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IDEOLOGY, INCIDENCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FUEL TAXES:
EVIDENCE FROM THE CALIFORNIA 2018 PROPOSITION 6

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Ideology, Incidence and the Political Economy of Fuel Taxes: Evidence from the California 2018 Proposition 6

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ABSTRACT

In 2018, California voters rejected Proposition 6, a ballot initiative that sought to repeal state gasoline taxes and vehicle fees enacted as part of the 2017 Road Repair and Accountability Act. We study the relationship between support for the proposition, political ideology and the economic burdens imposed by the Act. For every hundred dollars of annual per-household imposed costs, we estimate that support for the proposition rose by 3 - 9 percentage points. Notably, we find that the relationship between voting and the economic burden of the policy is seven times stronger in the most conservative tracts relative to the most liberal tracts. Since conservative areas in California and elsewhere tend to bear a higher burden from transportation and energy taxes than liberal areas, heterogeneity in the response to economic burdens has important implications for the popular support for environmental taxes and the ongoing policy debate about how to finance future road infrastructure.

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1 Introduction

Economists have long extolled the societal benefits of setting the price of energy equal to marginal social cost. Yet, policy rarely aligns with Pigouvian ideals. Although, in some circumstances prices exceed marginal social cost (Borenstein and Bushnell (2018)), most transportation and energy taxes in the U.S. are set below the socially-optimal levels (Parry and Small (2005)) with distributional considerations and the perceived regressivity of energy and transportation taxes often cited as a rationale.¹ In this paper, we investigate an alternative explanation, how popular support for or against transportation taxes may make adherence to the Pigouvian ideal difficult. Extending back to the time of the first oil embargo (Knittel (2014)), stated-preference surveys document the widespread popular opposition to gasoline tax increases relative to other policy approaches (e.g., fuel rationing or taxes on “gas guzzlers”) as a path to reduce fuel consumption.

In this paper, we offer revealed-preference evidence on popular support for transportation taxes by studying the 2018 popular vote on California Proposition 6, the “Voter Approval for Future Gas and Vehicle Taxes and 2017 Tax Repeal Initiative.” If approved by voters, the proposition would have had two immediate, tangible impacts on fuel tax policy in California. Proposition 6 would have rolled back the tax and fee provisions of the Road Repair and Accountability Act of 2017 (RRAA), the first major fuel tax and vehicle fee increase in California since more than two decades. At the time of passage, the California Department of Revenue projected the RRAA would raise over \$5 billion per year, through increased fuel tax, registration fees, and a new annual road use charge for electric vehicles. In addition, it would have required a successful ballot proposition to approve any future state-wide fuel or transportation tax increase, extension or introduction. Despite opposition to Proposition 6 from prominent Democrats, polling on the Proposition remained close up to election day, but, ultimately, the ballot initiative was defeated 56.8 to 43.2 percent.

We explore how support for transportation taxes and fees, measured as the fraction of voters opposed to Proposition 6, correlates with local ideological preferences and the economic burden imposed by the RRAA at the census tract level. We measure ideological preferences in a community by studying votes on other partisan propositions. We calculate household bur-

¹Although Poterba (1991) notes that gasoline taxes are less regressive when evaluated relative to household expenditures, regressivity remains a prominent concern (Chernick and Reschovsky (1997)), especially as high-income households increasingly adopt electric vehicles (Davis and Sallee (2020), Glaeser et al. (2023)). Counterintuitively, such considerations have also justified regulated per-unit prices that exceed marginal cost in circumstances where regulators view consumption as a proxy for household income, such as electricity (Borenstein (2012)), natural gas (Borenstein and Davis (2012)) and water (Porcher (2014)).

den imposed by the RRAA at the census tract level economic burdens using detailed data on vehicle ownership and household travel patterns. Our analysis makes four contributions to the understanding of political economy of energy and transportation taxes.

First, we begin by regressing opposition to Proposition 6 on the economic burdens of the policy, the political preferences of the local community and a rich set of demographic covariates. We find that ideological preferences and economic incidence are correlated with support for environmental taxes, which in our setting is reflected in opposition to Proposition 6. More conservative areas and areas where the RRAA imposed higher costs (as a result of greater gasoline consumption, higher amounts of travel, or a different mix of vehicles) were more likely to vote in favor of repealing gasoline taxes than more liberal areas and areas where the economic costs imposed by the RRAA were lower. The effects are economically significant – for every one hundred dollars of annual per-household imposed costs, we estimate that support for the proposition rose by 3 - 9 percentage points.

Here, our results complement two related literatures, a long one on transportation taxes that relies on stated-preference survey data to evaluate support for transportation taxes (Agrawal et al. (2010), Kallbekken et al. (2013), Kaplowitz and McCright (2015), Nixon and Agrawal (2019) and a more recent one that uses popular votes to infer voter preferences. With regard to the former, we show that the conclusion, that economic and ideological considerations matter, map into actual behavior for the most politically-engaged part of the population. With regard to the latter, our estimates contribute to a set of papers that unpack the importance of economic and ideological factors using votes on propositions and referenda to infer voter preferences. While the majority of this literature exploits trade and economic shocks to examine preferences for redistributive policy (see e.g., Brunner et al. (2011), Dippel et al. (2015), Dorn et al. (2020)) or the valuation of public goods (e.g., Burkhardt and Chan (2017)), our paper relates most closely to Anderson et al. (2019) and Chan and Sayre (2023), both of which study the failed carbon tax ballot initiatives in Washington State in 2016 and 2018. Here, our findings, that both ideological and economic considerations were correlated with voting for Proposition 6, mirror the findings of Anderson et al. (2019) and Chan and Sayre (2023), albeit in a different setting for a different type of tax.

Second, we explore how heterogeneity in the response to economic burdens varies by demographics and political ideology. Although the response to the economic burden of the RRAA is uncorrelated with income, education or race, we find a strong, monotonic relationship between the magnitude of the response to the economic burden of the tax and the political ide-

ology of a community. Voting in the most conservative census tracts in California is roughly seven times more responsive to the economic burden imposed by the RRAA than voting in the most liberal census tracts. Our results echo those of Dorn et al. (2020) and Dippel et al. (2015) that find the response to economic considerations elicited the strongest effects on voting and political attitudes amongst conservative voters. Yet, our results also provide a counterpoint to Chan and Sayre (2023) that found evidence that economic considerations most strongly correlate with voting patterns on the failed carbon tax ballot initiatives in the most liberal areas in Washington state, suggesting that unique features of each initiative may play an important role.

Third, we relate our finding, that conservative voters respond more strongly to economic considerations, to the implications for popular support for transportation and energy taxes. In California (as well as many other parts of the country), residents in conservative regions tend to travel more, drive vehicles with lower fuel economy, are more likely to drive an SUV or truck, are less likely to drive an electric vehicle and are less likely to use alternative forms of transportation.² Consequently, gasoline consumption on a per-capita basis in conservative regions tends to be higher than in more liberal areas. Similar patterns exist in household energy consumption – households in more conservative regions of the country spend a higher fraction of their disposable income on energy products and utilities. As a result, the burden imposed by energy or transportation taxes tends to fall more heavily on conservative and rural locations, areas for which our results suggest voting is most responsive to the economic considerations. If energy and transportation taxes impose greater costs on voters who respond most strongly, aggregate popular support for transportation and energy taxes may face an additional “headwind.” This intuition parallels the intuition of Ramsey taxation, although in this setting, the tax falls more heavily on the most responsive consumers and reduces aggregate support (rather than being levied more heavily on the least elastic goods to maximize welfare.)

