DIRECTING REMITTANCES TO EDUCATION WITH SOFT AND HARD COMMITMENTS:
EVIDENCE FROM A LAB-IN-THE-FIELD EXPERIMENT AND NEW PRODUCT TAKE-UP
AMONG FILIPINO MIGRANTS IN ROME

Giuseppe De Arcangelis
Majlinda Joxhe
David McKenzie
Erwin Tiongson
Dean Yang

Directing Remittances to Education with Soft and Hard Commitments: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-field
Experiment and New Product Take-up Among Filipino Migrants in Rome
Giuseppe De Arcangelis, Majlinda Joxhe, David McKenzie, Erwin Tiongson, and Dean Yang
NBER Working Paper No. 20839
January 2015
JEL No. C9,D19,F24,O15

ABSTRACT

This paper tests how migrants' willingness to remit changes when given the ability to direct remittances to educational purposes using different forms of commitment. Variants of a dictator game in a lab-in-the-field experiment with Filipino migrants in Rome are used to examine remitting behavior under varying degrees of commitment. These range from the soft commitment of simply labeling remittances as being for education, to the hard commitment of having funds directly paid to a school and the student's educational performance monitored. We find that the introduction of simple labeling for education raises remittances by more than 15 percent. Adding the ability to directly send this funding to the school adds only a further 2.2 percent. We randomly vary the information asymmetry between migrants and their most closely connected household, but find no significant change in the remittance response to these forms of commitment as information varies. Behavior in these games is then shown to be predictive of take-up of a new financial product called EduPay, designed to allow migrants to directly pay remittances to schools in the Philippines. We find this take-up is largely driven by a response to the ability to label remittances for education, rather than to the hard commitment feature of directly paying schools.

Giuseppe De Arcangelis
Department of Social Sciences and Economics
University of Rome "La Sapienza"
P.le Aldo Moro, 5
00185 Rome
Italy
giuseppe.dearcangelis@uniroma1.it

Majlinda Joxhe
John Cabot American University of Rome
mjoxhe@johncabot.edu

David McKenzie
The World Bank, MSN MC3-307
1818 H Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
dmckenzie@worldbank.org

Erwin Tiongson
Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University
Washington, DC 20057
ert@georgetown.edu

Dean Yang
University of Michigan
Department of Economics and
Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy
735 S. State Street, Room 3316
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
and NBER
deanyang@umich.edu

1. Introduction

Migrant remittances are one of the largest international financial flows to developing countries, exceeding US$400 billion in 2012 (World Bank 2013). These remittances represent the most tangible way in which migrants share the tremendous gains in income achieved through migrating abroad with remaining family members in their home countries. One common use of these funds is to fund the schooling of the migrant's children and other relatives in the home country, with several studies finding increases in education as a result (e.g. Cox-Edwards and Ureta 2003, Yang 2008, Theoharides 2014). However, migrants may differ from remittance recipients in their preferences for how money sent should be used (Ashraf et al 2015), with physical separation and limited information making it difficult for migrants to ensure money is used the way they intend.

In such a context, financial instruments which provide migrants with greater ability to monitor and control how funds are spent should have positive take-up by some migrants, and may lead to an increase in how money is remitted. In this paper we test this idea via a lab-in-the-field experiment with Filipino migrants in Rome, Italy. In a dictator game, migrants are asked to allocate 1000 € between themselves and people of their choice in the Philippines. Different games then allow them to explicitly set aside some of the money sent for educational purposes, varying the amount of control offered. Three levels of control are tested: the option to simply label some amount of money as for educational purposes only; labeling the funding and having it sent directly to a school to pay for a particular student's educational tuition; and combining labeled money sent direct to a school with reports on student attendance and grades. We also randomize whether the household in the Philippines is told the migrant's choices in the game, to test whether migrants are able to exhibit more control when the remittance receivers have less information.

Individuals who took part in this exercise were then subsequently offered the opportunity to use a new financial product, *EduPay*, developed by the authors in collaboration with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). This product allowed migrants to use a remittance to directly pay for tuition in educational institutions in the Philippines for students of their choosing, with this payment going directly to the school, and the school subsequently providing attendance records and grades. We use this to examine the actual demand for control over remittances for education

purposes. We can then combine this with the lab-in-the-field evidence to examine the extent to which behavior in the game predicts take-up of the new product, and to help better understand the likely mechanisms behind any take-up.

We find that introducing simple labeling of remittances for education increases the total amount remitted to individuals in the Philippines by 15 percent. This increase comes from increases in both the number of distinct individuals they choose to send money to, and from the amount sent to each individual. Adding the ability to directly send this funding to the school adds only an additional 2.2 percent to the amount remitted. The additional remitting largely occurs within the most closely connected household in the Philippines, and does not vary significantly as we vary the information this household is provided about the choice the migrant is making. We find that choices in these games are significant predictors of take-up of the EduPay product: individuals who allocate more of the 1000 € to this product in the game are more likely to want to use it in practice. Moreover, this take-up seems to be driven largely by preferences for education labeling, with no additional predictive power from use of direct payment in the game.

This paper contributes to two main literatures. The first is very recent literature which examines how migrants respond to changes in information asymmetry and to the opportunity to exert more control over how remittances are used. Ambler (forthcoming) finds in a lab-in-the-field experiment that migrants share more of a windfall when relatives are told the migrant received this windfall. Ashraf et al. (forthcoming) find that migrants from El Salvador save more in the home country when offered accounts providing greater ability to monitor and control savings. The most closely related work to our paper is Ambler et al (2015), which, in a sample of Salvadoran migrants in Washington, D.C., examines the demand for a new financial product that allowed migrants to target remittances towards the education of a specific student they selected in El Salvador. Money was sent via an ATM card, that the student was told was intended to support their education, but for which there was no enforcement on how the money was used. They find zero demand for this product when offered by itself, but do find positive demand for the product when it is accompanied by matching funds. Our study contrasts with this finding by showing there can be positive demand from migrants for education-labeled remittances, and through the use of a lab-in-the-field experiment to examine the mechanisms driving this demand.

This paper also contributes to a second, related literature, which examines the role of soft and hard commitments on financial decisions. Karlan and Linden (2014) test the demand and

3

impact of two savings accounts for education in Uganda: a school-based commitment account that can only be used for educational purposes, and a soft commitment product that was labeled for education use but could be withdrawn for any purpose. They find more savings under the weaker commitment product, suggesting individuals may wish to bind their future behavior, but not too tightly. Benhassine et al (forthcoming) show that simply labeling a cash transfer as intended for education can have similar positive effects on school participation as imposing that transfers be conditional on school attendance. Consistent with the idea that ear-marking, or labeling, money for a specific purpose can increase saving, Soman and Cheema (2011) find that low-income Indian workers save more when salaries are earmarked, especially when pictures of the household's children are placed on the earmarked envelope. Our findings of increased remittances when migrants can label accounts, and little additional remittances from directing the payments straight to the school, suggest that soft commitments may also be enough for educational remitting.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses different theories why labels and control over how remittances are spent may change remitting behavior. Section 3describes the setting, baseline sample, and lab-in-the-field experiment. Section 4 presents the main empirical results, quantifying the effects of the different forms of education labeling. Section 5 concludes.

2. Why might remittances respond to labeling and added control?

Remittances occur for a wide variety of reasons, including altruism, insurance, exchange, and as repayment of loans. Rapoport and Docquier (2006) provide an excellent summary of different theories of remitting, and note that a key feature of remittances is that distance makes informational problems more pervasive and hence strategic behavior more likely than is the case with many other types of transfers. In particular, the standard unitary model of the household seems particularly unlikely to hold in a migration context due to information asymmetries and to limits on monitoring within the household (de Laat 2014; Chen 2013; Ambler forthcoming; Doi et al 2014; Genicot et al 2014).

In particular, Ashraf et al (forthcoming) find migrants prefer that remittances be used less for immediate consumption and more for longer-term investment and savings than is the case for remittance receivers. Even when migrants and remittance recipients share the same preferences

over how remittances should be spent, self-control issues may lead remittance receivers to save and invest less than both they and the migrant prefer.

Money sent for education purposes may be subject to a number of these issues. Migrants may not be able to monitor how much school expenses actually are, whether money sent for schooling is diverted to other uses, and whether students actually attend school once such fees are paid. Since the returns to schooling occur in the future, while costs occur in the present, impatient or time-inconsistent remittance receivers may be tempted to spend money on items that bring immediate benefits. Knowing this, the migrant may send fewer remittances for schooling purposes than would be the case with perfect information and complete enforcement.

How might labeling a remittance as being for education purposes change this? The literature on self-control has long considered the role of rules to restrict opportunities (e.g. Thaler and Shefrin 1981). One way of doing this is through mental accounts (Thaler 1999), whereby money is implicitly or explicitly set aside in different labeled accounts for different purposes. Soman and Cheema (2011) note that once such rules are set, there is a large psychological literature detailing how breaking these rules can be costly, in terms of leading to negative emotions such as guilt, remorse, and regret. By labeling a remittance as being for education purposes, a migrant may effectively be able to create this mental account for the remittance receiver, with these psychological costs making it costly for the receiver to spend the money on other items.

Of course labels may not always work, in which case migrants may wish to exert even more control over how money is spent. Directly sending money to the school for fees is a much stronger way of exerting control, and may therefore be preferred by migrants if they believe labels do not exert enough pressure on the receiver to use money for the intended purpose.

Given that migrants regularly communicate with their family members, a natural question is then whether we should expect an outside entity's offer to label money for education to add anything beyond any labels migrants can already attach? That is, if migrants would send more money if this money were labeled as being for education purposes, why don't the migrants simply label remittances this way? There are at least two possible reasons why an outside party may provide a valuable label. First, the label may be seen as more credible or stronger when communicated by a third party. Second, attaching a label may be costly for migrants, as it could be seen by receivers as a signal of lack of trust. This same cost may not exist when the

communication comes from a third party, especially if the receiver is unsure of the circumstances under which the migrant is making this decision.

In contrast, it is easier to see how a third party offering the ability to directly send remittances to school to pay for expenses, and to provide monitoring reports on the child's attendance and progress can add value, since there is no easy way for migrants to do this by themselves. However, this hard form of commitment could be viewed by the recipient as indicating a lack of trust from the migrant, which could have offsetting negative costs for the sender. An additional downside of hard commitments is that they reduce the flexibility of recipients to use remittances for other purposes, for example if health or other emergencies arise.

