THE EMPIRICAL CONTENT OF MODELS WITH MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA IN
ECONOMIES WITH SOCIAL INTERACTIONS

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ABSTRACT

We study a general class of models with social interactions that might display multiple equilibria. We propose an estimation procedure for these models and evaluate its efficiency and computational feasibility relative to different approaches taken to the curse of dimensionality implied by the multiplicity. Using data on smoking among teenagers, we implement the proposed estimation procedure to understand how group interactions affect health-related choices. We find that interaction effects are strong both at the school level and at the smaller friends-network level. Multiplicity of equilibria is pervasive at the estimated parameter values, and equilibrium selection accounts for about 15 percent of the observed smoking behavior. Counterfactuals show that student interactions, surprisingly, reduce smoking by approximately 70 percent with respect to the equilibrium smoking that would occur without interactions.

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1 Introduction

In this paper, we study models with multiple equilibria in economies with social interactions. Social interactions refer to socioeconomic environments in which markets do not necessarily mediate all of the agents' choices. In such environments, each agent's ability to interact with others might depend on a network of relationships, e.g., a family, a peer group, or more generally a socioeconomic group. Social interactions represent an important aspect of several socioeconomic phenomena, such as crime, school performance, risky sexual behavior, alcohol and drug consumption, smoking, and obesity, and more generally are related to neighborhood effects, which are important determinants of economic outcomes such as employment, the patterns of bilateral trade and economic specialization, migration, urban agglomeration, and segregation.

Social interactions typically give rise to multiple equilibria as they induce externalities. Consider, for example, a society of agents whose preferences for smoking are stronger the higher the proportion of smokers in the population - in other words, agents have preferences for conformity at the *global* population level. In this society, we may find equilibria where few people smoke and equilibria where many people smoke if the dependence of agents' preferences on the proportion of smokers in the population is strong enough. But multiple equilibria may also arise if conformity in agents' preferences is at the level of *local* reference groups, smaller than the whole population, as in the case e.g., of peer effects. It is because of externalities of this kind that the canonical models of social interaction, Brock and Durlauf (2001b) and Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003), also display multiple equilibria, with either *local* and/or *global interactions*.

We refer to economies with social interactions as "societies." We consider a general society with (possibly) multiple equilibria and assume the econometrician observes data realized from one or more of the equilibria. We derive conditions for identification (in the population) of the parameters of the society. We show that identification is no more an issue when the model has multiple equilibria than when it has a unique equilibrium. We define the likelihood of the data conditionally on the equilibrium selection and introduce two estimators of the model's structural parameters. The first estimator is based on maximizing the likelihood of the data over both the set of equilibria and the set of structural parameters. Insofar as this estimator requires the ability to compute all of the equilibria that are consistent with

a given set of parameters, it might represent a daunting computational task. Therefore, we also propose a computationally simpler two-step estimation procedure that does not require computing all feasible equilibria, nor postulating an arbitrary equilibrium selection rule. We describe the estimators' properties and evaluate the efficiency and computational feasibility of the two approaches using Monte Carlo simulations. We show, in the context of Brock and Durlauf (2001b)'s canonical model that the two-step procedure, while less efficient, is faster by several orders of magnitude. We also show that estimation procedures based on the adoption of an arbitrary equilibrium selection rule can be less efficient (and are again much slower) than our two-step procedure, which is agnostic about equilibrium selection. We conclude that the two-step estimation procedure is particularly appropriate when the investigator does not have information about the equilibrium selection.

Furthermore, we implement the proposed two-step estimation using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health ("Add Health"), a longitudinal study of a nationally representative sample of adolescents in grades seven to twelve in the United States during the 1994-95 school year. In this data sample, an individual's smoking level is positively associated with the number of smokers within the individual's friendship network. The positive association holds even after controlling for individual characteristics such as grade, race, and gender. Further, the data exhibit large variation in aggregate smoking levels across schools. These facts are consistent with social interactions of significant strength and suggest that there may be scope for different schools to be in different equilibria with regard to smoking prevalence.

We indeed estimate the parameters of various extensions of Brock and Durlauf (2001b)'s model. Results show widespread social interactions among students, both at the level of the school and at the level of the individuals' friendship networks. Our parameter estimates are consistent with the presence of multiple equilibria in our empirical application. Simulations of the model indicate that changes in the strength of friendship or school-wide social interactions (e.g., changes in the number of friends in personal networks, or in policies aimed at discouraging tobacco use in schools) can have highly nonlinear and sometimes counterintuitive effects, with the possibility of large shifts in smoking prevalence because of the presence of multiple equilibria.

We find significant heterogeneity across schools in the magnitude of the interaction

effects. Simulating all equilibria in each school, we find that multiple equilibria are present in forty out of the forty-one schools used for this exercise. Simulating students' behavior if all schools selected the equilibrium with the lowest smoking level, we find that selection into a higher level of smoking equilibrium accounts for about 15 percent higher smoking, on average. Finally, to quantify the effect of social interactions, we simulate the level of smoking that would occur if there were no preferences for peers' behavior. Compared to the simulated outcome without interactions, actual smoking is 70 percent lower, on average. Somewhat contrary to standard presumptions, this result suggests that social interactions may have an important role in *reducing, rather than increasing*, smoking in adolescents.

With social interactions, comovements between an individual's and her peers' outcomes may be due to peer effects but also to sorting of individuals into groups according to observed and unobserved attributes. More generally, one needs to distinguish social interaction effects from other correlated unobservable factors that may induce the observed comovements in outcomes. This issue is sidestepped in this paper, to focus instead on how to explicitly treat the multiplicity of equilibria that typically arise in these economies.[1]

1.1   Related Literature

The identification and estimation of models with social interactions is an active area of research. In this context, the issue of identification has been analyzed by Manski (1993) with regards to the linear-in-means model. Though identification generally requires stringent conditions for this class of reduced-form linear models,[2] multiplicity of equilibria is typically not an issue. Estimates of social interactions and peer effects, in this context, have been obtained e.g., by Calvo Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009), De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli (2010), Patacchini and Zenou (2011a and 2011b), and Tincani (2011).

More generally, however, when agents' policy functions are nonlinear, multiplicities arise, especially when social interactions take the form of strategic complementarities, as in the

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[1]See, e.g., Ioannides and Zabel (2008) and Ioannides and Zanella (2008) for empirical studies of selection in related contexts. A companion paper, by Bisin, Moro, and Topa (in progress), addresses the possibility of correlated unobservables by explicitly modeling the selection of individuals into networks. Preliminary results indicate that sorting, while statistically significant, does not reduce by much the magnitude of the estimated social interaction effects.

[2]Sufficient conditions for identification in this context have been proposed by Graham and Hahn (2005), Bramoulle', Djebbari, and Fortin (2009), Davezies, D'Haultfoeuille, and Fougere (2006), and Lee (2007), among others.

case of preferences for conformity with a reference group. In the canonical nonlinear model of social interactions - Brock and Durlauf (2001b)'s binary choice model - multiple equilibria are hard to dispel, even if interactions are only global. In this class of societies, however, social interactions are identified under functional form assumptions on the stochastic structure of preference shocks, as well as nonparametrically (Brock and Durlauf (2007)).[3] Brock and Durlauf (2001a), Krauth (2006), and Soetevent and Kooreman (2007) extend these results to binary choice economies of local interactions.[4]

Indeed, in this class of nonlinear models identification is obtained under much weaker conditions than in the class of linear economies, typically even in the case in which only one realization of equilibrium is observed in the data, e.g., when social interactions are global and only the actions of agents belonging to a single population are observed. In empirical work, however, i) either sufficient conditions which guarantee a unique equilibrium are typically assumed, as e.g., in Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) and Head and Mayer (2008); ii) or else a selection mechanism is specified, as e.g., in Krauth (2006) and in Soetevent and Kooreman (2007), who exploit the structure of Nash equilibria of supermodular games to reduce the set of equilibria under strong assumptions on the support of the selection mechanism, and in Nakajima (2007) who instead adopts a selection mechanism which is implicitly determined by an adaptive learning mechanism.

Important and related work on the econometrics of multiple equilibria has also been done in macroeconomics. Dagsvik and Jovanovic (1994) study economic fluctuations in a model with two equilibria (high and low economic activity) in each period; they postulate a stochastic (Markovian) equilibrium selection process over time and estimate the parameters of this process with time-series data on economic activity. The adopted functional-form specification allows them to derive closed-form solutions of the mapping from the set of parameters to the set of equilibria, which helps in constructing the sample likelihood for estimation. Imrohoroglu (1993) and Farmer and Guo (1995) estimate dynamic macroeconomic models of inflation and business cycles, respectively, with a continuum of equilibria by parametrizing equilibria with a sunspot process and recovering from data the time series

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[3]Blume, Brock, Durlauf and Ioannides (2011) provide an excellent review of the existing literature on the identification of models with social interactions. They discuss several examples in which the presence of multiple equilibria helps achieve identification.

[4]Krauth (2006) allows for correlated effects - that is, for correlation in the preference shocks across peers, under specific parametric assumptions.

of the sunspot realizations under assumptions on the properties of the process; see also Aiyagari (1995). More recent developments of these methods are surveyed in Benhabib and Farmer (1998). In this paper, we show that assuming a specific equilibrium selection (or sunspot) process is not always necessary and may lead to inefficient estimates if the assumed process is not the "true" data-generating process.

A related literature studies the issue of identification and estimation in multiple equilibrium models of industrial organization. It concentrates on simultaneous-move finite games of complete information where the investigator observes only the actions played by the agents, whereas the parameters to be estimated also affect the payoffs.[5] Classic examples include the entry game studied by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), which has extensive applications (e.g., also in labor economics). In this class of games, the model is typically not identified: a continuum of parameter values is consistent with the same equilibrium realization of the strategy profile. Partial identification is possible, however, as shown by Tamer (2003) for large classes of *incomplete econometric structures.*[6] Others, such as Bjorn and Vuong (1985), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), and Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010), have opted for imposing assumptions that guarantee identification. Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010), in particular, have interesting results about estimation as well. The estimation procedure they adopt requires the computation of all equilibria of the game for any element of the parameter set and the joint estimation of the parameters of an equilibrium selection mechanism (in an ex ante pre-specified class), which determines the probability of a given equilibrium, as in Dagsvik and Jovanovic (1994).

Instead, Bajari, Hong, Krainer, and Nekipelov (2006) and Aguirregabiria-Mira (2007) study, respectively, static and dynamic versions of a discrete entry game of incomplete information. In this context, they study the properties of a two-step estimator similar in spirit to ours.[7] A version of this estimator had been introduced by Moro (2003) in the context of a model of statistical discrimination in the labor market.[8] In that application, the

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[5]See Berry and Tamer (2007) for a survey of this literature.

[6]See also Manski and Tamer (2002), Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2008), and Galichon and Henry (2008). Echenique and Komunjer (2005) have results regarding the identification of monotone comparative statics in incomplete econometric structures.

[7]See also Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2004), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2004), and Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007); see Aguirregabiria (2004) for some foundational theoretical econometric work.

[8]See also Fang 2006.

equilibrium map linking wages to the individual workers' characteristics is different across different equilibria, hence the model can be identified and estimated off cross-sectional data.

Finally, our application to teenagers' smoking behavior is also specifically related to a large empirical literature. These studies generally document strong social interactions, or peer effects, in smoking decisions. However part of the literature relies on linear-in-means models which, as shown by Manski (1993), are not identified. As a result, it tends to attribute to social interactions any effects that are possibly due instead to selection and/or common shocks. This is the case, e.g., of Wang, Fitzhugh, Westerfield, and Eddy (1995) and Wang, Eddy, and Fitzhugh (2000); see also the review in Tyas and Pederson (1998). Instrumental variable estimates, as in Norton, Lindrooth, and Ennett (1998), Gaviria and Raphael (2001), and Powell, Tauras, and Ross (2003), attempt to address these problems.[9] The evidence for strong social interactions in smoking is maintained when non-linear models are estimated which are better identified, e.g., by Krauth (2006), Soetevent and Kooreman (2007), and Nakajima (2007).

2   A general society

Consider a society populated by a set of agents indexed by $i \in I$. The population is partitioned into sub-populations indexed by $n = 1, ..., N$ and represented by disjoint sets I_n such that $\bigcup_{n=1}^{N} I_n = I$. Let $|I_n|$ denote the dimensionality of set I_n and $|I|$ the dimensionality of I. We shall be interested in the limit where each sub-population n is composed of countably infinite agents. Different sub-populations can be interpreted as neighborhoods, ethnic groups, schools, etc.

