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THE IMPACT OF CONSUMER CREDIT ACCESS ON EMPLOYMENT, EARNINGS  
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP

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**ABSTRACT**

How does consumer credit access impact job flows, earnings, and entrepreneurship? To answer this question, we build a new administrative dataset which links individual employment and entrepreneur tax records to TransUnion credit reports, and we exploit the discrete increase in consumer credit access following bankruptcy flag removal. After flag removal, individuals flow into self-employment. New entrants earn more, borrow significantly using unsecured and secured consumer credit, and are more likely to become an employer business. In addition, after flag removal, non-employed and self-employed individuals are more likely to find unemployment-insured "formal" jobs at larger firms that pay greater wages. These estimates imply that firms believe previously bankrupt workers are 3.8% less productive than non-bankrupt workers, on average. These results suggest that consumer credit access matters for each stage of entrepreneurship and that credit-checks may be limiting formal sector employment opportunities.

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While much is known theoretically and empirically about the interaction between credit constraints and startup rates (*inter alia* Cooley and Quadrini [2001], Hurst and Lusardi [2004], Buera et al. [2009], Hurst and Pugsley [2011], Greenstone et al. [2014], Buera et al. [2015]), little is known about the way access to consumer credit affects individual job flows, startup decisions, or subsequent earnings.<sup>1</sup> How does consumer credit access affect the transition rate into and out of employment and self-employment? What are the consequences of these transitions for labor earnings and business income?

The central issue with determining the causal impact of personal credit on employment outcomes is that personal credit is highly correlated with an individual’s quality as well as their wealth and access to funds. Thus, it is hard to separate out wealth effects and fundamental ability from access to credit. Our approach to this question is to examine individuals after bankruptcy flags are removed from consumer credit reports, similar to Musto [2004]. These removals occur, by law, no more than ten years after bankruptcy and give rise to large increases in credit ratings, while not reflecting large changes in an individual’s credit worthiness.

We use a standard difference-in-difference approach in which we compare cohorts of bankrupt individuals whose flags are removed to adjacent cohorts of bankrupt individuals whose flags are not yet removed. We apply this methodology to a new dataset which merges millions of credit histories and self-employment tax records to administrative US Census employment records. We show that consistent with prior studies such as Musto [2004], access to credit increases dramatically among the subgroup of individuals who have their bankruptcy flags removed. We show that these increases in credit access affect an individual’s employment outcomes and the likelihood of starting an employer firm. We then verify our results in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a public cross-sectional survey.<sup>2</sup>

We frame the subsequent discussion in terms of two competing economic forces generated by a bankruptcy flag removal: (i) the *credit-access* effect: credit constraints loosen after

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<sup>1</sup>The topic of startups and access to consumer credit has received much attention following the housing bust (*inter alia* Robb and Robinson [2012], Fairlie and Krashinsky [2012], Chatterji and Seamans [2012], Schmalz et al. [2013], Adelino et al. [2013], Jensen et al. [2014], Kerr et al. [2014]), however, only recently have studies emerged which assess the impact of consumer credit on job flows and unemployment quantitatively, e.g. Athreya and Simpson [2006], Karahan and Rhee [2011], Midrigan and Philippon [2011], Chen [2012], Carroll et al. [2012], Chen et al. [2013], Herkenhoff [2013], Schott [2013], Kehoe et al. [2014] as well as empirically, e.g. Mian and Sufi [2012], Bethune [2015], Mehrotra and Sergeyev [2015], Herkenhoff et al. [2015].

<sup>2</sup>See online appendix J for SCF comparison.

flag removal allowing individuals to start self-employed businesses or borrow to smooth consumption while searching for an unemployment-insured (UI) job (we refer to UI jobs as formal sector jobs, and non-UI jobs such as self-employment as informal sector jobs) (ii) the *credit-check* effect: individuals who were non-employed or self-employed subsequently find jobs in the formal sector after flag removal. Our main contribution is to provide suggestive evidence of these two economic forces as well as provide a complete picture of how the discrete rise in consumer credit following bankruptcy flag removal affects job flows, the transition rate from non-employer to employer businesses, and earnings. Our approach is to build a set of facts that when viewed together, provide consistent evidence that the credit-access and credit-check effects influence employment outcomes.

We first study self-employment, and we show that the self-employment rate does not change among individuals whose bankruptcy flag is removed versus those whose flag is not removed. However, the lack of movement in the self-employment rate masks offsetting movements in gross flows. Relative to the control group whose flags are not removed, those whose flags are removed have both gross flows into self-employment increase by .16% per annum and gross flows out of self-employment increase by about .17% per annum. As a result, these flows offset and the stock remains constant.

Examining individuals who transition into self-employment, we show that cohorts who transition into self-employment after a bankruptcy flag removal borrow \$15k more than cohorts who transition into self-employment prior to flag removal. This represents a 12.4% increase in borrowing relative to the sample average.<sup>3</sup> They borrow mainly in the form of mortgages, HELOCs and credit cards, and they earn ~\$1k more Schedule C net income at any time horizon we observe (an increase of about 4% relative to the sample average).<sup>4</sup> They are also more likely to enter capital intensive industries such as manufacturing and industries with high external finance needs.

We then use the new Integrated Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) to measure transitions from self-employment to employer firms. Those who enter self-employment after bankruptcy flag removal are .7% more likely to own an employer firm in the LBD compared to those who enter self-employment before bankruptcy flag removal. This represents a 200% increase over the sample average LBD firm ownership rate. Among those who own an

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<sup>3</sup>The average total balance across all forms of credit one year prior to removal is \$121k in our sample.

<sup>4</sup>Relative to national averages, this is still a 2.2% treatment effect. The median self-employment income is \$45,000 and calculated as the pooled average of all heads of household who have positive self-employment income from the 1998 SCF through the 2010 SCF, weighted.

employer firm in the LBD, they borrow on average \$40k more after flag drop, a 33% gain relative to the sample average.

We take this set of facts – (a) increased flow rates into self-employment, (b) the fact that they flow into capital intensive industries and industries with high external finance needs, (c) disproportionate borrowing by new self-employed entrants relative to other job-transitioners, (d) the increased likelihood of starting an employer business, and (e) the large amount borrowed by new employer businesses – as strong evidence of the credit-access effect.

We then examine formal sector job flows (i.e. flows into and out of jobs that are unemployment-insured (UI)) which we use to measure the credit-check effect. We find that the formal-sector employment rate of individuals whose bankruptcy flags are removed increases by .32% relative to those whose flags remain on their record. Measured relative to the control group, gross flows into the formal sector increase by .24% per annum. While average earnings of formally employed workers remains constant around flag removal, we find that those who make the transition into formal employment following a bankruptcy flag removal earn \$1.8k more per annum relative to individuals who transition into formal sector employment prior to flag removal. This earnings gain represents an increase of over 4.3% relative to the sample average. What is striking is that conditional on flowing into the formal sector after flag removal, individuals are 1.5% more likely to work for large firms (1000+ employees) and less likely to subsequently exit the formal sector to non-employment or self-employment. In other words, those who get jobs after the flag removal are not ‘bad’ workers.

While evidence on firm size and credit checks is scarce, [Society for Human Resource Management \[2012b\]](#) report that 45% of large firms (2,500 to 24,999 employees) conduct credit checks versus 25% of small firms (100 to 499 employees).<sup>5</sup> The fact that workers disproportionately flow into larger firms following flag removal provides one piece of suggestive evidence that credit-checks may have previously prevented these individuals from obtaining jobs at those firms.

One potential criticism of inferring the credit-check effect from the employer size result is that it is also consistent with individuals using consumer credit to smooth consumption while searching for higher paying jobs at larger and more productive firms. In particular,

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<sup>5</sup>They do not report other size intervals. In terms of background checks, existing evidence from the UK (e.g. [Zibarras and Woods \[2010\]](#)) and US (e.g. [Society for Human Resource Management \[2012a\]](#)) indicates that small firms are much less likely to conduct background checks.

recent work by [Herkenhoff et al. \[2015\]](#) shows that *displaced workers* borrow and take longer to find a job if they have more credit access. In the current sample, which includes few displaced workers, those who find a new formal job do *not* increase borrowing. This lack of borrowing for our non-displaced workers rules out the explanation that workers are using increased credit to search for a new job at larger firms that pay greater wages.

As [Chen et al. \[2013\]](#) discuss, 60% of employers conduct credit checks and the main reason they do so is to reduce theft. Furthermore, [Society for Human Resource Management \[2012b\]](#) report that among employers who conduct credit checks, 91% of the time they do so for “job candidates for positions with fiduciary and financial responsibility (e.g., handling cash, banking, accounting, compliance, technology).” As an additional test of the credit-check hypothesis, we further stratify job flows by industry, and we show that workers are more likely to find jobs in the retail and service sectors, which disproportionately involve handling payments and the use of cash registers, after bankruptcy flag removal. We find weaker effects in sectors such as transport/communications and manufacturing, which are less likely to involve jobs which require handling payments.

Since we do not directly observe credit checks, our findings can only be viewed as suggestive evidence that credit checks limit job opportunities for bankrupt workers. But, at the bare minimum, we take our results – (a) increased flow rates into formal-employment, (b) increased flow rates into large employers, (c) increased flow rates into jobs that involve handling of cash payments, (d) lack of borrowing by job finders – as evidence that is broadly consistent with concurrent and independent regional studies by [Shoag and Clifford \[2016\]](#) and [Cortes et al. \[2016\]](#) which have demonstrated that credit checks may limit employment opportunities for certain subgroups of individuals.

In terms of policy implications, we use our point estimates to provide an estimate of the costs of banning employer credit checks. We calibrate a directed search model using our empirical estimates, and we show that firms, ex-post, would be willing to pay approximately \$17.6k in net present value to be able to decipher between a potential hire who has a bankruptcy record versus a potential hire with no bankruptcy record. What drives this result is the large difference in wage payments between newly hired bankrupt and non-bankrupt workers, which can be used to back-out that firms believe bankrupt workers are 3.8% less productive than non-bankrupt workers. This implies that banning credit checks of potential hires, as many states have done (e.g. [Cortes et al. \[2016\]](#) and [Shoag and Clifford \[2016\]](#)), may be costly to firms, ex-post. Our empirical estimates also provide the first set of moments for

a growing class of quantitative models which study the normative implications of personal bankruptcy policy on entrepreneurship (e.g. [Glover and Short \[2010\]](#), [Akyol and Athreya \[2011\]](#), [Blanco and Navarro \[2014\]](#)) and household labor supply decisions ([Chatterjee et al. \[2007\]](#) and [Livshits et al. \[2007b\]](#)), as well as theories that focus on credit constraints and subsistence entrepreneurship (e.g. [Donovan et al. \[2014\]](#) and [Dinlersoz et al. \[2015\]](#)).

Our paper contributes to several literatures, including the theoretical and empirical literature on credit constraints and startup rates, cited on the first page of the introduction. Of particular note is the concurrent, independent, and innovative work by [Bos et al. \[2015\]](#) and [Dobbie et al. \[2016\]](#). [Bos et al. \[2015\]](#) focus on the way delinquencies, i.e. skipped payments as opposed to debt discharge, affect earnings and self-employment in Sweden. [Bos et al. \[2015\]](#) show that individuals whose past defaults are publicly available for longer are less likely to have a job, are more likely to be self-employed and earn lower incomes on average. They do not focus on transitions into and out of self- and formal-employment.