3. Setting, Baseline Sample, and Description of Lab-in-the-Field Experiment

3.1 Setting

Our experiment was conducted among Filipino workers in Rome, Italy. The Philippines sends workers to a very diverse set of migrant destinations. There are estimated to be approximately 113,000 Filipino migrants in Italy, remitting about US$500 million, on average, back to the Philippines each year in recent years. Education is a key desired use for these remittances, with US$233.5 million of remittances sent in expectation that this would finance the education of a relative (IOM 2010).[1]

3.2 EduPay

We worked with the Bank of the Philippines Islands (BPI) and the Philippine Association of Private Schools, Colleges, and Universities (PAPSCU) to develop and pilot a new remittance product, called *EduPay*, that was intended to provide migrant workers with greater ability to control the use of remittances for education. This product allows migrants to channel tuition payments for particular students directly to those students' educational institutions in the Philippines from a BPI remittance branch in Rome. This mechanism allowed migrants to avoid sending tuition payments via family members or others in the Philippines who might not be completely trusted to make such payments reliably. The migrant would then also subsequently

---

[1] The remittance data are from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and consistent with those also reported by IOM (2010).

receive attendance records and school grades from the child's school, enabling them to better monitor the schooling being paid for.

3.3 Baseline Sample

Given that Filipinos are a small minority of the overall population of Rome, we used intercept-point sampling to obtain a sample for this study. Between August 2012, and January 2013, we intercepted 2,291 Filipino migrants at common meeting points in Rome and at the main branch of BPI in Rome.[2] Migrants were given a general introduction to the research project, which was described as "about the lives and financial decisions of OFWs in Rome, and about the remittances they send home to the Philippines."[3] Migrants were also told, referring to the EduPay product, "We will also be offering you a new product related to education and remittances at the end of the survey, and you may benefit from using this product."

Migrants were then invited to answer some preliminary screening questions to determine their eligibility to participate in the pilot phase. To be considered eligible, a respondent had to meet two criteria: (a) the province of origin of the migrant and of his/her "mostly closely connected household" (i.e., the household where they lived before migrating, or the household they send the most remittances to) should be in one of three regions of the Philippines in which PAPSCU had agreed to assist in running the pilot;[4] and (b) had a relative in the Philippines aged 5-22. If the migrant did not refuse to answer further questions, the interview would begin. The complete survey instrument, including introductory text read to potential respondents, is provided in the Online Appendix.

This resulted in a sample of 501 migrant workers, who were then administered a baseline survey and a lab-in-the-field experiment. At the conclusion of the survey and experiment, participants were then told about the new EduPay product, provided with some related marketing material and, if they wanted to use this new product, asked to sign two forms: (i) a general information form on the sponsorable student(s) and (ii) an authorization form required by

---

[2] Intercepts were scheduled at various times on a variety of days of the week. The intercept points were five fixed locations: the Santa Pudenziana Filipino community church, the Bank of the Philippine Islands Rome branch, the Embassy of the Philippines, the headquarters of an important Filipino NGO (OFSPES), and the central train station in Rome (Termini Station).

[3] "OFW" is a commonly-used acronym among Filipino migrants, and stands for "overseas Filipino workers."

[4] These regions are: 1) Region 3 [Central Luzon];2) Region 4 [the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Quezon, Rizal, Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Palawan, and Romblon]; and 3) the National Capital Region (the group of contiguous cities comprising metro Manila).

PAPSCU to obtain all relevant information on the student (e.g., their school ID number) from the schools so as to implement EduPay.

The baseline survey collected information on demographic background, labor market status, remitting behavior, and the quality of their relationship with their most closely connected household in the Philippines. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. The sample is 73 percent female and the average (and median) age of the respondents is 42. Most (70 percent) of the migrants have a college or a university degree and have been living in Italy for about 7 years (median). Only 21 percent are never married, but only 5 percent have their spouse with them in Italy. Nearly 68 percent of the respondents are employed as domestic workers, with the other main occupations being housecleaners (8 percent) and nannies (6 percent). The median wage is 900 euro per month. Almost 96 percent have remitted regularly to the most closely connected household in the Philippines in the last 12 months, and 72 percent remit monthly. The median amount of remittances is 380 euro/month. 81 percent report having sent remittances in the past year for the specific purpose of funding the education of someone in the Philippines, with a median of 970 euro/year sent for this purpose.

It is worthwhile comparing these baseline characteristics to those of the overall Filipino migrant community in Italy. According to Italian labor force survey data (Italialavoro 2013), 58% of Filipino immigrants in Italy are female, 80% of those in the workforce have monthly incomes below 1,000 euro, the median age category is 30-39 years, and 53% have at least an upper secondary education. Comparing these figures with our sample statistics reveals that our study sample is more female, older, and better educated than the broader Filipino immigrant population in Italy.[5]

The most closely connected household to the migrant in the Philippines has an average of 4.45 individuals in it. The head is the migrant's parents in 29.5 percent of cases, the migrant's spouse 22.6 percent of the time, and the migrant's sister or brother in 17.2 percent of cases. 62.9 percent of migrants have one of their own children in this household, and 32.1 percent have a nephew or niece in this household. Communication between the migrant and this household is frequent, with 52 percent communicating daily, and 93 percent at least weekly. 71 percent of

---

[5] Because the sample appears, in particular, to be more female than the broader Filipino population in Italy, all empirical results in the main tables (in which we pool males and females) will also be presented in the Online Appendix with interaction terms testing whether effects found are different for males and females. Below, alongside discussion of our main (gender pooled) results, we discuss implications (if any) for our estimates of population average treatment effects.

migrants declare themselves to be "very well informed" on what happens in this household. However, despite this, 55 percent claimed they would like to have more influence on how the overall budget of the most closely connected household is spent and 37 percent stated that they wish to have more influence on the spending decisions of the remittances. This suggests there may be demand for interventions which provide them with more control over remittances.

3.4 The lab-in-the-field experiment

The experimental intervention was administered to participants face-to-face, immediately after they answered the baseline survey. There were three main objectives of this experiment. The first was to test the responsiveness of total migrant remittances when migrants have the ability to control some of this for education use. The second objective was to attempt to unbundle the different features of the EduPay product, in order to determine whether any positive responsiveness to EduPay was driven by the ability to channel funds directly to schools, or whether EduPay simply provided a way for migrants to label that a transfer was intended for education. The third objective was to examine how use of these features varies with the degree of asymmetric information between the migrant and the recipient.

Migrants were told that they were entered into a lottery to win a 1000 € prize, and asked how they would like to allocate any winnings between themselves, and between one or more other people in the Philippines. They were told that any amount shared with people in the Philippines would be remitted by the research project at no charge. As seen from Table 1, 1000 € corresponds to just over one month's median earnings, and almost three months of median remittances, so is a sizeable sum. We ask them to make this choice under four different settings, using a within-participant experiment in which we randomized the order in which each person was presented with these four cases.

The cases were as follows:

(i)   Basic: this choice corresponds to a simple dictator game, in which the migrant decides how much to keep for her or himself, and how much to share with others, with any funds allocated to people in the Philippines provided to them directly in the form of cash.

(ii)   Education label option: Under this choice, migrants were given the option (but no requirement) of labeling any amount shared as being for education, so that when it

9

was delivered to the recipient it would be accompanied by a note saying "these funds are intended to be used for the education of someone in your household". This captures the labeling aspect of the EduPay product.

(iii) <u>Direct Payment option</u>: This case is identical to (ii), in that migrants could choose for each amount shared whether or not to attach an education label.I In addition, this case adds the option of choosing to have the money paid directly to the student's school as tuition. This captures the labeling *and* direct payment aspects of the EduPay product.

(iv) <u>Direct payment with performance monitoring</u>: This case is identical to (iii), except that if the migrant chose to send money directly to the school for tuition, they would also receive reports on the attendance and grades of this student. This last case then mimics the three key features of the EduPay product: labeling, direct payment, and monitoring.

To be clear, cases (i) through (iv) are nested, in that each successive case only adds options for the migrant, and never takes any away. Case (ii) adds the education label option, but allows simply sending cash without a label, as in case (i). Case (iii) adds direct payments to schools, but also allows simple labeling as in case (ii) or just cash provision as in case (i). Respondents have free choice to use any, all, or none of the options available to them in a particular case. For example, in case (iii), a migrants could send, for a particular recipient, a cash remittance, a labeled remittance, or a direct payment to a school, or any combination of these three. What's more, respondents could make these transfers for any number of recipients in the Philippines.

This nested structure allows us to interpret differences in remittances between treatments as reflecting the impact on remittances of adding or subtracting particular sharing options. For example, the difference in remittances between cases (iii) and (ii) reflects the net impact of adding an option for direct payments to schools, over and above an ability to attach an education label or to simply share cash without a label.

Choices were incentivized by telling respondents that one respondent in the study would actually win the 1000 € prize, and for that winner one of their four cases (i, ii, iii, or iv) would be randomly selected to be implemented as they had specified. Migrants were told that they would not be allowed to change their allocation decision if they later learned that they had won the lottery, so they should take the allocation decision seriously. The lottery was actually implemented on 28 March 2013.

In this experiment we were also interested in whether migrants would make different choices under different assumptions about what their family members in the Philippines knew about their choice environment.[6] In particular, we were interested in the possibility that migrants might be less willing to use the education label or direct funds to schools if the most closely connected households in the Philippines felt that the migrant was explicitly seeking to control their behavior. This might be the case if beneficiaries viewed attempts to control them as reflecting the migrant's lack of trust in them or disapproval of their decision-making.

To test this, we randomly assigned the migrants into three treatment groups, each of 167 individuals:[7]

• Treatment 1 (*Private information*): Migrants assigned to this treatment were told that the most closely connected household in the Philippines would not be informed of any of the decisions or choices the migrant made. If the migrant decides to share money with anyone from this household, they would receive the money and be told it came from the migrant answering a survey in Italy, but not what the decision process was that resulted in this amount being transferred.

• Treatment 2 (*Information sharing*): Migrants assigned to this treatment were told that the household in the Philippines would be informed of all the choices they made. This means the household would know that the migrant had to allocate 1000 €, and exactly how they had decided to allocate it.

• Treatment 3 (*Social excuse)*: Migrants assigned to this treatment were told that, as in Treatment 2, the household in the Philippines would be informed of all choices made. However, if the migrant chose any of the EduPay options (directed payment, or directed payment + monitoring), the survey team would inform the household that a small donation to a Filipino community organization in Rome was made when the EduPay option was chosen. This was to provide the household with a social excuse for using EduPay.