Fourth, we illustrate how the correlation between the economic burdens of taxes and heterogeneity in the response to those burdens impacts willingness-to-pay calculations for policy for the median voter. Traditionally, these calculations scale the support or opposition to a policy by extent to which economic burdens (or benefits) impact support for the policy. In essence, the calculation provides an estimate of the additional costs or benefits required to make the median voter in a location indifferent between supporting or opposing the policy. Yet, when the responsiveness to economic burdens is positively correlated with the burdens themselves, a

²See, e.g., Sexton and Sexton (2014), Filippini and Wekhof (2021), and Archsmith et al. (2022)

naive estimate that does not account for heterogeneity systematically overstates willingness-to-pay in high-burden locations and understates willingness-to-pay in low-burden locations. In our setting, a naive estimate overstates the benefits that would be required to make conservative areas to be indifferent to higher transportation taxes and understates the amount by which liberal areas would be willing-to-pay to keep transportation taxes in place.

Our findings have important implications for the ongoing policy debate about how to finance future road infrastructure in the U.S. Fuel prices are amongst the most salient in the economy and fuel taxes receive disproportional media treatment relative to commensurate increases arising from oil prices (Li et al. (2014)).³ Yet, despite this and legislative support at the state-level that reflects popular opposition to gasoline taxes,⁴ per-gallon fuel taxes have been the central source of infrastructure funding in the U.S. With the shift towards vehicle electrification and the attendant decline in revenue from fuel taxes, policy makers are actively considering how to transition towards other methods of infrastructure funding as the fuel tax base declines⁵ and fuel-based excise taxes grow increasingly regressive (Glaeser et al. (2023)). The political feasibility of changes to the gasoline tax or other methods of funding, such as road-user charges or mileage-based taxes, will be central to that debate and to the long-term prospects for maintaining earmarked funding for infrastructure as the transportation mix shifts away from petroleum-based fuels.

2 Background and History of Proposition 6

Ballot initiatives and referenda (collectively “propositions”) are forms of direct democracy where citizens vote directly upon policy, on laws passed by the legislature, or on constitutional amendments. California is one of 18 states that allow voters to amend the state constitution by ballot initiative, and one of 26 states that allow voters to mandate new statutes (initiatives) or repeal laws previously enacted by the legislature (referenda). In California, ballot propositions require supporters to collect signatures from registered voters equal to 8% of the people who

³In contrast, the infrastructure investments, funded through a combination of state and federal transportation taxes and allocations from state and federal general funds, may be less tangible than the taxes paid every time a driver fuels at the pump.

⁴Past literature finds that gasoline taxes are negatively correlated with lagged state gasoline pre-tax prices (Goel and Nelson (1999)) and lagged state gasoline consumption (Hammar et al. (2004)), suggesting that politicians may be reticent to increase taxes at times and in areas where household fuel consumption costs are greater. Likewise, Decker and Wohar (2007) finds a negative correlation between the lagged employment in the trucking industry and diesel taxes.

⁵<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/03/business/energy-environment/support-for-gas-tax-increase-still-nil-despite-falling-prices.html>, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesmorris/2022/02/12/electric-vehicles-will-need-new-taxation-or-governments-will-lose-billions/?sh=5654846527ed>

participated in the previous election (roughly 585,000 signatures). Ballot propositions cannot be reversed by the legislature after being approved by the electorate, but rather can only be reversed through a subsequent ballot proposition.

In this paper, we study Proposition 6 on the 2018 general election ballot. Proposition 6 was a voter-sponsored ballot proposition that sought to amend the California constitution in response to the Road Repair and Accountability Act of 2017 ("RRAA"), also known informally as Senate Bill 1. The RRAA, passed by the state legislature in a party-line vote and signed into law on April 28, 2017, allocated \$54 billion to infrastructure investments over a decade. The RRAA financed the investment through three transportation fees. First, the RRAA raised gasoline and diesel excise tax rates by \$0.12 and \$0.20 per gallon on November 1, 2017, with built-in CPI adjustments beginning in 2020. The excise taxes applied to petroleum-based and green fuels (e.g., biodiesel and ethanol). Second, the RRAA introduced a new Transportation Improvement Fee ("TIF") levied annually when drivers register their vehicles. The fee scaled with vehicle value, from \$25 per year for vehicles worth less than \$5,000 to \$175 per year for vehicles worth more than \$60,000. Like the excise taxes, the RRAA indexed the TIF to CPI so that it increased over time. Finally, the RRAA also levied a new, annual \$100 road-use fee for electric vehicles beginning in 2020, supplemental to any TIF levied on the electric vehicle. At the time of passage, the California Legislative Analyst's Office forecasted tax revenues from the three fees at \$5.2 billion per year, of which the bill allocated roughly \$1.9 billion to highway infrastructure projects, \$1.8 billion to local infrastructure projects, \$0.8 billion to transit programs and the remainder to active transportation, enforcement, urban planning and research initiatives.⁶ The California Department of Finance estimated that the fees levied by the RRAA would impose direct costs of roughly \$10 per month for the average driver.⁷

Proposition 6 was a direct response to the RRAA. As written, the proposition

"Eliminates Recently Enacted Road Repair and Transportation Funding by Repealing Revenues Dedicated For Those Purposes. Requires Any Measure to Enact Certain Vehicle Fuel Taxes and Vehicle Fees Be Submitted to and Approved By the Electorate. Initiative Constitutional Amendment."⁸

The goal of Proposition 6 was two-fold: to repeal fuel tax increases and vehicle fees that were enacted in 2017, including those associated with the Road Repair and Accountability Act of 2017 (RRAA) and to amend the state constitution to require voter approval (via ballot propo-

⁶<https://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2017/3688/2017-transportation-package-060817.pdf>

⁷<http://rebuildingca.ca.gov/faqs>

⁸<https://lao.ca.gov/BallotAnalysis/Proposition?number=6&year=2018>

sitions) for any imposition, increase or extension of fuel taxes or vehicle fees in the future. If passed, Proposition 6 would have immediately reduced gasoline and diesel excise taxes by \$0.12 and \$0.20 per gallon respectively, eliminated the Transportation Improvement Fees associated with vehicle registration, and prevented the introduction of the electric vehicle road-use fee.

Prominent state and national Republicans expressed support for the proposition, including U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan, U.S. House Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy, California Representatives Doug LaMalfa, Devin Nunes, Ken Calvert and Mimi Walters, and Republican gubernatorial candidate John Cox, as did the California Republican Party. Proponents framed the vote on Proposition 6 as a vote on high gasoline excise taxes, with the ballot committee "Yes on Prop 6, Repeal the Gas Tax" leading the petition campaign to place Proposition 6 on the ballot.⁹ Backers argued that excise taxes contribute to California's gasoline prices being amongst the highest in the contiguous U.S., with the price of regular-grade gasoline averaging \$3.48 per gallon in 2018 relative to a nationwide average of \$2.72 per gallon. Quoting the argument offered in support of Proposition 6 in the 2018 Official California Voter Information Guide:

"Prop. 6 does two things. It repeals the massive increase in gas, diesel and car taxes imposed by the Legislature just last year. Second, it requires voter approval for any future attempt by the Legislature to do it again. That's it." - John Cox, Delores Chavez, and Peggi Buff¹⁰

Opponents of Proposition 6 included prominent Democrats (including governor Jerry Brown, Democratic gubernatorial candidate Gavin Newsom, and mayor of Los Angeles Eric Garcetti), industry and trade organizations, labor unions, the California Chamber of Commerce and the California Democratic Party. Opponents emphasized the need to fund aging infrastructure, the passage of which would undermine road quality and transportation safety.

"I can't believe the proponents of this ballot measure really want Californians to keep driving on lousy roads and dangerous bridges. Taking billions of dollars a year from road maintenance and repair borders on insanity." - Governor Jerry Brown¹¹

Opponents of the proposition out-raised supporters roughly ten-to-one, spending \$46 mil-

⁹[https://ballotpedia.org/California\Proposition\6,_Voter\Approval_for_Future\Gas_and\Vehicle\Taxes_and_2017\Tax\Repeal_Initiative_\(2018\)](https://ballotpedia.org/California\Proposition\6,_Voter\Approval_for_Future\Gas_and\Vehicle\Taxes_and_2017\Tax\Repeal_Initiative_(2018))

¹⁰California Secretary of State, "Official Voter Information Guide November 2018." pg 42.