Network. The network structure of the society is characterized by a map g from the set of agents I to its power set $\mathcal{P}$, so that $g(i) \subset I$ denotes the group of agents in the society that interact with agent i. We assume each agent $i \in I_n$ interacts locally with a finite group $g(i) \subset I_n$, composed of members of her own sub-population.[10] Let $\mid g(i) \mid < \infty$ be the dimensionality of $g(i)$.

Exogenous characteristics. Each agent $i \in I$ is characterized by a vector of exogenous

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[9]See also Bauman and Fisher (1986), Krosnick and Judd (1982), and Jones (1994).

[10]This is not a restriction on but rather a definition of the concept of sub-population. Also, we construct the network so that $g(i)$ does not contain i.

characteristics $x_i \in X$. Each sub-population n is in turn characterized by a vector of exogenous characteristics $z_n \in Z$. Let $\mathbf{z} = (z_n)_{n \in N}$, $\mathbf{x}_n = (x_i)_{i \in I_n}$, and $\mathbf{x} = (x_i)_{i \in I}$. We assume X and Z are compact sets.

Actions. Each agent $i \in I$ chooses an element y_i in a compact set Y (possibly a discrete set). Agents' choices are simultaneous. Let $\mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \mathbf{y}_n$, denote the vectors of choices in groups $g(i)$ and I_n, respectively, and let $\mathbf{y}$ denote the vector of choices of all agents.

Uncertainty. Let ε_i denote a vector of idiosyncratic shocks hitting agent $i \in I$; let u_n denote the vector of aggregate shocks hitting all agents $i \in I_n$, and let $\mathbf{u} = (u_n)_{n \in N}$. All shocks are defined on a compact support.[11] For any $i \in I_n$ let $p(\varepsilon_i \mid z_n, u_n)$ denote the conditional probability of the shocks ε_i. We allow the distribution $p(\varepsilon_i \mid z_n, u_n)$ to depend on the choice vector $\mathbf{y}_n$. We assume ε_i and ε_j are conditionally independent across $i, j \in I_n$, for any $n \in N$. Let $p(\mathbf{u})$ denote the probability of $\mathbf{u}$. Typically, these shocks are preference shocks, but they could also represent technology shocks.

Global interactions. Let π_n denote an A-dimensional vector of equilibrium aggregates defined at the level of sub-population n. Typically, π_n contains an externality, a global social interaction effect. If the society has a competitive market component, then π_n would typically also contain the vector of competitive equilibrium prices. Let A denote an (A-dimensional) vector valued continuous map $A(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$ such that equilibrium conditions in sub-population n are written

$$\lim_{|I_n| \to \infty} \frac{1}{|I_n|} \sum_{i \in I_n} A(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n) = 0$$

The map A could have a component A_j representing, e.g., the excess demand for commodity j of agent i with characteristics x_i in a sub-population n characterized by (π_n, z_n, u_n). The condition $\lim_{|I_n| \to \infty} \frac{1}{|I_n|} \sum_{i \in I_n} A_j(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n) = 0$ would in this case represent market clearing for commodity j in sub-population n. Also, the map A could have a component $A_{j'}$ such that $\lim_{|I_n| \to \infty} \frac{1}{|I_n|} \sum_{i \in I_n} A_{j'}(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n) = \lim_{|I_n| \to \infty} \frac{1}{|I_n|} \sum_{i \in I_n} y_i - \pi_n$, so that π_n represents the average action in sub-population n (if $Y = \{0, 1\}$ then π_n represents the fraction of agents in sub-population n choosing an element of $y = 1$).[12]

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[11] To simplify notation, we avoid specifying formally the probability spaces on which random variables are defined. We also refer generally to probability functions, which are to be interpreted as density functions when the underlying space is continuous.

[12] We implicitly require that both externalities and markets do not extend across the sub-population, as

Choice. Any agent $i \in I$, before choosing y_i observes the private shocks, the realization u_n, the whole vector $\mathbf{x}_n$, and z_n.[13] We shall also assume that the maximization problem of each agent is sufficiently regular for equilibrium conditions to be well-behaved mathematical objects amenable to standard calculus techniques. Detailed assumptions and formal arguments are relegated to Appendix A.[14]

The set of first-order conditions that determine the choice of an arbitrary agent $i \in I_n$ induces a conditional probability distribution on (y, x), $P_i \left(y, x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, u_n \right)$.[15]

2.1   Equilibrium

At equilibrium in sub-population n, the first-order conditions are satisfied jointly for any agent $i \in I_n$ and the equilibrium aggregates π_n satisfy a set of consistency and market-clearing conditions. Formally:

Definition 1 *An equilibrium in society, given (z_n, u_n) for any $n \in N$, is represented by a probability distribution on the configuration of actions and characteristics $(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n)$, $P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid z_n, u_n)$, and an $A-$dimensional vector π_n such that:*

1. $P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid z_n, u_n)$ is ergodic and satisfies

$$P \left(y_i = y, x_i = x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, z_n, u_n \right) = P_i \left(y, x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, u_n \right), \ \ P - a.s., \qquad (1)$$

for any $i \in I_n$ and any $(x, y) \in X \times Y$;

2. π_n satisfies

$$E_P \left[A \left(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n \right) \right] = 0, \ \textit{for any } i \in I_n. \qquad (2)$$

where the expectation is taken with respect to $P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid z_n, u_n)$.

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no $\pi_{n'}$, $n' \neq n$, enters in the equilibrium condition for sub-population n. In fact, our analysis is unchanged if we allow for relations across sub-populations, at the level of the general society, by introducing an aggregate equilibrium variable - say, Π - and equilibrium conditions of the form of a continuus map $B(\pi, \Pi) = 0$.

[13]The analysis is easily extended to the case of incomplete information, e.g., where agents' information is restricted to their neighbors or their sub-populations.

[14]Also, note that our formulation assumes that the system of first-order conditions and the equilibrium conditions are block recursive, in the sense that (x_i, ε_i) enter the first order conditions only through the *choice vector* $\mathbf{y}_n$.

[15]Typically, the first-order conditions will result from agent $i's$ choice of y_i to maximize preferences: $V \left(y_i, x_i, \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, \varepsilon_i, u_n \right)$. See Appendix A for details.

The infinite size of each sub-population I_n justifies a population interpretation of the equilibrium condition, (2), through an appropriate Law of Large Numbers.[16] In particular, the ergodicity requirement on the probability distribution on the configuration of actions and characteristics $P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid z_n, u_n)$ at equilibrium implies that

$$\lim_{|I_n| \to \infty} \frac{1}{|I_n|} \sum_{i \in I_n} A(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n) = E_P[A(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n)], \text{ for any } i \in I_n.$$

To understand the nature of multiple equilibria in our general society, it is convenient to think of an equilibrium as satisfying two interrelated fixed-point conditions. First, at equilibrium in sub-population n, the first-order conditions are satisfied jointly for any agent $i \in I_n$, *given equilibrium aggregates* π_n. This is equivalent to requiring that $\mathbf{y_n}$ satisfy a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move anonymous game. Second, at equilibrium, for any sub-population n, the equilibrium aggregates π_n satisfy a set of consistency and market-clearing conditions.

More precisely, at equilibrium in sub-population n, given π_n, there exists a probability distribution on the configuration of actions and characteristics $(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n)$, $P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$ such that

$$P(y_i = y, x_i = x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, u_n) = P_i(y, x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, u_n), \quad P - a.s., \qquad (3)$$

Generally, in a society with both global and local interactions, given a system of conditional probabilities $P_i(y, x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$ obtained from first order conditions given π_n, there might exist multiple probability distributions $P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$ that satisfy (3).[17] Let the set of such distributions, given (π_n, z_n, u_n), be denoted $\mathbf{P}(\pi_n, z_n, u_n)$. Consider instead a society with *only* global interactions. In such a society the set of first-order conditions of an arbitrary agent $i \in I_n$, given π_n, induces a conditional probability distribution on (y, x) of the form $P_i(y, x \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$. In this case, there exists a unique probability distribution

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[16]See Follmer (1974) and Horst and Follmer (2001). Appendix A, contains a formal construction of the equilibrium set, with conditions for existence and uniqueness. Finally, see Blume and Durlauf (1998, 2001) for a discussion of equilibrium concepts in related contexts.

[17]In the terminology of random fields, adopted in statistical mechanics, such probability distributions are typically called *phases* and the the occurrence of multiple phases is called *phase transition*.

$P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$ satisfying the first order conditions (see Appendix A).

Equilibrium also requires that π_n satisfies $E_P[A(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n)] = 0$, where the expectation is taken with respect to some probability distribution $P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n) \in \mathbf{P}(\pi_n, z_n, u_n)$. Fixing one such probability distribution, multiplicities might arise depending on the functional form for $A(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$ as a function of π_n.

To summarize the previous discussion, in the general setting with both global and local interactions, multiplicities may arise both with regard to the probability distributions $P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n) \in \mathbf{P}(\pi_n, z_n, u_n)$ and as a result of the form of the equilibrium map $A(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$ as a function of π_n. Thus, when only local interactions are present, one could still face multiplicity coming from the non-uniqueness of the probability distribution $P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid z_n, u_n)$; when only global interactions are present, one could encounter multiplicity arising from the shape of the equilibrium map $A(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$.

2.2   Example 1: Brock and Durlauf's binary choice model

Agent $i \in I_n$ chooses an outcome $y_i \in \{-1, 1\}$, to maximize his preferences which in turn depend on his own choice and on an average of the choices in sub-population n, π_n:[18]

$$\max_{y_i \in \{-1,1\}} V(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, \varepsilon_i, u_n) = h_n(x_i, z_n, u_n) \cdot y_i + J_n y_i \pi_n \ + \varepsilon_i. \tag{4}$$

We assume that $h_n(x_i, z_n, u_n)$ is linear and we eliminate any dependence from z_n for notational simplicity:

$$h_n(x_i, z_n, u_n) = c_n x_i + u_n.$$

The distribution of shocks ε_i is assumed to be independent of u_n and identical across sub-populations n: $p(\varepsilon_i \mid u_n) = p(\varepsilon_i)$. Furthermore, $p(\varepsilon_i)$ depends on agent i's choice y_i and it is extreme-valued. That is,[19]

$$\Pr(\varepsilon_i(-1) - \varepsilon_i(1) \leq z) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-z)}.$$

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[18]In this simple version of the model, therefore, there are no local interactions.

[19]More generally, for an extreme value distribution, $p(\varepsilon_i(-1) - \varepsilon_i(1) \leq z) = 1/(1 + \exp(-\beta z))$ where the parameter β is the variance of the distribution. But normalizing $\beta = 1$ is without loss of generality in our setting, as it is equivalent to normalizing the units of the utility function.

The utility of each choice y_i is then:

$$V\left(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, \varepsilon_i\left(y_i\right), u_n\right) = \left(c_n x_i + u_n\right) \cdot y_i + J_n y_i \pi_n + \varepsilon_i\left(y_i\right).$$

At equilibrium $\pi_n = E_P\left[\mathbf{y}_n\right]$, where P is the probability of $\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n\right)$.

2.3 Example 2: Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003)'s continuous choice model

Agent $i \in I_n$ chooses an outcome $y_i \in [0,1]$, as a solution of

$$\max_{y_i \in [0,1]} V\left(y_i, \Gamma\left(\mathbf{y}_{g(i)}\right), x_i, \pi_n, z_n, \varepsilon_i, u_n\right)$$

where $\Gamma\left(\mathbf{y}_{g(i)}\right) = \sum_{j \in g(i)} \gamma_{ij} y_j$, with $\gamma_{ij} \geq 0$, $\sum\limits_{j \in g(i)} \gamma_{ij} = 1$. At an equilibrium, the first-order conditions,

$$\frac{\partial V\left(y_i, \sum_{j \in g(i)} \gamma_{ij} y_j, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, \varepsilon_i, u_n\right)}{\partial y_i} = 0,$$

are satisfied, for any $i \in I_n$; jointly with the equilibrium condition $\pi_n = E_P\left[\mathbf{y}_n\right]$.

3 Identification

In this section, we study *identification*, which we intend as *identification in the population*, for any $n \in N$ (that is, for I_n infinitely large, for any $n \in N$). We show that the conditions for identification in economies with possibly multiple equilibria are not conceptually more stringent than those that apply to economies with a unique equilibrium.