Our prior was that migrants would be least willing to share money with the household in the Philippines when their choice was public information (treatment 2), and that they would be more willing to use education labeling or directed payment when either this choice was private

---

[6] Existing research (such as Ambler forthcoming, or Genicot et al 2014) suggests that remittance recipients' knowledge about the migrant's choice environment, and the migrant's economic conditions in particular, affects migrant remittance behavior.

[7] Randomization occurred by computer, and was a simple random draw, without stratification, since no baseline data were available to stratify on at the time of assigning questionnaires to different treatments.

information, or when they had a social excuse to justify to the household why they were doing this (treatments 1 and 3, respectively).

4. Lab-in-the-Field Results

We begin by pooling results across the different information treatments and examining how the migrant's willingness to share (remit) money with others in the Philippines varies with the different choices which provide greater or lesser degrees of control over how money is used for education. We then examine the extent to which these choices vary according to the information provided to the most connected household in the Philippines. In the next section we then investigate the extent to which behavior in these lab-in-the-field experiments helps predict take-up of the new EduPay product.

4.1 How does the amount remitted vary with different education commitments?

For each individual we observe four different allocation decisions, corresponding to one decision for each of the four choice cases (i)-(iv) above. To estimate the impact of these choice options on outcome *y* for migrant *j* we estimate fixed effects models of the form:

$$y_j = \alpha + \beta EduLabel_j + \gamma DirectPay_j + \delta DirectPay\&Monitor_j + \mu_j + \varepsilon_j$$

Where *EduLabel* indicates the decision is taken under choice (ii), where the migrant has the option of labeling remittances as for education purposes; *DirectPay* indicates the decision is taken under choice (iii), where the migrant also has the option of choosing to have money directly paid to the school, and *DirectPay&Monitor* indicates the decision is taken under choice (iv), where the migrant can choose to have money directly paid to the school and receive monitoring reports in return. μ_j is an individual fixed effect, enabling us to identify impacts from intra-migrant decisions. This fixed effect also captures the 24 randomization strata which determine the ordering of the four choices. The standard error ε_j is then clustered at the individual level.

We are then interested in testing whether $\beta = 0$, that is whether or not there is any change in remittance behavior when the option to label remittances as for education is given, as well as testing for equality of $\beta, \gamma,$ and δ, which tells us whether the form of educational commitment matters.

We consider several outcomes. The first is the extensive margin of whether or not the migrant chooses to remit any of the money at all with others in the Philippines. 87.8 percent of migrants do choose to remit in the basic, no-label option. The second outcome is the total amount remitted to anyone in the Philippines. Migrants could divide the money up with as many individuals in the Philippines as they liked, with the maximum being 9 individuals. We total this up, and find the mean amount remitted is 614.6 € under the basic, no-label option. That is, migrants are sharing more than they keep for themselves. We also consider the total number of people in the Philippines they choose to remit to (an average of 2.03 under the basic option), and the amount remitted to each beneficiary (conditional on making any remittances). Then to examine the extent to which differences are arising from changing remittance behavior with the most closely connected household, versus with other households in the Philippines, we examine the number of individuals within the most closely connected household that they choose to allocate money to, whether or not they choose to allocate money to someone outside this main household (23.8 percent do under the basic choice option), and the amount remitted to people outside the main household (90.2 € on average under the basic option).

Table 2 reports the results. First consider the effect of being able to include an education label. This results in a 4.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of remitting at all, and a 93.7 € increase in the total amount remitted, both significant at the 1 percent level. This increase in the total remitted is approximately a 15 percent increase on the amount remitted under the basic choice option. We see that this increase reflects migrants remitting to both more people (0.15 more people), and remitting more to each person that they do remit to. Most of the increase appears to be occurring within the most closely connected household, with no increase in the likelihood of remitting to someone outside this main household, and 82 percent of the total increase in remittances going to individuals inside the main household.

Adding the option of direct payment to the school, or direct payment and monitoring, only leads to modest changes relative to education labeling alone. Although there is a statistically significant difference between education labeling alone and the direct payment option for several outcomes, the magnitudes of these differences are relatively small. With direct payment the total amount remitted increases by 107.4 € relative to the basic, no-label option, which represents only a 2 percent higher increase than that under education labeling alone. Moreover, the last row of Table 2 shows that for all but one outcome we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of the

three forms of directing the remittance for education purposes. The one exception is in the number of individuals in the main household that money is shared with. This is 0.06 to 0.08 persons higher with either direct payment option, a 4 to 5 percent increase on the basic option mean.

Figure 1 shows the CDFs of the total amount remitted under the four choice structures. We see the change in the amount remitted when moving from the basic (no label) option to any of the other three options occurs across the entire distribution, while the other three choices have very similar distributions to one another.

In sum, it does appear that migrants are willing to remit more when given the ability to direct these remittances towards education, but that the main effect appears to come from the softer commitment of education labeling, rather than through the ability to exert more control through direct payment.[8]

4.2 How do these choices vary with the information provided to the household in the Philippines?

Next we examine whether the responsiveness of migrants to the ability to label remittances for education or to be able to directly pay the school varies with the information the most closely connected household in the Philippines has about this choice.[9] The information randomization occurred at the individual migrant level, with a migrant making each of her or his four choices under the same information condition. Therefore to identify the impact of different information settings, we rely on random assignment of information treatments across individuals, and estimate the following regression at the individual level:

$$y_j = \alpha + \beta EduLabel_j + \gamma DirectPay_j + \delta DirectPay\&Monitor_j$$

---

[8] To test differences in treatment effects across male and female migrants, Online Appendix Table 1 presents regression results analogous to those of Table 2 but where interaction terms are added between "male" and the three treatment dummies. (The "male" main effect need not be included in the regression, because the regression includes individual respondent fixed effects, which absorb all time-invariant respondent variables such as gender.) The only statistically significant difference that appears is in the "total amount remitted" regression, where for males the effect of the education label appears to be larger, by 46 euro, than the effect for females (81 euro). (By contrast, the effects of education labeling on other outcomes found in Table 2 do not seem to be differential by gender at conventional significance levels.) Because our study population is more female than the general population of Filipinos in Italy, this result suggests that our estimate in Table 2 of the population-average effect of education labeling on total remittances sent is downward-biased.

[9] A relevant background statistic is that 80.8% (405 out of 501) study participants remit to their most closely connected household. Given that 87.8% of study participants (440/501) remit to anyone at all in the Philippines, 92.0% of households doing any remitting (405/440) remit to their most closely connected household.

$$\theta_1 InfoShared_j + \theta_2 InfoShared_j EduLabel_j + \theta_3 InfoShared_j DirectPay_j$$
$$+\theta_4 InfoShared_j DirectPay\&Monitor_j +$$
$$\lambda_1 SocialExcuse_j + \lambda_2 SocialExcuse_j EduLabel_j + \lambda_3 SocialExcuse_j DirectPay_j$$
$$+\lambda_4 SocialExcuse_j DirectPay\&Monitor_j + \varepsilon_j$$

Where $InfoShared$ denotes the individual was assigned to information treatment 2, in which all choices are shared with the main household in the Philippines, and $SocialExcuse$ denotes the individual was assigned to information treatment 3, in which all choices are shared with the main household, but a social excuse is given for using EduPay-like options. Here α is the mean outcome (e.g. total remittances) for the basic choice option under treatment 1 (private information). We then test $\theta_1 = \lambda_1 = 0$ to test whether information treatment has no effect on decisions under the basic (no label) choice option; test $\beta = \theta_2 = \lambda_2$ for no difference in the added effect of education labeling relative to the basic, no-label, case across the information treatments; and likewise test $\gamma = \theta_3 = \lambda_3$ and $\delta = \theta_4 = \lambda_4$.

Table 3 presents the results. Consider first the outcomes under the basic, no-label choice. The point estimates on information sharing and on having a social excuse suggest that, if anything, migrants are remitting less in total when the choice decision is to be communicated to the most closely connected household. This contrasts with the finding of Ambler (forthcoming), but this difference is not statistically significant, and for none of the outcomes can we reject equality of means for the basic (no label) choice across the different information treatments. Consider next choices under education labeling. We see migrants send an additional 102.7 € relative to the no-label choice when the choice is made privately, an additional 85.9 € relative to the basic choice when the choice is made under information sharing with the migrant, and an additional 36.4 € relative to the no-label choice when migrants are provided with a social excuse. The p-value for testing equality of these effects is 0.127, so we cannot reject that there is no impact of information treatment on the decisions made.

We see this is generally true across the different outcomes and tests: we cannot reject equality of decisions under the different information treatments for 23 of the 28 tests performed at the bottom of the table. Three of the five significant tests are for testing equality of information treatment effects for the outcome of the number of individuals in the most closely connected household remitted to. The increase seen in this outcome under private information appears to be lower when a social excuse is provided for using education labeling or direct

payment. This contrasts with our prior that a social excuse would lead migrants to use these features more. The point estimates suggest that one explanation might be that migrants shift more of their funding towards individuals outside the most closely connected household (perhaps now because the migrant can use the social excuse as a justification for why they are helping others outside the main household), but this effect is not statistically significant.[10]

5. Do choices in the lab-in-the-field experiment predict product take-up?

Following the lab-in-the-field experiment, our field team explained the new EduPay product developed with BPI with the help of some marketing material. Migrants who were interested in using the product signed a request letter to the school, asking them to release the students' identification number, make available an invoice for payment to the school, provide details of the bank account of the school, and also release the grades of the student. These forms were then sent to our project coordinator in the Philippines, who worked with PAPSCU to contact the schools and arrange the logistics. Overall 27.1% of individuals offered the product signed this letter of intent. We use this as our take-up measure, since in practice during the pilot phase, many of the schools did not provide the needed information in a timely fashion, so that the majority of these intended transactions were not executed.[12]

We examine the determinants of take-up via probit regressions of the form:

$$\Pr(Use\ EduPay) = Probit(\delta' GameBehavior + \zeta' X)$$

where X are additional control variables that may be likely to determine the desire of the migrant to remit for education. We include here gender, the number of children in the Philippines, whether the individual has their spouse in the Philippines, whether they have nephews and nieces of school-age in the Philippines, their own education level, whether they have been in Italy longer than the median of 7 years, whether they earn less than the median of 800 euro per month, and the amount they report having sent to the Philippines for educational

---

[10] Online Appendix Table 2 presents regression results analogous to those of Table 3 but where interactions are added between "male" and the relevant treatment terms in Table 3. Because the regressions do not include individual respondent fixed effects, the "male" main effect is included in the regression. As it turns out, there is no evidence that the estimates in Table 3 are different across genders: none of the interaction terms with male are statistically significant from zero at conventional levels.