[Dobbie et al. \[2016\]](#) merge bankruptcy court records with SSA administrative earnings and study the impact of bankruptcy flag removal on the stock of formal employment and self-employment as well as earnings. [Dobbie et al. \[2016\]](#) find insignificant impacts of flag removal across most of their specifications, but, where our papers overlap, our point estimates fall within their confidence intervals. One key advantage of our dataset is that we observe credit bureau records, and so we have little measurement error because we see the actual date bankruptcy flags are removed from credit reports, whereas [Dobbie et al. \[2016\]](#) must infer removal of bankruptcy flags from court filing records.

Relative to [Bos et al. \[2015\]](#), [Dobbie et al. \[2016\]](#), and the existing literature, to our knowledge, we are the first to measure gross employment transitions into and out of self- and formal-employment in response to Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag removals, and we are the first, to our knowledge, to measure the causal impact of consumer credit access, inclusive of both unsecured and mortgage credit, on the rate at which individuals move from being a non-employer to employer business. Since we are the first to merge credit reports with LBD firm ownership records, we also provide the most complete characterization of the consumer-credit choices of these new entrants (which we believe to be an advance over survey data which often aggregates or does not measure all sources of consumer credit, e.g. Census CBO/SBO and SCF – an exception is [Robb and Robinson \[2012\]](#) who conducted a detailed survey of business financing sources).

We also build on the recent literature which studies bankruptcy institutions and labor supply (e.g. [Livshits et al. \[2007a\]](#), [Han and Li \[2007\]](#), [Chen \[2012\]](#), [Chatterjee and Gordon \[2012\]](#), [Herkenhoff and Ohanian \[2012\]](#), [Dobbie and Song \[2013\]](#), [Athreya et al. \[2014\]](#)) as well as the impact of credit information structures on employment ([Chatterjee et al. \[2008\]](#), [Athreya et al. \[2012\]](#), [Chen et al. \[2013\]](#), and [Corbae and Glover \[2015\]](#)). In particular, [Chen et al. \[2013\]](#) develop a model in which credit scores reveal information about the productivity of a worker, leading employers to discriminate based on credit scores. Our empirical findings are consistent with this mechanism.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the institutional background. Section 2 summarizes the data and our empirical approach. Section 3 presents the baseline ‘stock’ or ‘level’ results. Section 4 analyzes self-employed transitioners and LBD firm owners, and Section 5 analyzes those who obtain a job in the formal sector. Section 6 presents a simple model that uses our point estimates to calculate firms’ beliefs about bankrupt workers productivity, and Section 7 concludes.

## 1 Institutional Background

Our discussion of the bankruptcy institutions in the United States is abbreviated and based largely on the discussion by [Han and Li \[2007\]](#), [Li and White \[2009\]](#), and [Han and Li \[2011\]](#). There are two main types of bankruptcy filings in the United States, Chapter 7 (liquidation) and Chapter 13 (repayment plan), however we are unable to differentiate between the two in our dataset. As [Han and Li \[2007\]](#) discuss, more than 70% of bankruptcy filings in the US are Chapter 7 filings, and of those filings that initially begin as Chapter 13 filings, many are subsequently converted into Chapter 7 filings.<sup>6</sup> As [Han and Li \[2011\]](#) explain, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the original Bankruptcy Code itself largely govern how bankruptcy filings appear on a credit report. Chapter 7 bankruptcy information is removed up to 10 years after the date of filing, whereas Chapter 13 is removed up to 7 years after filing.<sup>7</sup> What is important for the purpose of our regression design is that the removal of the

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<sup>6</sup>In short, Chapter 7 involves the liquidation of an individual’s assets and the discharge of certain debts (student debt for instance cannot be discharged, and home equity is often protected up to a state-specific limit, and so we include individual fixed effects to absorb this variation), whereas Chapter 13 is essentially a repayment plan and it allows individuals to repay all or part of their debts. See [Li and White \[2009\]](#) for discussion of the way repayments are used strategically to save one’s home.

<sup>7</sup>Quoting from [Han and Li \[2011\]](#): “The FCRA states: ‘605 (a) Information excluded from consumer reports. (1) Cases under title 11 [United States Code] or under the Bankruptcy Act that, from the date of



bankruptcy flag is statutory and follows a cutoff rule.

## 2 Data Description and Empirical Approach

Our data on unemployment-insured (UI) jobs (or formal sector jobs) comes from the Longitudinal-Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) database. The LEHD, which is a matched employer-employee dataset that covers 95% of U.S. private sector jobs, includes information on worker flows between UI jobs as well as quarterly earnings.<sup>8</sup> Our employment and earnings data span from 1995 (or 1998 in some cases) to 2008 for 11 states: California, Maryland, Illinois, Texas, Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington.

Our self-employment and firm-ownership measures are derived from the Integrated Longitudinal Business Database (ILBD). This database integrates self-employment records (identified by a unique scrambled version of their social security number) with the employer-firms that are subsequently created and owned by the same individuals. We use the non-employer/employer links built in the path-breaking work of [Davis et al. \[2007\]](#), but, for the sake of self-containment, in online appendix [A](#) we briefly describe the way the non-employer/employer universes were linked. The self-employment income comes from the universe of Schedule C tax records for sole-proprietors across all U.S. states. We therefore have net self-employment income annually from 1998-2010, as well as indicators of whether or not the self-employed individual began employing others.

All consumer credit information is taken from TransUnion at an annual frequency from 2001 to 2010. TransUnion is one of the three largest credit scoring companies in the United States, and it has a similar market share to Equifax and Experian. Our main sample is an approximately 5% random sample of individuals with credit reports from the 11 states for which we have LEHD data. The TransUnion data is then merged based on an anonymized unique identifier to the LEHD. Our data includes information on the balance, limit, and status (delinquent, current, etc.) of different classes of accounts held by individuals. Our

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entry of the order for relief or the date of adjudication, as the case may be, antedate the report by more than 10 years'; and '(5) Any other adverse item of information, other than records of convictions of crimes which antedates the report by more than seven years.' The FCRA has no rule on the minimum period of time that credit bureaus have to report a bankruptcy filing. Indeed, it is common that credit bureaus remove a Chapter 13 bankruptcy record from a credit report after only seven years. Also, the Act has no time restrictions on using the bankruptcy record that is maintained in the creditors proprietary database."

<sup>8</sup>See [Abowd et al. \[2009\]](#) for an extensive description of the LEHD.

credit data is measured as of September in each year, so there are instances in which flags are removed in October, November, or December of the prior year (i.e. prior fiscal year ending Dec. 31 through which we measure earnings and self-employment earnings), but the flag removal is classified as a removal only in the following year. In online appendix I, we attempt to capture these early transitions by using beginning-of-year employment (e.g. if an individual earned \$1k last year and \$1k this year, then they were employed at the beginning of the year, and they transited at some point in the prior year). Under these alternate beginning-of-year definitions of employment and self-employment, our main results persist.

Each database contains the same anonymized unique identifiers that can be used to link the datasets together. Our resulting panel is unbalanced and contains earnings (1998-2008), self-employment income (1998-2010), and credit reports (2001-2010) at an annual frequency.

## 2.1 Empirical Approach

Our empirical strategy is to compare previously bankrupt individuals before and after their bankruptcy flag removal to a subset of individuals whose flags are removed later in the sample, i.e. we implement a difference-in-difference analysis. In particular, our sample window is 2001-2007<sup>9</sup> and we always restrict our attention to 24-65 year olds.<sup>10</sup> Even though our sample window stops in 2007, our credit data allows us to identify flag removals between 2002 and 2010. We include all flag removal cohorts in our analysis.

Let  $i$  index individuals and  $t$  index years (from 2001 to 2007). Let  $\alpha_i$  denote a set of individual fixed effects, and  $\gamma_t$  denote year dummies. Let  $Y_{i,t}$  denote the outcome of interest (a self employment dummy, earnings, wages, etc.). Let  $D_{x,i,t}$  be a dummy variable taking the value 1 when an individual is  $x$  periods before (if  $x$  is negative) or after (if  $x$  is positive) flag removal. E.g.  $D_{-2,i,t}$  is a dummy indicating if an individual is 2 periods before flag removal, likewise  $D_{0,i,t}$  takes a value of 1 if the individual is in the year of flag removal, and  $D_{1+,i,t}$  takes a value of 1 if the treated individual is 1 or more years past flag removal. The

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<sup>9</sup>Since we use several forward lags of variables, we cannot include 2008 in our sample window. However, our 2007 variables that are forward looking are using 2008 data.

<sup>10</sup>We do note that while our time period includes individuals whose flags are removed before and after the bankruptcy reform act of 2005, our research design is unaffected since everyone in our sample previously filed bankruptcy before 2005. In online appendix I we limit the sample window to 2001-2005, and we use alternate variable definitions. See Albanesi and Nosal [2015] for more analysis of the how the reform affected new delinquency behavior.

specifications we use are of the following form:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_{-2}D_{-2,i,t} + \beta_{-1}D_{-1,i,t} + \beta_0D_{0,i,t} + \beta_{1+}D_{1+,i,t} + \Gamma X_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

The objects of interest are  $\beta_0$  and  $\beta_{1+}$  which summarize the impact of flag removal on the outcome variable in the year of removal as well as subsequent years, respectively. To check whether our point estimates are valid, we show that the treatment and control group have parallel trends prior to flag removal, (i.e.  $\beta_{-2}$  and  $\beta_{-1}$  are not statistically different from zero).

## 2.2 Variable Definitions

All nominal variables such as labor earnings, credit balance, and self-employed net income are deflated by the CPI (expressed in 2008 dollars), and we winsorize the top 1% of each continuous variable, except variables pertaining to the LBD (since fewer than 1% of our sample has admissible values).

We define an individual to be self-employed in a given year if they earn at least \$1k of real Schedule C net income throughout the year, and we define an individual to be formally employed if they earn at least \$1k of real labor earnings throughout the year in an unemployment-insured job. Transitions are defined at an annual frequency, e.g. an individual is counted as transitioning into self-employment if they earn less than \$1k of real Schedule C net income in the prior year and then earn at least that much in the current year.

An individual is counted as owning a firm in the LBD if their social security number or any other comparable identifier is linked to the ownership of an LBD firm.<sup>11</sup> We define two measures of LBD firm ownership, the first of which only requires one year of ownership and includes potentially transitory businesses. Our second definition is more stringent and requires at least two years of ownership.

A new job accession occurs if the individual begins working at an employer that they

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<sup>11</sup>Links are made to firmids, which refer to firms, not establishments. See online appendix A and Davis et al. [2007] for more details on the links. The 1+ years ownership equals one if the individual has a valid ‘firmid’ in that year. The 2+ years ownership equal one if the individual has a valid ‘firmid’ for at least two years in a row.

previously have not worked for in our sample period.<sup>12</sup> Individuals may have multiple job accessions in a given year, and some job accessions may not necessary result in a separation from a prior employer (in the case of holding two jobs). Employer measures of size are taken as the monthly average of 4th quarter employment.

Rather than using a traditional credit risk score, we use the TransUnion bankruptcy score which is designed to be a measure of bankruptcy propensity. The bankruptcy score lies between 0 and 1000 and higher scores reveal lower odds of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy scores are used only by more sophisticated lenders, and when they are used, they are used in conjunction with a traditional credit risk score. The Revolving Balance variable includes any type of credit that can be rolled over at a preset interest rate (this includes bankcards, revolving personal finance loans, and other revolving lines of credit). The combined sum of Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs) are included in the HELOC Balance variable. Traditional unsecured credit cards that are issued by banks are included in the Bankcard Balance variable.

## 2.3 Summary Statistics

Table 1 compares the mean values of our main variables of interest one year before bankruptcy flag removal to one year after bankruptcy flag removal.<sup>13</sup> This section is designed to provide raw averages of important variables and summarize broad changes in those variables. In the sections that follow, we will address compositional issues by including fixed effects and dynamic controls in all regressions.