¹¹The Sacramento Bee, "Gas tax repeal would strip California lawmakers' ability to pass increases," September 14, 2017

lion defeat Proposition 6 relative to roughly \$5 million dollars in support.¹² Yet, despite the funding gap and strong opposition by labor and industry groups, the outcome of Proposition 6 was uncertain near to the election. During the week of October 14, 2018, the Public Policy Institute of California polled support for the Proposition 6 at 41%, while a Survey USA poll estimated 58% support. Online prediction markets estimated the probability that Proposition 6 would pass at roughly one-third a few days before the vote.¹³ Ultimately, the electorate voted down Proposition 6 with 57% of voters opposed, leaving the fuel taxes and vehicle fees of the RRAA intact.

3 Data

We combine publicly available voting data, demographic data from the census, and data on vehicle ownership and travel intensity at the census-tract-level to examine how electoral support or opposition to Proposition 6, and by extension, transportation taxes and fees, correlates with ideological beliefs and economic considerations.¹⁴ Table 1 presents the tract-level summary statistics for a subset of voting, ideological, economic and demographic variables.

We obtain data on voting and electoral registration in the 2018 general election from the Statewide Database maintained at University of California, Berkeley.¹⁵ There are over 20,000 voting precincts in California, but due to the availability of demographic and vehicle ownership data, we aggregate voting data from the precinct-level to the 8,057 census-tracts in California. To do so, we use the crosswalk provided by the Statewide Database that maps the fraction of each precinct attributable to each overlapping census tract.¹⁶ Our dependent variable is the share of votes in opposition to Proposition 6. For ease of interpretation, we focus on “support” the RRAA and opposition to Proposition 6 as our primary outcome variable. We also use the voting data to construct several proxies for the political preferences of each census tract. We calculate our primary proxy for the ideological preferences from voters’ support for other ballot propositions in 2018. Following Anderson et al. (2019), we classify positions on

¹²[https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_6,_Voter_Approval_for_Future_Gas_and_Vehicle_Taxes_and_2017_Tax_Repeal_Initiative_\(2018\)](https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_6,_Voter_Approval_for_Future_Gas_and_Vehicle_Taxes_and_2017_Tax_Repeal_Initiative_(2018))

¹³<https://www.predictit.org/markets/detail/5000/Will-California-voters-approve-gas-tax-repeal-ballot-initiative-in-2018>.

¹⁴All publicly-available data and the code used for the analysis is available at the online repository: <https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/198176/view>

¹⁵<https://statewidedatabase.org>

¹⁶Formally, the SWDB crosswalk calculates the percentage overlap at the census-block level, described in https://statewidedatabase.org/info/metadata/disaggregation_of_prec_to_block.pdf

ballot propositions as either "liberal" or "conservative."¹⁷ We use the average vote share for the liberal positions on the other ballot propositions as our proxy for the political preferences of those who voted in the 2018 general election. As alternative measures of ideology, we also consider the fraction of registered voters who chose to self-identify as members of the Democratic or Green parties and the fraction of voters supporting the 2018 Democratic gubernatorial candidate, Gavin Newsom. As with the voting data on Proposition 6, we aggregate voting data and registration data to the census tract level using the crosswalk provided by the Statewide Database.¹⁸

Turnout for the 2018 midterm election was exceptional, driven by the contentious elections for the U.S. Congress. State-wide, 64.5% of voters cast a ballot in the 2018 California midterm elections, the highest turnout for a midterm election in 36 years. Virtually all of these voters cast a vote on Proposition 6 - only 4% of voters who cast a ballot in the election abstained from voting on Proposition 6.

Just under 57% of the voters opposed Proposition 6, voting to retain the gasoline taxes and fees imposed that financed the RRAA infrastructure investments. This is slightly lower than the fraction of registered liberal voters in California - roughly two-thirds of voters who self-identify with a political party are registered members of the Democratic or Green parties.¹⁹. Notably, opposition to Proposition 6 was also lower than support for the 2018 Democratic gubernatorial candidate, Gavin Newsom (64.5%), or for Joseph Biden in the 2020 Presidential Election (65.2%). The state-wide result masks substantially heterogeneity across census tracts and geographies within California. Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution function and histogram of opposition to Proposition 6. Although, on election day, roughly 58 percent of voters opposed the proposition, Proposition 6 received majority support in roughly one-third of California's census tracts.

The RRAA imposes two types of fees directly upon households: a per-gallon excise tax on gasoline and a registration fee inclusive of the electric vehicle road-use tax. The costs of the RRAA (and the economic incentive to support Proposition 6) consequently depend on gasoline

¹⁷We exclude three ballot propositions from this calculation. We exclude Propositions 3 and 6, both of which lacked a clear liberal / conservative position, and Proposition 11 for which the wording of the proposition was unclear. See table A1 for a description of ballot measure used in the ideological index.

¹⁸Appendix Figure A2 presents scatter plots of our preference measure of ideological preferences against our two alternative measures of ideological preferences. We find that the choice of variable makes little qualitative difference to our results.

¹⁹Roughly 45% of voters are registered members of the Democrat or Green Parties, 24% are registered members of the Republican, Libertarian or Peace and Freedom parties, and 28% are either unaffiliated, declined to state or are registered as Independents

consumption and the mix of vehicles owned within each census tract.²⁰ We merge four datasets to construct a measure of the economic incidence of the RRAA. Data purchased from Experian reports the make-model-model-year of all vehicles purchased from the fourth quarter of 2017 to the third quarter of 2018 at the census tract level. We merge this with data from the DataOne VIN decoder to obtain vehicle characteristics including fuel type and gas mileage (at the make-model-model-year level), from which we construct the fuel-economy distribution of newly-owned vehicles in each census-tract. The California Department of Motor Vehicles reports the share of electric vehicles registered as a fraction of the total light-duty fleet in 2018. Finally, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics provides tract-level estimates of mean daily vehicle miles traveled at the household level.

We construct a measure of the RRAA-imposed gasoline excise taxes for the average household in census tract i as the product of the twelve cent-per-gallon excise tax increase²¹ and the annual number of gallons of gasoline consumed for a household driving a vehicle with average fuel economy in the tract. Formally,

$$\text{Annual Gas Tax Burden}_i = 0.12 * (1 - EV_i) * \frac{VMT_i}{MPG_i} * 365 \quad (1)$$

where EV_i is the share of electric vehicles from the California DMV, VMT_i is the estimate of weekly vehicle miles traveled from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and MPG_i is the average fuel economy of gasoline-powered vehicles.²² Importantly, our data provide a high degree of geographic variation based on the observable characteristics of vehicle ownership and travel patterns at the census-tract level. This allows us to compare, for example, census tracts with voters who are equally conservative, but face different burdens imposed by the RRAA as a result of the types of vehicles they own and the amount they tend to drive.²³

The cost of the Transportation Improvement Fee imposed by the RRAA is a function of the value of the vehicle, so the actual burden varies substantially across census tracts based on the price of vehicles owned in those locations. We not observe the distribution of vehicle

²⁰As discussed above, the RRAA also increased diesel excise taxes. Although diesel taxes paid to transport goods might, plausibly, be partially borne by consumers in the form of higher prices of goods and services, we omit these costs from the calculation of the economic incidence of the RRAA.

²¹Consistent with Marion and Muehlegger (2011), we assume that state gasoline taxes are fully-borne by consumers.

²²Implicitly, our calculation assumes that the number of gallons of gasoline consumed daily by the average household is given by $(1 - EV_i) * \frac{VMT_i}{MPG_i}$. Although we lack households-level data on vehicle miles traveled by census tract, Levinson and Sager (2023) finds little evidence that vehicle miles traveled are correlated with fuel economy.