Let $\theta_n \in \Theta$ denote the vector of parameters to be estimated in sub-population n, with Θ compact. We derive conditions for $\boldsymbol{\theta} = \{\theta_n\}_{n \in N}$ to be identified from the econometrician's observation of $(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\pi}, \mathbf{z})$ as well as of the composition of each sub-population and of the whole neighborhood network – that is, the observation of the map g.

The definition of identification we adopt in our context is *semi-parametric identification*;[20] that is, we assume some parametric specification for $p(\varepsilon_i | z_n, u_n)$ - the parameter

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[20]For related definitions, see Lehmann and Casella (1998), Definition 1.5.2, and van der Vaart (1998), p. 62.

vector $\theta_n \in \Theta$ may contain parameters of the distribution $p(\varepsilon_i | z_n, u_n)$ - but not for $p(\mathbf{u})$.

Explicitly including the dependence of probability distributions at equilibrium on $\theta_n \in \Theta$ for clarity in the notation:

Definition 2 *The parameters of a society are identified by observation of* $(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\pi}, \mathbf{z})$ *and* g *if, for all* $n \in N$, *and any* $\boldsymbol{\theta}_n, \boldsymbol{\theta}'_n \in \Theta$,

$$(\boldsymbol{\theta}_n, u_n) \neq (\boldsymbol{\theta}'_n, u'_n) \Rightarrow P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid z_n, u_n; \boldsymbol{\theta}_n\right) \neq P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid, z_n, u'_n; \boldsymbol{\theta}'_n\right).$$

Recall from the previous section that the equilibrium conditions can be written as $E_{P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n | \pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n)}\left[A\left(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n\right)\right] = 0$. Without loss in generality, let us assume that the vector of parameters θ_n can be partitioned as $\theta_n = \left[\theta_n^{foc}, \theta_n^{eq}\right]$ so that:

$$P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n\right) = P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc}\right) \tag{5}$$

The equilibrium conditions can therefore be represented, for any $n \in N$, as a map from $(z_n, u_n, \theta_n^{eq})$ into π_n for given θ_n^{foc} and a map from $(\pi_n, z_n, u_n, \theta_n^{foc})$ into $P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc}\right)$. Let $\pi_n(z_n, u_n, \theta_n^{eq})$ and $\mathbf{P}(\pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc})$ be such maps, respectively, with some abuse of notation. Equilibrium is then unique, in sub-population n, if $\pi_n(z_n, u_n, \theta_n^{eq})$ and $\mathbf{P}(\pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc})$ are one-to-one. This is, however, neither necessary nor sufficient for identification.

Proposition 1 *The parameters of a general society are identified by observation of* $(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\pi}, \mathbf{z})$ *and* g *if for any* $n \in N$, *given* z_n, $\pi_n(z_n, u_n, \theta_n^{eq})$, *as a map from* (u_n, θ_n^{eq}) *to* π_n, *and* $\mathbf{P}(\pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc})$, *as a map from* $(\pi_n, u_n, \theta_n^{foc})$ *to* $P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc}\right)$, *are both onto.*

Note that the condition in Proposition 1 is not required for the uniqueness of equilibrium; nor does uniqueness imply the condition.[21] To illustrate this point, consider a society characterized by a map $\mathbf{P}(\pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc})$ which is one-to-one and onto. In this case, identification rests on the properties of the map $\pi_n(z_n, u_n, \theta_n^{eq})$, given z_n. Panel (a) in Figure 1 displays an equilibrium map that does not satisfy the *condition for identification* in Proposition 1 even though the equilibrium is unique. Panel (b) displays a manifold

---

[21] A related result appears in Jovanovic (1989), who shows that a unique reduced form is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for identification.

Figure 1: (a) Unique equilibrium, no identification; (b) multiple equilibria with identification

$\pi_n(z_n, u_n, \theta_n^{eq})$ that is not one-to-one (with multiple equilibria), but is onto, and hence it satisfies the *identification condition*.

Importantly, in Proposition 1, identification of θ_n is obtained independently of the distribution of shocks $\mathbf{u}$, $p(\mathbf{u})$, as the realization u_n is identified jointly with θ_n, for any $n \in N$. Under an ergodicity assumption on the stochastic process for u_n, the distribution of $\mathbf{u}$, $p(\mathbf{u})$, can then typically be identified non-parametrically in population (that is, for N infinitely large); see Appendix A.[22] Of course less restrictive identification conditions can be constructed under parametric restrictions on $p(\mathbf{u})$, e.g., when we allow for some specific (known to the econometrician) correlation form of u_n with observable variables like z_n.

In empirical implementations it might be convenient to impose parameter constraints across sub-populations, e.g., that all parameters be identical, $\theta_n = \theta$, for any $n \in N$, as in Section 5. The conditions for identification are weaker under these classes of constraints.

3.1   Example: Brock and Durlauf

Under the assumptions in the example, the first-order conditions take the following form:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Pr(y_i = 1) &= \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-2\phi_i)} \\
\Pr(y_i = -1) &= 1 - \Pr(y_i = 1) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(2\phi_i)}
\end{aligned}
$$

---

[22]This is trivially the case when u_n is independently and identically distributed across n. But this is also the case if the spatial correlations of the u_n across $n \in N$ satisfy an appropriate boundedness conditions. See also Conley and Topa (2007) for some identification results in a related context.

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where

$$\phi_i \equiv c_n x_i + J_n \pi_n + u_n.$$

The equilibrium condition, $\pi_n = E_P[\mathbf{y}_n]$, is reduced to

$$\pi_n = E_{x_i} \tanh(c_n x_i + J_n \pi_n + u_n) \tag{6}$$

It is straightforward to show that, typically, equation (6) has multiple solutions. Assuming scalar individual characteristics and abstracting from sub-population shocks u_n, it is shown by Brock and Durlauf (2001b) that the equilibrium condition $\pi_n = E_{x_i} \tanh(c_n x_i + J_n \pi_n)$ has generically either one or three solutions.

It is also immediate to show that the sufficient condition for identification in Proposition 1 is satisfied for this economy as long as either $\theta_n = \theta$, $n \geq 2$ or as long as c_n does not contain a constant.

4 Estimation

The previous section argues that identification is no more an issue when the model has multiple equilibria than when it has a unique equilibrium. This is not the case for estimation, when the identification conditions require that the econometrician be able to compute all feasible equilibria for every set of parameters, often a daunting computational task.[23] In this section, we introduce two alternative estimation methods for societies with potentially multiple equilibria. The *direct estimation method* has all the large and small sample properties of a standard maximum-likelihood method, though it requires the computation of all the feasible equilibria for every set of parameters. The alternative estimator we propose, a *two-step estimation method,* preserves the large sample properties of the direct method while being computationally straightforward.

Suppose that, for any sub-population $n \in N$, the econometrician observes (y_i, x_i) for a random sample of the individuals $i \in I_n$. The econometrician also observes, for any individual i in the sample, his network $g(i)$, and the vector $\mathbf{y}_{g(i)}$. Finally, the econometrician observes z_n and can obtain a point estimate of π_n, $\widehat{\pi}_n$, as well as of the distribution of actions

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[23]See however Judd and Su (2006) for a discussion of these issues and a claim that the computational complexity of these tasks is exaggerated in the current econometric literature.

and characteristics $P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$, $\widehat{P}(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$. We assume that, for any $n \in N$, the condition for identification in Proposition 1 is satisfied.

The *likelihood* for the random variables $(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x})$, given $\mathbf{z}$ and $\boldsymbol{\theta}$, is defined as $L(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$. In our setup, because of the possible presence of multiple equilibria, $L(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$ is a correspondence. Let

$$\mathbf{P}(z_n, u_n; \theta_n) = \mathbf{P}(\pi_n(z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{eq}), z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc}).$$

Then

$$L(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta}) = \int \left[\Pi_{n \in N} \mathbf{P}(z_n, u_n; \theta_n)\right] p(\mathbf{u}) \, d\mathbf{u} \tag{7}$$

where $\int$ denotes the Aumann integral.[24] Let $\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$ be the set of measurable likelihood functions induced by (7); so that any $l(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta}) \in \mathbf{L}(\mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$ is a measurable selection of the correspondence $L(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$.[25]

4.1 The direct estimation method

We define a direct (maximum likelihood) estimator of θ as follows:

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}} = \arg\max_{\theta} \max_{l(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \theta) \in \mathbf{L}(\mathbf{z}; \theta)} l(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \theta) \tag{8}$$

Because of the possible multiplicity of equilibria, $\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$ is generally difficult to characterize. However, under standard regularity conditions, the following proposition holds:

Proposition 2 *The direct maximum likelihood estimator $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}$ is consistent.*

The estimator $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}$ can be computed by using the following algorithm: *1.* Consider sub-population $n \in N$; *2.* For each (θ_n, u_n), compute all the equilibria of the model; *3.* Compute

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[24]See Appendix A for details and references. Loosely speaking, the Riemann integral is not defined since $\pi_n(z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{eq}$ is a correspondence; the Aumann integral is defined for correspondences and is constructed by taking the union of the Riemann integrals of all measurable selections of the correspondence; it coincides with the Riemann integral when applied to a measurable function.

[25]The standard sufficient condition for identification in the sample of the parameter vector θ at θ^0 can then be written as follows: For all $\theta \in \Theta^N, \theta \neq \theta^0$,

$$\arg\max_{l(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \theta) \in \mathbf{L}(\mathbf{z}; \theta)} l(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \theta) \notin \mathbf{L}(\mathbf{z}; \theta^0).$$

the likelihood of each equilibrium and choose the maximum among them; *4.* Repeat for all $n \in N$; *5.* Integrate over $\mathbf{u}$ and maximize over $\boldsymbol{\theta}$. This procedure is computationally difficult, especially when the society is sufficiently complex that a closed-form characterization of equilibrium is impossible.

4.2 The two-step estimation method

We now introduce a simpler two-step estimation procedure.

First step. Compute the point estimates $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}_n$ and $\widehat{P}(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \widehat{\pi}_n, z_n, u_n)$ for, respectively, $\boldsymbol{\pi}_n$ and $P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n)$.

Second step. Estimate

$(\hat{\hat{u}}_n, \hat{\hat{\theta}}_n^{eq})$ as a solution of

$$\widehat{\pi}_n \in \pi(z_n, \hat{\hat{u}}_n, \hat{\hat{\theta}}_n^{eq});$$

and

$\hat{\hat{\theta}}_n^{foc}$ as a solution of

$$P(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}_n, z_n, \hat{\hat{u}}_n; \hat{\hat{\theta}}_n^{foc}) = \widehat{P}.$$

Note that this estimation procedure does not require the computation of all the equilibria as a function of θ_n, because the inversion operations in the second step are guaranteed by the identification condition. Note also that the inversion operations in the second step are substituted e.g., by standard maximum likelihood procedures when parametric assumptions are imposed on $p(\mathbf{u})$ and/or when parameter constraints across sub-populations are imposed, as in Section 5.

It is straightforward to conclude the following.

Proposition 3 *If $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}_n$ and $\widehat{P}$ are consistent estimators of $\boldsymbol{\pi}_n$ and P, the two-step estimator $\hat{\hat{\theta}}_n$ is a consistent estimator of θ_n.*

Furthermore, in specific empirical implementations, the small sample properties for the *two-step estimator* can be improved by means of several expedients. First, the two-step method can be iterated as, e.g., in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). Second, in constructing

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the likelihood the econometrician could account for the distribution of the estimators $\widehat{\pi}_n$ and $\widehat{P}$ due, e.g., to sampling error.[26]

4.3   Monte Carlo analysis of estimators in Brock and Durlauf

We now study in detail the estimation methods in the previous section in the context of the binary choice model of Brock and Durlauf (2001b), introduced in Section 2.2.