Panel (A) of Table 1 describes the main ‘stock’ (or ‘level’) variables. If we define formal and self employment based on a \$1,000 dollar earnings threshold, Column (1) of Table 1 shows that 78.7% of individuals are formally employed and 9.0% of individuals are self-employed one year before bankruptcy flag removal. Following flag removal, Column (2) shows that the formal-employment rate decreases by .1% to 78.6%, whereas the self-employment rate

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<sup>12</sup>We use an end-of-quarter accession definition (Abowd et al. [2009]) that requires the individual to earn at least \$500 dollars from the new employer in two consecutive quarters.

<sup>13</sup>The 2006 and 2007 flag removal cohorts are not in our sample one year after their flag removal, but they are still used as controls. Therefore, the two sample sizes differ by 60k, where 60k is the combined number of individuals in the 2006 and 2007 cohorts. Likewise, the 2009 cohort and 2010 cohorts (approximately 50k individuals) will never be in our sample one year before or after their flag removal. But they are still used as controls in the main tables. So while the total number of individuals in our sample frame is 220k, only 170k reach one year before flag removal, and only 110k reach one year after flag removal.

increases by .6% to 9.6%. Column (4) shows that the change in self-employment is significant at the 10% level while the change in formal-employment is not.

Roughly 6.1% of individuals in our sample are simultaneously formally-employed and self-employed (SE), and roughly 18.4% of the individuals in our sample are non-employed. Following flag removal, the fraction who hold two jobs increases significantly, whereas non-employment moves insignificantly. Prior to flag removal, .4% of our sample own a firm in the LBD for 1+ years, whereas .2% of our sample own a firm in the LBD for 2+ years. Following flag removal, we see a significant increase in the latter definition of LBD firm ownership by .1%. In terms of employer characteristics, roughly 1/3 of our workers are employed at large firms with 500+ employees, and this fraction increases significantly following flag removal.

Panel (B) of Table 1 describes the main flow variables. Approximately 4.6% of individuals transit into formal-employment in the year before flag removal, whereas 4.4% of individuals transit out of formal-employment. In both instances, there is an insignificant change in flows following flag removal. Prior to flag removal, 3.1% of individuals transition into self-employment whereas 2.8% transition out of self-employment. In the year after flag removal, the transition rate into self-employment increases by .3% per annum to 3.4%, which is significant at the 10% level.

Panel (C) of Table 1 describes the main earnings variables. Per capita labor income in the sample is \$32,683. Following flag removal, real annual labor income increases by \$300, and this is a significant change. If we adjust for the fact that some individuals are not working, annual labor earnings per worker is approximately \$41,529 ( $=\$32,683/.787$ ). Per capita self-employment income is about \$2,140 per annum. If we adjust for the fact that most individuals are not self-employed, annual self-employed net income per self-employed individual is \$23,778 ( $=\$2,140/.09$ ). Following flag removal, self-employed net income per capita increases by \$161. Real annual total income is the sum of both self-employed (SE) net income and labor (non-SE) earnings.

Panel (D) of Table 1 describes the main credit variables. We see large credit balances prior to flag removal since the individuals have a partial recovery in credit access before their flag is removed (for more discussion, see [Cohen-Cole et al. \[2009\]](#)). Following flag removal, however, we see a large increase across all types of credit, especially mortgage credit (see [Han and Li \[2011\]](#) for more results on credit portfolios after flag removal).

### 3 Level of Employment and Earnings

We begin our analysis with what we will call the ‘stock’ (or ‘level’) results, meaning that we only consider the impact of bankruptcy flag removal on the levels of employment and self-employment. In the subsequent section, we then turn to our main analysis of gross flows and examine the individual flow rates into and out of formal and self-employment change after bankruptcy flag removal, and we further characterize subsequent borrowing, earnings gains, and transitions into LBD firm ownership.

Table 2 illustrates the baseline stock results. The coefficients in Table 2 correspond to  $(\beta_{-2}, \beta_{-1}, \beta_0, \beta_{+1})$  in Equation 1, and throughout the paper we will estimate coefficients using OLS, and we cluster standard errors at the individual level. In all regressions, we include year fixed effects and individual fixed effects in order to correct for time trends, and compositional differences in state laws, industry, occupation, and any other static characteristics of the individual. We also include dynamic controls such as quadratics in age and tenure.

Table 2 illustrates a large spike in bankruptcy scores in Columns (1) and (2) following bankruptcy flag removal. This finding corroborates the prior work of Musto [2004] and Han and Li [2011], and is at the core of the credit access effect we study below. To visualize this change in bankruptcy scores, Figure 1 illustrates the regression coefficients from Column (1), showing the stable trend in bankruptcy scores leading up to the flag removal, followed by a punctuated one-time level shift in bankruptcy scores. Column (2) illustrates that after we take out a quadratic age trend, individuals’ credit scores are close to pre-flag removal scores; however, this subsequent mean-reversion in scores is largely due to the increased borrowing following flag removal.

Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 show the impact of flag removal on formal-employment. Column (3) defines formal employment to be those who have earned at least \$1,000 in an unemployment-insured job, whereas Column (4) defines formal employment to be those who have earned at least \$5,000 in an unemployment-insured job. Using the \$1k threshold, Column (3) shows that the stock of formally employed individuals increases by .465% for those whose bankruptcy flags were removed relative to the control group who are 3 or more years before flag removal. Using the 5k definition in Column (3), formal employment increases by .323%. Ceteris paribus, if all bankruptcy flags in the US were eliminated from credit reports, our partial equilibrium estimates would imply that roughly 50,000 individuals

find formal sector jobs.<sup>14</sup> Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 show the impact of flag removal on self-employment, defined using \$1k and \$5k annual net income thresholds, respectively. Both columns reveal a small, but insignificant increase in self-employment following bankruptcy flag removal.

In summary, the ‘stock’ or ‘level’ results indicate that while formal-employment responds to flag removal, self-employment is stagnant. However, this relatively stable stock of self-employment masks offsetting changes in gross flows and as such leads to the potential mistaken conclusion that self-employment does not respond to credit changes. As we will see in our main tests in Section 4, following flag removal, there is more churn and reallocation as flows into and out of self-employment increase. Some individuals leave self-employment for the formal sector and other individuals move into self-employment.

## 4 Transitions Into and Out of Self-Employment

In this section, we examine gross flows into and out of self-employment and individuals borrowing patterns. We also use the ILBD to look beyond self-employment and focus on the transition from non-employer to employer businesses. We examine transitioners earnings, borrowing behavior, and the subsequent rate at which non-employers become employer businesses in the LBD. By doing so, we attempt to disentangle the two competing forces following a bankruptcy flag removal: (i) the credit-access affect which allows previously constrained individuals to start a business, and the (ii) credit-check affect allows individuals who were previously unable to find a formal sector job due to poor credit to enter the formal labor force from self-employment.

Table 3 measures self-employment flows following flag removal. Column (1) illustrates that flows into self-employment, using the \$1k threshold, increase by .16% per annum following a bankruptcy flag removal relative to individuals whose flag is not removed. This increase is quite transitory, and relatively small in economic magnitude. However, individuals who subsequently flow into self-employment following bankruptcy flag removal, as we show below, borrow more, earn more net income, and are more likely to become an employer firm. We argue in the sections that follow, that the increased flow rate into self-employment is due to

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<sup>14</sup>Assuming 1 million individuals per year file, flags stay on for 10 years, and one half percent find jobs. In the online appendix B, we include additional results regarding non-employment, and we show that non-employment drops by over .5% following bankruptcy flag removal.

the credit-access effect. Column (2) shows that transitions out of self-employment increase following bankruptcy flag removal as well. But, the table reveals a significant pretrend in the time series, which we address this in the next two columns.<sup>15</sup>

In the next two columns of Table 3, we use a \$5k earnings threshold to define self-employment. Column (3) illustrates that flows into self-employment still increase by .1%; however, this coefficient is significant only at the 10% level. Column (4) of Table 3 shows that flows out of self-employment still exhibit a weak pretrend, but the same general pattern emerges: individuals are exiting self-employment following bankruptcy flag removal. In online appendix C, we include additional results which show that the rate at which individuals transition directly from self-employment to formal-employment increases by .12% after the flag drop. As we discuss in the following sections, the increased flow rate out of self-employment following flag removal, and the subsequent flow into formal-employment, is consistent with credit checks precluding bankrupt individuals from finding formal-sector jobs.

## 4.1 Earnings After Transitioning into Self-Employment

To isolate the net income of new entrants, Table 4 reports the coefficients on the window of dummies surrounding the bankruptcy flag removal in Equation 1 interacted with a dummy of whether the individual transitioned into self-employment. The non-interacted dummies around flag removal can be interpreted as the effect of flag removal on the incumbent self-employed’s earnings, i.e. those who were previously self-employed before flag removal; those dummies reveal a slightly declining profile of earnings in each specification. How should the interaction terms be interpreted? Over and above the individual effects of transitioning into self-employment and having a bankruptcy flag removed, the interaction terms capture the additional effect of having both events occur simultaneously. To meaningfully interpret the interaction terms, we compare those who transition into self-employment 2 years before flag removal to those who transition into self-employment 1 year after flag removal.

Column (1) is the easiest to interpret since all interaction terms and all coefficients are negative and monotone, meaning that formal sector employment earnings drop when individuals enter self-employment following flag removal. This is intuitive since individuals

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<sup>15</sup>In online appendix I, we further address the pretrend issue with an alternate regression design that uses non-overlapping cohorts. The results are very similar.



have less time for a formal sector job if they are running their own business. Column (2) illustrates that among individuals who transition into self-employment, those who transition into self-employment 1+ years after flag removal earn on average \$991 ( $= (3376 - 158.2) - (2274 - 47.61)$ ) more in Schedule C net income relative to those who transition into self-employment 2 years prior to flag removal. Relative to the sample average self-employed net income of \$23.8k (adjusting for 0s in Table 1), \$991 represents a 4% gain. We arrive at this number by first computing the net income gain of an individual who transits into self-employment 1+ years after flag removal. For such an individual 3 coefficients are non-zero and must be summed to obtain the overall effect of \$11,739.8 ( $=$  ‘1+ Years After Removal (d) x Trans. into Self-Employed, 1k (d)’ + ‘1+ Years After Removal (d)’ + ‘Transition into Self-Employed, 1k (d)’ =  $3376 - 158.2 + 8522$ ). Repeating this exercise for those who transition 2 years before flag removal, the overall effect is \$10,748.39 ( $= 2274 - 47.61 + 8522$ ). Taking the difference yields \$991 ( $= \$11,739.8 - \$10,748.39$ ). Since the unconditional transition term (‘Transition into Self-Employed, 1k (d)’) cancels in these calculations, we omit it in the remainder of the paper. This combined difference of coefficients between the year after flag removal and two years before is the key statistic from the transition tables since it captures the impact of flag removal on transition outcomes. Therefore it is reported in the bottom two rows of every table along with its significance level.

Figure 2 plots the summed coefficients from Column (2) of Table 4. The points on the plotted line can be interpreted as the gain in Schedule C net income from entering self-employment, relative to a non-transitioner in the control group (i.e. those who are 3 or more years prior to flag removal). In particular, we add the coefficients on the flag removal dummy (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d)), interaction term (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d) x Trans. Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)) and the transition term (e.g. Transition Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)), and we compute standard errors using the delta method. As the figure demonstrates, there is a stable trend for self-employed income prior to flag removal. Following flag removal, the net income gain for those who enter self-employment increases rapidly. The difference in self-employed income for those who transition into self-employment one or more years after removal vs. 2 years prior to removal is, as we saw before, \$991. This calculation is illustrated on the graph.