²³The spatial variation in our setting relies on observable ownership and travel patterns at the census tract level. Chan and Sayre (2023) offer an alternative approach using spatial micro-simulation to simulate the distribution of household-level economic burdens based on local demographics and the relationship between demographics and energy consumption in the Consumer Expenditure Survey.

values within each census tract. Here, we rely on an estimate from the California Department of Finance that, on average, vehicles in California would pay a Transportation Improvement Fee of \$48 per annum. Although this likely underestimates the registration fees paid in affluent areas and overestimates in less affluent areas. To this, we add the annual \$100 road use fee that RRAA levies on electric vehicles and estimate the average combined vehicle fees per household in each census tract i .

$$\text{Annual Vehicle Fees}_i = ((EV_i * 100) + 48) * \text{vehicles per household}_i \quad (2)$$

In the mean census tract, the average household travels approximately forty miles per day, drives a car with fuel economy of 28 miles per gallon and consumes 1.4 gallons of fuel. Scaled up by the gasoline tax imposed by RRAA yields average annual costs of roughly \$62 per year in increased gasoline tax costs.²⁴ The transportation improvement fee and electric vehicle road-use tax would average an additional \$88 per year in increased fees for the typical household. Tract-level vehicle fees and gasoline taxes imposed by the RRAA are positively correlated, illustrated in figure 2. Locations with lower fuel consumption also tend to have fewer vehicles per household.²⁵

Finally, we track local infrastructure spending from the RRAA. Caltrans publicly reports each infrastructure project that uses RRAA funds, the amount of funds used by the project, and the assembly district in which the project occurred. We use this data to estimate the average annual infrastructure investment financed by the RRAA in each assembly district between 2017 - 2023 per household. We obtain tract-level demographic variables for income, race, gender and educational attainment from the American Communities Survey (ACS) 2018 5-year estimate.

3.1 Descriptive Results

We begin by presenting a set of bivariate comparisons and maps to illustrate the broad patterns between support for Proposition 6, ideological preferences and the economic burden imposed by the RRAA. Opposition to Proposition 6 is positively correlated with the share of liberal voters and negatively correlated with the economic burden imposed by the RRAA. We illustrate both in Figure 3 that plots binned scatter plots of the relationship between opposition to Proposition 6 and liberal party affiliation (in Panel A) and opposition to Proposition 6 and annual

²⁴We assume, throughout, that consumers bear the entire burden of gasoline taxes, consistent with Marion and Muehlegger (2011) that finds that state gasoline taxes are fully passed-through to consumers.

²⁵We also estimate that local infrastructure investment average \$191 per year per household. The difference between average infrastructure investment and household-level direct costs is a result of the diesel fuel tax increase.

RRAA-imposed costs (in Panel B). In the most conservative ventile of census tracts, roughly two-thirds of voters supported Proposition 6, whereas roughly three-quarters of voters opposed Proposition 6 in the most liberal ventile of census tracts. In addition, in the census tracts least-exposed to the gasoline taxes imposed by the RRAA, voters strongly opposed Proposition 6, whereas voters were split on Proposition 6 in the decile of census tracts most exposed to gasoline taxes. Between these extremes, opposition to Proposition 6 changes roughly linearly with respect to the two covariates.

For reference, we present maps in Figure 4 that color code each of California’s counties based on the county mean for each of three variables. In Panel A, we map political opposition to Proposition 6 at the county-level. Voters in the San Francisco metro area were most strongly opposed to Proposition 6, as were voters in Santa Barbara and Los Angeles counties. In contrast, voters in interior counties, were less strongly opposed to Proposition 6. In fact, in many interior counties, a majority of voters supported repealing the RRAA. These patterns mirror the well-known pattern of political partisanship in California (Panel B). Voters on the California coast are much more liberal, on average, than voters in interior counties. But, coastal areas also tend to be less exposed to transportation taxes (Panel C) and thus, face less economic incentive to repeal the RRAA by supporting Proposition 6.

We further highlight this negative correlation between the burdens imposed by the RRAA and local ideology in Figure 5 which plots the fraction of voters in each census tract registered as a member of either the Democratic or Green party against the burden imposed by the RRAA. On average, the most liberal decile of census tracts in California face three-quarters the imposed-RRAA burden of the least liberal decile of census tracts (\$126 versus \$171, respectively). Residents in the more liberal census tracts tend to drive fewer miles per week, drive more fuel efficient vehicles and are more likely to other methods of transportation than driving.²⁶

4 Methodology and Results

We begin by asking a similar question to past work – what is the relative importance of political ideology and economic considerations for popular support for transportation taxes? We regress the share of votes in favor of the gasoline tax (i.e., in opposition to Proposition 6) on our ideology measure (i.e., mean support for the “liberal” position on other 2018 ballot measures), the costs imposed by RRAA for the mean household in the census tract, and demographic

²⁶Scatter plots illustrating these relationships are included in Appendix Table Figure A3.

characteristics to unpack the relative importance of each in explaining voting on Proposition 6.²⁷ Formally,

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Liberal Index}_i + \gamma \text{RRAA Costs}_i + \Theta X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where Liberal Index_i is the average fraction of voters who supported the “liberal” position on the other 2018 ballot measures and RRAA Costs_i are the annual costs and fees in hundreds of dollars per annum imposed by the RRAA for the mean household. Like most papers studying revealed-preference data on voting, the analysis is limited to a single cross-section – the voting patterns and characteristics of the roughly 8,000 census tracts in California in the 2018 election. Thus, we also include binned sociodemographic covariates (X) related to the racial, gender, education attainment and income distribution of the census tract to control for other differences across census tracts that might be correlated with both voting and either political ideology or the economic burdens imposed by the RRAA.²⁸ We cluster our standard errors geographically, by county.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present the bivariate correlations between gas tax support, ideology and the costs imposed by RRAA, conditional on the binned demographic variables. Analogous to the unconditional binned scatter plots presented in Figure 3, we find a positive correlation between the ideology and support for gasoline taxes and a negative correlation between the costs imposed by the RRAA on the mean household and support for gasoline taxes.

Column (3) includes both ideology and the costs imposed by RRAA to address covariance between ideology and the costs of RRAA. Again, we estimate a positive coefficient on ideology and a negative coefficient on the costs imposed by RRAA, although in both cases, the coefficients are attenuated relative to those in Columns (1) and (2), consistent with a negative correlation between the ideology of a census tract and the costs imposed by RRAA illustrated in Figure 5. Similar to past work, we gauge the relative importance of economic considerations and ideological preferences by comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients of our two primary coefficients of interest. One hundred dollars of additional costs imposed by the RRAA on the mean household in a census tract is associated with an 8.6 percentage point reduction in support for transportation taxes. This relationship is roughly equivalent to a six percentage point reduction in the liberal index – roughly comparable to moving from the median to

²⁷For ease of interpretation, we code our dependent variable in terms of “support” for the gasoline tax – that is, since Proposition 6 sought to *repeal* the gasoline tax, we assign a value of 1 for votes in *opposition* to Proposition 6, and a value of 0 for votes in support of Proposition 6.

²⁸We replicate the specifications with the binned covariates using the alternative measures of “liberal” support in Appendix Table A2

the thirtieth percentile of census tracts in California, ranking the census tracts by ideology. In column (4), we add county fixed effects and identify the coefficients on ideology and imposed costs off of within-county variation, controlling for geographically-correlated unobservables. The coefficients on ideology and tax burden attenuate, suggesting that the estimates in column (3) are driven both by within-county variation but also variation across counties that is uncorrelated with binned demographics. In the latter case, one hundred dollars of additional annual cost is associated with a three percentage point reduction in support for gasoline taxes.