Because the model abstracts from local interactions, multiplicity in $P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$, for any π_n, is not an issue. Assume without loss of generality that agents do not condition on any z_n. In this model, independence of ε_i across agents $i \in I$ implies that, for the vector of choices y_n:

$$\Pr\left(\mathbf{y}_n|\mathbf{x}_n, \pi_n, u_n\right) \;\; = \;\; \prod_i \Pr\left(y_i|x_i, \pi_n, u_n\right) \sim \prod_i \exp\left(\left(c_n x_i + u_n\right) \cdot y_i + J_n y_i \pi_n\right) \quad (9)$$

Equation (9) suggests the formulation of the likelihood as a function of $\theta_n = \{c_n, J_n\}$:

$$
\begin{aligned}
l(\mathbf{y}_n|\mathbf{x}_n, \pi_n, u_n; \theta_n) \;\; = \;\; & \prod_i \left[\Pr\left(y_i = 1|x_i, \pi_n, u_n\right)\right]^{\frac{1+y_i}{2}} \cdot \left[\Pr\left(y_i = -1|x_i, \pi_n, u_n\right)\right]^{\frac{1-y_i}{2}} \sim \\
& \prod_i \left[\exp\left(c_n x_i + u_n + J_n \pi_n\right)\right]^{\frac{1+y_i}{2}} \cdot \left[\exp\left(-c_n x_i - u_n - J_n \pi_n\right)\right]^{\frac{1-y_i}{2}}
\end{aligned}
$$

We run two sets of experiments: The first using the Brock-Durlauf model with one sub-population, $N = 1$. We compare the performance of the two-step estimator to that of the full maximum-likelihood estimator (what we call the "direct method"). The second set of experiments is run in a multiple sub-population setting, $N \geq 2$. Here, we compare the properties of the two-step method to both the direct method and another estimation method in which the multiplicity issue is addressed by explicitly incorporating an equilibrium selection mechanism into the likelihood function, as in Dagsvik and Jovanovic (1994).

Note that the slope coefficients c_n are identified in the single sub-population case by the variation in average smoking across different values of the x_i's. An intercept term in c_n is only identified in the multiple sub-population case with commmon parameters if sub-populations select at least two different equilibria, because c_n has the same effect on

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[26]Moro (2003) first employed this two-step method to estimate a model with multiple equilibria. In his model, identifying restrictions require that shocks are independently and identically distributed across sub-populations $n \in N$.

Evaluation Criterion	Direct	Two-step	Direct, two-step initial est
RMSE, parameter c	0.05056	0.05043	0.05043
Bias, parameter c	-0.00315	-0.00251	-0.00251
RMSE, parameter J	0.10768	0.10708	0.10706
Bias, parameter J	-0.00184	-0.00542	-0.00390
Min time	136.57404	0.23075	132.76532
Max time	183.95280	0.36781	181.82902
Mean time	157.22378	0.30190	158.34783
Median time	156.88555	0.29983	158.34823

Table 1: Monte Carlo single sub-population experiment - results (low-equilibrium)

behavior in all equilibria, but J_n's effect is proportional to the equilibrium behavior. We do not include an intercept term in any of our specifications.

4.3.1 Results for a single sub-population $(N = 1)$

We use a version of the Brock-Durlauf model with a single covariate $x_i \sim N(\mu_x, 1)$ and global interactions (no local interactions). Thus the model parameters are a pair $\theta \equiv (c, J)$; note that we drop the index n for simplicity as $N = 1$. We draw an artificial sample of 20,000 students (characterized by their attribute x_i) and run a Monte-Carlo experiment, drawing $\mathcal{N} = 160$ vectors of the true parameters of the model. Parameter c is drawn from a uniform with support $[-0.8, 0.8]$, and parameter J from a uniform with support $[1, 3]$. For each random draw θ_j^{true} of the model parameters, $j = 1, ..., \mathcal{N}$, we use the model to generate simulated data $\widetilde{y}(\theta_j^{true})$, choosing one single equilibrium for a given experiment (i.e., all students are acting according to the same equilibrium). For each simulated dataset $\widetilde{y}(\theta_j^{true})$ we estimate the model parameters using both the two-step and the direct methods, $\left\{ \widehat{\theta}_j^{2s}, \widehat{\theta}_j^{d} \right\}$, $j = 1, ..., \mathcal{N}$. We then compare the properties of the two estimators, focusing on several evaluation criteria: bias (the average difference between the estimator and the true parameter), root mean squared error (RMSE) (the root of the average of the squared differences between the estimator and the true parameter), and computational speed.

Table 1 reports the results of the experiments in which the low-level equilibrium was always chosen; results for the intermediate and high-level equilibrium are very similar and are available from the authors upon request. The second column reports properties of the direct method where the starting value θ_0 used in the likelihood maximization routine was

fixed at $c = 0, J = 2$. The third column reports statistics for the two-step method. The fourth column reports results for the direct method when the two-step estimates $\widehat{\theta}_j^{2s}$ were used as initial values for the maximization algorithm.

The two-step method always exhibits lower RMSE than the direct method with fixed starting values.[27] This is surprising since the direct method represents the full maximum-likelihood estimation and should therefore achieve a weakly lower RMSE. The reason for this result is that, even though we use a maximization algorithm – simulated annealing – that is very robust to discontinuities in the objective function, in a small but nontrivial number of cases the algorithm gets "stuck" in a region of the parameters that correspond to the wrong equilibrium, which yields estimates very far from θ^{true}. To address this issue, we also use the direct method with $\widehat{\theta}_j^{2s}$ as starting values (column four): in this case, the RMSE is the same or slightly lower than in the two-step case.

The real advantage of the two-step method, however, is in computational speed. Even with this very stripped-down model, an estimation run with the direct method took a median time between 156 and 159 minutes (depending on the choice of equilibrium); instead, the two-step method took roughly between twenty-seven and thirty *seconds*. This is a vast computational advantage that enables researchers to estimate much richer models of economic behavior than if they were to use brute force maximum-likelihood only.

4.3.2 Results for multiple sub-populations $(N \geq 2)$

Our second set of experiments concerns a setting with multiple sub-populations n, where all agents in a single sub-population n, $i \in I_n$, are assumed to be in the same equilibrium but each sub-population may be in a different equilibrium.

A possible approach is to postulate a selection mechanism across equilibria, which involves a specific correlation structure (in equilibria) across the different sub-populations of the society (see, e.g., Dagsvik and Jovanovic (1994) and Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010)). This enables the econometrician to write the likelihood as the product of two terms: loosely speaking, the probability of the data in a given sub-population n, conditional on parameters and on the equilibrium chosen in n; and the probability that sub-population n is in that particular equilibrium given the selection mechanism. Therefore, the likelihood is a mixture

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[27]The difference is slight in the case in which the low equilibrium is picked and larger in the other two cases, especially when the intermediate equilibrium is selected.

of likelihoods conditional on equilibria, where the weights are equal to the probabilities of equilibria given data. Thus the likelihood becomes a well-behaved function rather than a complicated correspondence. The downside of this approach is that the econometrician has to take a stand on the specific equilibrium selection mechanism being used.

We perform two types of experimental comparisons. First, we again compare the two-step estimator to the direct method. Second, we compare the two-step estimator with the estimators obtained by postulating an equilibrium selection (we call this the D-J method, for Dagsvik and Jovanovic). In the direct versus two-step method experiment, we use $n = 20$, with 5,000 agents in each sub-population; in the D-J versus two-step method comparison, we use $n = 300$, with 200 agents in each sub-population.[28] To concentrate on equilibrium selection, we assume the parameters are identical across sub-populations: $(c_n, J_n) = (c, J)$, for all n, and are randomly drawn as in the single sub-population experiments. Suppose the equilibrium set contains at most K equilibria, indexed by $k = 1, ..., K$. Let

$$\phi_n(\pi_k) = \Pr(\text{sub-population } n \text{ is in eqm. } \pi_k \,|\, \mathbf{y}_{n-1}, \mathbf{y}_{n-2}, ...).$$

To simulate the experimental data, we used a second-order spatially auto-regressive process (SAR(2)) as our equilibrium selection mechanism. The sub-population is ordered on a one-dimensional integer lattice, where "closeness" in the lattice represents "closeness" in terms of social distance and hence it justifies the correlation structure imposed on equilibrium selection.[29] Let $K = 3$, as in the Brock and Durlauf model we simulate. The first two sub-populations are assigned one of the three possible equilibria at random (independently), with probabilities $(p_1, p_2, 1 - p_1 - p_2)$. For $n > 2$, each sub-population n adopts the same equilibrium as sub-population $n-1$ with probability a_1, and it adopts the same equilibrium as sub-population $n - 2$ with probability a_2; with the residual probability $(1 - a_1 - a_2)$ sub-population n is assigned an equilibrium independently of the preceding sub-population (again with probabilities $(p_1, p_2, 1 - p_1 - p_2)$). The conditional probabilities $\phi_n(\pi_k)$ are computed recursively based on this particular selection mechanism.

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[28] We have a larger number of cities in the D-J experiment because we wanted to also study the method's ability to estimate the equilibrium selection mechanism; consequently, we were limited to having only 200 artificial students in each sub-population n for computational reasons.

[29] In a time-series context, correlation across time-periods is perhaps more natural. In a cross-sectional context, one can still determine "closeness" between sub-populations by using some notion of social distance: see Conley and Topa (2002).

| Correlation in eq. selection | $\alpha_1=\alpha_2=1/3$ | | $\alpha_1=0.1,\alpha_2=0.8$ | |
| Evaluation Criterion | Direct | Two-step | Direct | Two-step |
(1)	(2)	(4)	(5)	(6)
RMSE, c	0.04849	0.00343	0.02468	0.02330
Bias, c	0.00530	-0.00006	-0.00239	-0.00093
RMSE, J	0.18000	0.02769	0.04941	0.04216
Bias, J	0.03824	0.00705	0.00584	-0.00023
Min time	133.07780	1.23348	130.13754	1.30992
Max time	234.96883	6.49528	224.77100	7.60333
Mean time	159.35291	1.57270	154.92274	1.65008
Median time	157.15724	1.53797	152.82602	1.59336

Table 2: Monte Carlo multiple sub-populations experiments: comparison of direct and two-step methods

Table 2 collects results for the first set of experiments, comparing the two-step and direct methods, where the evaluations are based on the results obtained from 160 runs where the "true" parameters are randomly drawn using the same criteria used in the previous subsection. The second and third columns concern an experiment in which the parameters of the SAR(2) selection mechanism were set at $a_1 = 1/3$, $a_2 = 1/3$. In this particular case, both RMSE and bias measures are much lower for the two-step than for the direct method. We suspect that this is a consequence of the extreme computational difficulties involved in maximizing the full likelihood in the multiple sub-populations case. As in the single sub-population case, computational speed is again roughly two orders of magnitude higher for the two-step method than for the direct method.

The RMSE and bias properties are quite sensitive to the specific parameterization of the selection mechanism. Columns 4 and 5 display results for the case in which the SAR(2) parameters are set at $a_1 = 1/10$, $a_2 = 4/5$. Here, the two methods under comparison exhibit roughly similar properties in terms of RMSE and bias, although computational speed is again much higher for the two-step method.

Finally, we turn to two experiments that perform a comparison between the two-step and D-J methods. In each experiment, we wish to evaluate the performance of the D-J method in the case in which the econometrician correctly specifies the equilibrium selection process, as opposed to a situation in which the equilibrium selection is misspecified relative to the truth. In the first experiment, the true selection mechanism is a SAR(2) process,

Econometrician Conjectures	Correct: $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 > 0$		Misspecified: $\alpha_2 = 0$	
Evaluation Criterion	D-J	Two-step	D-J	Two-step
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
RMSE, C	0.00580	0.00736	0.00567	0.00721
Bias, C	-0.00015	-0.00027	-0.00032	-0.00036
RMSE, J	0.02455	0.04497	0.02390	0.04466
Bias, J	0.00235	0.02343	0.00253	0.02302
Min time	330.61444	0.60659	277.07853	0.62736
Median time	352.19753	0.74459	297.17443	0.73311
Max time	417.93318	2.32693	382.53198	5.82907

Table 3: Monte Carlo experiments: misspecification of the equilibrium transition probabilities

with $a_1 = 0.01$, $a_2 = 0.95$, whereas the econometrician assumes a SAR(1) specification in the misspecified case. In the second experiment, the true equilibrium selection mechanism imposes $p_1 = p_2 = 1/3$ and $a_1 = a_2 = 1/3$, but the econometrician assumes $p_2 = 0$ (i.e., the intermediate equilibrium is never chosen) in the misspecified case.[30]

The results of these two experiments are reported in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. In each table, columns 2 and 3 report results for a situation in which the econometrician adopting the D-J method uses the correct specification, whereas columns 4 and 5 focus on the case in which the "D-J econometrician" chooses a misspecified model. Notice that, when using the two-step method, one does not need to take a stand on the selection mechanism.

The comparison is interesting: in the first experiment, the D-J method performs somewhat better than the two-step in terms of RMSE, especially with regard to the social interactions parameter J, in both the correct and the misspecified case. In the second experiment, however, the two-step method performs much better than the D-J method, with RMSE measures roughly one order of magnitude smaller for the former. In both cases, computational speed remains much higher for the two-step method, even more so than in the comparison with the direct method. These Monte Carlo experiments therefore highlight another advantage of the two-step method (in addition to speed): since it does not involve explicitly specifying an equilibrium selection, it is more robust to potential misspecification of this sort than methods that rely on taking a stand on the selection mechanism.