Column (3) of Table 4 shows that among the individuals who transition into self-employment, unconditionally they have incomes that are \$7,016 greater, where total income is defined to be the sum of self-employed and formal labor earnings. However, among those who transi-

tion into self-employment after flag removal, their total income actually declines by \$-670 ( $= (1667-761.7) - (1629-53.66)$ ) relative to those who transition prior to flag removal. This indicates that the marginal self-employed entrant, while more profitable running a business, may not actually be benefiting from increased credit access since they must forgo their labor earnings.

## 4.2 Borrowing Among Those Who Transition into Self-Employment

Table 5 illustrates the borrowing behavior of individuals who transition into self-employment. Individuals who transit into self-employment following a bankruptcy flag removal borrow heavily using secured credit (mortgages and HELOCs) as well as non-bankcard revolving credit. This provides a plausible mechanism for the increased earnings of individuals who transition into self-employment following a bankruptcy flag removal – they simply have more capital to work with. We further test this hypothesis in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 by analyzing the external capital needs of the new entrants’ industries and comparing borrowing of new entrants to other job transitioners.

Column (1) of Table 5 shows that individuals who transit into self-employment, regardless of whether their flag is removed or not, borrow very little using their bankcards (note, ‘bankcards’ refers to traditional unsecured credit cards issued by banks). However, following flag removal, those who transition into self-employment borrow significantly using revolving credit (e.g. revolving personal finance loans) as shown in Column (2). They also take out large amounts of mortgage credit as shown in Column (3) and HELOCs as shown in Column (4). Those who transition into self-employment following a bankruptcy flag removal borrow \$3,766 ( $= 1253 + 3551 - (277.8 + 759.8)$ ) more using HELOCs relative to those who transition into self-employment prior to flag removal. Turning to the total balance across all types of consumer credit, Column (5) shows that those who transition into self-employment 1 or more years after flag removal borrow \$15,337 ( $= (16195 + 14373) - (6422 + 8809)$ ) more than those who transition into self-employment 2 years prior to flag removal.

There are two caveats that must be discussed. Table 5 exhibits a pretrend due to the fact that credit partially recovers before flag removal (e.g. see the discussion in [Cohen-Cole et al. \[2009\]](#)). However, we argue that a better gauge of ability to borrow is the credit score. The total amount which can be borrowed is proportional to the credit score and this exhibits a stable trend prior to flag removal (e.g. Figure 1) and a large discrete rise following flag

removal. Furthermore, we formally test for sources of bias in every specification by including dummies prior flag removal; this allows readers to assess the parallel trends assumption throughout the paper. It is the exception that our regressions fail this assumption.

A second caveat is that our data does not specify the use of funds. While our point estimates imply that self-employed entrants borrow \$16k over and above others who have their flag removed, we do not directly observe whether these loans were used for the small business. However, our findings are consistent with direct survey questions on mortgage borrowing by entrepreneurs (e.g. see the discussion in [Adelino et al. \[2013\]](#)), as well as direct survey questions on credit card borrowing by small business owners (e.g. the Kaufman Survey studied by [Robb and Robinson \[2012\]](#)). We attempt to alleviate these concerns in several ways: (i) comparing entry across sectors, stratified by external finance dependence ratios, (ii) comparing the self-employed entrants to an alternate control, the formal sector entrants (who should not have a need for working-capital but realize similar earnings gains), and (iii) looking at subsequent business growth as a function of access to credit.

### **4.3 External Finance Dependence of Newly Self-Employed**

To test the importance of credit access for new startups, online appendix [H](#) describes the industry, based on 1-digit SIC codes, in which individuals enter self-employment after bankruptcy flag removal. Among new entrants to self-employment, they are more likely to enter manufacturing, which is very capital intensive, as well as transport/communications, and retail. There is no differential impact of flag removal on services and finance startups, which are relatively less capital intensive and relatively less dependent on external finance than manufacturing or transport/communications startups. We take this as suggestive evidence that consumer credit is being used by the self-employed in order to enter sectors with large external finance needs and greater capital intensity.

## 4.4 Importance of Credit for Newly Self-Employed vs. Other Job Transitioners

Are all job-transitioners more likely to borrow, simply because they have earnings gains, or do the newly self-employed rely particularly heavily on credit?<sup>16</sup> As another test of the importance of credit for the self-employed, Table 6 compares borrowing by those who transition into formal sector employment and those who transition into self-employment. Both sets of individuals realize income gains, (recall, \$991 for the new self-employed entrants after flag removal and \$1,817 for the new formal-employed entrants after flag removal). However, Table 6 illustrates that those who transition into formal-employment after flag removal borrow \$4,526 relative to those who transition prior to flag removal; however, the interaction terms are negative, indicating that formal transitioners are just like everyone else, and if anything, they borrow less than non-transitioners (this is an important point that we will revisit shortly since it allows us to rule out consumption smoothing explanations for observed job finding patterns). In contrast, those who transition into self-employment after flag removal borrow \$15,337 more relative to those who transition prior to flag removal. So even though self-employed entrants have smaller earnings gains than new formal-employment entrants after flag removal, the self-employed borrow much more heavily following flag removal, nearly ~10k more. This evidence is consistent with the credit-access effect being an important determinant of self-employment.

## 4.5 Hiring the First Employee: LBD Firm Ownership

We further explore the importance of credit for job creation by looking at the impact of flag removal on business startups that employ at least one worker. In particular, Table 7 illustrates the impact of bankruptcy flag removal on whether or not the individual owns a firm in the Longitudinal Business Dynamics (LBD) database. Firms in the LBD database must have at least one employee. In Column (1), we define LBD firm ownership to be at least one or more years of firm ownership. This definition includes relatively transitory firm ownership spells of 1 year and less. We find that following flag removal, ownership of LBD firms increases, but insignificantly. In Column (2), we define LBD firm ownership to be at least two or more years of firm ownership. Column (2) illustrates that under this more

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<sup>16</sup>We thank Nawid Siassi for suggesting this exercise.

stringent definition, there is now a significant and positive increase in ownership following bankruptcy flag removal, relative to the control group. The magnitude of this increase, however, is economically quite small; following flag removal, the odds that an individual owns a firm in the LBD increases by .05% (or approximately 1000 startups in our sample of 1.5m person-year observations). Figure 3 plots the results from Column (2), illustrating the rise in employer firms following flag removal.

## 4.6 Flows In and Out of LBD Firm Ownership

Are those who transition into self-employment following flag removal ‘marginal’ entrepreneurs? Or are they subsequently growing and becoming LBD firm owners? The evidence in this section suggests that the post-flag removal self-employed entrants are more likely to make the transition into an employer-firm in the LBD. However, even though they have access to more capital, the odds that they subsequently exit self-employment is stable and statistically indistinguishable from those who transition into self-employment prior to flag removal.

Table 9 illustrates these results more formally. Column (1) of Table 9 shows the odds that a newly self-employed individual becomes the owner of an employer-firm in the LBD (under the 2+ years definition), and Column (2) of Table 9 illustrates the subsequent turnover rate among newly self-employed individuals. Column (1) shows that individuals are .7%  $(=.00979+.000204)-(.00312-.0000893)$  more likely to own a firm in the LBD if they transition into self-employment 1+ years following a flag removal relative to those who transition into self-employment 2 years prior to flag removal. Column (2) shows that newly self-employed individuals are transitioning out of self-employment at a very high rate, 38%, unconditionally. However, following flag removal we see no disproportionate change in the subsequent rate at which these individuals exit self-employment. This suggests that the marginal entrepreneur is not surviving any longer due to the additional access to capital market.

## 4.7 Borrowing by LBD Owners

Table 8 illustrates the borrowing behavior of LBD firm owners. Column (1) shows that they borrow moderate amounts of bankcard credit following flag removal. Column (2) shows that they increase revolving credit significantly following flag removal, and Column (3) illustrates

that they borrow significant amounts of mortgage credit. Column (3) shows that LBD firm owners who are 1 or more years after flag removal borrow \$29,693  $(=(37997+8462)-(7493+9273))$  more using mortgage credit than LBD firm owners who are 2 years prior to flag removal. A significant fraction of their increased borrowing comes in the form of Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs), as shown in Column (4). Turning to total debt balances (including secured and unsecured debts), Column (5) shows that LBD firm owners who are 1 or more years after flag removal borrow \$39,835  $(=(47332+14812)-(13318+8991))$  more across all lines of credit than LBD firm owners who are 2 years prior to flag removal.

Figure 4 plots the summed coefficients from Column (5) of Table 8. The points on the plotted line can be interpreted as the increase in total credit balances among LBD firm owners, relative to non-owners in the control group (i.e. those who are 3 or more years before flag removal).<sup>17</sup> As the figure demonstrates, there is a stable trend in borrowing prior to flag removal. Following flag removal, relative borrowing among LBD firm owners increases rapidly. The difference in borrowing for those who are LBD firm owners one or more years after removal vs. 2 years prior to removal is \$39,835  $(=(47332+14812)-(13318+8991))$ .

## 4.8 LBD Pay and Employment

Finally, online appendix D illustrates the impact of bankruptcy flag removal on the payroll and employment of LBD firm owners. Our results indicate that there is an increase in both LBD payroll and employment, however this increase is insignificant at standard levels. The lack of power is presumably from the small fraction of bankrupt individuals who own employer-firms in the LBD. We therefore see online appendix D as inconclusive evidence regarding the importance of consumer credit access for payroll and hiring decisions. In future research, we plan to explore the impact of credit access on hiring patterns in more detail with a broader sample of firm owners.

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<sup>17</sup>In particular, we add the coefficients on the flag removal dummy (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d)), interaction term (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d) x LBD Ownership, 2+ Yrs. (d)) and the ownership term (e.g. LBD Ownership, 2+ Yrs (d)), and we compute standard errors using the delta method.

## 4.9 Discussion of Selection Issues

Since flag removal is foreseeable, there may be concern that better entrepreneurs who anticipate the need for credit deliberately wait until the flag is removed to start a business. There are two ways we address this potential issue: (i) if ‘better’ entrepreneurs are waiting until their flag is removed in order to borrow and start a business, this simply reinforces the point that credit matters for startups, (ii) to test for selection more formally, we take advantage of the panel dimension to our data and we use standard selection correction methods. In online appendix F we show that the entrepreneurs who transition into self-employment following flag removal are very similar in terms of prior self-employment income and prior labor earnings. And, in online appendix G, we use the heckit selection correction for self-employment transitions and formal-employment transitions, and we find very similar results.

Moreover, recent independent work by [Gross et al. \[2016\]](#) has also provided formal tests of the anticipation of bankruptcy flag removal by looking at credit application behavior. They show that rather than waiting an additional quarter for credit at more favorable rates after their flag is removed, individuals continue to apply for credit normally prior to the removal, indicating a lack of foresight.

## 4.10 Taking Stock: The Credit-Access Effect

By analyzing gross flows as opposed to levels, we were able to establish several facts in Sections 4.1 to 4.8. Namely, following bankruptcy flag removal there is (a) increased flow rates into self-employment, (b) the fact that they flow into industries with high external finance needs and greater capital intensity, (c) disproportionate borrowing by new self-employed entrants relative to other job-transitioners, (d) the increased likelihood of starting an employer business, and (e) the large amount borrowed by new employer businesses. We believe that these facts, taken together, provide strong evidence of the credit-access effect. Our findings also indicate that credit access not only affects the self-employment decision, but also the decision to become an employer firm, i.e. credit-access influences both stages of entrepreneurship.

As robustness, we verify that our results regarding entrepreneurship and credit access hold in pooled SCF cross-sections from 1998-2010 in online appendix J.