Tax revenues generated by RRAA fund infrastructure projects in California. While many of the highway infrastructure projects benefit citizens throughout the state, local infrastructure and transit projects create benefits that accrue to residents of nearby communities. In Columns (5) and (6), we include the amount of investment in local infrastructure and transit projects, funded by the RRAA, in each community.²⁹ As with revenues, we normalize infrastructure funding to annual funding per household in each census tract. Although the coefficients on local funding are positive, they are close to zero. Local infrastructure funding from the RRAA has relatively little correlation with opposition to Proposition 6. The asymmetry between the economic burdens and local infrastructure funded by the RRAA is unsurprising. While the investment spending in a local community might be correlated with local infrastructure needs, RRAA funding is only one source of funding for transportation infrastructure for local, county and regional transportation authorities. Not only might voters fail to understand sources of infrastructure funding, but they might rationally conclude that transportation funding is fungible and would be reallocated in the event that Proposition 6 passed. In contrast, gasoline taxes are amongst the most salient in the economy. The gasoline taxes and vehicle fees imposed by the RRAA were easily communicated and were a central piece of the platform of the Republican gubernatorial candidate, John Cox.

4.1 Does the response to economic burdens vary by demographic group?

A natural extension of the results in Table 2 is to consider whether the voting of some demographic groups is more strongly correlated with the economic burdens imposed by the RRAA. In ways, this question parallels the survey literature on energy tax preferences (e.g., Dolšak et al. (2020), Mildenberger et al. (2022), Ewald et al. (2022)) that seeks to unpack the relationship between demographics and stated-preferences for environmental policy. Our setting offers revealed-preference evidence on a similar question, specifically, the degree to which voting

²⁹The California Department of Transportation tracks each local project funded by the RRAA. Each local infrastructure or transit project is assigned to communities based on the geographic scope reported by the DOT.

of different demographic groups on Proposition 6 correlated with the costs imposed by the RRAA.

Heterogeneity in the response to the economic burden of a policy has important implications for popular support and feasibility of taxes, if the burdens are inequitably imposed. This is illustrated by a simple model of political support where the fraction of a group with demographics x facing costs of the policy c that votes in favor of ballot initiative is given by $S(x, c) = \alpha + \beta x + \gamma c + \lambda x c$. In the model, β and γ denote the relationships between support for the policy and demographics and economic costs, respectively, and λ denotes how the magnitude of the response to economic costs shifts as demographics change. Denoting the joint PDF of the ideology and costs imposed by the policy on individuals in a jurisdiction as $f(x, c)$, we can express aggregate support for the policy in the jurisdiction as:

$$\int_x \int_c S(x, c) f(x, c) dc dx = \alpha + \beta E(x) + \gamma E(c) + \lambda [E(x)E(c) + cov(x, c)]. \quad (4)$$

If there is no relationship between demographics and the response to the cost of a program (i.e., $\lambda = 0$) or if demographics and costs imposed are uncorrelated (i.e., $cov(x, c) = 0$), aggregate support for the policy simplifies into a function of the expected values of x and c . But, if the burdens of the policy are inequitably shared (i.e., $cov(x, c) \neq 0$ and magnitude of the response to the economic variable shifts as demographic change ($\lambda \neq 0$), the covariance can either increase or decrease aggregate support for the policy. In our setting, if the RRAA tends to impose higher costs on less responsive groups, support for the RRAA will be higher than if the costs are equitably shared. In contrast, if the gasoline and fees fall more heavily on more responsive voters, aggregate support for the RRAA will be lower. This intuition echoes the familiar intuition of Ramsey taxation – maximizing welfare with linear taxes requires shifting the relative tax rates onto inelastic products. Here, aggregate political support is greatest in settings where the burden of a policy falls disproportionately on groups that are the least responsive to the costs of the policy.

We bring the intuition of the simple model above to the voting data on Proposition 6. To estimate heterogeneity in the relationship between voting and the economics costs imposed by the RRAA, we separate census tracts into deciles based on four demographic covariates: (1) the fraction of voters who were registered in 2018 as members of the Democratic or Green parties³⁰, (2) median income, (3) share of population identifying as white, and (4) share of

³⁰We use voter registration data as a measure of the political attitudes of a community rather than our summary statistic based on the voting on other Propositions. Unlike voting on other propositions in the 2018 election, which is correlated with differential turnout, registration data is more plausibly exogenous to differential turnout in the con-

population with a 4 year college degree. Although California, on average, is one of the most left-leaning states, there is substantial heterogeneity in ideology within the state. Conservatives outnumber liberals roughly 2:1 in the least liberal decile of census tracts in California, which is a higher ratio than the state-wide averages for all but a handful of states.³¹ In contrast, in the most liberal decile of census tracts, voters registered for as Democratic or Green Party members outnumber Republican and Libertarian registered voters by roughly 10 to 1.

We interact dummy variables for the binned deciles for each of the four covariates with the costs imposed by the RRAA on the mean household in census tract i , and estimate a specification similar to that used in Table 2.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Liberal Index}_i + \sum_k \sum_{j=1}^{10} \gamma_{jk} \text{RRAA Costs}_i * \text{Decile}_{ijk} + \Theta X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (5)$$

where X include the previously-used set of demographic variables, k denotes the set of four demographic covariates of particular interest (liberal, income, fraction white and bachelor's degree share), and Decile_{ijk} is an dummy variable equal to one if a particular tract falls within the j th decile of the state-wide distribution of demographic k .

Figure 6 plots the decile-specific coefficients and 95% confidence intervals each of the interactions between economic costs and the deciles of liberal registration (panel A), income (panel B), white fraction of the population (panel C) and the fraction of the population with a bachelor's degree or higher (panel D). Notably, the results in Panel A suggest a clear monotonic relationship where the correlation between the economic burden of the RRAA and voting gets progressively weaker as we move from the most conservative to the most liberal census tracts. In the most conservative locations, every \$8 of annual household costs is associated with one additional percentage point of support for Proposition 6. Moving to more and more liberal deciles, the relationship between costs and support for Proposition 6 erodes – by the tenth decile, a \$50 increase in annual household costs is associated with an additional percentage point of support for Proposition 6.

In contrast, we find little variation in the coefficients by income decile (panel B), decile of fraction white (panel C) and educational attainment decile (panel D). Although a handful of individual coefficients are statistically distinguishable from zero, they are small in magnitude (relative to the coefficients for political ideology). In all three cases, it is not possible to reject

tentious 2018 election.

³¹<https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/religious-landscape-study/compare/party-affiliation/by/state/>

an F-test of equality across the decile-specific coefficients.³² After conditioning on the political alignment of a community, additional demographics have little impact on the correlation between voting behavior and economic burdens.

As already illustrated in Figure 5, more conservative areas of California tend to bear a higher burden from the RRAA. Residents in these areas tend to drive more, own lower fuel economy vehicles, own fewer electric vehicles and are less likely to take alternative forms of transportation. The findings in Figure 6 suggest that more conservative areas also exhibit a stronger correlation between how they vote and the tax burden they bear. This has implications for popular support for transportation taxes in California, as the voters most responsive to tax burden are also the ones who are most likely to face high burdens imposed by the RRAA. For reference, if the tax burden was shared equally by conservative and liberal regions alike, our results imply that state-wide support for the RRAA would be half a percentage point greater. Falling support in liberal tracts would be more than offset by a reduction in opposition in conservative tracts. Notably, the features that lead the most conservative California counties to bear a higher transportation cost burden are also present in the United States more broadly. Drivers in more conservative states tend to drive more miles per year, drive lower fuel economy vehicles, are more likely to drive trucks or SUVs and less likely to drive electric vehicles. (Archsmith et al. (2022)). To the extent the voting of conservative regions outside California is also more sensitive to economic burdens, transportation taxes might face additional headwinds.

The way in which Proposition 6 was framed by Democrats and Republicans offers one possible explanation as to why voting in conservative areas was more strongly correlated with economic burdens. Conservative proponents of Proposition 6 framed their arguments largely around costs, emphasizing the reduction in vehicle fees and gasoline taxes that Californians would enjoy if Proposition 6 were passed and the relatively high transportation taxes faced by Californians relative to residents of other states. Proposition 6 and the repeal of the gas tax was a prominent policy goal of the Republican gubernatorial candidate, John Cox and was viewed as a potential issue that would help to increase Republican turnout in the midterm election.³³ In contrast, liberal opponents of Proposition 6 tended to focus on the infrastructure investment that would be forgone if the ballot measure passed, framing the proposition as one that would impact infrastructure safety and quality. Past research suggests that how issues are framed

³²The p-value of the F-tests for income, fraction white and educational attainment are 0.15, 0.20 and 0.16, respectively.