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[30]The second experiment is inspired by models with myopic dynamics in which the intermediate equilibrium is typically unstable.

| Econometrician Conjectures | Correct: $P_1, P_2 > 0$ | | Misspecified: $P_2 = 0$ | |
| Evaluation Criterion | Jovanovic | Two step | Jovanovic | Two step |
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
RMSE, C	0.00517	0.00912	0.07751	0.00911
Bias, C	0.00001	-0.00042	-0.01124	-0.00043
RMSE, J	0.02523	0.08002	0.74713	0.07953
Bias, J	0.00437	0.05484	0.65119	0.05394
Min time	333.29544	0.59714	271.94123	0.62225
Median time	356.65684	0.72343	287.05614	0.73007
Max time	453.14298	3.49153	398.08752	0.84737

Table 4: Monte Carlo experiments: misspecification of the equilibrium selection probabilities

5 Social interactions and smoking

In this section, we estimate several different specifications of the social interactions model in Brock and Durlauf (2001b), presented in Section 2.2. To this end, we use data on smoking obtained from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), a longitudinal study of a nationally representative sample of adolescents in grades seven to twelve in the United States during the 1994-95 school year. Add Health combines longitudinal survey data on respondents' social, economic, psychological, and physical well-being with contextual data on the family, neighborhood, community, school, friendships, peer groups, and romantic relationships. A sample of eighty U.S. high schools and fifty-two U.S. middle schools was selected with unequal probability of selection. Incorporating systematic sampling methods and implicit stratification into the Add Health study design ensured this sample is representative of U.S. schools with respect to region of the country, urban or rural setting, school size, school type, and ethnic composition.

In the empirical application, therefore, we encode $y_i = 1$ if agent i smokes and $y_i = -1$ if he or she does not. Each sub-population n is a school. We consider only high schools, which we define as schools having students enrolled in all grades between nine and twelve. Among these, we include only the forty-five schools that have at least 400 students, in order to have a sufficient number of smokers and minorities in each school. Even with these restrictions, there are cases in which the parameter estimates associated with specific racial or ethnic groups are not estimated with any precision.

5.1 Specification of social interactions

We explore different specifications of the structure of interaction inside schools. In most cases, we consider the general case in which interactions have both a school-wide and a local component, that is, at the level of each agent's circle of friends, which are reported in the Add Health individual friendship network data. We estimate the model parameters separately for each school (without imposing any structure on the distribution of parameters across schools), as well as jointly, imposing some additional structure. However, when we estimate the model parameters separately for each school, the global interaction parameter is not identified separately from the intercept term in agents' random utility (see Section 5.3). Therefore, in this case we estimate a specification with local interactions only. Finally, as we discuss later, in order to study the effects of changes in the parameters on the equilibrium mapping, we also need to estimate a specification with school-wide interactions only, so that we have a closed-form solution for the equilibrium mapping.

In the general case each agent $i \in I_n$ has preferences represented by

$$V\left(y_i, x_i, \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, \varepsilon_i, u_n\right) = c_n x_i \cdot y_i + J_n^G y_i \pi_n + \sum_{j \in g(i)} J_n^L y_i \pi_{g(i)} + \varepsilon_i$$

where $\pi_{g(i)} = \frac{1}{|g(i)|} \sum_{j \in g(i)} y_j$.

Only school-wide interactions are obtained with $J_n^L = 0$; only local interactions are present with $J_n^G = 0$.

5.2 Specification of parameters

First, we estimate (c_n, J_n) separately for each school n, to study the distribution of parameter estimates across schools. Second, we estimate a set of model specifications in which the model parameters (c_n, J_n) are either constrained to be the same across schools or to be a function of observed school attributes z_n: $c_n = c(z_n)$, $J_n = J(z_n)$. Finally, we estimate specifications with multiple schools where we allow (c_n, J_n) to contain random coefficients as in (12)-(13) or in (14)-(15). In all cases, we allow for an intercept term in c_n.

More specifically, in the case in which the parameters are specified as a function of observed school attributes, let the dimension of the vector z_n be K, for any school n. We

adopt the following linear specification:

$$c_n = c(z_n) = \alpha_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k z_n^k; \tag{10}$$

$$J_n = J(z_n) = \gamma_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \gamma_k z_n^k. \tag{11}$$

In the case in which we let the parameters contain random coefficients, the specification we adopt is:

$$c_n = \alpha_0 + \alpha_n, \text{ with } \alpha_n \sim N(0, \sigma_\alpha) \tag{12}$$

$$J_n = \gamma_0 + \gamma_n, \text{ with } \gamma_n \sim N(0, \sigma_\gamma) \tag{13}$$

More generally, we also include school attributes z_n:

$$c_n = \alpha_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \alpha_k z_n^k + \alpha_n, \text{ with } \alpha_n \sim N(0, \sigma_\alpha) \tag{14}$$

$$J_n = \gamma_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \gamma_k z_n^k + \gamma_n, \text{ with } \gamma_n \sim N(0, \sigma_\gamma) \tag{15}$$

We assume that the random coefficients $\{\alpha_n, \gamma_n\}$ are independent of each other and of the individual random terms $\varepsilon_i(y_i)$ that enter the individuals' random utilities. We specify a functional form for the probability distribution of $\{\alpha_n, \gamma_n\}$ in order to put some structure on the distribution of the realized $\{c_n, J_n\}$.

5.3 Identification of parameters

In the general case presented above, where the estimation is run on data from all schools jointly, the parameters $\left(c_n, J_n^L, J_n^G\right)$ are identified separately by the variation in demographic attributes within schools, in smoking prevalence across personal networks, and in school-wide smoking prevalence across schools. The parameter ruling school-wide interactions, J_n^G, is identified separately from the intercept in c_n – which is assumed constant across schools – by the variation in the fraction of smokers across schools. The parameter for local interactions, J_n^L, is identified by the variation in smoking behavior across personal

friendship networks, both within and across schools.

In a single-school setting, the school-wide interaction parameter is identified separately from the slope coefficients in c_n as long as there is some variation in demographic attributes within the school. Similarly, the local interaction parameter is identified as long as there is some variation in smoking prevalence across individual networks. However, J_n^G is not identified separately from the intercept term in c_n. Therefore, in the school-by-school estimation we present below, we focus on the specification with local interactions only, arbitrarily setting $J_n^G = 0$.

5.4 Empirical results

In what follows, we present summaries of the parameter estimates for a selection of specifications. Standard errors of the parameter estimates were computed using the bootstrap method. We then perform some simulation exercises to compute the estimated effect on the incidence on smoking of changes in the level of social interactions.

In the general case in which interactions have both a school-wide ("global") and a local (personal network) component, and random fixed effects $\{\alpha_n, \gamma_n\}$ are added to the parameters, the likelihood of the data $\mathbf{y}_n$ given $\pi_n, \left[\pi_{g(i)}\right]_{i \in I_n}, \theta_n$ in school n is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\log \quad & L(\mathbf{y}_n | \pi_n, \left[\pi_{g(i)}\right]_{i \in I_n}; \theta_n) = \\
& -\sum_{i \in I_n} \left[\begin{array}{l} \left(\frac{1+y_i}{2}\right) \cdot \log\left(1 + \exp\left[-2\left(c_n x_i + J_n^G \pi_n + J_n^L \pi_{g(i)}\right)\right]\right) \\ + \left(\frac{1-y_i}{2}\right) \cdot \log\left(1 + \exp\left[2\left(c_n x_i + J_n^G \pi_n + J_n^L \pi_{g(i)}\right)\right]\right) \end{array} \right] \\
& + \Pr(\alpha_n) + \Pr(\gamma_n).
\end{aligned}
$$

5.4.1 School-by-school estimation

In this section, the model parameters are estimated separately for each school, that is we maximize a separate likelihood for each school. (See Section 5.3 for a discussion of identification in this case.) Table 5 reports the means and medians of the parameter estimates across schools for the specification with local interactions only because, as discussed earlier, the global interaction parameter is not identified separately from the constant in this case[31].

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[31]The parameter estimates for each school are available from the authors upon request.

| | Local interactions | |
Variable	Mean	Median
Black	-0.7358	-0.6737
Asian	-0.0576	-0.2356
Hispanic	-0.0206	-0.1690
Female	0.1248	0.1844
Age	0.1084	0.0795
Does not belong to a club	0.3394	0.2917
GPA	-0.3281	-0.3231
Mom college	-0.0237	0.1585
Dad at home	-0.2056	-0.2174
Local Interactions	0.7964	0.8241
Constant	-0.7270	-0.8506

Table 5: Mean and median parameter estimates, all schools estimated separately

The parameter estimates are qualitatively consistent with other studies of smoking:[32] minorities (blacks, Asians, Hispanics) tend to smoke less than whites. Female students, older students, and students who do not participate in any school clubs, organizations, or athletic teams tend to smoke more. Students who perform better academically and students whose father is present at home tend to smoke less. Finally, the local interaction parameter estimate is positive and statistically significant in all schools. Its median size is roughly two and a half times as large as that of a student's GPA (in absolute value).

Figure 2 reports the distribution of parameter estimates for this specification. Only parameter estimates with t test statistics greater than unity are plotted. There is considerable dispersion around the medians across schools, especially with regard to the Hispanic category and the education level of the mother. The results are strongest (in terms of consistency of coefficient signs across schools) for age, club, and GPA: in almost all schools, being younger (in a lower grade), belonging to a club, organization, or team, and having a higher GPA are unequivocally associated with less smoking. This pattern is confirmed across all specifications we have estimated. As noted, the local interaction parameter estimates are positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all schools. This finding is strongly suggestive of the presence of social interaction effects operating through individual friendship networks, although, as we mentioned earlier, it may also be consistent

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[32]See, for instance, Gruber and Zinman (2000) or Gilleskie and Strumpf (2005).

Figure 2: Distributions of parameter values, all schools separately, local interactions only

Variable	Coefficient	Std. err.
Black	-0.4415	0.0355
Asian	-0.0664	0.0392
Hispanic	-0.1622	0.0288
Female	0.0693	0.0174
Age	0.0441	0.0060
Does not belong to a club	0.2022	0.0208
GPA	-0.2695	0.0121
Mom college	0.0166	0.0199
Dad at home	-0.0877	0.0230
Global interactions	0.7191	0.0717
Local interactions	0.8252	0.0152
Constant	0.1889	0.1062
Log Likelihood	-11252.50	

Table 6: All schools, constant parameters

with sorting into networks along unobservable traits.

5.4.2 Multiple schools

Having estimated (c_n, J_n) independently across schools, we now report the estimation re-
sults for specifications that impose some functional form on the way in which the model
coefficients vary as a function of observed school-level characteristics. To do so, we estimate
our social interactions model jointly for all schools in our sample, where the overall log
likelihood is the sum of the individual schools' contributions.

First, we report, as a baseline, estimation results for a specification in which the model
parameters (c_n, J_n) are the same across all schools. This specification is obviously not a
good fit of the data, since we have shown in the previous discussion that the distribution
of parameter estimates across schools exhibits a significant amount of dispersion for all
variables. All the same, this is a good robustness check to see if our estimation results seem
consistent across specifications.

Table 6 collects results for the general case with both school-wide and local interac-
tions. The estimates are qualitatively similar to the distribution medians reported for the
unconstrained case in Section 5.4.1. Again, minorities tend to smoke less; female and older
students are more likely to smoke; and students with higher GPAs, those who participate

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in school organizations or teams, and those whose fathers are present at home smoke less. The parameter estimate for local interactions is very similar in magnitude to the median estimate for the case in which each school is treated separately. The school-wide interaction parameter, which is identified in this specification because of the variation in smoking prevalence across schools, is slightly smaller than that for local interactions, but still positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Next, we turn to a specification in which parameters – while still deterministic – are a function of observed school attributes z_n, as in equations (10) and (11). We have chosen the following list of attributes describing the presence of tobacco-related policies at a given school: whether the school enacts state-mandated training on the use of tobacco products, whether the school has implemented rules regarding the use of tobacco products by students, and whether the school has implemented rules regarding the use of tobacco products by its staff. We have also added the following list of attributes pertaining to the county in which the school is located: whether the county is urban or rural, the percentage of families under the poverty line, the fraction of college-educated individuals in the population twenty-five years and older; and the fraction of female (male) adults in the labor force.