## 5 Transitions Into and Out of Formal-Employment

We now turn our attention to gross formal-employment flows where we provide another set of facts that allows us to partially disentangle the credit-access effect from the credit-check effect. Among bankrupt individuals who transition into formal employment, we find that if they make that transition after flag removal as opposed to prior to flag removal, they have (i) significantly greater earnings, (ii) work for larger firms, (iii) are more likely to work in jobs that require handling of payments, and (iv) as we show in online appendix J in the SCF, they are more likely to work for firms with non-wage benefits such as pensions. We argue throughout the remainder of the section that these findings provide suggestive evidence of credit-checks precluding bankrupt workers from finding certain types of jobs.

Table 10 illustrates the impact of bankruptcy flag removal on formal-employment flows. Columns (1) and (2) show that for the baseline definition of formal employment, the flows in and flows out are insignificant. We attribute the lack of significance to the sample size and churn, since the levels increase significantly, but the flow regressions are essentially estimating coefficients on rare events with noise (since many of these individuals are marginally attached to the labor force, they may flow in and out of formal employment several times in the span on a few years).

In Table 10, if we define formal employment using a more stringent earnings threshold of \$5k, we do see flows into and out of formal employment increase significantly following flag removal. The flow rate into formal employment increases by .24% in the year of removal, relative to non-transitioners the control group. We can reject equality of coefficients on the dummy for the year of removal and the dummy for 2 years prior to removal, but the increase is short lived. The flow rate out of formal employment also increases following flag removal, suggesting that some individuals may be leaving formal employment to start businesses once they have credit access.

In online appendix C we illustrate the impact of flag removal on flows from self-employment to formal-employment, and vice versa. While point estimates imply that the transition rate from formal employment to self-employment increases, the results cannot be distinguished from zero. This suggests that if individuals are leaving formal employment to start businesses after flag removal, they are first going through a spell of non-employment. For completeness, online appendix C also shows how bankruptcy flag removal impacts the odds of holding both a formal sector job and self-employed job, as well as the odds of being only formal-employed



and only self-employed.

## 5.1 Earnings Among New Formal Sector Entrants

Table 11 includes interaction terms between the dummies surrounding the bankruptcy flag removal and an indicator for whether the individual transitioned into formal employment. Similar to Table 4, the non-interacted dummies around flag removal can be interpreted as the effect of flag removal on labor earnings of non-transitioners, i.e. those who remain employed throughout the flag removal; those dummies show a slightly declining profile of earnings for non-transitioners. However, the interaction terms in Table 11 illustrate that among individuals who transition into formal employment, earnings rise significantly, and this increase is largely driven by the interaction of having a bankruptcy flag removed and simultaneously transitioning into a formal sector job. For example, Column (1) shows that individuals who transition into formal employment 1 or more years after bankruptcy flag removal earn \$1,816 ( $= (4033-847) - (1459-89.74)$ ) more than individuals who transition into formal employment 2 years prior to bankruptcy flag removal. Relative to the sample average of labor earnings which is \$41.5k (see Table 1), these labor earnings gains represent a 4.3% increase.

Column (2) of Table 11 shows that those who transition into formal sector employment earn less from self-employment. This is an intuitive result, since the individual is taking a formal sector job, they have less time to devote to self-employment.

Column (3) of Table 11 looks at the sum of labor earnings and self-employment earnings. Column (3) shows that individuals who transition into formal employment 1 or more years after bankruptcy flag removal have a total annual income that is \$1,696 ( $= (3726-870.7) - (1209-49.87)$ ) more than individuals who transition into formal employment 2 years prior to bankruptcy flag removal. Relative to the sample average of total income which is \$34.8k, these gains are quite large, approaching 5% of the average individual's total income.

Figure 5 plots the summed coefficients from Column (3) of Table 11.<sup>18</sup> By summing the coefficients, we can compare those who transition into formal-employment to non-transitioners in the control group (i.e. those who are 3 or more years before flag removal).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Standard errors are computed using the delta method.

<sup>19</sup>In particular, we add the coefficients on the flag removal dummy (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d)), interaction term (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d) x Trans. Into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)) and the transition

As the figure demonstrates, there is a stable trend in total income prior to flag removal. Following flag removal, the gains from transitioning into formal-employment increase rapidly. The difference in total income for those who transition into formal employment one or more years after removal vs. 2 years prior to removal is \$1,696 ( $= (3726-870.7) - (1209-49.87)$ ). This calculation is illustrated on the graph.

## 5.2 Firm Size After Transitioning into Formal Employment

Column (1) of Table 12 shows that individuals who transition into formal employment following bankruptcy flag removal are more likely to work at a firm with 1000+ employees relative to individuals who transition into formal employment prior to flag removal. Column (1) shows that individuals who transition into formal employment 1 or more years after bankruptcy flag removal are 1.48% ( $= (.0357-.0034) - (.0188-.00126)$ ) more likely to work at a firm with 1000+ employees than individuals who transition into formal employment 2 years prior to bankruptcy flag removal. Column (2) illustrates a similar result, showing that individuals who transition into formal employment following bankruptcy flag removal are more likely to work for firms with greater than 500 employees relative to those who transition into formal employment prior to bankruptcy flag removal. Column (3) shows that among those who transition into formal sector employment, the fraction of individuals who work for small and young firms (firms with 1 employee or less and 1 year in age or less) remains unchanged. However, regardless of labor market transitions, the fraction of individuals who work at young small firms drops by a small, but statistically significant amount .0855%.

These results suggest that individuals are finding jobs at larger firms which may provide better job security, health insurance, pensions etc. Since the LEHD does not cover healthcare or pensions, we show in online appendix J that in the SCF, following flag removal, individuals are more likely to work at larger firms that provide pensions; however, this result is only significant at the 10% level and occurs with a significant lag. Nonetheless, this suggests that individuals are able to obtain jobs with better non-wage benefits after bankruptcy flag removal.

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term (e.g. Transition Into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)), and we compute standard errors using the delta method. The points on the plotted line can be interpreted as the increase in total income from entering formal employment, relative to non-transitioners in the control group.

### 5.3 Formal Sector Exit Rates and Job Turnover

Are those who transition into formal employment marginal workers? In online appendix E we explore this question by computing rates at which workers transit out of formal employment after finding a new job. In general, these newly employed workers are attached to the formal sector and are less likely to exit the formal sector after flag removal. In other words, individuals whose bankruptcy flags are dropped are no more likely to be separated from an employer when compared to other bankrupt individuals near flag removal. Their new job accession rate within the formal sector increases after flag removal, but their large and persistent wage gains suggest that these subsequent accessions are simply reflecting the fact that these workers are climbing the job ladder.

### 5.4 Industries of New Job Finders

In online appendix H, we stratify job finders by industry, and we show that workers are more likely to find jobs in the retail and service sectors after bankruptcy flag removal. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these sectors disproportionately involve the handling of payments and the use of cash registers.<sup>20</sup> We find weaker effects in sectors such as communications/transport and manufacturing, which are less likely to involve jobs which require handling payments.

### 5.5 Taking Stock: The Credit-Check Effect

In Section 4.4 and Sections 5.1 to 5.3 we demonstrated that if a bankrupt individual transitions into formal employment after flag removal as opposed to prior to flag removal, they (a) earn more, (b) work for larger firms with greater non-wage benefits, (c) find jobs in industries that require handling payments, and (d) do *not* borrow more than other transitioners (recall Section 4.4). We argue that these facts, taken together, provide strong evidence that credit-checks are generating the formal-employment flows we observe in our data.

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<sup>20</sup>While there appears to be no systematic tabulations of cash handling across industries, the following websites [https://www.glassdoor.com/Job/cash-handler-jobs-SRCH\\_K00,12.htm](https://www.glassdoor.com/Job/cash-handler-jobs-SRCH_K00,12.htm) and [http://www.ehow.com/list\\_6941548\\_jobs-require-cash-handling-balancing.html](http://www.ehow.com/list_6941548_jobs-require-cash-handling-balancing.html) include lists of jobs that require handling cash and they are primarily made of jobs such as ‘cashier’, ‘bartender’, ‘server’, etc. Employee theft accounts for 34.5% of inventory shrinkage at retailers, <http://fortune.com/2015/06/24/shoplifting-worker-theft-cost-retailers-32-billion-in-2014/>.

The fact that workers disproportionately flow into larger firms after flag removal may be because of two reasons: (1) credit-checks may have previously been preventing these individuals from obtaining jobs at large firms, or (2) following flag removal access to consumer credit allows individuals to smooth consumption while searching for higher paying job at larger and more productive firms. Existing evidence from [Society for Human Resource Management \[2012b\]](#) corroborates the credit-check explanation since small firms are 2x less likely to conduct background checks.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, related work by [Herkenhoff et al. \[2015\]](#) shows that displaced workers borrow more and take longer to find a job if they have more credit access, providing support for the consumption smoothing explanation. However, the sample in this paper includes few displaced workers and as Section 4.4 shows, those who transition into formal employment after flag removal do not borrow disproportionately relative to other transitioners. This suggests that the consumption smoothing role is less important in the sample studied in the current paper, and individuals may be obtaining better jobs after flag removal because credit-checks by employers were previously limiting employment opportunities.

As [Chen et al. \[2013\]](#) and [Society for Human Resource Management \[2012b\]](#) discuss, the primary reason employers conduct credit checks is to reduce theft, and credit checks are primarily conducted for jobs that require the handling of cash. Our industry results suggest that credit checks may have been limiting bankrupt workers from finding retail and service sector jobs, which disproportionately involve handling payments, since individuals are more likely to flow into those jobs after bankruptcy flag removal. This additional evidence also points to credit checks as the mechanism for generating these patterns of job flows.

Ultimately, we are unable to observe credit checks directly, and so we take our set of facts as supportive, but not conclusive, evidence of credit-checks limiting employment opportunities of bankrupt individuals.

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<sup>21</sup>[Society for Human Resource Management \[2012b\]](#) report that 45% of large firms (2,500 to 24,999 employees) conduct credit checks versus 25% of small firms (100 to 499 employees). Other studies by [Society for Human Resource Management \[2012a\]](#) and [Zibarras and Woods \[2010\]](#) find similar patterns for background checks, which may or may not include credit checks.

## 6 Implied Productivity of Bankrupt Workers

Our results have important policy implications, especially for the debate over credit checks (Chen et al. [2013], Cortes et al. [2016], and Shoag and Clifford [2016]). In this section, we use the free entry condition from the canonical directed search model, e.g. Moen [1997] and Menzio and Shi [2011], to calculate firms' beliefs about the productivity of bankrupt workers relative to non-bankrupt workers. Using our wage and job-finding estimates from our empirical analysis, we show that firms would be willing to pay approximately \$17.6k, in net present value, to be able to decipher between a potential hire who has a bankruptcy record versus a potential hire with no bankruptcy record, ex-post.

Let  $i \in \{B, N\}$  summarize the bankruptcy status of a worker at match formation (we can allow for alternate information structures or stochastic types), where  $B$  denotes bankrupt and  $N$  denotes non-bankrupt, e.g.  $y_B$  is the productivity of a bankrupt worker and  $y_N$  is the productivity of a non-bankrupt worker. Likewise, let  $w_i$  denote the wage, and let  $J_i$  denote the value of a firm matched with a worker that has bankruptcy status  $i$  at match formation.

Let  $\kappa$  denote the vacancy cost, and let  $\theta_i$  denote market tightness of submarket  $i$ , i.e.  $\theta_i = v_i/u_i$  where  $v_i$  is the level of vacancies posted by firms in submarket  $i$  and  $u_i$  is the number of workers looking for a job in that submarket. The number of worker-firm matches that occur in submarket  $i$  any given period is given by  $M(u_i, v_i) = \frac{u_i \cdot v_i}{(u_i^\zeta + v_i^\zeta)^{1/\zeta}} \in [0, 1)$ .