³³<https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-california-governor-john-cox-gavin-newsom-issues-20181105-htmlstory.html>

offers an explanation for heterogeneity in response by political ideology to policies. Hardisty et al. (2010) finds evidence that a framing environmental policy as a tax (rather than alternative language) elicited strong opposition from conservative voters, whereas liberal voters did not differentially respond to how the issue was framed. Dorn et al. (2020) and Dippel et al. (2015) find similar evidence that the response to economic considerations elicited the strongest effects on voting and political attitudes amongst conservative, rather than liberal, voters. But, the heterogeneous response by conservative voters is not universal. Interestingly, Chan and Sayre (2023) found that support for state-wide carbon taxes in Washington to be most responsive to economic incidence in the most liberal tracts, suggesting that the heterogeneous response to the economic burdens (or benefits) of policy may be malleable.

Along these lines, we explore several possible mechanisms for why voting in conservative census tracts is more strongly correlated with economic burdens. Table 3 presents the regression results for a linear analogue to Equation (5)

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Liberal Index}_i + \gamma \text{RRAA Costs}_i + \sum_k \lambda_k \text{RRAA Costs}_i * X_{ik} + \Theta X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (6)$$

where X_k are the four demographic covariates (indexed by k) of particular interest: liberal voter registration share, median income, fraction white and bachelor's degree share.

We begin, in column (1) with the analogue to the non-parametric results presented in Panel A of Figure 6, using the share of voters opposing Proposition 6 as the dependent variable. Our findings are qualitatively similar – although we find that the burden imposed by the RRAA increases support for Proposition 6, the response to the economic burden diminishes with the share of liberal voters in the census tract. In next three columns, we consider three possible ways in which voting in the most conservative census tracts in California might be particularly sensitive to economic burdens: (1) abstentions on Proposition 6, (2) voter turnout and (3) voter preferences, conditional on voting on Proposition 6. Although the voting data does not disaggregate voting patterns by party registration, aggregate statistics on abstentions, turnout and voting provide suggestive evidence of competing mechanisms. For instance, if conservative voters are more likely to vote on Proposition 6 or to turnout at all when facing high transportation tax burdens, we would expect the number of abstentions on Proposition 6 to fall and voter turnout to rise in conservative tracts facing higher tax burdens from the RRAA. In columns (2) and (3), we find little support for either of these hypotheses. Unlike the vote share on Proposition 6, we do not see that the relationships between voter turnout or abstention and

the economic burden of the RRAA to be particular pronounced in more conservative census tracts. In contrast, we see some evidence that, like support for Proposition 6, support for the Republican gubernatorial candidate, John Cox, is higher in conservative census tracts that face higher burdens than equally conservative census tracts facing lower burdens from the RRAA. To what extent this reflects a shift in attitudes, versus an increase in conservative turnout offset by a decline in liberal turnout remains a question for future inquiry.

4.2 Willingness to pay and heterogeneity in response

Commonly, studies of popular votes calculate estimates of willingness to pay to keep a policy in place. If we assume that the coefficient on the economic burdens imposed by a policy reflects an estimate of the average marginal utility of income for those who voted, we can scale the amount by which a proposition passes or fails in a locality by the inverse of the coefficient on economic covariates to obtain a “willingness-to-pay” estimate. The estimate captures the amount of additional costs or benefits required to make the median voter in the locality indifferent to the policy. In our setting, the willingness to pay (WTP) captures how much the average household in each census tract would be willing to pay to keep the policy in place for tracts that greater than majority support for gasoline taxes. Conversely, for tracts that voted against RRAA, the WTP estimate describes how much the average household in a given tract would be willing to pay to repeal the policy.

Building on the preceding sections, we consider how heterogeneity in the response to the economic burden of taxes impacts willingness to pay estimates. We begin by following the standard approach, clearly described in Anderson et al. (2019) and Burkhardt and Chan (2017), in which local vote share is regressed upon ideological and economic covariates. Formally, we estimate the logit specification:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Liberal Index}_i + \gamma \text{RRAA Costs}_i + \Theta \mathbf{X} + \epsilon_i \quad (7)$$

where $y_i = \ln(\frac{s_i}{1-s_i})$ in which s_i represents the share of voters in tract i supporting the gasoline tax (opposing Proposition 6), and Liberal Index_i and RRAA Cost_i are the ideological and economic incidence variables from Table 2. Following Anderson et al. (2019) and Burkhardt and Chan (2017), we interpret the fitted value $\hat{\gamma}$ as the average marginal utility of income across all census tracts.³⁴ Under the typical WTP assumptions, we back out the WTP estimate for tract i

³⁴WTP estimation relies on an interpretation of electoral support for RRAA as the utility derived from living in an RRAA policy regime and the assumptions that voters had an accurate understanding of the costs imposed by RRAA

as: $y_i/\hat{\gamma}$.

As an alternative, we estimate a variant of the specification above that allows for heterogeneity in the response to the economic burdens of taxation. For parsimony, we regress the vote share for Proposition 6 on the ideological and economic covariates and linear interactions of economic covariates with income, education, fraction white and ideology, mirroring the specification in equation (7):

$$\begin{aligned} y_i &= \alpha + \beta \text{Liberal Index}_i + \gamma \text{RRAA Costs}_i + \\ &+ \sum_k \lambda_k \text{RRAA Costs}_i * X_{ik} + \Theta X_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

where y_i remains $\ln(\frac{s_i}{1-s_i})$. X_k are the four demographic covariates (indexed by k): liberal voter registration share, median income, fraction white and bachelor's degree share which we interact linearly with the costs imposed by the RRAA. We present the coefficients on taxes and fees from both specifications in table 4. The signs of the economic coefficients are consistent with our previous results – in the aggregate, economic considerations are negatively correlated with support for transportation taxes, but the relationship between economic considerations and voting is stronger in conservative tracts than in liberal tracts.

Based on the coefficients in column 2 and the demographics for each tract, we construct tract-specific of $\hat{\gamma}_i$ reflecting how responsive we would expect voting in that tract to be, as a function of the demographic interaction terms.³⁵ We plot the histogram of the tract-specific values of $\hat{\gamma}_i$ in Figure 7. Relative to the common value of gamma estimated in column 1 (denoted by the vertical red line), the tract-specific values of gamma vary substantially. More liberal tracts tend to have tract-specific values of gamma that are closer to zero while more conservative tracts, all else equal, tend to have values of gamma that are larger in magnitude. Conservative tracts in the left tail of the distribution have demographics that suggest almost twice the sensitivity to the economic burdens imposed by the RRAA relative to the common value of gamma estimated in column (1). At the other extreme, a group of liberal tracts in the right tail of the distribution have a profile that suggest virtually no relationship between opposition to Proposition 6 and the economic burdens imposed by the RRAA, mirroring the estimates for the most liberal decile of tracts in figure 6.

Just as we constructed willingness-to-pay estimates for each tract based on the common

at the time of voting, that the estimated household incidence of RRAA policy (described in section 3) is accurate, and that the estimated incidence of the RRAA is uncorrelated with the error term in the regression (i.e. no omitted variable bias).

