today** because they anticipate more inflation in the future.
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
2. **(Greediness) Firms and businesses trying to increase their profits by increasing prices even though their costs have not increased.**
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
3. **(Decreases in competition between firms) Lack of competition** and the rise of big firms that have no competitors.
[Not important at all; Only a little important; Very important; Extremely important]
4. Among the following, please select the most important cause of inflation
[Firms increasing prices due to expecting higher prices; firms increasing prices to increase profits; Lack of competition]

A.4.5.2 Distributional impacts of inflation

1. Which people or groups would you say are **most negatively affected** by inflation?
[Text Box]
2. Which people or groups would you say **benefit most** from inflation?
[Text Box]

For the next questions, suppose **prices unexpectedly increased by 10% over the next year**, on average.

3. Would the following **income groups** lose or gain from inflation?
[Lose a lot; Lose somewhat; Neither gain nor lose; Gain somewhat; Gain a lot]
 - High-income households
 - Middle-income households
 - Low-income households
4. Would the following **age groups** lose or gain from inflation?
[Lose a lot; Lose somewhat; Neither gain nor lose; Gain somewhat; Gain a lot]
 - People between 18 and 30 years old
 - People between 31 and 65 years old

- People more than 65 years old

5. Would the following **occupation groups** lose or gain from inflation?

[Lose a lot; Lose somewhat; Neither gain nor lose; Gain somewhat; Gain a lot]

- The unemployed
- The employed
- Retirees

6. Would the following **groups** lose or gain from inflation?

[Lose a lot; Lose somewhat; Neither gain nor lose; Gain somewhat; Gain a lot]

- People whose savings are mainly in the form of cash (in their checking or savings accounts)
- People whose savings are mainly invested in financial assets (such as stocks or bonds)
- People without any savings

7. Would the following **groups** lose or gain from inflation?

[Lose a lot; Lose somewhat; Neither gain nor lose; Gain somewhat; Gain a lot]

- People with credit card debt
- People with fixed-rate mortgages, that is, home loans that have a fixed interest rate for the entire term of the loan
- People with adjustable-rate mortgages, that is, home loans with an interest rate that can fluctuate periodically
- People with low levels of debt

8. Would the following **types of firms** lose or gain from inflation?

[Lose a lot; Lose somewhat; Neither gain nor lose; Gain somewhat; Gain a lot]

- Small businesses
- Large corporations

A.4.5.3 Consequences of inflation on the economy

1. If prices increased by 10% over the next year, what would the major consequences for the **US economy** be?

[Text Box]

For the next few questions, we ask you to keep thinking about the **consequences of inflation on the US economy**.

Suppose that the inflation rate over the next 12 months is 10%.

2. **(Difficulty in taking economic decisions - HHs)** Does inflation make it simpler or more complicated for households to take **daily economic decisions** such as spending and saving?
[Much more complicated; More complicated; Neither simpler nor more complicated; Simpler; Much simpler]
3. **(Households uncertainty)** How does inflation affect the uncertainty households face when making decisions? [Significantly increases uncertainty, Somewhat increases uncertainty, Neither increases nor decreases uncertainty, Somewhat reduces uncertainty, Significantly reduces uncertainty]
4. **(Shoeleather costs)** How much of an inconvenience would it be for most US households to adjust their savings and investment plans to have more cash available for rising expenses?
[Almost no inconvenience; A small inconvenience; A moderate inconvenience; A very big inconvenience]
5. **(Price setting/menu costs)** Does inflation make it easier or more difficult for firms to **set their prices**?
[Much more difficult; More difficult; Neither easier nor more difficult; Easier; Much easier]
6. **(Difficulty in taking economic decisions - firms)** Does inflation make it easier or more difficult for firms to take **daily business decisions** such as those related to their products, finances, and personnel?
[Much more difficult; More difficult; Neither easier nor more difficult; Easier; Much easier]
7. **(Resource misallocation)** During inflation, businesses selling similar products might face challenges in adjusting their prices frequently. How do these price differences affect the economy's use of resources?

[Greatly improve use; Slightly improve use; Neither improve nor worsen use; Slightly worsen use; Greatly worsen use]

Suppose again that the inflation rate over the next 12 months will be 10%.