[12] There were several reasons for this. First, a number of schools did not have bank accounts set up, and were not prepared to do so for only a small number of transactions. Second, schools typically took two to three weeks to provide the invoice and bank account information, and so many migrants, being nervous about meeting tuition deadlines, opted to send money through other means. Ultimately this resulted in only 21 individuals making an EduPay transaction, 11 in the first pilot phase and 10 in an extension phase.

purposes in the past 12 months. The regression analysis will use a sample of 483 individuals out of our original sample of 501.[13]

We consider several measures of behavior in the lab-in-the-field games. The first measure is simply the amount of money they decide to remit explicitly in the form of a direct payment to the school under the direct payment choice option, case (iii). The mean is 316€ with a standard deviation of 364€. For ease of interpretation, we divide by 100€, so the coefficient represents the marginal effect of allocating 100€ more to direct payment in the choice experiment.

The second measure is the difference in the total amount they choose to remit to the Philippines when given the option to label money for education compared to the basic, no-label, choice. The mean is 93.7€, with a standard deviation of 253€. We then also consider the additional difference in the total amount they choose to remit when given the further option of directing payments straight to the school versus education labeling alone. The mean for this variable is 13.8€, with a standard deviation of 156€. Again we standardize these variables in terms of hundreds of euro.

Table 4 reports the results. In the first column we see that individuals who choose to remit more money via the direct payment option during the game are significantly more likely to take up the EduPay product. Each 100€ more allocated to the direct payment option in the game is associated with a 2.4 percentage point higher take-up rate. A one standard deviation increase in the amount chosen to be remitted via direct payment option in the game is therefore associated with an 8.7 percentage point higher take-up rate, which represents a 32 percent increase relative to the mean take-up rate of 27.1 percent. Column 2 shows this effect continues to hold in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance once we add control variables. We also see that migrants with children in the Philippines are more likely to sign up for this product, whereas those with lower incomes are less likely to use the product.

The third and fourth columns show the association with the differential amount they choose to remit in the game when given the education labeling option. Column 3 shows each 100€ more remitted when given the labeling option is associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of take-up, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This relationship strengthens slightly when we add additional controls in column 4. Here a one standard deviation

---

[13] Four individuals were dropped because of missing data on control variables, and an additional 14 were dropped because of lack of information on the schools, because the schools were public, or because the school could not be managed by PAPSCU.

increase in the differential amount remitted when given the option for education labeling is associated with a 5.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of take-up, representing a 19 percent increase relative to the mean take-up rate.

The last column adds the differential amount remitted when given the direct payment option versus the education labeling option. We see that this variable has a small and not statistically significant association with take-up, while the effect of labeling versus the basic option remains statistically significant. This suggests that take-up of the EduPay product is largely driven by a demand for being able to label remittances for education, rather than for a demand for direct payment to schools. This is consistent with the findings of the lab-in-the-field experiment.[14]

6. Conclusion

We find in a lab-in-the-field experiment that migrants are prepared to remit more money back to the home country when given the option to label some of this money as explicitly for education purposes. Strengthening this commitment from the soft commitment of labeling to the hard commitment of directly paying the school (and potentially monitoring the schooling of the sponsored student) results in little additional change in remitting behavior. Furthermore, we find behavior in this game predicts take-up of a new financial product designed to enable migrants to direct remittances to schools in the Philippines. Migrants who remit more for education purposes in the game, and who remit more with education labeling than without, are more likely to want to use this new product. The demand for the new product seems driven more by a demand for the ability to label remittances for education, than for the hard commitment entailed by paying the school directly.

These findings are consistent with recent evidence from other domains suggesting that soft commitments in the form of labeling can change spending and saving behaviors. They suggest

---

[14] Online Appendix Table 3 presents regression results that correspond to those of Table 4, but in which interaction terms are added between "male" and the measures of game behavior. The "male" main effect is also included in the regression. It appears that the responsiveness of EduPay take-up to the amount tagged with direct payment is statistically significantly larger for males than for females (columns 1 and 2). In addition, it appears that for males, unlike for females, this is driven by difference in total remittances in education label compared to direct payment: the coefficient in column 5 on "Difference in Total Remittances in Education Label vs Direct Payment*male" is positive and statistically significantly different from zero, while that on "Difference in Total Remittances in Basic vs. Education Label * male" is much smaller in magnitude and never statistically significant in columns 3-5. It appears that male demand for EduPay is better predicted by their experimental responsiveness to direct payment, compared to females. This may suggest different marketing strategies in approaching men and women with EduPay-like products in practice.

that migrants may be willing to increase the amount they remit for education if given the ability to exert some soft control over its use. The challenge for future work is then to explore further the logistics of how best to do this, as well as to determine when harder forms of commitment such as direct payment to the schools will be more effective. Related work by Ambler et al (forthcoming) points to a challenge in doing so, since they find no take-up among Salvadoran migrants for one product labeled for education. However, several private sector companies are now piloting products that channel remittances directly to education, including *PhilSmile* for the Philippines, and the remittance operator *IME* in Nepal. We view measuring the impact of such products on overall remittances and on schooling outcomes as a promising direction for future research.

References

Ambler, Kate (forthcoming). "Don't tell on me: Experimental evidence of Asymmetric Information in Transnational Households," Journal of Development Economics.

Ambler, Kate, Diego Aycinena, and Dean Yang (2015), "Subsidizing Remittances for Education: A Field Experiment Among Migrants from El Salvador," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*.

Ashraf, Nava, Diego Aycinena, Claudia Martinez A., and Dean Yang (2015) "Savings in Transnational Households: A Field Experiment among Migrants from El Salvador," *Review of Economics and Statistics*.

Benhassine, Najy, Florencia Devoto, Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, and Victor Pouliquen (forthcoming), "Turning a Shove into a Nudge? A 'Labeled Cash Transfer' for Education," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*.

Chen, Joyce 2013. "Identifying non-cooperative behavior among spouses: Child outcomes in migrant-sending households," *Journal of Development Economics* 100(1): 1-18.

Cox Edwards, Alejandra and Manuelita Ureta (2003) "International migration, remittances and schooling: evidence from El Salvador", *Journal of Development Economics*, 72(2): 429-61.

De Laat, Joost (2014), "Household allocations and endogenous information: The case of split migrants in Kenya," *Journal of Development Economics*, 106, pp. 108-117.

Doi, Yoko, David McKenzie and Bilal Zia (2014) "Who You Train Matters: Identifying Combined Effects of Financial Education on Migrant Households", *Journal of Development Economics*, 109: 39-55.

Genicot, Garance, Joachim de Weerdt, and Alice Mesnard (2014), "Asymmetry of Information within Family Networks," working paper, Georgetown University.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2010), *The Italy-Philippines Migration and Remittance Corridor*, Makati, Philippines: International Organization for Migration.

Italialavoro (2013), "The Philippine Community in Italy," Annual Report on the Presence of Immigrants, Ministerio del Lavoro e delle Politische Sociali, Government of Italy.

Karlan, Dean and Leigh Linden (2014) "Loose Knots: Strong versus Weak Commitments to Save for Education in Uganda", Mimeo. Yale University.

Rapoport, Hillel and Frederic Docquier (2006) "The Economics of Migrants' Remittances" pp. 1135-98 in Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (eds.) *Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, Volume 2*, Elsevier.

Soman, Dilip and Amar Cheema (2011) "Earmarking and Partitioning: Increasing Saving by Low-Income Households",*Journal of Marketing Research* 48, S14–S22.

Thaler, Richard (1999) "Mental accounting matters", *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making* 12: 183-206.

Thaler, Richard and H. M. Shefrin (1981) "An Economic Theory of Self-Control", *Journal of Political Economy* 89(2): 392-406.

Theoharides, Caroline (2014), "Manila to Malaysia, Quezon to Qatar: International Migration and the Effects on Origin-Country Human Capital," working paper, Amherst College.

World Bank (2013) *Migration and Development Brief no. 20.* http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief20.pdf

Yang, Dean (2008) "International Migration, Human Capital, and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from Philippine Migrants' Exchange Rate Shocks," *Economic Journal,* 118: 591-630.

Figure 1: CDFs of Amount Remitted Under the Four Different Choice Options

Table 1: Baseline Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	Observations
Migrant is female	0.73	0.44	0	1	1	501
Migrant's age	42.25	10.32	19	42	71	499
Migrant is married	0.68	0.47	0	1	1	501
Migrant's number of children	1.95	1.47	0	2	8	501
Migrant's years in Italy	9.68	8.56	0	7	38	499
Migrant is employed	0.98	0.15	0	1	1	499
Migrant's monthly Income	1045.18	566.42	0	900	7000	481
Migrant's Hours working	42.66	18.87	0	40	88	499
Migrant remits monthly	0.72	0.45	0	1	1	501
Monthly remittances sent	412.54	299.17	0	380	3000	499
Annual remittances for education	1383.72	1724.83	0	970	12000	500
Average cost of remittance	5.64	1.97	0	5	15	498
Sponsored student is a female	0.51	0.50	0	1	1	490
Age of the sponsored student	14.35	4.72	2	15	28	488

Notes: All variables are from 2012 survey of migrants. Financial amounts are expressed in Euros.

Table 2: Impacts of Education Labeling and EduPay in Lab-in-the-Field Experiment

	Proportion choosing to remit	Total Amount Remitted	Number of People Remitted to	Amount remitted per beneficiary	Number in main hh remitted to	Remits to someone outside main household	Amount remitted to someone outside main household
Education labeling	0.0459***	93.66***	0.148***	30.30***	0.188***	0.0140	17.25**
	(0.0120)	(11.31)	(0.0470)	(9.585)	(0.0390)	(0.0153)	(7.550)
Direct payment to school	0.0579***	107.4***	0.162***	28.19***	0.269***	-0.00399	5.573
	(0.0119)	(11.58)	(0.0495)	(10.35)	(0.0410)	(0.0160)	(7.930)
Direct payment to school + monitoring	0.0519***	103.0***	0.152***	28.31***	0.251***	0.00200	7.579
	(0.0121)	(11.50)	(0.0478)	(10.42)	(0.0413)	(0.0154)	(7.990)
Mean for Choice with No-labels	0.878***	614.6***	2.032***	422.7***	1.481***	0.238***	90.17***
	(0.00847)	(8.077)	(0.0327)	(7.240)	(0.0273)	(0.0104)	(5.214)
p-values for testing							
Education labeling = Direct payment	0.0832	0.0486	0.7124	0.7041	0.0101	0.1394	0.0569
Direct payment = Direct payment + monitoring	0.3182	0.4771	0.7538	0.9836	0.5563	0.6401	0.7541
All three education versions equal	0.1942	0.1424	0.9217	0.9253	0.0199	0.3035	0.1188
Observations	2,004	2,004	2,004	1,838	2,004	2,004	2,003

Notes: estimation includes individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.