³⁵Formally, $\hat{\gamma}_i = \hat{\gamma} + \sum_k \hat{\lambda}_k X_{ik}$.

value of $\hat{\gamma}$ estimated in column 1, we use the tract-specific values to construct a second willingness-to-pay estimate for each tract that depends on support for Proposition 6 and the *tract-specific* value of $\hat{\gamma}_i$ as: $WTP_i = y_i / \hat{\gamma}_i$. We plot the two willingness-to-pay cumulative distribution functions in Figure 8. Notably, the distribution using the tract-specific values of gamma (in navy) is not a mean-preserving spread of the distribution using the common value of gamma (in red). The use of the tract-specific values of gamma shifts the willingness-to-pay distribution to the right, reducing the willingness-to-pay to avoid the RRAA for tracts that tended to support Proposition 6 and increasing the willingness-to-pay to maintain the RRAA in tracts that tended to oppose Proposition 6. For liberal census tracts, a tract-specific value of gamma close to zero implies that the willingness-to-pay estimate from the common value of gamma would tend to underestimate true willingness-to-pay. A tract that tends to be less responsive than the average would require a larger shift in costs to induce the tract to be indifferent to the policy under consideration. In contrast, a common value of gamma would tend to overstate how much a conservative tract (that is more responsive to the economic costs of the policy) would need to receive to make it indifferent. Allowing for heterogeneity in our setting leads to economically meaningful changes in the aggregate willingness-to-pay to maintain the RRAA. Under a common value of gamma, mean willingness to pay per capita is approximately \$58. Allowing for values of gamma to vary by tract, mean willingness to pay rises by approximately 80 percent to \$105 per capita.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we examine the role that economic and ideological considerations play in popular support for gasoline taxes, as observed through voting on California Proposition 6 in 2018. Consistent with past papers, we find that both ideological and economic considerations matter. But, we also find substantial heterogeneity in the response to economic burden of taxes between liberal and conservative areas, after controlling for income, education and race. Notably, the more conservative an area, the more responsive voting in the area is to the economic burden imposed by the Road Repair and Accountability Act.

In our setting, this heterogeneity, combined with the correlation between the burdens of gasoline taxes and ideology, has important implications for the political economy of gasoline taxes. Foremost amongst these is that in our results suggest that, in California, gas taxes face additional headwinds since gasoline tax burdens tend to fall more heavily on conservative communities that are particularly sensitive to those economic costs. It is instructive to note the

parallel to Ramsey taxation in which the deadweight-loss-minimizing schedule levies higher taxes on the most inelastic, and therefore least responsive, goods. If demographic groups are differentially responsive to taxation, aggregate support would be greater if the burdens fell disproportionately on groups whose voting was less sensitive to economic burdens.

Our study only focuses on gasoline taxes in California, but one avenue for future research might be to test for heterogeneity in both burdens and response in other parts of the country. Although we lack the data to recreate tract-level fuel tax burden outside of California, Figure 9 graphs the share of the state's popular vote for Democratic U.S. House of Representative candidates in the 2018 election against the share of household expenditures spent on transportation fuels (red) and energy utilities (blue). As is the case for tract-level gasoline tax burden in California, more liberal states spend a smaller fraction of household expenditures on transportation and energy utilities. Although these relationships reflect a combination of different habits, technology and income levels, they inform the distributional burden of environmental taxes, similar to those raised by Pizer and Sexton (2019), and suggest that uniform energy policy would tend to impose a greater burden on more conservative states. If voters in these states are also more responsive to economic burdens, this would imply that national policy might face similar "headwinds" in terms of aggregate support.

Yet, our findings and the related literature also suggests that the relationship between voter attitudes and economic burdens may be malleable. While our finding, that voting in the most conservative areas is the most responsive to economic considerations, echoes findings from Hardisty et al. (2010), Dippel et al. (2015) and Dorn et al. (2020), Chan and Sayre (2023) finds largely the opposite result when studying the popular vote on the Washington state carbon tax Initiative 732. Whether the different findings reflect nuances between the populations of California and Washington, differences in policy details or differences in how the policies were framed has important implications for the political economy of environmental policy, especially in jurisdictions where policy faces direct consideration by the electorate.

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
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
6 Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Prop 6 opposition, by census-tract




Note: The figure plots the cumulative distribution function and histogram of the percent of "No" votes on proposition 6 at the census tract level. The values for the CDF and histogram are plotted on the primary and secondary y-axes, respectively.

Figure 2: RRAA gasoline tax and vehicle fee burdens, by census tract




Note: The figure plots tract-level annual gasoline tax burden and vehicle fees per household imposed by the RRAA.

Figure 3: Prop 6 opposition, ideology and RRAA burden




Note: The figures present binned scatter plots of the fraction of votes in opposition to Proposition 6 (on the y-axis) against the share of voters who are registered as member of the Democrat or Green parties (left-panel) and the annual costs imposed by the RRAA (right-panel). All variables are aggregated to the census tract level.

Figure 4: Proposition support, ideology and economic burden, by county




Note: County-level values are population-weighted averages from census tract data.

Figure 5: RRAA tract-level burden and ideology




Note: The figure graphs the estimated tax burden imposed by the RRAA (on the y-axis) against the fraction of a tract's voters who are registered as a Democrat or Green party member. The line of best fit is plotted in red.

Figure 6: Responsiveness to economic burden by Demographic Deciles




Note: The panels plot the point estimate and 95 percent confidence intervals for the coefficient on the interaction between the annual costs imposed by the RRAA and deciles of liberal registration (panel A), median income (panel B), fraction white (panel C) and fraction with a Bachelor's degree (panel D). Specifications include binned covariates and liberal index. 95 percent confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered at the county level.

Figure 7: Distribution of tract-level response to economic burden




Note: The figure presents a histogram of the predicted tract-specific values for gamma, where the value for each tract is based on the demographics of the tract and the coefficients in column 2 of table 4. The vertical line corresponds to the estimated value of gamma from the model in column 1 of table 4 that imposes a common value of gamma across all CA census tracts.

Figure 8: Willingness to pay distributions, with and without tract-specific response



Note: The figure presents the CDF of willingness to pay estimates under a common value of gamma (red) and under tract-specific values of gamma (navy). The graph restricts the range to values between the 5th and 95th percentiles of willingness-to-pay.

Figure 9: Transportation Fuel and Energy Utility Expenditure Share and State Political Ideology



Note: The figure plots state average expenditure shares for transportation fuel (in red) and energy utilities (electricity, natural gas and other fuels, in blue) reported in the 2018 consumer expenditure survey on the vertical axis, and the share of the state's votes for Democrats in 2018 US House races. The graph omits the District of Columbia and states for which households in the CEX PUMD are not identified.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Gas Tax Support (voting no on Prop 6)	8001	0.58	0.14	0.22	0.97
Liberal Index (2018 Propositions)	8001	0.65	0.15	0.12	0.96
Vote Share for Democrat Governor (2018 General Election)	8001	0.64	0.17	0.13	1
Liberal Party Registration	8001	0.45	0.12	0.13	0.79
Conservative Party Registration	8001	0.24	0.13	0.019	0.66
Decline to State Party Registration	8001	0.28	0.048	0.077	0.56
Turnout (2018 General Election)	8001	0.63	0.12	0.16	1
Gas Tax Abstentions	8001	0.038	0.013	0	0.18
RRAA Total Annual Costs (\$100s per Household)	7870	1.5	0.3	0.38	2.6
RRAA Annual Gas Tax Increase (\$100s per Household)	7870	0.62	0.13	0.18	1.1
RRAA Annual Fee Increase (\$100s per Household)	7977	0.88	0.2	0.048	1.9
RRAA Gross Local Benefits (\$100s per Household)	8001	1.9	1.1	0.51	5.6
Average Gas Price	7805	3.8	0.13	3.2	4.8
Household Weekday Gallons	7870	1.4	0.29	0.42	2.4
Household Vehicle Miles	7872	39	7.9	13	63
Share of Total Miles in Vehicles	7849	0.67	0.036	0.4	0.79
Miles per Gallon	7996	28	1.2	18	42
Vehicles per Household	7977	1.9	0.4	0.11	3.1
Commute Minutes	7986	32	6.7	5.5	78
Household Income	7962	77349	37705	2499	250001
White	7989	0.61	0.21	0	1
Male	7989	0.5	0.044	0	1
BA degree fraction	7987	0.2	0.11	0	1
Population	8001	4883	2216	0	38932
Population Density	8001	8716	9704	0	151487