The estimation results are reported in Figure 3 and Table 7. The first observation is that the distributions of estimated coefficients across schools reported in Figure 3 are qualitatively similar to those in the unrestricted specifications in Figure 2. However, the parameter estimate distributions tend to exhibit less dispersion across schools than the unconstrained ones; for instance, the distribution of the age parameters in Figure 3 ranges from about 0.01 to about 0.08, whereas in the unrestricted case it ranges from about 0.05 to 0.25. The same is true for most of the other attributes, as well as for the local interaction parameters: the latter ranges between 0.7 and 0.95, whereas in the school-by-school estimation it ranges between 0.5 and 1.2. This observation motivates our use of the random coefficients specifications, to better capture the wide dispersion across schools of the coefficients associated with individual attributes. Finally, the distribution of school-wide interaction estimates exhibits a much wider dispersion than that of local interactions, ranging between 0 and 2.

Some of the parameter estimates for the $c(z_n)$ and $J(z_n)$ functions are noteworthy. For instance, the mostly positive coefficients associated with female students are greatly reduced in neighborhoods with higher poverty levels, a lower fraction of college graduates,

Figure 3: Distributions of parameter values, all schools, deterministic coefficients function of school characteristics

	Female	Age	No club
Intercept	1.4904 (0.1300)	-0.0037 (0.0067)	-0.5867 (0.2113)
% Urban	0.0034 (0.0601)	0.0333 (0.0080)	-0.0122 (0.0726)
% Poverty	-1.6764 (0.3644)	0.1857 (0.0400)	0.4575 (0.4327)
% College over 25	0.6127 (0.3485)	0.0370 (0.0238)	0.2228 (0.4275)
Female Labor Force P.R.	-1.4867 (0.2978)	-0.0900 (0.0133)	0.9968 (0.5351)
Male Labor Force P.R.	-0.8336 (0.1841)	0.0106 (0.0076)	0.2586 (0.3100)
Tobacco training	-0.0888 (0.0379)	0.0223 (0.0058)	0.0122 (0.0482)
Tobacco student policy	0.0922 (0.0880)	-0.0179 (0.0068)	0.2056 (0.1004)
Tobacco staff policy	-0.1237 (0.0882)	0.0388 (0.0061)	-0.1809 (0.0956)

	GPA	Mom college	Dad Home
Intercept	0.1427 (0.0325)	-0.3879 (0.1720)	-0.2364 (0.0966)
% Urban	0.0001 (0.0370)	0.1338 (0.0730)	-0.0185 (0.0707)
% Poverty	0.0711 (0.1740)	-0.0321 (0.3909)	0.3613 (0.3915)
% College over 25	-0.0967 (0.1322)	-0.4370 (0.3739)	0.2692 (0.3856)
Female Labor Force P.R.	-0.4700 (0.0734)	-0.4900 (0.4452)	-0.6471 (0.2632)
Male Labor Force P.R.	-0.1830 (0.0449)	0.9316 (0.2464)	0.4012 (0.1495)
Tobacco training	-0.0128 (0.0245)	-0.0264 (0.0457)	0.1201 (0.0485)
Tobacco student policy	-0.0375 (0.0386)	-0.0075 (0.1104)	-0.1367 (0.0996)
Tobacco staff policy	0.0106 (0.0402)	-0.0205 (0.1065)	0.1388 (0.0923)

	Local Inter.	Global Inter.	Constant
Intercept	0.3394 (0.1373)	2.5743 (0.1562)	0.1882 (0.1099)
% Urban	-0.1048 (0.0517)	0.9509 (0.1878)	
% Poverty	-0.2967 (0.3193)	4.4323 (0.7985)	
% College over 25	-0.0294 (0.2953)	1.2494 (0.6009)	
Female Labor Force P.R.	0.5911 (0.3383)	-6.8403 (0.3243)	
Male Labor Force P.R.	0.5800 (0.2016)	-0.8632 (0.1961)	
Tobacco training	-0.0403 (0.0397)	0.6166 (0.1487)	
Tobacco student policy	0.0038 (0.0821)	-0.6505 (0.1554)	
Tobacco staff policy	-0.0951 (0.0816)	1.0344 (0.1506)	

Table 7: All schools, deterministic coefficients function of school characteristics (standard errors in parenthesis, log likelihood -11130.5654)

and higher female labor force participation, suggesting that female smoking may be related to higher socioeconomic status. The positive relationship between student age and smoking is stronger in higher poverty areas. The finding that Dad's presence at home is associated with less smoking is reinforced in neighborhoods with higher female labor force participation, perhaps indicating that one parent's presence and control is even more crucial when the other parent works outside the home.

Interestingly, a school's tobacco-related policies can have a large impact on the strength of the social interaction terms. The presence of tobacco rules for students is associated with lower school-wide interactions parameters, whereas tobacco training programs and tobacco rules for the staff seem to increase the strength of school-wide interactions but slightly reduce the strength of local interactions (however, the latter estimates are not statistically significant). Of course, these school policy variables are likely endogenous, but the finding

that various tobacco policies may be related to stronger or weaker social interaction terms is important, and we will return to it in our discussion of counterfactual experiments.

Finally, it is worth noting that neighborhood poverty levels and female labor force participation have a very large impact on school-wide interactions estimates. This suggests that some of the variation in smoking across schools that is unexplained by observed student attributes and is attributed in the estimation to school-wide interaction effects may in fact be a school-wide fixed effect related to the area's socioeconomic status and other attributes. This possibility stresses the value of having individual friendship network data to estimate local social interaction effects.

5.4.3 Multiple schools, random coefficients

As mentioned in the previous section, letting (c_n, J_n) depend on observed school characteristics in a deterministic fashion may not be sufficient to capture the wide variation of parameter estimates across schools found in the unrestricted case. Therefore, we also use the random coefficient specification described in Section 5.2, to better capture the dispersion in coefficient values across schools. We first estimate a version with only an intercept and a random term, as in (12)-(13), and then augment it with school-level characteristics z_n as in (14)-(15). For computational feasibility, we use only two individual student attributes – age and grade point average – since the introduction of random coefficients raises considerably the number of parameters to be estimated.

Figure 4 reports the distributions of the estimated parameters for two specifications without z_n: with only school-wide interactions (left three panes) and with both school-wide and local interactions (right four panes). Results are qualitatively consistent with the specifications presented so far. As expected, the range of values for the age, GPA, and local interaction coefficients is wider than in the deterministic case (Figure 3) and very similar to that of the unrestricted school-by-school specification (Figure 2). Introducing local interaction effects generally lowers the school-wide interactions estimates relative to the case with school-wide interactions only.

Interestingly, we find a very large dispersion in the strength of school-wide social interaction effects, ranging roughly between zero and eight. We conjecture that this dispersion may reflect differences across schools in terms of neighborhood attributes, or in the extent

Figure 4: Distributions of parameter values, random coefficients. Left three panes: global interactions only; right four panes: both local and global interactions

Figure 5: Distributions of parameter values, random coefficients and school characteristics

of stratification and segregation along racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic status lines within schools. This finding highlights the unique nature of the Add Health data, that allows us to contrast interactions occurring within individual networks to those occurring within larger groups. Studies that do not use individual network data would not be able to detect these stark differences in the nature of the interactions occurring for different reference groups[33].

Figure 5 and Table 8 report estimation results for the model with random coefficients and school attributes z_n. The table only reports the parameters of the deterministic portion of the $c(z_n)$ and $J(z_n)$ functions, i.e., the $(\alpha_0, \alpha_k, \gamma_0, \gamma_k)$ parameters. The estimated distributions in Figure 5 are remarkably similar to those estimated in the unrestricted case. Smoking is positively associated with age and negatively associated with academic achievement. We also find significantly positive local interaction effects and a bimodal distribution of school-wide effects, again with a large dispersion in the magnitude of the latter.

Table 8 shows somewhat similar patterns to the deterministic specification in Table 7.

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[33]See Manski (1993) for the importance of having accurate data on the extent and definition of relevant reference groups.

	Age	GPA	Local	Global
Intercept	0.0134 (0.0058)	-0.4033 (0.0284)	1.2017 (0.1173)	2.8264 (0.1628)
% Urban	0.0357 (0.0080)	-0.1293 (0.0417)	-0.1000 (0.1252)	0.4317 (0.1884)
% Poverty	-0.0415 (0.0405)	0.6534 (0.1972)	1.1833 (0.6447)	-1.2664 (1.0062)
Female LFPR	0.0068 (0.0126)	-0.0341 (0.0634)	1.0298 (0.2635)	1.6282 (0.3240)
Tbc. training	0.0208 (0.0065)	-0.0153 (0.0330)	-0.7897 (0.1197)	0.4142 (0.1641)
Tbc. stud. pol.	0.0147 (0.0067)	0.1088 (0.0359)	-0.0039 (0.1233)	0.1736 (0.1720)
Tbc. staff pol.	-0.0089 (0.0069)	0.0252 (0.0346)	-0.4069 (0.1366)	-1.0318 (0.1702)

	Constant
Intercept	1.8125 (0.0846)

Table 8: All schools, random coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis, log likelihood -11033.074)

Again, the presence of tobacco training programs is associated with stronger school-wide interactions but weaker local interactions. Tobacco policies for the staff are associated with weaker social interactions both within personal friendship networks and school-wide. As we discuss in the next section, however, such policy effects do not necessarily imply less smoking in a given school.

6 Counterfactual experiments

In this section, we use our estimation results to perform two sets of exercises. First, given the estimates, we compute the set of feasible equilibria in each school, to see whether the estimated model parameters lie in regions of the parameter space that give rise to multiplicity. This allows us to determine whether a given school is in the equilibrium with the lowest possible smoking prevalence, or if there are other equilibria that exhibit lower levels of smoking. Second, we simulate the effect of lowering or increasing the strength of the interaction parameters on smoking. Because our previous results reveal that tobacco-related policies may affect interaction effects, this analysis could shed some light on the possible effects of such policies.

We carry out this analysis both in the case of school-wide interactions only and in the case of local as well as school-wide interactions. In the former case, we can compute the set of equilibria directly from the equilibrium mapping, since it has a closed-form solution. We can then see how the mapping moves as we vary the strength of interactions. In the case

School ID	N	Global int. (J)	Percentage of smokers			
			Data	Equil. 1	Equil. 2	Equil. 3
41	1056	2.67	5.9	5.9	17.2	99.8
56	1093	6.50	18.7	0.2	18.4	100.0
72	899	0.14	24.4	24.8	–	–

Table 9: Equilibrium smoking levels in a sample of schools

with both local and school-wide interactions, on the other hand, we rely on simulations of a Markov process that captures the Brock-Durlauf model and characterize how its stationary distribution changes as we change its parameters (including, but not limited to, those capturing the strength of interactions).

6.1 The prevalence of multiplicity

To perform our first set of simulations, we use the model specification with random effects (no school covariates z_n) and school-wide interactions only, whose results are reported in the left three panes of Figure 4. This specification makes it manageable to compute the equilibrium mapping because it uses only two student attributes, thus making it easier to numerically integrate over the empirical distribution of these covariates (see equation (6)). At the same time, we have seen that this specification seems to capture well the variability of parameter estimates found in the unrestricted case. Here, we focus on the school-wide interactions case as an illustration, again for computational ease. Later, we study the case with both local and school-wide interactions.

Table 9 reports the equilibria computed for a sample of schools, as an illustration (results for all schools used in this exercise are in Appendix B). The first and second columns report school ID and number of observations; the third column contains the estimated school-wide interactions parameter; average smoking in each school in the data is reported in column 4; columns 5-7 report the computed equilibria in the case of multiple equilibria, or the single equilibrium that arises for that school.

Actual smoking averages are very close to smoking levels in one of the simulated equilibria in all schools; small differences are due to the fact that we had to discretize the support of the GPA variable for computational reasons. Therefore, this model specification captures the large variation in smoking behavior across schools very well. Multiple equilibria are

Figure 6: Equilibrium mapping as a function of global interactions J (left pane) and direct utility from smoking c_n (right pane). The mapping becomes flatter' as J decreases and moves down as c_n decreases.

present in forty out of forty-one cases, given our parameter estimates (see, e.g., schools #41 and #56 in the table).[34] This validates our approach, as it shows that, in this application, multiple equilibria are prevalent. Finally, in thirty-five out of the forty schools exhibiting multiple equilibria, the fraction of smokers is consistent with the intermediate equilibrium (see, e.g., for school #56). Thus in most of the schools where multiple equilibria arise, there exists one other equilibrium with a lower (and typically substantially lower) smoking prevalence. This is again very important from a policy perspective as it raises the question of whether it is feasible to move a school from one equilibrium to another, and if so how.