Column 4 conditions on remitting at all

Table 3: Do the impacts vary with the degree of information asymmetry?

	Proportion choosing to remit	Total Amount Remitted	Number of People Remitted to	Amount remitted per beneficiary	Number in main hh remitted to	Remits to someone outside main household	Amount remitted to someone outside main household
Education labeling	0.0299	102.7***	0.114	38.25**	0.269***	-0.0359	-2.898
	(0.0198)	(20.57)	(0.0808)	(16.14)	(0.0688)	(0.0267)	(12.61)
Direct payment to school	0.0599***	124.6***	0.174*	28.88	0.341***	-0.0479	-7.090
	(0.0203)	(20.19)	(0.0887)	(18.06)	(0.0750)	(0.0292)	(13.57)
Direct payment to school + monitoring	0.0539***	125.4***	0.126	40.71**	0.305***	-0.0359	-5.293
	(0.0195)	(19.71)	(0.0863)	(18.36)	(0.0735)	(0.0281)	(13.18)
Info shared with recipient household	-0.0419	-25.03	-0.0539	-44.31	-0.0539	0.00599	9.599
	(0.0360)	(35.81)	(0.184)	(32.37)	(0.133)	(0.0467)	(22.40)
Education labeling*Info shared	0.0479	85.90***	0.216	-10.19	0.132	0.0539	39.10
	(0.0293)	(32.94)	(0.186)	(32.74)	(0.135)	(0.0481)	(24.54)
Direct payment*Info shared	0.0299	81.11**	0.108	5.716	0.180	0.0240	18.74
	(0.0309)	(33.56)	(0.180)	(33.54)	(0.133)	(0.0473)	(23.26)
Direct payment+monitoring*info shared	0.0299	76.32**	0.150	-8.423	0.186	0.0299	16.37
	(0.0309)	(33.51)	(0.181)	(32.98)	(0.136)	(0.0474)	(23.04)
Social excuse	-0.0180	-31.02	-0.246	-7.791	-0.228*	0.00599	11.08
	(0.0336)	(35.64)	(0.174)	(33.99)	(0.128)	(0.0466)	(22.23)
Education labeling*social excuse	-0	36.35	-0.186	16.63	-0.120	0.0359	36.23
	(0.0323)	(34.58)	(0.172)	(33.13)	(0.133)	(0.0476)	(24.07)
Direct payment*social excuse	0.0240	60.60*	-0.0958	3.807	0.00599	0.0240	25.75
	(0.0304)	(33.98)	(0.167)	(32.83)	(0.130)	(0.0472)	(23.26)
Direct payment+monitoring*social excuse	0.0120	51.32	-0.120	7.842	-0.0180	0.0240	32.93
	(0.0314)	(34.55)	(0.169)	(33.25)	(0.132)	(0.0472)	(24.24)
Mean for no label choice in private	0.898***	633.2***	2.132***	438.3***	1.575***	0.234***	83.23***
	(0.0235)	(24.75)	(0.136)	(24.06)	(0.0974)	(0.0329)	(15.31)
p-values for testing equality of:							
no label choices across information treatments	0.5074	0.6489	0.3050	0.3324	0.1603	0.9890	0.8621
labeled choices across information treatments	0.2638	0.1273	0.0383	0.3370	0.0162	0.1175	0.1504
Direct payment choices across information treatments	0.2985	0.1224	0.1875	0.7020	0.0450	0.1773	0.3306
Direct payment+monitoring choices across information treatments	0.2999	0.0698	0.1497	0.3249	0.0488	0.2752	0.2773
Observations	2,004	2,004	2,004	1,838	2,004	2,004	2,003

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Column 4 conditions on remitting at all.

Table 4: Do Lab Choices Predict Actual Product Interest?

Dependent variable: signing letter of authorization for EduPay

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Amount tagged with Direct payment in Direct payment choice experiment	0.0240***	0.0207***			
	(0.00529)	(0.00540)			
Difference in Total Remittances in Basic vs. Education Label			0.0154**	0.0201**	0.0194**
			(0.00748)	(0.00792)	(0.00823)
Difference in Total Remittances in Direct Payment vs. Education Label					-0.00503
					(0.0122)
Female		0.0350		0.0558	0.0570
		(0.0451)		(0.0439)	(0.0442)
Number of Children in the Philippines		0.0499***		0.0543***	0.0548***
		(0.0161)		(0.0164)	(0.0164)
Married with spouse in the Philippines		0.0766		0.0728	0.0720
		(0.0559)		(0.0557)	(0.0558)
Number of Nephews and Nieces aged 5-22 in the Philippines		-0.00448		-0.00532*	-0.00521*
		(0.00294)		(0.00301)	(0.00300)
Attended College or University		-0.0480		-0.0409	-0.0418
		(0.0472)		(0.0472)	(0.0472)
First came to Italy before 2005		-0.0496		-0.0631	-0.0632
		(0.0421)		(0.0424)	(0.0424)
Income in Italy less than 800 euros/month		-0.0773*		-0.0915**	-0.0927**
		(0.0424)		(0.0421)	(0.0420)
Amount sent to the Philippines for education in last 12 months		-0.000233		0.000543	0.000538
		(0.00122)		(0.00124)	(0.00124)
Mean take-up rate:	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
Observations	483	483	483	483	483

Notes: coefficients are marginal effects from probit estimation, estimated at the mean. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Amounts expressed in terms of hundreds of Euros.

FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION

APPENDIX FOR

Directing remittances to education with soft and hard commitments: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment and new product take-up among Filipino migrants in Rome

By Giuseppe de Arcangelis, Majlinda Joxhe, David McKenzie, Erwin Tiongson, and Dean Yang

Contents of this online appendix:

a. Appendix Tables 1, 2, and 3

b. Full survey instrument used in experiment

Appendix Table 1: Impacts of Education Labeling and EduPay in Lab-in-the-Field Experiment

	Proportion choosing to remit	Total Amount Remitted	Number of People Remitted to	Amount remitted per beneficiary	Number in main hh remitted to	Remits to someone outside main household	Amount remitted to someone outside main household
Education labeling	0.0464***	81.22***	0.150***	25.83***	0.205***	0.00546	18.23**
	(0.0115)	(11.03)	(0.0495)	-9,625	(0.0418)	(0.0164)	-8,264
Direct payment to school	0.0656***	104.9***	0.150***	29.59***	0.284***	-0.00273	7,164
	(0.0115)	(11.03)	(0.0495)	-9,580	(0.0418)	(0.0164)	-8,264
Direct payment to school + monitoring	0.0601***	98.98***	0.156***	23.89**	0.279***	0	10.90
	(0.0115)	(11.03)	(0.0495)	-9,596	(0.0418)	(0.0164)	-8,272
Male	-0.0337	12.28	-0.487***	109.6***	-0.131	-0.126***	-41.58*
	(0.0272)	(30.12)	(0.149)	(29.65)	(0.119)	(0.0419)	(21.58)
Education labeling*male	-0.00200	46.19**	-0.00953	17.15	-0.0642	0.0316	-3,637
	(0.0221)	(21.25)	(0.0954)	(18.67)	(0.0805)	(0.0315)	(15.92)
Direct payment to school*male	-0.0285	9.59	0.0423	-4,731	-0.0545	-0.00468	-5,905
	(0.0221)	(21.25)	(0.0954)	(18.64)	(0.0805)	(0.0315)	(15.92)
Direct payment to school + monitoring*male	-0.0305	15.10	-0.0150	17.79	-0.101	0.00741	-12.24
	(0.0221)	(21.25)	(0.0954)	(18.69)	(0.0805)	(0.0315)	(15.92)
Mean for Choice with No-labels	0.889***	612.4***	2.167***	393.9***	1.519***	0.272***	101.5***
	(0.0143)	(15.94)	(0.0794)	(15.20)	(0.0634)	(0.0221)	(11.39)
Observations	2.004	2.004	2.004	1.838	2.004	2.004	2.003

Notes: estimation includes individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
individual level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively
Column 4 conditions on remitting at all. Regressions identical to those in Table 2 except interactions of treatment variables with "male" are added.

Appendix Table 2: Do the impacts vary with the degree of information asymmetry?