8. (**Economic growth**) Under this level of inflation, would the US economy **grow** more quickly, more slowly, or at the same rate, compared to a situation with no inflation?
[Much more slowly; More slowly; At same rate; More quickly; Much more quickly]
9. (**Value of the dollar**) Would **value of the dollar** increase, remain the same, or decrease relative to the currencies of other countries where the inflation rate is lower?
[Decrease by a lot; Decrease somewhat; Remain the same; Increase somewhat; Increase by a lot]
10. (**National prestige**) Would the **national prestige** of the US increase, remain the same, or decrease relative to countries with a lower inflation rate?
[Decrease by a lot; Decrease somewhat; Remain the same; Increase somewhat; Increase by a lot]
11. (**Inequality**) Is inflation associated with a higher, lower, or the same level of **inequality** in the US?
[Much lower; Lower; The same; Higher; Much higher]
12. Does inflation increase or decrease **social cohesion**?
[Increases by a lot; Increases somewhat; Neither increase nor decrease; Decreases somewhat; Decreases by a lot]
13. Does high inflation increase or decrease people's **trust** in the Federal Government?
[Increases by a lot; Increases somewhat; Neither increase nor decrease; Decreases somewhat; Decreases by a lot]
14. Among the following, please select the most important consequence of inflation
[Only options selected above]

A.4.6 Information on the trade-offs between inflation and unemployment

Script of the slide-show:

Inflation is the rate of increase in prices over a given period of time, meaning you have to spend more money to buy the same things.

Why does inflation happen? Imagine prices like a game of tug-of-war or a balancing act between the money we all have to spend and the amount of things available to buy. If people have more money and start buying a lot, but there's not enough stuff for everyone, prices will go up.

This increase in prices can happen because of government policies, actions by the Federal Reserve Bank, or when the stock market is doing really well, for instance.

On the flip side, if making products becomes pricier due to higher material costs or wages, companies may pass these costs to you.

Here's the tricky part: reducing inflation can be like walking a tightrope. Cutting down on how much money is floating around might cool off inflation, but it's not without its pains, affecting jobs and economic vibrancy.

Importantly, policies that are, in principle, good, such as those that reduce unemployment and increase economic activity might, paradoxically, increase inflation too.

Take reducing unemployment: a great goal! But this might lead to more competition for workers, and higher wages, which in turn will tend to increase prices and inflation. This is why economists often talk about the "inflation-unemployment trade-off," this balancing act between keeping jobs plentiful but not increasing inflation.

Tax cuts are another example of a policy that can put more cash in your pocket and that can stimulate economic activity. But if lots of people start spending more, demand outstrips supply, and that might also result in inflation.

In a nutshell, while fighting inflation is critically important, the trade-offs require careful navigation to avoid swapping one problem for another.

A.4.7 Policy Views

A.4.7.1 Tradeoffs (First stage)

1. To what extent do you agree with the statement that inflation is an unfortunate side effect of positive economic developments, like higher employment and increased economic activity?
[Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree]
2. **(Spending)** How **necessary** do you think it is to **reduce household spending** in the US in order **to decrease inflation**?
[Not necessary at all; Somewhat necessary; Very necessary; Extremely necessary]
3. **(GDP growth)** How **necessary** do you think it is to **induce a reduction in US GDP growth** in order **to decrease inflation**?
[Not necessary at all; Somewhat necessary; Very necessary; Extremely necessary]
4. **(Govt debt)** How **necessary** do you think it is to **induce a reduction in US government debt** in order **to decrease inflation**?
[Not necessary at all; Somewhat necessary; Very necessary; Extremely necessary]

5. **(Unemployment)** How **necessary** do you think it is to **induce an increase in the US unemployment rate** in order to **decrease inflation**?
[Not necessary at all; Somewhat necessary; Very necessary; Extremely necessary]
6. **(Side effects of expansionary policies)** How do you think **policies designed to reduce unemployment** typically affect inflation?
[Significantly increase; Increase; Neither increase nor decrease; Decrease; Significantly decrease]
7. Do you think that inflation is **most often** a sign of a good, a bad economy, or neither?
[Most often a sign of a bad economy; Neither a sign of a good nor a bad economy; Most often a sign of a good economy]
8. In general, do you think **inflation** occurs **more frequently** during times of economic growth (booms) or economic downturns (recessions)?
[Mostly in booms; Slightly more in booms; Equally in booms and recessions; Slightly more in recessions; Mostly in recessions]