To give an idea of the magnitude of the changes in smoking levels across equilibria, we computed the average smoking that would arise if all schools that are estimated to be in the middle equilibrium were instead in the lowest smoking equilibrium (details for each school are reported in the last column of Table 12 in Appendix B). The differences are economically significant, ranging from 6.3 to 31.6 percentage points. The average difference in smoking across schools in our sample (weighted by the number of observations in each school) that would arise if all schools were in the lowest equilibrium is 14.3 percentage points. This is quite a large difference, illustrating the importance of equilibrium selection in determining aggregate smoking behavior.

Before turning to the counterfactual exercises with school-wide only interactions, we

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[34]We report results only for forty-one of the forty-five schools used in the estimation. The remaining four schools also exhibit multiple equilibria, but for these the equilibrium mapping lies at the knife-edge case in which the low and intermediate equilibria coincide. To capture this, our simulation algorithm requires a much finer discretization than that needed for the other schools; therefore, for convenience we drop them from this exercise.

School ID	Interactions	Percentage of smokers			
		Data	Equil 1	Equil 2	Equil 3
	Baseline	5.9	5.9	17.2	99.8
41	J reduced 3%		9.1	11.8	99.8
	J reduced 5%		99.8	–	–
	J reduced 10%		99.8	–	–
	Baseline	18.7	0.2	18.4	100.0
56	J reduced 3%		0.3	17.0	100.0
	J reduced 5%		0.4	16.0	100.0
	J reduced 10%		0.9	13.0	100.0

Table 10: Simulations with global interaction estimates

illustrate the effects of changes in the strength of social interactions J_n in Figure 6. The dotted line in the left pane shows how the equilibrium mapping moves for a representative school following a 10 percent reduction in the level of J_n (the mapping has been "rotated" so that the 45-degree line is horizontal; the axes domain is $\{-1, +1\}$, with -1 corresponding to no students smoking and +1 to all smoking). The mapping becomes "flatter," and as a result the equilibria (points where the mapping crosses the 45-degree line) move in interesting ways: specifically, the low equilibrium moves up, whereas the intermediate and the high equilibria both move down. Thus, depending on whether a given school is in the low or the intermediate equilibrium, the same reduction in social interactions may increase or decrease the equilibrium level of smoking (assuming the school stays in the same equilibrium). This is in contrast to simple regression analyses that did not consider the existence of multiple equilibria: here, a change in the strength of one estimated parameter would have a univocal effect on the outcome variable. In addition, as J_n decreases even further (dash-dotted line), the equilibrium mapping ends up crossing the 45-degree line only once (at the previous "high" equilibrium), thus inducing a very large change in smoking prevalence.

These patterns are confirmed in our counterfactual simulations. For simplicity, Table 10 reports two examples to illustrate our findings (the full results of this exercise are available from the authors). The top panel of Table 10 focuses on school #41. Here, the prevalence of smokers in our sample is 5.9 percent, and the school is in the low equilibrium. If the strength of social interactions is reduced by 3 percent, the fraction of smokers in the low equilibrium

actually rises to 9.1 percent (consistent with Figure 6, smoking prevalence increases in the low equilibrium). When the school-wide interaction parameter is reduced even further, by 5 percent and 10 percent, a large discontinuity occurs: the equilibrium mapping flattens to the point that it crosses the 45 degree line only once, at the high equilibrium. Thus smoking prevalence jumps to a very high level, where nearly everyone smokes.

The bottom panel, representing school #56, tells a different story. Here, because the school finds itself in the intermediate equilibrium, a reduction in J_n is accompanied by a reduction in smoking prevalence (from 18.4 percent to 13.0 percent for a 10 percent decrease in the interaction parameter). If social interactions were reduced even further (e.g., by reducing J_n by 20 percent, not reported here), the multiplicity of equilibria would disappear, leaving only the high smoking equilibrium, in which almost everyone smokes.

These strong nonlinearities in the effect of a reduction in social interactions stress the importance of estimating a structural model that explicitly takes into account the possibility of multiple equilibria induced by the positive feedbacks among agents' actions. These are very important from a policy perspective. As a mere illustration, if the adoption of rules for tobacco use by school staff indeed reduces the strength of school-wide social interactions, such a policy may have the unintended consequence – in some schools – of actually increasing smoking prevalence in the school. It would be impossible a priori to predict the direction of a change in smoking behavior resulting from various policies without an estimation approach that fully incorporated multiple equilibria.

Finally, we study the effect of shutting down social interactions completely. As expected, multiplicity disappears in all schools, with only the high equilibrium surviving everywhere (see Table 13 in Appendix B). What is interesting is that, at our parameter estimates, the high equilibrium at $J_n = 0$ is associated with a large fraction of smokers in most schools. The last column in Table 13 reports the difference in smoking between the estimated prevalence and the level of smoking that would prevail in this counterfactual. The average increase in smoking across all schools is about 70 percentage points. Thus, according to our estimates, the presence of social interactions actually reduces equilibrium smoking in our sample of schools. This is an important point, since in the context of social pathologies such as smoking, drug and alcohol use, teenage pregnancies, crime, or dropping out of school, network interactions (or peer effects) are often viewed as one of the channels that can

help sustain and propagate such pathologies.[35] Here, instead, shutting down the social interactions channel would lead to a large increase in the prevalence of smoking.

A final caveat concerns equilibrium selection. Both the model we use in this application and our estimation approach are silent on the actual mechanism through which an equilibrium is selected. It could very well be that equilibria are "sticky" and that it is very difficult to move a school from one equilibrium to another. Even so, our illustration shows that the same policy may have very different effects in different schools, depending on the specific equilibrium the school finds itself in.

6.2 Accounting for the variation of smoking across schools

Results presented in the previous subsection show that most schools choose the intermediate-level of smoking equilibrium. The correlation between the percentage of smokers and the school-wide interaction coefficient across schools is small: -0.04. Hence, even though equilibrium selection and preferences for interaction play an important role in determining the *level* of smoking, they do not seem to account for most of the variation in smoking across schools. The correlation between smoking and the coefficient relating the utility from smoking and the student's GPA, c_{GPA} is 0.01, whereas the correlation between smoking and c_{age} is -0.16. Therefore, most of the variation seems to be driven by the different interactions of age and smoking across schools. We investigated this possibility by running various simulations.

First, we simulated equilibrium smoking when the preference parameters (c, J) are the same for all schools and equal to the mean of their estimated values. Results are reported in the second row of Table 11.[36] We find that the standard deviation of smoking across schools in each type of equilibrium is smaller when compared to the standard deviation computed in the original parameter estimates. We interpret this result as indicating that heterogeneity in the distribution of students is not driving much of the smoking variation in the data, and that school heterogeneity is more important.

To confirm this intuition, we simulated smoking behavior using the estimated values of (c, J) in each school, but assumed that all schools have the same student body, that of school #56. In the low-level equilibrium, the variance of smoking in this simulation is similar to

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[35]See, for instance, Crane (1991) or Patacchini and Zenou (2009).
[36]We excluded from these simulations all schools with less than three equilibria.

Simulation	Eq. 1	Eq. 2	Eq. 3
Original estimates	2.7	4.8	0.1
All schools same c, J	0.6	3.0	0.0
All schools same set of students as School #56	2.2	6.0	0.2

Table 11: Standard deviation of smoking in various simulations

that computed from the estimates (see the third row of Table 11).[37] When schools have the same set of students, the variance of smoking in equilibrium 2 is larger than in the original estimates, confirming that smoking variation is not determined by differences between the students' distributions across schools.

6.3   Counterfactuals with both local and school-wide interactions

We now focus on a single school and perform two sets of simulation exercises using the Brock-Durlauf (BD) model with both local and school-wide interactions. First, given our estimates for a representative school, we simulate the smoking process over time for a variety of different scenarios: changing the intensity of local and/or school-wide interactions; changing the direct (personal) utility of smoking (this experiment can also be interpreted as introducing a tax on cigarettes); and changing the number of friends in students' friendship networks. Second, again given our estimated parameter values, we simulate the smoking process for an artificial school, to study the impact of different network structures (in the presence of student heterogeneity) on outcomes. In particular, we focus on two polar cases, looking at perfectly segregated versus perfectly integrated personal networks.

Because we allow for both local and school-wide interactions, it is very difficult to compute the model equilibria and to obtain a closed-form solution for the stationary distribution of the model. This is why we resort to simulations to compute the long-run fraction of smokers. Specifically, we simulate the BD model as a first-order Markov process in discrete time, where the agents' state in each period (a configuration of smokers and nonsmokers in the school) is a function of the state of all agents at the previous period.

All agents change state at each period, based on the smoking configuration in the previous period. Our simulation results do not change if we instead allow only one randomly drawn agent to change her state in each period. We let the process run for many periods

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[37]Simulations performed using the student bodies of different schools provide the same qualitative results.

Figure 7: Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in a representative school for different values of the local interaction parameter (high-level equilibrium is at 100 percent smokers in every simulation)

(2,400) and report the long-run average out of the last 1,000 iterations (we have also let the process run for up to 10,000 periods as a robustness check; the reported results do not change). We use the parameter estimates from the model specification with random coefficients (no school covariates z_n) and both local and school-wide interactions, as a parallel to the specification we use for the counterfactuals with school-wide interactions only.[38]

6.3.1 Results for a representative school

We chose school #56 as a representative school, in terms of both its demographics and its parameter estimates. Figures 7-11 report the results of our counterfactual experiments to show the importance of multiple equilibria and nonlinearities. Figure 7 reports the equilibria we find for several values of the local interactions parameter (displayed in the vertical axis). The horizontal lines display the basin of attraction of the low-level equilibrium. For example, at the estimated value of J, when setting an initial fraction of smokers between 0 and about

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[38]We have also performed all counterfactual exercises using parameter estimates from other specifications. The results are qualitatively very similar.

43

Global interaction parameter

Figure 8: Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in a representative school for different values of the global interaction parameter; high-level equilibrium at 100 percent smokers unless indicated

17 percent, the procedure converges to a low-level equilibrium with almost no students smoking. For all other initial levels of smoking, the procedure converges to the high level of smoking, with 100 percent of students smoking. Figure 8 repeats the exercise by varying the school-wide interaction parameter, Figure 9 by changing the number of friends, Figure 10 by changing both local and global interactions, and Figure 11 by changing the direct utility of smoking.

Overall, multiple equilibria are pervasive. In our simulations, only the high and low equilibria appear in the long run. Because we are using a dynamic process in which agents are myopic, the middle equilibrium does not seem to be stable, even though for certain choices of parameter values and for certain starting points (in terms of smoking averages) the process seems to tend to an intermediate equilibrium for a few iterations. Eventually, however, it goes to one of the two extreme equilibria.

Changes in the strength of local and/or school-wide interactions, or in the number of friends in students' personal networks, all go in the same direction (see Figures 7-9). As we reduce J, G, or the number of friends, the basin of attraction of the low equilibrium (i.e.,

Baseline ——————————— 0.16
One fewer ——————————— 0.29
2 fewer ——————————— 0.48
3 fewer ————— 0.7
4 fewer ————— 1.99

0   5   10   15   20   25   30
Initial percentage of smokers

Figure 9: Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in a representative school for different number of friends

Interaction parameters

$2J, 2G$ —————————————————————— 0
$2J, 1.2G$ ——————————————————— 0
$2J, 1.05G$ ————————————————— 0.01
$2J, 0.95G$ ————————————— 0.08
$2J, 0.8G$ ————————————— 0.25
$2J, G = 0$ | Only high-level equilibrium (100% smokers)

$1.2J, 2G$ —————————————————————— 0
$1.2J, 1.2G$ ————————————————— 0.01
$1.2J, 1.05G$ ————————————————— 0.11
$1.2J, 0.95G$ ————————————— 0.19
$1.2J, 0.8G$ ———— 1.37
$1.2J, G = 0$ | Only highlevel equilibrium (99.98% smokers)

$0.8J, 2G$ —————————————————————— 0
$0.8J, 1.2G$ ————————————————— 0.03
$0.8J, 1.05G$ ————————— 0.14
$0.8J, 0.95G$ ————————— 0.45
$0.8J, 0.8G$ | Only high-level equilibrium (100% smokers)
$0.8J, G = 0$ | Only high-level equilibrium (99.95% smokers)

$J = 0, 2G$ —————————————————————— 0
$J = 0, 1.2G$ ————————— 0.14
$J = 0, 1.05G$ ————— 0.59
$J = 0, 0.95G$ | Only high-level equilibrium (100% smokers)
$J = 0, 0.8G)$ | Only high-level equilibrium (100% smokers)
$J = 0, G = 0$ | Only high-level equilibrium (99.7% smokers)

0   5   10   15   20   25   30   35
Initial percentage of smokers

Figure 10: Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in a representative school for different values of local and global interactions; high-level equilibrium always 100% smokers unless indicated

45

Utility from smoking

Figure 11: Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in a representative school for different values of direct utility from smoking

the set of initial conditions from which the process reaches it) shrinks, until it eventually disappears; this is consistent with the left panel of Figure 6 (which illustrates movements in the equilibrium mapping following a change in G). The fraction of smokers increases slightly at the low equilibrium, until it jumps to a near totality of smokers in the high equilibrium when the low equilibrium disappears. Local and school-wide interactions appear to be "strategic complements" (Figure 10): Keeping the strength of local (respectively, school-wide) interactions fixed, the basin of attraction of the low equilibrium shrinks as the strength of school-wide (respectively, local) interactions decreases, and vice versa.[39]

Therefore, as is the case for school-wide only interactions, a decrease in the magnitude of social interactions leads, in a very nonlinear fashion, to a sharp increase in the prevalence of smoking in the representative school. For low levels of social interactions, only the high equilibrium survives, in which almost every student smokes. This confirms the observation made earlier: that the presence of social interactions may actually lead to lower equilibrium smoking than would be the case in their absence.