	Proportion choosing to remit	Total Amount Remitted	Number of People Remitted to	Amount remitted per beneficiary	Number in main hh remitted to	Remits to someone outside main household	Amount remitted to someone outside main household
Education labeling	0.0240	71.60*	0.104	24.82	0.272*	-0.0480	-6,432
	(0.0348)	(38.86)	(0.194)	(37.50)	(0.154)	(0.0537)	(27.67)
Direct payment to school	0.0560	102.4***	0.160	20.33	0.344**	-0.0480	-6,832
	(0.0348)	(38.86)	(0.194)	(37.18)	(0.154)	(0.0537)	(27.67)
Direct payment to school + monitoring	0.0480	96.40**	0.136	19.10	0.296*	-0.0240	2,768
	(0.0348)	(38.86)	(0.194)	(37.26)	(0.154)	(0.0537)	(27.67)
Info shared with recipient household	-0.0365	-45.02	-0.106	-45.82	-0.168	0.0250	31.11
	(0.0350)	(39.18)	(0.195)	(38.46)	(0.155)	(0.0542)	(27.90)
Education labeling*Info shared	0.0752	41.84	0.218	7,573	-0.00754	0.0811	34.33
	(0.0495)	(55.41)	(0.276)	(53.49)	(0.220)	(0.0766)	(39.46)
Direct payment*Info shared	0.0349	7,319	0.0301	30.52	-0.0300	0.0480	8,700
	(0.0495)	(55.41)	(0.276)	(53.32)	(0.220)	(0.0766)	(39.46)
Direct payment+monitoring*info shared	0.0512	16.62	0.128	17.87	0.0511	0.0323	0.108
	(0.0495)	(55.41)	(0.276)	(53.32)	(0.220)	(0.0766)	(39.50)
Social excuse	-0.00433	-30.12	-0.296	-1,965	-0.322**	0.0273	27.04
	(0.0351)	(39.26)	(0.196)	(38.18)	(0.156)	(0.0543)	(27.96)
Education labeling*social excuse	-0.00733	-12.85	-0.0790	7,559	-0.197	0.0813	40.60
	(0.0497)	(55.52)	(0.277)	(53.70)	(0.220)	(0.0767)	(39.54)
Direct payment*social excuse	-0.00600	0.1000	-0.0600	13.01	-0.152	0.0897	33.92
	(0.0497)	(55.52)	(0.277)	(53.24)	(0.220)	(0.0767)	(39.54)
Direct payment+monitoring*social excuse	-0.0147	-8,900	-0.0693	11.74	-0.104	0.0407	25.57
	(0.0497)	(55.52)	(0.277)	(53.41)	(0.220)	(0.0767)	(39.54)
Male	0.00876	0.133	-0.653**	131.4**	-0.386*	-0.0893	1,088
	(0.0490)	(54.79)	(0.273)	(53.02)	(0.217)	(0.0757)	(39.02)
Education labeling*male	0.0236	123.6	0.0389	49.60	-0.0101	0.0480	14.05
	(0.0693)	(77.48)	(0.386)	(74.16)	(0.307)	(0.107)	(55.18)
Direct payment to school*male	0.0154	88.08	0.0543	31.88	-0.0107	0.000381	-1,025
	(0.0693)	(77.48)	(0.386)	(73.67)	(0.307)	(0.107)	(55.18)
Direct payment to school + monitoring*male	0.0234	115.5	-0.0408	81.48	0.0373	-0.0474	-32.05
	(0.0693)	(77.48)	(0.386)	(73.71)	(0.307)	(0.107)	(55.18)
Info shared with recipient household*male	-0.0204	72.55	0.246	-3,836	0.447	-0.0612	-78.21
	(0.0683)	(76.38)	(0.381)	(74.99)	(0.303)	(0.106)	(54.39)
Education labeling*Info shared*male	-0.0576	-132.7	-0.231	-39.79	-0.276	0.00590	-8,256
	(0.0966)	(108.0)	(0.539)	(104.4)	(0.428)	(0.149)	(76.92)
Direct payment*Info shared*male	-0.0846	-101.1	-0.157	-27.82	-0.282	0.0648	27.42
	(0.0966)	(108.0)	(0.539)	(104.5)	(0.428)	(0.149)	(76.92)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Direct payment+monitoring*info shared*male	-0.123	-157.9	-0.180	-75.08	-0.428	0.104	46.57
	(0.0966)	(108.0)	(0.539)	(104.8)	(0.428)	(0.149)	(76.95)
Social excuse*male	-0.0494	-3,217	0.249	-30.48	0.377	-0.0663	-56.83
	(0.0681)	(76.13)	(0.380)	(74.51)	(0.302)	(0.105)	(54.22)
Education labeling*social excuse*male	-0.0190	-93.03	0.0851	-79.20	0.127	-0.0601	-46.09
	(0.0963)	(107.7)	(0.537)	(104.5)	(0.427)	(0.149)	(76.68)
Direct payment*social excuse*male	-0.0442	-126.7	0.122	-111.3	0.159	-0.0846	-43.08
	(0.0963)	(107.7)	(0.537)	(104.0)	(0.427)	(0.149)	(76.68)
Direct payment+monitoring*social excuse*male	-0.0355	-133.9	0.251	-137.0	0.0263	0.0520	9,040
	(0.0963)	(107.7)	(0.537)	(104.1)	(0.427)	(0.149)	(76.68)
Mean for no label choice in private	0.896***	633.2***	2.296***	405.0***	1.672***	0.256***	82.96***
	(0.0246)	(27.48)	(0.137)	(26.69)	(0.109)	(0.0380)	(19.57)
Observations	2,004	2,004	2,004	1,838	2,004	2,004	2,003

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Column 4 conditions on remitting at all.

Regressions identical to those in Table 3 except interactions of treatment variables with "male" are added, as well as "male" main effect.

Table 4: Do Lab Choices Predict Actual Product Interest?
Dependent variable: signing letter of authorization for EduPay

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Amount tagged with Direct payment in Direct payment choice experiment	0.0136**	0.0121*			
	(0.00611)	(0.00628)			
Difference in Total Remittances in Basic vs Education Label			0.0140	0.0196**	0.0172*
			(0.00859)	(0.00911)	(0.00955)
Difference in Total Remittances in Education Label vs Direct Payment					-0.0189
					(0.0152)
Number of Children in the Philippines			0.0514***	0.0543***	0.0543***
			(0.0162)	(0.0165)	(0.0165)
Married with spouse in the Philippines			0.0633	0.0732	0.0674
			(0.0556)	(0.0559)	(0.0556)
Number of Nephews and Nieces aged 5-22 in the Philippines			-0.00405	-0.00532*	-0.00547*
			(0.00282)	(0.00301)	(0.00300)
Attended College or University			-0.0369	-0.0406	-0.0445
			(0.0474)	(0.0473)	(0.0474)
First came to Italy before 2005			-0.0530	-0.0630	-0.0627
			(0.0421)	(0.0425)	(0.0424)
Income in Italy less than 800 euros/month			-0.0614	-0.0914**	-0.0901**
			(0.0428)	(0.0421)	(0.0421)
Amount sent to the Philippines for education in last 12 months			-0.000498	0.000535	0.000521
			(0.00123)	(0.00125)	(0.00125)
Male	-0.139***	-0.131**	-0.0563	-0.0582	-0.0660
	(0.0527)	(0.0533)	(0.0478)	(0.0478)	(0.0477)
Amount tagged with Direct payment in Direct payment choice experiment*male	0.0356***	0.0315***			
	(0.0120)	(0.0119)			
Difference in Total Remittances in Basic vs Education Label*male			0.00850	0.00188	0.00834
			(0.0173)	(0.0185)	(0.0196)
Difference in Total Remittances in Education Label vs Direct Payment*male					0.0680**
					(0.0290)
Mean take-up rate:	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
Observations	487	483	487	483	483

Notes: coefficients are marginal effects from probit estimation, estimated at the mean. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
Amounts expressed in terms of hundreds of Euros.
Regressions identical to those in Table 4 except interactions of treatment variables with "male" are added, as well as "male" main effect.

Increasing the Development Impact of Migrant Remittances
Consent to Participate in a Research Study

Lead principal investigator: Dean Yang (University of Michigan)
Co-principal investigators:
Giuseppe De Arcangelis (Sapienza University of Rome, Italy)
David McKenzie (World Bank)
Erwin Tiongson (World Bank)

*Please approach potential study participants and say:

We invite you to participate in a research study about the lives and financial decisions of OFWs in Rome, and about the remittances they send home to the Philippines. The study is funded by USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) and is being conducted by researchers from University of Michigan, Sapienza University of Rome, and the World Bank. The field work for this study is being conducted by Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), a nonprofit research organization based in the U.S. I am an employee of IPA.

If you agree to be part of the research study, you will be asked about your current work and financial situation, and about support you provide to family and friends in the Philippines. Your participation in the study can help improve the lives of Filipinos back home by possibly influencing policies of institutions like USAID. We will also be offering you a new product related to education and remittances at the end of the survey, and you may benefit from using this product. The researchers have taken steps to minimize the risks of this study. The main risks that remain are minimal; in rare cases you may be uncomfortable answering some questions in the survey, and there is minimal risk that the confidentiality of your responses to the survey may be violated. You have the right to not answer any question and to stop the interview at any time.

To thank you for your time, you will receive €5, and additionally we will be holding a lottery in which you will be entered to potentially win even more.

We plan to publish the results of this study, but will not include any information that would identify you. There are some reasons why people other than the researchers may need to see information you provided as part of the study. This includes organizations responsible for making sure the research is done safely and properly, including the University of Michigan and the study sponsor (USAID).

The interview will take approximately **40 minutes**. Please contact Majlinda Joxhe (mjoxhe@poverty-action.org; +39/3477073405) with any questions or concerns.

If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, or wish to obtain information, ask questions or discuss any concerns about this study with someone other than the researcher(s), please contact the University of Michigan Health Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board, 540 E Liberty St., Ste 202, Ann Arbor, MI 48104-2210, +39/734-9360933, irbhsbs@umich.edu.

Your participation is completely voluntary and all of your responses will be kept confidential and used for research purposes only. Your name and contact information will not be shared and will be used only for the purpose of contacting you. It is possible that someone from the study will contact by text message or mail.

Do you have any questions? If all of your questions have been answered, may we continue?

ORAL CONSENT OF RESEARCH SUBJECT

Oral Consent Given? (**CIRCLE ONE**)

YES - (*continue survey*)   NO - (*thank participant and stop survey*)

WORK RECORD

Interviewer Code: |____|____|

Survey Location Code: |____|____| _____(See Codebook)

Date of Interview: Day |____|____| Month |____|____| Year |____|____|____|____|

Time Started: |____|____| : |____|____| AM/PM

1

SUBJECT CONTACT INFORMATION

Name of Subject: _____ _____ _____
                    (First Name)   (Middle Name)   (Last Name)

Rome (Italy) Address: **Address Line 1:** _____
                              Address Line 2: _____
                              City:_____ **Località:**_____ **CAP:**_____

Primary Phone Number: _____
Phone Type (circle):   Cell/Landline
*Primary Phone Test Call***:**   Successful   Unsuccessful   Not done (Why?)_____

Secondary Phone Number:_____ _____
Phone Type (circle):   Cell/Landline
Whose is this number?   _____

Other Phone Number: _____
Phone Type (circle):   Cell/Landline
Whose is this number?   _____

E-mail Address: _____

** READ THE BELOW TO THE INTERVIEWEE BEFORE CONTINUING.

"If before the end of 2012 we would like to contact you and have been unable to do so using the above information, who should we call in order to figure out how to contact you?"

Name of that person   _____

Telephone of that person   _____   Type (circle): Cell/Landline

Introduction to experimental choices in this survey

As part of this survey, we will be asking you to make a series of decisions regarding how you would allocate a large amount of money, €1,000. In some of these you will be asked to choose how much to allocate between yourself and one or more people in the Philippines. In another case, you will be asked how you would like to allocate €1000 entirely to your closest family in the Philippines, but across expenditure items. It is important that you take these decisions seriously, because there is a chance that these decisions will be implemented. Let me explain how this will work.