Define the firm contact rate in submarket  $i$  as  $q_i = \frac{M(u_i, v_i)}{v_i}$ . The free entry condition implies that the expected profits of matching ( $q_i J_i$ ) in either submarket equals the vacancy cost ( $\kappa$ ),  $\kappa = q_i J_i$ .<sup>22</sup>

Let  $\delta_i$  be the associated transition rate out of formal employment. Assume that both productivity and wages are constant throughout the duration of a match so that  $J_i$  can be expressed as  $J_i = \frac{y_i - w_i}{1 - \beta(1 - \delta_i)}$ . The assumption of constant wages over the duration of a match can be relaxed with little impact on the results; however, the bankrupt/non-bankrupt wage premium is important and is discussed in the next section in more detail. Using the free entry condition in conjunction with the expression for  $J_i$  yields the implied productivity of

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<sup>22</sup>Screening costs are quite low for small businesses, ranging from \$30 to \$300 (depending on the range of checks conducted). E.g. [www.businessnewsdaily.com/7638-best-background-check-services.html](http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/7638-best-background-check-services.html) includes a list of providers of these services and costs. We could incorporate these costs in the model, but it would only complicate the calculation and have little influence on the results.

a worker with bankruptcy status  $i$ ,

$$y_i = w_i + \frac{\kappa(1 - \beta(1 - \delta_i))}{q_i} \quad (2)$$

How can  $y_i$  be interpreted?  $y_i$  is simply a residual. It may capture unmodeled costs or other unobserved characteristics of workers that affect profitability (tardiness, ability to handle money, etc.). In what follows, we interpret  $y_i$  as firms’ belief about the per-period productivity of a type  $i$  worker.

## 6.1 Type Structure

Some discussion of the Bankrupt (B)/Non-bankrupt (N) type structure is warranted. We are not writing down the individual’s problem, but the implicit assumption in the current formulation is that individuals switch types, and they only do so when they switch jobs. Bankrupt workers who remain in a match that was formed when the worker was initially bankrupt face a flat wage profile dictated by their status at match formation. This assumption is supported by the null average affects on wages shown in Table 11 for non-transitioners; only transitioners realize the wage gains shown in Table 11. This assumption may also be justified if employers do not repetitively check credit scores during a match. Limited evidence by [Society for Human Resource Management \[2012b\]](#) suggests that these checks are only conducted at the interview stage.<sup>23</sup> When an individual’s flag is removed, the worker can switch jobs and search for a job in the ‘non-bankrupt’ submarkets. We adjust for these on-the-job-search incentives by using the actual separation rate from the data following flag removal.

## 6.2 Calibration and Measurement

Let the period be annual, and let  $\beta = .96$  (implying an annual interest rate of 4%). We set  $\delta_N = .0559$  ( $=.044/.787$ ) based on transition rate out of formal employment (into non-

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<sup>23</sup>Quoting from [Society for Human Resource Management \[2012b\]](#): “When do organizations initiate credit background checks? Of the organizations that conduct credit background checks, most organizations initiate credit background checks after a contingent job offer (58%) or after the job interview (33%).”

employment or self-employment) prior to bankruptcy flag removal.<sup>24</sup> We measure the vacancy cost following [Hagedorn and Manovskii \[2008\]](#) as 4.5% of the quarterly wage of a new hire, i.e.  $\kappa = .045w_B$ .<sup>25</sup> We use the same matching elasticity,  $\zeta = 1.6$ , as [Schaal \[2012\]](#).

To measure the contact rate between firms and workers, we first recover the job finding rate for workers. The transition rate into formal employment is 4.6% per annum prior to flag removal, which, after adjusting for the fact that only 18.4% of the sample are non-employed and 9.0% are self-employed, yields an annual job finding rate of 16.79% =  $(.046/ (.184 + .09))$ . Using the definition of the matching function, the worker contact rate is  $p_B = M(u_B, v_B)/u_B = \theta_B(1 + \theta_B)^{-1/\zeta} = .1679$  which implies  $\theta_B = 0.1947$ . Therefore the firm contact rate is  $q_B = M(u_B, v_B)/v_B = (1 + \theta_B)^{-1/\zeta} = .862$ .

After flag removal, the flow transition rate into formal employment increases by .241% per annum. After adjusting for composition, this implies a 17.67%  $(=.046+.00241)/(.184+.09)$  annual job finding rate. The firm contact rate with non-bankrupt workers is therefore  $q_N = .855$ .

The final object that needs to be measured is the difference in wages of those who find jobs following flag removal versus those who find jobs with a flag still on their record. Using our wage gain estimates from [Table 11](#), we measure the wage difference to be  $w_N - w_B = \$1,696$ . Using equation (2), we can now calculate the implied productivity difference:

$$y_N - y_B = \underbrace{w_N - w_B}_{\cong \$1,696} + \underbrace{\kappa \left( \frac{(1 - \beta(1 - \delta_N))}{q_N} - \frac{(1 - \beta(1 - \delta_B))}{q_B} \right)}_{\cong -40} = \$1656 \quad (3)$$

The relatively small differences in firm contact rates drives the second term in equation (3) to zero. The productivity difference is almost entirely summarized by the wage gap. In net present value the productivity difference is quite large,  $\frac{y_N - y_B}{(1 - \beta(1 - \delta_N))} = \$17,676$ . In absolute value, according to our calibration, non-bankrupt workers produce \$43,387 per annum and bankrupt workers produce on average \$41,732. Our productivity estimates imply that firms believe bankrupt workers are approximately 3.8%  $(=1.6k/43.3k)$  less productive than non-bankrupt workers. Given we are assuming free entry, free entry implies firms are indifferent between the two workers. However, in net present value, firms in our sample would be willing

<sup>24</sup>The 4.4% transition rate is the odds that any worker transitions out of employment. We adjust for the fact that only the formal-employed individuals can transition out of employment, and 78.7% of individuals in our sample are formally employed.

<sup>25</sup>Which wage we use as the base wage does not alter the results.

to pay approximately \$17.6k in order to avoid hiring a bankrupt worker, ex-post.

## 7 Conclusions

We construct a new administrative dataset in order to examine how consumer credit access impacts employment prospects, earnings, and entrepreneurship. We use bankruptcy flag removals to isolate a large discrete increase in credit access which is not directly associated with credit worthiness, wealth, or any other unobserved characteristics of the individual. We examine whether bankruptcy flag removals not only increase credit access, but also change the set of potential jobs available to a individual. We call these two effects from bankruptcy flag removal (i) the *credit access effect*, which is the way increased credit access following flag removal allows previously constrained individuals to start businesses or smooth consumption while searching for a job, and (ii) the *credit check effect*, which is the way bankruptcy flag removal gives individuals previously excluded from formal sector unemployment-insured jobs, the opportunity to obtain a formal sector job.

We demonstrate that following flag removal there is (a) an increased flow rate into self-employment, (b) disproportionate borrowing by new self-employed entrants relative to other job-transitioners, (c) an increased likelihood of starting an employer business, (d) startups enter capital intensive and external finance intensive industries, and (e) disproportionate borrowing by new employer businesses. Taken together, we view these facts as strong evidence of the credit-access effect. On the formal sector job side, we examine gross flows into new formal sector unemployment-insured jobs. Post-flag removal, entrants in the formal sector (a) earn more, (b) work for larger firms with greater non-wage benefits, (c) find jobs in industries that disproportionately require cash handling, but (d) do *not* necessarily borrow more. This last fact, in conjunction with limited evidence on background checks by firm size and in sectors that require cash handling, points toward credit-checks preventing bankrupt workers from obtaining jobs at large firms.

Our results have important policy implications, especially for the debate over credit checks (Chen et al. [2013], Cortes et al. [2016], and Shoag and Clifford [2016]). Using our empirical findings, we calibrate a simple directed search model and provide the first estimates of the implied productivity of bankrupt versus non-bankrupt workers. Our estimates reveal that firms would be willing to pay \$17.6k, ex-post, in order to tell the difference between a



bankrupt and non-bankrupt worker. In future work, which is beyond the scope of the paper, we believe the tools used in [Chen et al. \[2013\]](#) and [Dávila \[2014\]](#) can be used to assess the optimal information structure following bankruptcy.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics Before and After Flag Removal

	<u>Sample Averages</u>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	1 Yr. Before Flag Drop	1 Yr. After Flag Drop	Diff. ((1)-(2))	Sig. Diff.
<b>(A) Employment Stocks</b>				
Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	78.70%	78.60%	-0.10%	
Self-Employed, 1k (d)	9.00%	9.60%	0.60%	*
Both SE and Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	6.10%	6.40%	0.30%	*
Non-Employed, 1k (d)	18.40%	18.20%	-0.20%	
LBD Firm Ownership, 1+ Yrs. (d)	0.40%	0.40%	0.00%	
LBD Firm Ownership, 2+ Yrs. (d)	0.20%	0.30%	0.10%	*
Employer Size $\geq$ 500 (d)	31.70%	32.00%	0.30%	*
Employer Size $\geq$ 1000 (d)	25.40%	25.60%	0.20%	
<b>(B) Employment Flows</b>				
Transition into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	4.60%	4.50%	-0.10%	
Transition out of Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	4.40%	4.50%	0.10%	
Transition into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	3.10%	3.40%	0.30%	*
Transition out of Self-Employed, 1k (d)	2.80%	2.80%	0.00%	
New Formal Job Accession Next Year (d)	17.30%	17.00%	-0.30%	*
<b>(C) Earnings</b>				
Real Annual Labor Earnings (\$41.5k without 0s)	\$32,683	\$33,005	\$323	*
Real Annual Self-Employed Net Income (\$23.8k without 0s)	\$2,140	\$2,300	\$161	*
Real Annual Total Income (SE and Non-SE)	\$34,822	\$35,305	\$483	*
<b>(D) Credit Variables</b>				
Credit Score	288.0	351.8	63.8	*
Real Bankcard Balance	\$3,441	\$4,467	\$1,027	*
Real Revolving Balance	\$7,601	\$10,475	\$2,874	*
Real Mortgage Balance	\$92,417	\$104,000	\$11,583	*
Real HELOC Balance	\$3,355	\$5,181	\$1,825	*
Observations	170000	110000		

Notes: Column (1) computes averages using the individuals in our sample who are 1 year before bankruptcy flag removal. Column (2) computes averages using the individuals in our sample who are 1 year after bankruptcy flag removal. Column (3) is the difference in means between Columns (1) and (2), and Column (4) indicates if that difference in means is significant at the 10% level. The symbol (d) indicates a dummy variable. Formal-Employed, 1k (d) is a dummy that equals one when an individual earned at least \$1k in a UI insured job covered by the LEHD. Self-Employed, 1k (d) is a dummy that equals one when an individual earned at least \$1k in net income on their 1040 Schedule C. LBD Firm Ownership, 1+ Yrs (d) is a dummy for LBD firm ownership of 1 or more years. LBD Firm Ownership, 2+ Yrs (d) is a dummy for LBD firm ownership of 2 or more years. For all other definitions, see Section 2.2.