A.4.7.2 Priority of inflation

- How important or unimportant is price stability as an objective of US economic policy?
[Not important at all; Slightly important; Moderately important; Very important]
- Now, we are going to list some widely debated **economic policy issues** in the US. Could you please **rank** them depending on how much you think they should be a **national priority**?
 - Price stability
 - Low unemployment
 - High economic growth
 - Investments in national defense
 - Stability of the financial system
- Now, we are going to list some widely debated **civic and social policy issues** in the US. Could you please **rank** them depending on how much you think they should be a **national priority**?
 - Inflation
 - Gun rights

- Access to abortion
- Civil rights
- Access to education
- Affordable healthcare

A.4.7.3 Tools to combat inflation

1. In your view, what is the single most important thing that the government or the Fed should do to reduce inflation?

[Text Box]

We now want to ask you whether you would oppose or support the following policies to **fight inflation**.

Do you support or oppose the following policies **as tools to combat inflation**?

1. **(Federal Reserve Bank increasing interest rates today)** An increase in interest rates by the Federal Reserve Bank.
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Support; Strongly support]
2. **(Federal Reserve Bank decreasing interest rates today)** A decrease in interest rates by the Federal Reserve Bank.
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Support; Strongly support]
3. **(Forward guidance)** The Federal Reserve’s practice of publicly sharing its future plans for interest rates to influence economic expectations and behaviors today?
[Strongly support; Support; Neutral; Oppose; Strongly oppose]
4. **(Federal Reserve Bank reducing the amount of money circulating in the economy)** A reduction of the money that the Federal Reserve Bank provides to banks in the economy, which in turn would reduce access of firms and households to loans and credit.
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither oppose nor support; Support; Strongly support]
5. **(Increase in income taxes I)** An increase in taxes on high-income taxpayers used to reduce government debt.
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither oppose nor support; Support; Strongly support]

6. **(Increase in income taxes II) A increase in taxes on the middle class and high-income taxpayers** used to reduce government debt.
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither oppose nor support; Support; Strongly support]
7. **(Government spending cut I into less debt) A reduction in spending on social programs,** such as Medicare or the Child Tax Credit, to reduce government debt.
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither oppose nor support; Support; Strongly support]
8. **(Government spending cut III into reallocation) An increase in taxes on top earners** to fund additional low-income transfers.
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither oppose nor support; Support; Strongly support]
9. **(Increase in corporate taxes) An increase in corporate taxes.**
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither oppose nor support; Support; Strongly support]
10. **(Anti-trust) An tightening of anti-trust regulation** to ensure more competition between firms.
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither oppose nor support; Support; Strongly support]
11. **(Price controls) A policy freezing the prices of gas or basic food items.**
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither oppose nor support; Support; Strongly support]
12. **(Wage controls) Regulations to cap the wage growth** of workers in the US.
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither oppose nor support; Support; Strongly support]
13. **(Limit imports from other states (more generally, use trade policy to relocate production in the US)) A policy restricting imports from other countries.**
[Strongly oppose; Oppose; Neither oppose nor support; Support; Strongly support]

A.4.7.4 Tools to combat the redistributive effects of inflation

1. Do you support or oppose the following policies to help the **most vulnerable population groups** after a **rise in the cost of living**?
[Strongly oppose; Oppose somewhat; Neither oppose nor support; Support somewhat; Strongly support]
 - More cash transfers to low-income families
 - Expanding the food stamps program to help more families with food expenses
 - Providing vouchers for fuel, gas, and electricity to low-income families
 - Providing vouchers for fuel, gas, and electricity to middle-income families
 - Increasing the minimum wage

A.4.8 Economic Information about the Household

1. Do you and your household own any motor vehicle?

[Yes; No]

2. With which frequency do you typically use any of the motor vehicles you own?

[Daily; On a weekly basis, but not all days; On a monthly basis, but not all weeks; Less than once per month]

3. Do you and your household own or rent your primary residence?

[Own; Rent; I have no primary residence]

4. Could you provide an estimate of the monthly rent (excluding utilities) that you and your household pay for your primary residence?