At the end of this round of surveys (in about four months), we will hold a lottery among survey respondents, including you. At least one (and possibly up to three) respondents in the study will win a €1,000 prize. If you are among those chosen to win the prize, we will then randomly select one of your allocations in this survey to be implemented.

Lottery for MCCH

Here is the first decision we are asking you to make about €1,000.

First, please think about **your most closely connected household (MCCH)** in the Philippines. This is the household that you feel closest to in the Philippines. It might be the household where you lived before going abroad, the household where your closest relatives live, the household you send the most remittances to, or all of these, or none of these. You decide which is your most closely connected household in the Philippines.

Please tell us how would you like your MCCH to receive the €1,000. We are not going to give the money in cash, but in the way you tell us. It could be **anything that you want** us to give to them (**not what you think your family would want**). What you tell us will not affect the probability of wining for your family, since the winner will be selected randomly.

Tell us what you really want us **to give to your MCCH.** Think well, and tell us all what you really want, since if you win, **that is exactly what we are going to give them**. It could be any type of expense or type of savings/investments. If this choice is selected to be implemented, a project staff member will accompany each beneficiary to purchase the item or pay for the expense specified.

It could be several things, but the total amount must add up to €1,000.

The important thing is that **this is what you want** for your MCCH.

ITEMS		Euro
1. Food	☐ 1	_____
2. Clothes	☐ 2	_____
3. Rent payment	☐ 3	_____
4. Down payment on a house/land	☐ 4	_____
5. Current mortgage on a house/land	☐ 5	_____
6. Construction of a house (including repairs)	☐ 6	_____
7. Medical expenditure and medicines	☐ 7	_____
8. Education expenses (tuition, books, etc).	☐ 8	_____
9. Utilities payment (electricity, water, etc.)	☐ 9	_____
10. Phone (house, cell phone, calling cards)	☐ 10	_____
11. Agricultural inputs	☐ 11	_____
12. Business expenses	☐ 12	_____
13. Savings[1]: (*must state purpose*)		

---

[1] A special savings account will be opened in the Philippines where the money can only be withdrawn once a target amount has been reached that is then used to purchase the item specified. Funds cannot just be withdrawn in cash.

13a. To buy a house   ☐ 13a _____

    13b. To buy land   ☐ 13b _____
    13c. To buy a vehicle   ☐ 13c _____
    13d. Marriage expenses   ☐ 13d _____
    13e. Others, specify: _____   ☐ 13e _____

14. Long-term investments (e.g. time deposit for 1 year+,   ☐ 14 _____
    mutual funds, stocks/shares).
15. Large goods for the household (durables)   ☐ 15 _____
16. Car or other vehicle   ☐ 16 _____
17. Emigration expenditures   ☐ 17 _____
18. Insurance   (life, health, etc.)   ☐ 18 _____
19. Marriage expenses   ☐ 19 _____
20. Others, specify:_____   ☐ 20 _____
           _____
TOTAL   _____ Euro

    Verify that the total adds up to 1,000 Euro.

What is the name of the head of your MCCH? _____

What is your relationship to this person?
*[Before marking the answer, repeat:] :
<u>Name of the head of</u> his/her MCCH is his/her:

1. Spouse
2. Son
3. Daughter
4. Parents
5. Grandparent
6. Grandchildren
7. Sister, Brother
8. First Cousin
9. Aunt, Uncle
10. In-law
11. Other (Specify): _____

PART I: Survey Instrument
A. Individual Questionnaire (General Information)

A1. Demographics

A1.1	What is your date of birth?	Month/Day/Year	|__|__|/|__|__|/ |__||__|__||__|
A1.2	Are you a male or female?	Male	0
		Female	1
A1.3	What is your marital status?	Married	1
		Living together	2
		Widowed	3
		Divorced	4
		Separated	5
		Single	6
A1.4	How many children do you have?	|__|__|	
A1.5	Where do your children live? *Indicate the number of children living in each country.*	Philippines		0
		Italy		1
		Other country		2

	A1.6	How many total people (excluding yourself), live with you in the same household in Italy? *Specify the number for each category*	A1.6.1 Relatives	A1.6.2 Non-Relatives (*not including employer's family*)	A1.6.3 Employer's family
			|__|__|	|__|__|	|__|__|
	A1.7	*Specify the number of relatives in each category in each column.* **(Leave blank for "0".)** *See Survey Manual*	A1.7.1 How many of each of the following relations live with you in the same residence in Italy?	A1.7.2 How many of each of the following relations live in Italy, but not in the same residence as you?	A1.7.3 How many of each of the following relations live in your **most closely connected household (MCCH)** in the Philippines? ***Most Closely Connected Household** ***Survey Manual**	A1.7.4 How many of each of the following relations **aged 5-22** do you have in the Philippines? (*These can be in the MCCH or in other housholds.*)
1	Spouse					
2	Son					
3	Daughter					
4	Father					
5	Mother					
6	Brother					
7	Sister					
8	Grandparents					
9	Grandchildrens					
10	First cousins					
11	Uncle, Aunt					
12	Niece, Nephew					
13	In-laws					

14	Other, family member (*specify*)				
15	Other, not family member (*specify*)				
-99	Don't know				
-88	No Response				

A2	Initial Conditions		

A2.1	Where were you living before you came to Italy? Please tell me the name of the country.	Philippines	1
		Other(specify) _____	2
A2.2	What year did you come to live in the Italy for the first time?	|__|__|__|__|	
A2.3	Are you an Italian citizen, a citizen of your country of birth or a citizen of another country? If you have citizenship of more than one country please tell me all of them.	Italian citizen	0
		Citizen of country of birth	1
		Citizen of other country	2

A3	Education Background		

A3.1	What is the highest education level you completed?	No education **SKIP TO A4**	1
		Kinder	2
		Primary level	3
		Secondary level	4
		College or University	5
		Superior non-university	6
		Special education	7
A3.2	What is the highest grade or year you reached at this level?	|__|__| th *"Doesn't know" = (-)(88)*	

A4	Language		

A4.1	Do you have any difficulty speaking Italian to people for day to day activities such as shopping or taking the bus?	No	0
		Yes	1
A4.2	And do you have any difficulty filling in official forms in Italian?	No	0
		Yes	1

A5. Employment Status History			

A5.1	Have you worked, even for a short time, either for yourself or for someone else, within the last 12 months?	No **SKIP TO A6**	0
		Yes	1
A5.2	Was your main activity as an employee or for your own business (self-employed)	Employee	0
		Self-employed **SKIP TO A5.4**	1

A5.3	What was your principal occupation over the last 12 months?	Domestic	01	Mechanic	17
		Day laborer	02	Painter	18
		Construction	03	Hotel and related work	19
		House cleaning	04	Machine operator-factories	20
		Office cleaning	05	Bakery	21
		Nanny (childcare)	06	Laundromat-dry clean	22
		Gardner	07	Delivery	23
		Secretary	08	Carwash	24
		Chauffer	09	Repair or painting	25

		vehicles	
Vendor	10	Fireman, police, security	26
Waiter or cook	11	Student	27
Technician or professional	12	Moving services	28
Cashier	13	Housewife (of own home)	29
Carpenter	14	Other (*specify*)	30
Electrician	15	Don't know	-88
Maintenance	16	No response	-99

A5.4	What type of business do you have?		
		Restaurant	01
		Hair salon	02
		Food Shop	03
		Internet caffè service	04
		Housekeeping	05
		Commercial cleaning	06
		Whole sale distributor	07
		Supermarket	08
		Heavy machinery	09
		Professional services	10
		Others (**specify**)	11
		Don't know	-88
		No response	-99

A6. Individual Income			
A6.1	What is the total income **per month** of you and your spouse in Italy?	_____€ *"No response"= (-99)*	
A6.2	*If the total income not reported, ask:* In which of the following ranges does the total income per month of you and your spouse in Italy fall? ***Do not include income of spouse if separated, or if spouse is not in Italy.*** ***Include income of partner if "Living together"***	Less than €600/month	1
		€600- €800/month	2
		€800-€1100/month	3
		Over €1400	4
		Don't know	-88
		No response	-99
A6.3	How many paid hours do you work per week?	|__|__| *"Doesn't know" = (-)(88)*	

B. REMITTANCES

INTERVIEWER READ ALOUD:

"Now think about remittances that you have sent in the Philippines in the past 12 months. Regular remittances are remittances that you send (or try to send) to a person or household in the Philippines or on a regular basis to help pay for recurring, day-to-day expenses. I am now going to ask you some questions about the regular remittances that you send to people in the Philippines."

B1	In the last 12 months have you sent 'regular' remittances to your **MCCH**?	No **SKIP TO B4**	0
		Yes	1
B2	With what frequency do you send "regular" remittances to your **MCCH?**	Weekly	1
		2 times per month	2
		Monthly	3
		Every other month	4
		4 times per year	5
		3 times per year	6
		2 times per year	7
		Yearly	8
		Other (specify): |__|__| times per year	9
B3	How much money did you send, on average, each time?	€ _____	

**READ ALOUD: In addition to these regular remittances just mentioned, have you sent other amounts of money to the MCCH in the last 12 months for the following occasions? If this was an additional remittances for one of these following occasions, could you tell us what the amount that you sent was? Or if you sent an amount larger than what you normally sent, could you tell us what the difference was between this larger amount and the amount that you normally send?

	Event Code	Event	How much was sent (or what was the value of the remittances sent) for this occasion, in total?
	1	Christmas	
	2	Birthday	
B4	3	Other Religious Fest	
	4	Health	
	5	Other (specify)	
	6	Other (specify)	

**READ ALOUD: Now I have similar questions regarding remittances you have sent to *all other households* in the Philippines (that is, not to your MCCH).