Table 2: Baseline Results: Credit Scores, Formal-Employment, and Self-Employment Levels

	(1) Credit Score	(2) Credit Score	(3) Formal- Employed (d)	(4) Formal- Employed, 5k (d)	(5) Self-Employed (d)	(6) Self-Employed, 5k (d)
2 Years Before Removal (d)	66.52*** (0.513)	19.70*** (0.444)	0.000308 (0.000897)	0.000425 (0.000914)	0.000600 (0.000701)	0.000919 (0.000597)
1 Year Before Removal (d)	76.39*** (0.528)	13.26*** (0.592)	0.00154 (0.00120)	0.00129 (0.00121)	-0.000384 (0.000903)	0.000353 (0.000772)
Year of Removal (d)	148.2*** (0.675)	68.70*** (0.798)	0.00289* (0.00149)	0.00292* (0.00151)	0.000950 (0.00112)	0.00108 (0.000955)
1+ Years After Removal (d)	119.1*** (0.524)	7.046*** (0.939)	0.00465** (0.00185)	0.00323* (0.00187)	0.00108 (0.00137)	0.000983 (0.00117)
Individual Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Age and Tenure Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.116	0.134	0.122	0.122	0.003	0.003
Indiv-Yr Obs.	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06
No. of Indiv.	220000	220000	220000	220000	220000	220000
Sig Diff 1+Yr & -2Yr at 10%	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Sig Diff 0Yr & -2Yr at 10%	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N

Notes: SE in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Age and Tenure controls include quadratics in age and tenure. The symbol (d) indicates a dummy variable. Credit score refers to the TransUnion bankruptcy score. For formal-employment and self-employment definitions, see Section 2.2. 'Sig Diff 1+Yr & -2Yr at 10%' is an indicator that the coefficients are different on the terms '1+ Years After Removal (d)' and '2 Years Before Removal (d)' at the 10% level. 'Sig Diff 0Yr & -2Yr at 10%' is an indicator that the coefficients are different on the terms 'Year of Removal (d)' and '2 Years Before Removal (d)' at the 10% level.

Table 3: Baseline Self-Employment Flows

	(1) Transition into Self- Employed, 1k (d)	(2) Transition out of Self- Employed, 1k (d)	(3) Transition into Self- Employed, 5k (d)	(4) Transition out of Self- Employed, 5k (d)
2 Years Before Removal (d)	0.000527 (0.000576)	0.000898* (0.000540)	0.000536 (0.000491)	0.000644 (0.000458)
1 Year Before Removal (d)	2.64e-05 (0.000635)	0.00137** (0.000598)	0.000219 (0.000540)	0.000939* (0.000509)
Year of Removal (d)	0.00161** (0.000740)	0.00169** (0.000691)	0.00107* (0.000630)	0.00131** (0.000590)
1+ Years After Removal (d)	0.000649 (0.000891)	0.00222*** (0.000837)	0.000119 (0.000757)	0.00149** (0.000708)
Individual Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Age and Tenure Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001
Indiv-Yr Obs.	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06
No. of Indiv.	220000	220000	220000	220000
Sig Diff 1+Yr & -2Yr at 10%	N	Y	N	N
Sig Diff 0Yr & -2Yr at 10%	N	N	N	N

Notes: SE in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Age and Tenure controls include quadratics in age and tenure. Fixed Effects include individual fixed effects and year dummies. Transition into Self-Employed, 1k (d) is a dummy that takes the value 1 when an individual earns less than \$1k of self-employed earnings this year, and more than \$1k of self-employed earnings this year.

Table 4: Transitions into Self-Employment: Earnings

	(1) Real Annual Earnings	(2) Real Self- Employed Net Income	(3) Real Total In- come (SE and Non-SE)
2 Years Before Removal (d)	-6.046 (44.85)	-47.61** (20.08)	-53.66 (47.42)
1 Year Before Removal (d)	-111.5* (61.86)	-78.49*** (27.70)	-190.0*** (65.21)
Year of Removal (d)	-205.6*** (77.99)	-101.3*** (34.61)	-306.9*** (82.02)
1+ Years After Removal (d)	-603.5*** (96.19)	-158.2*** (43.52)	-761.7*** (101.2)
Transition Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	-1,506*** (116.6)	8,522*** (123.4)	7,016*** (154.0)
2 Yrs. Before Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	-645.0** (273.8)	2,274*** (268.1)	1,629*** (345.9)
1 Yr. Before Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	-1,138*** (272.8)	2,185*** (274.8)	1,048*** (346.5)
Yr. of Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	-1,534*** (295.2)	2,704*** (297.7)	1,170*** (376.4)
1+ Yrs. After Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	-1,709*** (216.4)	3,376*** (212.7)	1,667*** (273.8)
Individual Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Age and Tenure Controls	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.122	0.077	0.105
No. Person-Yr Obs.	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06
No. of Individ.	220000	220000	220000
Combined Coeff Diff 1+Yr & -2Yr	-1,661	991	-670
Combined Coeff Diff Sig at 10%	Y	Y	Y

Notes: SE in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Age and Tenure controls include quadratics in age and tenure. Fixed Effects include individual fixed effects and year dummies. The row titled 'Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs' calculates the difference in the summed coefficients for those who transition 1 year after flag removal (Sum the coefficients on '1+ Years After Removal (d)' + '1+ Yrs. After Removal (d) x Trans into Self-Empl, 1k (d)' = 3376-158.2) minus the summed coefficients for those who transition 2 years before flag removal (= 2274-47.61). Taking the difference yields \$991 (= (3376-158.2) - (2274-47.61)) which is the additional amount earned by those who transition into self employment 1 year after flag removal, relative to 2 years before. The titled 'Combined Coeff Diff Sig at 10%' is an indicator if that difference is significant at the 10% level.



Table 5: Transitions into Self-Employment: Borrowing

	(1) Real Bankcard Balance	(2) Real Revolv- ing Balance	(3) Real Mort- gage Balance	(4) Real HELOC Balance	(5) Real Total Balance
2 Years Before Removal (d)	202.1*** (13.09)	1,112*** (40.60)	6,023*** (329.1)	759.8*** (47.46)	8,809*** (350.1)
1 Year Before Removal (d)	336.3*** (18.21)	1,793*** (56.30)	8,957*** (443.1)	1,377*** (66.35)	13,038*** (475.3)
Year of Removal (d)	586.4*** (23.83)	2,735*** (72.19)	10,387*** (556.3)	1,978*** (84.78)	15,800*** (598.6)
1+ Years After Removal (d)	892.7*** (28.47)	4,257*** (83.77)	8,084*** (675.8)	3,551*** (98.35)	14,373*** (728.1)
Transition Into Self-Employed (d)	-62.55*** (24.01)	-461.9*** (75.81)	-5,635*** (742.6)	-486.9*** (88.90)	-6,483*** (790.1)
2 Yrs. Before Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	99.73 (66.47)	298.4 (216.5)	5,642*** (1,835)	277.8 (270.1)	6,422*** (1,955)
1 Yr. Before Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	91.64 (74.23)	822.2*** (252.3)	10,086*** (1,875)	575.8* (298.1)	11,815*** (2,011)
Yr. of Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	46.52 (86.61)	598.9** (271.6)	7,348*** (2,026)	640.2* (331.9)	8,511*** (2,162)
1+ Yrs. After Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	416.6*** (74.15)	1,610*** (211.2)	13,714*** (1,483)	1,253*** (267.9)	16,195*** (1,594)
Individual Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Age and Tenure Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.027	0.050	0.092	0.026	0.105
No. Person-Yr Obs.	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06
No. of Individ.	220000	220000	220000	220000	220000
Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs	1,007	4,457	10,133	3,766	15,337
Combined Coeff Diff Sig at 10%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: SE in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Age and Tenure controls include quadratics in age and tenure. Fixed Effects include individual fixed effects and year dummies. 'Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs' compares the overall effect of transitioning 1+ years after flag removal to the overall effect of transitioning 2 years before flag removal. See Table 4 for more details.

Table 6: Comparison of Total Borrowing by Newly Formal-Employed and Newly Self-Employed.

	(1) Total Balance		(2) Total Balance
	<u>Formal Trans.</u>		<u>Self-Empl Trans.</u>
2 Years Before Removal (d)	9,234*** (353.2)	2 Years Before Removal (d)	8,809*** (350.1)
1 Year Before Removal (d)	13,483*** (478.8)	1 Year Before Removal (d)	13,038*** (475.3)
Year of Removal (d)	16,355*** (602.0)	Year of Removal (d)	15,800*** (598.6)
1+ Years After Removal (d)	15,220*** (729.9)	1+ Years After Removal (d)	14,373*** (728.1)
Transition into <b>Formal-Employed</b> , 1k (d)	-1,976*** (536.2)	Transition Into <b>Self-Employed</b> (d)	-6,483*** (790.1)
2 Yrs. Before Removal (d) x Trans into <b>Formal-Empl</b> , 1k (d)	-5,095*** (1,361)	2 Yrs. Before Removal (d) x Trans Into <b>Self-Empl</b> , 1k (d)	6,422*** (1,955)
1 Yr. Before Removal (d) x Trans into <b>Formal-Empl</b> , 1k (d)	-1,600 (1,453)	1 Yr. Before Removal (d) x Trans Into <b>Self-Empl</b> , 1k (d)	11,815*** (2,011)
Yr. of Removal (d) x Trans into <b>Formal-Empl</b> , 1k (d)	-6,143*** (1,616)	Yr. of Removal (d) x Trans Into <b>Self-Empl</b> , 1k (d)	8,511*** (2,162)
1+ Yrs. After Removal (d) x Trans into <b>Formal-Empl</b> , 1k (d)	-6,555*** (1,164)	1+ Yrs. After Removal (d) x Trans Into <b>Self-Empl</b> , 1k (d)	16,195*** (1,594)
Individual Fixed Effects	Y	Individual Fixed Effects	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Year Fixed Effects	Y
Age and Tenure Controls	Y	Age and Tenure Controls	Y
R-squared	0.105	R-squared	0.105
No. Person-Yr Obs.	1.500e+06	No. Person-Yr Obs.	1.500e+06
No. of Indiv.	220000	No. of Indiv.	220000
Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs	4,526		15,337
Combined Coeff Diff Sig at 10%	Y		Y

Notes: SE in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Age and Tenure controls include quadratics in age and tenure. Fixed Effects include individual fixed effects and year dummies. 'Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs' compares the overall effect of transitioning 1+ years after flag removal to the overall effect of transitioning 2 years before flag removal. See Table 4 for more details.

Table 7: Ownership of LBD Firms

	(1) LBD Firm Ownership, 1+ Yrs (d)	(2) LBD Firm Ownership, 2+ Yrs (d)
2 Years Before Removal (d)	-0.000126 (0.000172)	1.30e-05 (0.000110)
1 Year Before Removal (d)	-0.000110 (0.000215)	0.000113 (0.000149)
Year of Removal (d)	0.000179 (0.000259)	0.000394** (0.000191)
1+ Years After Removal (d)	0.000297 (0.000334)	0.000540** (0.000230)
Individual Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Age and Tenure Controls	Y	Y
R-squared	0.001	0.000
Indiv-Yr Obs.	1.500e+06	1.500e+06
No. of Indiv.	220000	220000
Sig Diff 1+Yr & -2Yr at 10%	N	Y
Sig Diff 0Yr & -2Yr at 10%	N	Y

Notes: SE in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . The symbol (d) indicates a dummy variable. Age and Tenure controls include quadratics in age and tenure. LBD Firm Ownership, 1+ Yrs (d) is a dummy for LBD firm ownership of 1 or more years. LBD Firm Ownership, 2+ Yrs (d) is a dummy for LBD firm ownership of 2 or more years. For more details on LBD firm ownership measures, see Section 2.2.