Table 2: Voting, Ideology and Economic Incidence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Liberal Index (0 - 1)	1.37*** (0.070)		1.33*** (0.065)	1.10*** (0.022)	1.31*** (0.059)	1.10*** (0.021)
Annual RRAA taxes and fees, per HH		-0.24*** (0.043)	-0.086*** (0.0081)	-0.030*** (0.0053)	-0.086*** (0.0077)	-0.031*** (0.0052)
Local Annualized funding, per HH					0.0078*** (0.0021)	0.0011 (0.0018)
Observations	7920	7831	7831	7829	7831	7829
R-Squared	0.89	0.62	0.90	0.95	0.90	0.95
Demographics	Binned	Binned	Binned	Binned	Binned	Binned
County FE				X		X

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by county, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. The dependent variable is the fraction of voters in the census tract opposing Proposition 6. All columns include demographic and socioeconomic controls: the share of population in 8 different race categories, the share of population in 16 income level bins, in 5 education level bins, in 12 commute time bins, the share of population that is male, the share that is Hispanic, the share of residents that own their home, median age of residents, mean household size, and log population density, and the share of housing in 26 bins for home value. Columns (4) and (6) add fixed effects for the fifty-five counties in California.

Table 3: Economic Burden, Ideology and Turnout

	(1) Prop 6 Vote Share	(2) Prop 6 Abstention	(3) 2018 Turnout	(4) Newsom Vote Share
Liberal Index (0 - 1)	0.63*** (0.039)	0.019 (0.012)	-0.30*** (0.044)	0.96*** (0.067)
Annual RRAA taxes and fees, per HH	-0.26*** (0.028)	-0.0060 (0.0067)	-0.026 (0.048)	-0.18*** (0.022)
RRAA taxes and fees * Lib. Reg. Share	0.35*** (0.026)	0.0012 (0.0074)	0.022 (0.030)	0.30*** (0.018)
Observations	7828	7828	7828	7828
R-Squared	0.93	0.46	0.84	0.98
Demographics	Binned	Binned	Binned	Binned

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by county, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. The dependent variables in columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) are fraction of voters who opposed Proposition 6, the rate of abstention on Proposition 6, voter turnout in the 2018 general election, and the fraction of voters supporting Gavin Newsom in the 2018 general gubernatorial election. All columns include demographic and socioeconomic controls: the share of population in 8 different race categories, the share of population in 16 income level bins, in 5 education level bins, in 12 commute time bins, the share of population that is male, the share that is Hispanic, the share of residents that own their home, median age of residents, mean household size, and log population density, and the share of housing in 26 bins for home value.


Table 4: Voting and Demographic-specific Economic Incidence

	(1)	(2)
Liberal Index (0 - 1)	5.81*** (0.27)	3.07*** (0.22)
Annual RRAA taxes and fees, per HH	-0.54*** (0.073)	-1.05*** (0.11)
RRAA taxes and fees * Lib. Reg. Share		1.31*** (0.14)
RRAA taxes and fees * Median Income (000s)		0.00081** (0.00031)
RRAA taxes and fees * White share		0.22 (0.15)
RRAA taxes and fees * BA share		-0.82*** (0.21)
Observations	7834	7831
R-Squared	0.90	0.93
Demographics	Binned	Binned

Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by county, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. The dependent variable is the log odds of the vote share in the census tract opposing Proposition 6. Both columns include demographic and socioeconomic controls: the share of population in 8 different race categories, the share of population in 16 income level bins, in 5 education level bins, in 12 commute time bins, the share of population that is male, the share that is Hispanic, the share of residents that own their home, median age of residents, mean household size, and log population density, and the share of housing in 26 bins for home value.

A Supplementary Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Responsiveness to Benefits by Demographic Deciles



Note: The panels plot the point estimate and 95 percent confidence intervals for the coefficient on the interaction between deciles of infrastructure funding and liberal registration (panel A), median income (panel B), fraction white (panel C) and fraction with a Bachelor's degree (panel D). Specifications include binned covariates and liberal index.

Figure A2: Alternative measures of political ideology





Figure A3: Liberal Registration and Transportation Covariates



The binned-scatter plots display miles traveled (Panel A), fraction of miles traveled by car (Panel B) and average fuel economy (Panel C) against the fraction of a tract's voters who are registered as a Democrat or Green party member. The lines of best fit are plotted in red.

Table A1: 2018 Ballot Propositions

Proposition number	Description	Vote share in support	Supporters	Opposition	For index
Proposition 1	Issues \$4 billion in bonds for housing programs and veterans' home loans	56.2	CDP, Governor Newsom (D), Rep. Waters (D), Mayor Garcetti (D), Mayor Steinburg (D), Toni Atkins (D), Bill Dodd (D), Sierra Club		Liberal
Proposition 2	Authorizes state to use revenue from millionaire's tax for \$2 billion in bonds for homelessness prevention housing	63.4	California Democratic Party (CDP), California Republican Party (CRP), Governor Newsom (D), Rep. Waters (D), Mayor Garcetti (D), Mayor Steinburg (D), Tony Atkins (D), Sierra Club	California Libertarian Party (CLP)	Liberal
Proposition 3	Issues \$8.877 billion in bonds for water-related infrastructure and environmental projects	50.7	John Cox (R), Senator Feinstein (D), Rep. Garamendi (D), Toni Atkins (D), National Wildlife Federation	Anthony Rendon (D, speaker of state house), sierra club, green party	Exclude
Proposition 4	Issues \$1.5 billion in bonds for children's hospitals	62.7	California Teachers Association, CDP	League of Women Voters, CRP	Liberal
Proposition 5	Revises process for homebuyers who are age 55 or older or severely disabled to transfer their tax assessments	40.2	CRP, California Chamber of Commerce	CDP, YIMBY Action, Asm. David Chiu (D)	Conservative
Proposition 6	Repeals 2017's fuel tax and vehicle fee increases and requires public vote on future increases	43.2	CRP	Sierra Club, CDP	Exclude
Proposition 7	Authorizes legislature to provide for permanent daylight saving time if federal government allows	59.8	CRP, CDP		Exclude
Proposition 8	Requires dialysis clinics to issue refunds for revenue above a certain amount	40.1	CDP, Rep. Waters (D), Fiona Ma (D)	CRP	Liberal
Proposition 10	Allows local governments to regulate rent on any type of housing	40.6	Sierra Club, CDP, Bernie Sanders, Rep. Waters (D)	CRP, Gov. Newsom (D), John Cox (R)	Liberal
Proposition 11	Allow ambulance providers to require workers to remain on call during breaks paid	59.6	CRP	CDP	Exclude for confusing wording
Proposition 12	Bans sale of meat from animals confined in spaces below specific sizes	62.3	CDP	CRP	Liberal

Table A2: Alternative measures of political ideology

	Liberal Registration Share (0-1)		Newsom Vote Share (0-1)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Liberal Registration Share (0 - 1)	1.05*** (0.023)	1.04*** (0.023)		
Gavin Newsom Vote Share (0 - 1)			0.83*** (0.022)	0.83*** (0.021)
Annual RRAA taxes and fees, per HH	-0.049*** (0.0058)	-0.050*** (0.0059)	-0.067*** (0.0078)	-0.068*** (0.0079)
Local Annualized funding, per HH		0.0030 (0.0022)		0.0018 (0.0014)
Observations	7831	7831	7831	7831
R-Squared	0.92	0.92	0.94	0.94
Demographics	Binned	Binned	Binned	Binned

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. Demographic controls include the share of population in 8 different race categories, 16 income levels, 26 home value levels, 5 education levels, 12 commute time categories, the share of population that is male, the share this is hispanic, the share of residents that own their home, median age of residents, mean household size, and log population density.