B5	In the last 12 months, to how many households other than your MCCH have you sent remittances (of any type)?	|__|__| **IF = 00, SKIP TO B7**	
B6	In the last 12 months, how much have you sent in total to households in the Philippines **other than your MCCH**?	€ _____	
B7	Do you have a preference over how the money that you send the MCCH should be spent?	No	0
		Yes	1
B8	In the last 12 months how much money have you sent to the Philippines with the specific intention that the money was meant to finance the education of someone in your **MCCH**?	€ _____	

B9	For students other than **those in your** **_MCCH,_** in the last 12 months how much money have you sent in the Philippines with the specific intention that the money was meant to finance the education of a specific student?	€_____	
B10	How do you send remittances to the Philippines?	BPI	1
		Western Union	2
		Money Gram	3
		BDO	4
		Metro Bank	5
		Poste Italiane	6
		Other money transfer or bank transfer	7
		Friends when they go to the Philippines	8
		Other (Specify)	9
B11	How much do you usually pay for remittance transfer?	€_____	

C. RELATIONSHIP WITH & KNOWLEDGE OF *MCCH*

C1	How frequently do you communicate with individuals living in your **MCCH**?	More than once a day	1
		Daily	2
		More than once a week	3
		Weekly	4
		More than once a month	5
		Monthly	6
		Every 2-3 months	7
		Annually	8
		Other (specify)	9
		Never	10
C2	By what methods do you communicate with individuals in *MCCH*? (**MARK ALL THAT APPLY**)	Writing letters (traditional letters, on paper)	1
		By telephone	2
		E-mail	3
		Text messages	4
		Instant messages on the computer (Skype)	5
		Other methods (specify)	6
		We do not communicate	7
		Don't know	-88
C3	How well informed are you about what is going on in **MCCH**: very well informed, well informed, not well informed, or not informed? (**READ OPTIONS**)	Very well informed	1
		Well informed	2
		Not well informed	3
		Not informed	4
C4	Have you had any disagreements with anyone in **MCCH** household regarding remittances in the last twelve months?	No	0
		Yes	1
C5	Do you participate in the decisions regarding how remittances sent to **MCCH** are spent?	No	0
		Yes	1
C6	Do you wish you had more influence over how **MCCH** spends your remittance money?	No	0
		Yes	1
C7	Do you wish you had more influence over the *overall* budget in **MCCH**?	No	0
		Yes	1
C8	When considering the budget in **MCCH**, what three of the following do you feel are the most important to spend money on: food and other basic expenditures, health, education, savings, entertainment, household improvements, or transportation? **READ THE OPTIONS AND MARK THE THREE THAT SUBJECT INDICATES.**	Food and other basic expenditures	1
		Health	2
		Education	3
		Savings	4
		Entertainment	5
		Home improvements and repairs	6
		Transportation	7
		Other, specify: _____	8
		Doesn't know	-88
C9	How much do you trust the persons in your MCCH the Philippines given a scale from 1-10? *Explain to the responded: 1-not at all and 10-completely*	1 – not at all	1
		2	2
		3	3
		4	4
		5	5
		6	6
		7	7
		8	8
		9	9
		10 - completely	10
		Doesn't know	-88

10

PART II: EXPERIMENTAL ROUNDS

*Text to read to the respondent:
   Now I am going to ask you to make more decisions regarding about a large amount of money, €1,000. I will ask you to choose how much to allocate between yourself and one or more people in the Philippines. As with the allocation of €1,000 to your MCCH that we asked you about at the beginning of the survey, it is important that you take these decisions seriously, because there is a chance that one of these decisions will be implemented. As I mentioned at the beginning, we will hold a lottery among survey respondents, including you. At least one (and possibly up to three) respondents in the study will win the €1,000 prize. If you are among those chosen to win the prize, we will then randomly select one of your allocations in this survey (from among the one you decided on at the beginning or the questions below) to be implemented.
Notes to enumerator: Refer to respondent's ID1 and determine which of the following to read to respondents:

Treatment 1: Please keep in mind that because of the rules of this project, we will never inform your MCCH of any of the choices you have made below. This means that your MCCH will not know of any of the choices you will be making below.

Treatment 2: Please keep in mind that because of the rules of this project, if your name is chosen to win the €1000, we must inform your MCCH of all the choices you have made below. This means that your MCCH will know of all the choices you could possibly have made.

Treatment 3: Please keep in mind that because of the rules of this project, if your name is chosen to win the €1000, we must inform your MCCH of all the choices you have made below. This means that your MCCH will know of all the choices you could possibly have made. But if you choose any of the EduPay options, we will also inform your MCCH that we encouraged you to allocate funds to EduPay by making a small donation to a Filipino organization in Rome. If your name is chosen to win the E1,000, we will donate E5 to OFSPES for every EduPay payment that is chosen to be implemented

Refer to respondent's ID2 and implement experimental rounds in that order. If the respondent allocates anything to other individuals, please collect the names of these individuals and the amount to be sent to each person. Make sure that the amounts sum to €1000 for each question.

*Ask D5 always in the end.
Explain the experiment in D5 reading the example that is given on the questionnaire, do not give examples with other amount of money. The examples are randomly implemented to each questionnaire and refer to 200, 400, 600, 800 and 1000.

Ask if each beneficiary is in the respondent's MCCH, and if so check the relevant box [   ].

		Beneficiary	Amount
D.1	You have 1000 € to allocate between yourself and any number of others in the Philippines. **Any Amount shared with others will be remitted by the research project at no charge.** How would you like to divide this money?	Respondent	|__|__|__|__|
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|

		Beneficiary	Amount	Education Label
D.2	You have €1000 to allocate between yourself and any number of others in the Philippines. Any amounts shared with others will be remitted by the research project at no charge. **You also have the option (but not the requirement) of labeling any amount you share as "money to be used for education". If you choose the Education Label, the money will be delivered to the respondent with a note saying: "These funds are intended to be used for the education of someone in your household." For any particular individual in the Philippines, you may send both unlabeled and labeled amounts.** How would you like to divide this money?	Respondent	|__|__|__|__|	
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N

		Beneficiary	Amount	Education Label	EduPay
D.3	You have €1000 to allocate between yourself and any number of others in the Philippines. Any amounts shared with others will be remitted by the research project at no charge. ***You also have two additional options. First, you may label any amount you share as "money to be used for education". If you choose the Education Label, the money will be delivered to the respondent with a note saying: "These funds are intended to be used for the education of someone in your household."*** ***Second, you have the option of sending some amount directly to a school to pay for a particular student's educational tuition, which we call the EduPay option. Any amounts sent as EduPay also automatically come with the Education Label.*** * Enumerator: explain Basic EduPay. If EduPay funds are allocated, and this choice is chosen to be implemented, a project staff member will accompany the student or a representative from the student's household to pay the tuition at the respective school(s). ***For any particular individual in the Philippines, you may send any combination of unlabeled, labeled, and EduPay amounts.*** How would you like to divide this money?	Respondent	|__|__|__|__|		
		—————————— [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N	Y/N
		—————————— [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N	Y/N
		—————————— [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N	Y/N
		—————————— [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N	Y/N

		Beneficiary	Amount	Education Label	EduPay with Monitoring Performance
D.4	You have €1000 to allocate between yourself and any number of others in the Philippines. Any amounts shared with others will be remitted by the research project at no charge. ***You also have two additional options. First, you may label any amount you share as "money to be used for education". If you choose the Education Label, the money will be delivered to the respondent with a note saying: "These funds are intended to be used for the education of someone in your household." Second, you have the option of sending some amount directly to a school to pay for a particular student's educational tuition, which we call the EduPay option. You will receive reports on the attendance and grades of any student supported via EduPay. Any amounts sent as EduPay also automatically come with the Education Label.*** * Enumerator: explain EduPay with Performance Monitoring. If EduPay funds are allocated, and this choice is chosen to be implemented, a project staff member will accompany the student or a representative from the student's household to pay the tuition at the respective school(s). ***For any particular individual in the Philippines, you may send any combination of unlabeled, labeled, and EduPay amounts.*** How would you like to divide this money*?*	Respondent	|__|__|__|__|		
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N	Y/N
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N	Y/N
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N	Y/N
		_____ [ ] in MCCH	|__|__|__|__|	Y/N	Y/N

*Enumerator:
Use this space for allocations to additional beneficiaries if the rows in questions D.1 to D.4 are insufficient

		Beneficiary name	Amount
D.5	You have €1000 to allocate between yourself and the head of your MCCH. He/she will then choose how much to keep for himself/herself and how much to send back to you, knowing that the amount he/she will send back will be doubled. **For example, if you decided to send the head of your MCCH € _X____, he/she can decide to send you back the whole amount and you will receive ___2X____-. Or he/she can send you back € 0,25X and keep the rest for himself/herself. In this case, you get €0,5X. Remember that the head of your MCCH knows that the money he/she sends back will be doubled.** How would you like to divide this money?	Respondent	|__|__|__|__|
		Head of your MCCH	|__|__|__|__|

E. SURVEYOR OBSERVATIONS

Time Survey Ended: |____|____| : |____|____|

Time Marketing Ended: |____|____| : |____|____|

Result of Survey: COMPLETE
          INCOMPLETE – Did not have contact info of MCCH
          INCOMPLETE – Did not have contact info of other beneficiary
          INCOMPLETE – Survey interrupted and migrant never returned
          INCOMPLETE – Migrant stopped the survey
          INCOMPLETE – Other (*specify*)

_____

F.   **Type of Treatment Offered?:** [   ]

Contact information (head of MCCH)		
D1.01	Complete Name of Ms/Mr, head of the MCCH *(Name)*	
D1.02	Complete Adress of the head MCCH *(Residence)*	Province: [ ][ ] — Street name:_____ Number:_____ City_____
D1.03	Telephone munber of the head of MCCH (Tel. #)	[ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] C/L
D1.04	Alternative telephone number of the head of MCCH *(Alternative tel. #)*	[ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] C/L
D1.05	Name of the Enumerator *(Nameofenumerator)*	

16

Contact information (other Beneficiary)		
D1.06	Complete Name of Ms/Mr, the other Beneficiary *(Name)*	
D1.07	Complete Adress of the other Beneficiary *(Residence)*	Province: ☐☐ Street name:_____ Number:_____ City_____
D1.08	Telephone munber of the other Beneficiary (Tel. #)	☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐ C/L
D1.09	Alternative telephone number of he other Beneficiary *(Alternative tel. #)*	☐☐☐☐☐☐☐ C/L
D1.10	Name of the Enumerator *(Nameofenumerator)*	

DID THE MIGRANT PROVIDE ALL OF THE BELOW:
- **G. MCCH Information**
- **H. EduPay Information**

YES   Turn the survey into the IPA Project director.

NO   Keep the application in order to call the migrant and collect the remaining information. Record every call attempt in the table below.

…………………..

Log of Attempts			
	Migrant answered? (YES/NO)	**Obtained contact information? (YES/NO)**	**Comments**
Attempt 1			
Attempt 2			
Attempt 3			
Attempt 4*			

Turn in the survey after the fourth failed attempt.