[\$0-\$399; \$400-\$499; \$500-\$649; \$650-\$799; \$800-\$949; \$950-\$1,099; \$1,100-\$1,299; \$1,300-\$1,499; \$1,500-\$2,499; \$2,500 or more]

5. Could you provide an estimate of your primary residence value (if it was sold today)?

[\$0-\$49,999; \$50,000-\$99,999; \$100,000-\$149,999; \$150,000-\$199,999; \$200,000-\$249,999; \$250,000-\$299,999; \$300,000-\$349,999; \$350,000-\$449,999; \$450,000-\$649,999; \$650,000 or more]

6. Do you have a mortgage on your primary residence?

Yes; No

7. What is the outstanding amount of the mortgage on your primary residence? In other words, if it were fully repaid today, how much would you have to pay?

Note that we are interested in the outstanding principal, excluding interests, fees, etc.

[\$0-\$24,999; \$25,000-\$49,999; \$50,000-\$74,999; \$75,000-\$99,999; \$100,000-\$124,999; \$125,000-\$149,999; \$150,000-\$199,999; \$200,000-\$249,999; \$250,000-\$349,999; \$350,000 or more]

8. Do you and your household own any checking accounts?

[Yes; No]

9. Could you provide an estimate of the total amount currently held in your checking account(s)?

[\$0-\$199; \$200-\$699; \$700-\$1,299; \$1,300-\$1,999; \$2,000-\$2,999; \$3,000-\$4,999; \$5,000-\$8,999; \$9,000-\$19,999; \$20,000-\$39,999; \$40,000 or more]

10. Do you and your household own any other short-term savings (savings/money market accounts, brokerage accounts or shares in money market mutual funds)?
Yes; No
11. Could you provide an estimate of the total amount currently held in these account(s)?
[\$0-\$999; \$1,000-\$1,999; \$2,000-\$4,999; \$5,000-\$9,999; \$10,000-\$14,999; \$15,000-\$29,999; \$30,000-\$49,999; \$50,000-\$99,999; \$100,000-\$149,999; \$150,000 or more]
12. Do you and your household own shares of mutual funds, ETFs, or hedge funds?
Yes; No
13. Could you provide an estimate of the total value of these assets (if they were sold today)?
[\$0-\$9,999; \$10,000-\$24,999; \$25,000-\$49,999; \$50,000-\$74,999; \$75,000-\$99,999; \$100,000-\$199,999; \$200,000-\$399,999; \$400,000-\$699,999; \$700,000-\$1,699,999; \$1,700,000 or more]

A.4.9 Demographics

1. Where you **born in the United States**?
[Yes; No]
2. How many **children** do you currently have?
[I do not have children; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more]
3. Which category best describes your **highest level of education**?
[Primary education or less; Some High School; High School degree/GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College-Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)]
4. Did you study economics in college?
[Yes; No]
5. What is your **current employment status**?
[Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or business owner; Unemployed and looking for work; Student; Not working and not looking for a job; Retiree]
6. Please select all years in which you have been unemployed and looking for work for at least one week
[menu with years from 1968 to 2024]

7. [(If “Full-time employee”, “Part-time employee”, or “Self-employed or small business owner” to employment_status)] Which category best describes your **main occupation**?
[Management, business and financial occupations; Professional and related occupations; Service occupations; Sales and related occupations; Office and administrative support occupations; Farming, fishing and forestry occupations; Construction and extraction occupations; Installation, maintenance and repair occupations; Production occupations; Transportation and material moving occupations; Armed forces; Other (Please specify)]
8. [If “Unemployed and looking for work” to 5] Even if you are not currently working, which category best describes your most recent main occupation? Check the one that applies.
9. [If “Full-time employee”, “Part-time employee”, or “Self-employed or small business owner” to employment_status] Which of the following **sectors** are you currently employed in?
 If you have multiple jobs, check the one that best corresponds to your main occupation.
[Agriculture, plantations, other rural sectors; Basic metal production; Chemical industries; Commerce; Construction; Education; Financial services, professional services; Food, drink, tobacco; Forestry, wood; Health services; Hotels, tourism, catering; Mining; Mechanical and electrical engineering; Media, culture, graphical; Oil and gas production, oil refining; Postal and telecommunications services; Public service; Shipping, ports, fisheries, inland waterways; Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear; Transport (including civil aviation, railways, road transport); Transport equipment manufacturing; Utilities (water, gas, electricity); Other (Please specify)]
10. [If “Unemployed and looking for work” to 5] Even if you are not currently working, in which sector did you last work?
 If you had multiple jobs, check the one that best corresponds to your main latest occupation.
11. Do you work in the **gig economy**?
 The gig economy is based on flexible, temporary or freelance jobs, often involving connecting with clients or customers through an online platform.
[Yes;No]
12. Please indicate your **marital status**.
[Single; Married; Legally separated or divorced; Widowed]
13. What is your **spouse’s** current **employment status**?
[Same options as in the respondent’s case] Conditional on having a spouse.
14. At any time in **2023**, even for one month, did you or anyone in your household receive:

- Any **cash assistance** from a state or county welfare program such as welfare to work, TANF, general assistance, diversion payments, or refugee cash?
- An **Earned Income Tax Credit Break**?
- Any **unemployment insurance transfers**?

[Yes;No]

15. Are you covered by **Medicaid or Medical Assistance**?

[Yes;No]

16. Did you, or anyone in your household, receive **food stamps** or use a **food stamp benefit card** at any time in **2023**?

[Yes;No]

17. For what you currently know, do you think your **total household income** this year (2024) will be **significantly different from 2023**, overall?

[It will be a lot less; It will be a bit less; It will be around the same; It will be a bit more; It will be a lot more;]

18. On **economic policy** matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?

[Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative]

19. What do you consider to be your **political affiliation**, as of today?

[Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other (Please specify); Non-affiliated]

20. Did you vote in the **2020 presidential election**?

[Yes;No]

21. *(If answered “Yes”)*

In the **2020 presidential election**, who did you vote for?

[Joe Biden; Donald Trump; Howie Hawkins; Jo Jorgensen; Other]

(If answered “No”) Even if you **did NOT vote**, please indicate the **candidate** that you would have voted for or who represented your views most closely.

[Joe Biden; Donald Trump; Howie Hawkins; Jo Jorgensen; Other]

A.4.10 Feedback and Debrief

1. Please feel free to give us any **feedback** or impression regarding this survey.

[Text box]

2. Thank you for your participation in our research study.

To end the survey, please click on the arrow at the bottom right of the page as if you were answering a question.

We would like to discuss with you in more detail the study you just participated in and to explain exactly what we were trying to study.

Before we tell you about all the goals of this study, however, we want to explain why it is necessary in some kinds of studies not to tell people all about the purpose of the study before they begin. As you may know, scientific methods sometimes require that participants in research studies not be given complete information about the research until after the study is completed. Although we cannot always tell you everything before you begin your participation, we do want to tell you everything when the study is completed.

We do not always tell people everything at the beginning of a study because we do not want to influence their responses. If we tell people what the purpose of the study is and what we predict about how they will react, then their reactions would not be a good indication of how they would react in everyday situations.

This study had three main goals: understand how you think **about inflation and its causes**; understand **your policy preferences** in terms of inflation and unemployment; finally, we also wanted to study your understanding of the consequences of inflation.

When you were asked to choose between different economies (the pairs between inflation and unemployment), the order and levels of inflation and unemployment shown to you were randomly chosen each time. The purpose of this was to understand how you trade-off these concerns.

Moreover, before you were asked to choose between different economies, you might or might not have been given information about the true current values of inflation and unemployment rate in the US. The purpose of this was to understand how this information may have an effect on your preferences for inflation and unemployment. This is the information that was provided to some randomly selected respondents (that might include you): "For in-

formation, the current unemployment rate in the US is around 4%, while the current annual inflation rate is around 3%.”

In addition, you might or might not have seen a video explaining the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. We did this in order to understand how you would use this information when expressing your policy preferences. This was randomized, meaning that you were randomly allocated to either see the video or not, as other respondents were. We could not tell you this beforehand in order to not affect your responses and have them be as they would in a real world setting. Please note that the information reflected general economic knowledge and there is nothing misleading in the video. Here is the video, please watch it if you are interested and to see what other respondents saw.

If other people get to know the true purpose of the study, it might affect how they answer questions, so we are asking you not to share the information we just shared.

We hope you enjoyed your experience, and we hope you learned something today. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us on the email provided in the consent form (social.economics.research2020@gmail.com).

Do you have any other questions or comments about anything you did today or anything we’ve talked about? Thank you again for your participation.