Table 8: LBD Ownership and Borrowing

	(1) Real Bankcard Balance	(2) Real Revolv- ing Balance	(3) Real Mort- gage Balance	(4) Real HELOC Balance	(5) Real Total Balance
2 Years Before Removal (d)	205.0*** (12.96)	1,116*** (40.32)	6,189*** (326.3)	766.9*** (47.19)	8,991*** (347.2)
1 Year Before Removal (d)	338.4*** (18.10)	1,812*** (56.18)	9,273*** (441.9)	1,388*** (66.23)	13,406*** (474.3)
Year of Removal (d)	586.0*** (23.73)	2,745*** (72.00)	10,597*** (555.6)	1,988*** (84.50)	16,045*** (598.0)
1+ Years After Removal (d)	904.1*** (28.44)	4,291*** (83.73)	8,462*** (675.5)	3,576*** (98.32)	14,812*** (728.0)
LBD Ownership, 2+ Yrs. (d)	-195.6 (172.8)	-3,055*** (808.7)	-16,342** (6,410)	-3,674*** (989.6)	-17,637** (6,862)
2 Yrs. Before Removal (d) x LBD Ownership, 2+ Yrs. (d)	175.4 (300.3)	3,682*** (1,269)	7,493 (9,526)	1,317 (1,408)	13,318 (10,209)
1 Yr. Before Removal (d) x LBD Ownership, 2+ Yrs. (d)	449.7 (334.4)	4,326*** (1,646)	4,209 (10,123)	4,520** (2,149)	6,382 (10,937)
Yr. of Removal (d) x LBD Ownership, 2+ Yrs. (d)	902.0** (383.7)	4,843*** (1,742)	18,303* (10,899)	5,953** (2,437)	20,255* (11,717)
1+ Yrs. After Removal (d) x LBD Ownership, 2+ Yrs. (d)	1,067*** (406.2)	8,645*** (1,487)	37,997*** (9,793)	7,716*** (2,030)	47,332*** (10,710)
Individual Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Age and Tenure Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.027	0.050	0.092	0.026	0.105
No. Person-Yr Obs.	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06
No. of Individ.	220000	220000	220000	220000	220000
Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs	1,591	8,138	32,777	9,208	39,835
Combined Coeff Diff Sig at 10%	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: SE in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Age and Tenure controls include quadratics in age and tenure. Fixed Effects include individual fixed effects and year dummies. 'Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs' compares the overall effect of transitioning 1+ years after flag removal to the overall effect of transitioning 2 years before flag removal. See Table 4 for more details.

Table 9: LBD Firm Ownership and Subsequent Turnover Among Newly Self-Employed

	LBD Firm Ownership, 2+Yrs (d)	Transition out of Self- Employment Next Yr., 1k (d)
2 Years Before Removal (d)	-8.93e-05 (9.33e-05)	0.000481 (0.000456)
1 Year Before Removal (d)	-2.84e-05 (0.000132)	0.000153 (0.000509)
Year of Removal (d)	0.000145 (0.000171)	0.000583 (0.000602)
1+ Years After Removal (d)	0.000204 (0.000223)	0.00117 (0.000754)
Transition Into Self-Employed (d)	0.00936*** (0.000692)	0.380*** (0.00392)
2 Yrs. Before Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	0.00312* (0.00162)	-0.00672 (0.00830)
1 Yr. Before Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	0.00451*** (0.00172)	0.00761 (0.00850)
Yr. of Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	0.00694*** (0.00191)	-0.0128 (0.00889)
1+ Yrs. After Removal (d) x Trans Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)	0.00979*** (0.00145)	0.00437 (0.00649)
Individual Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Age and Tenure Controls	Y	Y
R-squared	0.006	0.158
No. Person-Yr Obs	1.500e+06	1.500e+06
No. Individ.	220000	220000
Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs	0.70%	1.18%
Combined Coeff Diff Sig at 10%	Y	N

Notes: SE in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Age and Tenure controls include quadratics in age and tenure. Fixed Effects include individual fixed effects and year dummies. 'Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs' compares the overall effect of transitioning 1+ years after flag removal to the overall effect of transitioning 2 years before flag removal. See Table 4 for more details.

Table 10: Baseline Formal-Employment Flows

	(1) Transition into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	(2) Transition out of Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	(3) Transition into Formal-Employed, 5k (d)	(4) Transition out of Formal-Employed, 5k (d)
2 Years Before Removal (d)	-0.000892 (0.000687)	0.000709 (0.000686)	0.000788 (0.000711)	0.000595 (0.000703)
1 Year Before Removal (d)	0.000127 (0.000763)	0.000421 (0.000764)	0.00118 (0.000786)	0.000927 (0.000784)
Year of Removal (d)	-0.000380 (0.000878)	0.000932 (0.000887)	0.00241*** (0.000907)	0.00224** (0.000912)
1+ Years After Removal (d)	-0.00121 (0.00107)	0.00168 (0.00108)	0.000713 (0.00110)	0.00303*** (0.00111)
Individual Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Age and Tenure Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.026	0.026	0.018	0.011
Indiv-Yr Obs.	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06
No. of Indiv.	220000	220000	220000	220000
Sig Diff 1+Yr & -2Yr at 10%	N	N	N	Y
Sig Diff 0Yr & -2Yr at 10%	N	N	Y	Y

Notes: SE in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Age and Tenure controls include quadratics in age and tenure. Fixed Effects include individual fixed effects and year dummies. Transition into Formal-Employed, 1k (d) is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the individual earned less than \$1k in formal sector earnings last year, and greater than \$1k in formal sector earnings this year.

Table 11: Transitions into Formal Employment: Earnings

	(1) Real Annual La- bor Earnings	(2) Real Annual Self-Employed Net Income	(3) Real Annual To- tal Income (SE and Non-SE)
2 Years Before Removal (d)	-89.74** (44.94)	39.87* (22.45)	-49.87 (48.18)
1 Year Before Removal (d)	-239.8*** (62.11)	11.64 (29.39)	-228.1*** (65.74)
Year of Removal (d)	-381.2*** (78.42)	10.57 (36.76)	-370.6*** (82.76)
1+ Years After Removal (d)	-847.1*** (96.50)	-23.63 (44.79)	-870.7*** (101.7)
Transition into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	2,673*** (91.15)	-332.2*** (47.31)	2,341*** (98.08)
2 Yrs. Before Removal (d) x Trans. into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	1,459*** (207.1)	-249.9** (110.8)	1,209*** (225.6)
1 Yr. Before Removal (d) x Trans. into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	2,013*** (215.0)	-455.0*** (117.5)	1,558*** (235.6)
Yr. of Removal (d) x Trans. into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	2,695*** (237.3)	-140.5 (131.0)	2,554*** (259.2)
1+ Yrs. After Removal (d) x Trans. into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	4,033*** (169.9)	-307.3*** (91.28)	3,726*** (185.4)
Individual Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Age and Tenure Controls	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.126	0.004	0.100
No. Person-Yr Obs.	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06
No. of Individ.	220000	220000	220000
Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs	1,817	-121	1,696
Combined Coeff Diff Sig at 10%	Y	N	Y

Notes: SE in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Age and Tenure controls include quadratics in age and tenure. Fixed Effects include individual fixed effects and year dummies. 'Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs' compares the overall effect of transitioning 1+ years after flag removal to the overall effect of transitioning 2 years before flag removal. See Table 4 for more details.


Table 12: Transitions into Formal Employment: Firm Size

	(1) Employer Size $\geq$ 1000 (d)	(2) Employer Size $\geq$ 500 (d)	(3) Employer Size $\leq$ 1 & Age $\leq$ 1 Yr. (d)
2 Years Before Removal (d)	-0.00126 (0.000868)	-0.00121 (0.000950)	2.43e-05 (0.000286)
1 Year Before Removal (d)	-0.00205* (0.00115)	-0.000788 (0.00125)	-3.53e-05 (0.000346)
Year of Removal (d)	-0.00199 (0.00143)	0.000167 (0.00155)	-0.000559 (0.000409)
1+ Years After Removal (d)	-0.00344* (0.00178)	-0.000773 (0.00193)	-0.000855* (0.000515)
Transition into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	0.0911*** (0.00196)	0.114*** (0.00214)	0.0350*** (0.00117)
2 Yrs. Before Removal (d) x Trans into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	0.0188*** (0.00454)	0.0292*** (0.00499)	-0.00261 (0.00258)
1 Yr. Before Removal (d) x Trans into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	0.0147*** (0.00452)	0.0210*** (0.00498)	0.00481* (0.00274)
Yr. of Removal (d) x Trans into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	0.0206*** (0.00490)	0.0268*** (0.00537)	0.00329 (0.00295)
1+ Yrs. After Removal (d) x Trans into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)	0.0357*** (0.00357)	0.0511*** (0.00394)	0.00310 (0.00208)
Individual Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Age and Tenure Controls	Y	Y	Y
R-squared	0.013	0.017	0.009
No. Person-Yr Obs.	1.500e+06	1.500e+06	1.500e+06
No. of Indiv.	220000	220000	220000
Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs	1.47%	2.23%	0.48%
Combined Coeff Diff Sig at 10%	Y	Y	Y

Notes: SE in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Age and Tenure controls include quadratics in age and tenure. Fixed Effects include individual fixed effects and year dummies. Employer Size $\geq$ 1000 (d) is a dummy that takes the value 1 when an individual works at an employer with 1000+ other employees. Employer size is measured with respect to the SEIN and taken as the average of 4th quarter monthly employment. 'Combined Coeff Diff 1+ Yrs & -2 Yrs' compares the overall effect of transitioning 1+ years after flag removal to the overall effect of transitioning 2 years before flag removal. See Table 4 for more details.




Figure 1: Bankruptcy Score (Coefficients plotted from Table 2, Column (1))




Notes: Coefficients from Table 2, Column (1). Standard errors clustered at individual level.

Figure 2: Impact of Flag Removal on Self-Employed Income, for Those who Transition into Self-Employment (Summed Coefficients Plotted from Col. (2), Table 4)




Notes: Coefficients from Col. (2), Table 4. Sum of coefficients on the flag removal dummy (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d)), interaction term (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d) x Trans. Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)) and the transition term (e.g. Transition Into Self-Employed, 1k (d)), and we compute standard errors using the delta method. The points on the plotted line can be interpreted as the differential gain in self-employed income from entering self-employment, relative to a non-transitioner in the control group, where the control group is those who are 3+ years prior to flag removal.

Figure 3: LBD Firm Ownership (Coefficients Plotted from Table 7, Column (2))




Notes: Coefficients from Table 7, Column (2). Standard errors clustered at individual level. LBD firm ownership defined as 2+ years of firm ownership (i.e. two consecutive firmid links). Must employ at least 1 worker to be in LBD.

Figure 4: Impact of Flag Removal on Total Credit Balances, for Those who Own Firms in LBD (2+ Yrs.) (Summed Coefficients Plotted from Col. (5), Table 8)



Notes: Coefficients from Col. (5), Table 8. Sum of coefficients on the flag removal dummy (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d)), interaction term (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d) x LBD Ownership, 2+ Yrs. (d)) and the ownership term (e.g. LBD Ownership, 2+ Yrs (d)), and we compute standard errors using the delta method. The points on the plotted line can be interpreted as the differential increase in borrowing from LBD firm owners, relative to non-owners in the control group, where the control group is those who are 3+ years prior to flag removal.

Figure 5: Impact of Flag Removal on Total Income (Labor Earnings plus Self-Employed Net Income), Among Those Who Transition into Formal Employment (Summed Coefficients Plotted from Col. (3), Table 11)



Notes: Coefficients from Col. (3), Table 11. We add the coefficients on the flag removal dummy (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d)), interaction term (e.g. 2 Years Before Removal (d) x Trans. Into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)) and the transition term (e.g. Transition Into Formal-Employed, 1k (d)), and we compute standard errors using the delta method. The points on the plotted line can be interpreted as the increase in total income from entering formal employment, relative to a non-transitioner in the control group.