Figure 11 reports the effect of changes in the individual cost of cigarettes (measured in "utils"): Specifically, a decrease in the cost of smoking is modeled as an increase of the intercept in the random utility of smoking of each student. This experiment changes the

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[39]When school-wide interactions (G) are set to zero and only local interactions (J) are present, multiple equilibria persist for sufficiently large values of J (not reported here).

Figure 12: Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in artificial school for different values of the local interaction parameter; high-level equilibrium at 100% smokers in all simulations

long-run level of smoking in the direction that one would expect from the right panel in Figure 6. As the utility cost of smoking goes down (i.e., the intercept of C_i rises), the basin of attraction of the low equilibrium shrinks and the fraction of smokers in the school rises slightly, until the process jumps to the high equilibrium where everyone smokes.

6.3.2 Results for an artificial school

For these experiments, we construct an artificial school with characteristics similar to those of the actual school we used above. We consider a school with 800 students disposed on a circle. Every student i has R friends, defined as the R students directly to the right of i. The baseline number of friends is $R = 4$ (which is the median number of friends for students in our representative school #56), but we vary this parameter in the simulations. Note that friendship ties are modeled as directed links: Student i "names" student j as a friend, but not vice versa. Initially all students are homogeneous and have the same characteristics as the median student in school #56: 16 years old and with a 3.0 GPA. Subsequently, we allow for different types of students, with varying propensity to smoke.

Figures 12-14 report the results of our experiments on the strength of local and global

Figure 13: Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in artificial school for different values of the global interaction parameter; high-level equilibrium at 100% smokers unless indicated

interactions (changes in J, G) and on the number of friends R. The artificial school behaves very similarly to the representative one. Reductions in local interactions J, in school-wide interactions G, or in the number of friends R all induce the basin of attraction of the low equilibrium to become smaller and eventually disappear. While the low equilibrium persists, reductions in these parameters are associated with a slight increase in the fraction of smokers in the school. As with the actual school, holding fixed any two parameters in (J, G, R) while reducing the third one has the same qualitative effect on the basin of attraction of the low equilibrium and on the fraction of smokers in this equilibrium while it persists. Thus, as in the representative school case, stronger social interactions and/or a larger number of friends tend to reduce smoking, according to our estimates.

Figure 15 reports the effects of changing the demographic characteristics of all artificial students in the school; agents are still homogeneous here. These experiments are equivalent to shifting the intercept of the individual utility of smoking (conceptually, it is the same as introducing a "tax/subsidy" on cigarettes). For younger students, or those with a higher GPA, the intercept shifts down relative to our baseline student, which induces the basin of

Figure 14: Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in artificial school for a different number of friends and interaction parameters; high-level equilibrium at 100% smokers unless indicated (continues on next page)

attraction of the low-smoking equilibrium to widen. Changing our baseline artificial student to an older student, or to a student with a lower GPA, induces the opposite effect.

Figures 16 and 17 look at the effects of introducing two different types of students in the artificial school: Type L students are the least likely to smoke based on their individual characteristics; type M students are the most likely to smoke. We vary both the fraction and the arrangement of the two types within the artificial school (i.e., along the circle), focusing on two polar cases. In Figure 16, we vary the relative fraction of the two types,

Chart 1

	Initial percentage of smokers	
200 friends		0
80 friends		0
40 friends		0
16 friends		0
8 friends		0
4 friends		0
3 friends		0
2 friends		0
1 friends	0.01	
0 friends	1.29	

$J = 4*\text{baseline},\ G = \text{baseline}$

	Initial percentage of smokers	
200 friends		0
80 friends		0
40 friends		0
16 friends		0
8 friends		0
4 friends		0
3 friends		0
2 friends		0
1 friends	0	
0 friends	1.29	

$J = 8*\text{baseline},\ G = \text{baseline}$

Initial percentage of smokers

Figure 14: (continued) Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in artificial school for different number of friends and interaction parameters; high-level equilibrium at 100% smokers unless indicated

Chart 2

19yo, GPA=2

Most	0.7

16yo, GPA=3

13yo, GPA = 4

Baseline	0.13

Least	0.03

Initial percentage of smokers

Figure 15: Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in artificial school for different artificial (homogenous) students; high-level equilibrium at 100% smokers unless indicated

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Figure 16: Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in perfectly integrated artificial school for different arrangements of two types of students: L: least smoker; M: most smoker; high-level equilibrium at 100% smokers in all simulations

Figure 17: Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in perfectly segregated artificial school for different groupings of students; type of students: L=50%, M=50%; high-level equilibrium at 100% smokers unless indicated

1 friend ———————— 0.34
4 friends ———————— 0.34
8 friends ———————— 0.34 J, G =baseline

1 friend ———————— 0.01
4 friends ————————— 0 $J = 4*$baseline , G =baseline
8 friends   0 ———————+—— 25.01 (3 equilibria)

1 friend   Only high-level equilibrium (100)
4 friends ———————— 0.01 $J = 4*$baseline , $G = 3/4$baseline
8 friends   0 ——————+—— 25.04 (3 equilibria)

1 friend
4 friends   Only high-level equilibrium (100) $J = 4*$baseline , $G = 0.5*$baseline
8 friends

0   10   20   30   40   50   60   70   100

Initial percentage of smokers

Figure 17: (continued) Percentage of smokers and basins of attraction of low-level equilibrium in perfectly segregated artificial school for different groupings of students; type of students: L=75%, M=25%; high-level equilibrium at 100% smokers unless indicated

but maintain an arrangement that is "perfectly integrated": $LMLM...$, or $LLLMLLLM...$, or $LLLLLLLMLLLLLLLM...$. In Figure 17, instead, we simulate perfect "segregation": The school is divided into two subgroups, one where everyone is of type L and the other where everyone is of type M. Local interactions occur only within the two subgroups (that is, friendship networks are perfectly segregated), but global interactions still occur school-wide (hence, across groups).

To summarize the results, in both the perfectly integrated and the perfectly segregated schools the basin of attraction of the low-smoking equilibrium widens as local or school-wide interactions increase, as the number of friends increases, and as the fraction of "high smokers" decreases in the school. In addition, in the segregated school there are parameter values for which a new intermediate equilibrium appears. This equilibrium is characterized by a fraction of smokers that is equal to the proportion of high smokers in the school. Thus, when students are heterogeneous, the arrangement of students within the school and the composition of students' personal networks play a role in determining equilibrium outcomes.

7   Conclusions

In this paper, we present a general framework for studying models with multiple equilibria in economies with social interactions. We show that point identification of model parameters

is conceptually distinct from the presence of multiple equilibria, and derive some general conditions for identification. We then present a two-step estimation strategy that, while less efficient than the direct maximum-likelihood estimator, has two significant advantages. First, it is computationally feasible, as it is several orders of magnitude faster than the direct or the Dagsvik-Jovanovic method; second, it does not rely on making explicit assumptions about the nature of the selection mechanism across equilibria, as in the D-J method.

We then apply our estimation approach to a version of the Brock-Durlauf binary choice model with social interactions, using data on teenage smoking. We find statistically significant evidence of both school-wide and local (within personal networks) interactions. Our estimates are consistent across specifications that take into account school and local neighborhood attributes. Given our estimates, multiple equilibria are prevalent in our data: the estimated parameter values give rise to multiplicity in forty out of forty-one schools. In many cases where multiple equilibria are present, there exists one other equilibrium with a lower smoking prevalence than that observed in a given school.

Having estimated the parameters of a structural model, we are able to run several counterfactual experiments. In specifications with school-wide interactions only, we show that reductions in the strength of social interactions may increase or decrease smoking prevalence, depending on whether the school is in the low or intermediate equilibrium. Large reductions in school-wide interactions eventually make equilibrium multiplicity disappear, with only the high smoking equilibrium surviving. Thus, tobacco policies that are associated with lower school-wide social interactions may have the counterintuitive and undesirable effect of actually increasing smoking prevalence in a school, sometimes by a large amount.

Simulations in settings where both school-wide and local interactions are present show that reductions in local and/or global interactions, or in the number of friends, make the basin of attraction of the low-smoking equilibrium shrink until it disappears; while this equilibrium persists, smoking prevalence rises slightly. Reductions in the utility cost of smoking also make the basin of attraction of low equilibria become smaller, and smoking prevalence increases. When the low equilibrium disappears, the fraction of smokers in a school jumps dramatically to an equilibrium where almost everyone smokes. Finally, the arrangement of students within a school, and hence the structure of personal networks (e.g., segregation versus integration by demographics), can influence the number and types

of smoking equilibria that may arise.

These results should be taken as an illustration of the kind of policy experiments that one may carry out after having obtained structural parameter estimates for a behavioral model of smoking with social interactions that exhibits multiple equilibria. However, they should not be taken literally: here, we assume that personal networks are given and that tobacco use policies are exogenous, the model does not incorporate dynamic features such as addiction, and we do not take a stand on the way in which agents select a specific equilibrium. This is left for future work. In a companion paper (Bisin, Moro, and Topa (in progress)), we study settings where friendship networks are endogenous. Agents sort on the basis of both observable and unobservable attributes, which in turn may be related to one's propensity to smoke. Taking this endogeneity explicitly into account can help identify the extent of social interactions.

A   Appendix: Regularity assumptions on general societies and proofs of propositions

In this appendix, we detail the construction of general societies in Section 2, as well as our analysis of identification and estimation in Sections 3 and 4. We also sketch the proofs of Propositions 1-3, that depend on this construction. While assumptions are overly strong in several dimensions, it is left for a separate paper to obtain tighter conditions.

A.1   First-order conditions

Let agent i's maximization problem be:

$$\max_{y_i \in Y} V\left(y_i, x_i, \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, \varepsilon_i, z_n, u_n\right).$$

Let $P_i\left(y, x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$ denote the first-order conditions of the problem.

We assume that $P_i\left(y, x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$ is continuous and differentiable, for any i. This is guaranteed if either

(i) the choice set Y is convex and compact, the utility function $V\left(y_i, x_i, \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, \varepsilon_i, z_n, u_n\right)$ is C^2 in its arguments and Inada conditions to avoid corner solutions are imposed,

the density $p(\varepsilon_i \mid z_n, u_n)$ is non-atomic and C^2 as a function of (z_n, u_n); or

(ii) the choice set Y is discrete, the utility function $V\left(y_i, x_i, \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, \varepsilon_i, z_n, u_n\right)$ is C^2 in its arguments for any $y_i \in Y$, the density $p(\varepsilon_i \mid z_n, u_n)$ is non-atomic and C^2 as a function of (z_n, u_n).

We also assume that $P_i\left(y, x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$ is strictly positive.

A.2 The probability distribution $P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$

Recall that, at an equilibrium in sub-population n, given π_n, there exists an ergodic probability distribution on the configuration of actions and characteristics $(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n)$, $P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$ such that

$$P\left(y_i = y, x_i = x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right) = P_i\left(y, x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right), \quad P - a.s.,$$

Existence of such a $P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$ is guaranteed if the probability distribution $P_i\left(y, x \mid \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$ has a Markovian structure across agents i; for the proof of this statement, see Follmer (1974), Section 3, and Preston (2008). In our context, this in turn is essentially guaranteed by the assumption that $\mid g(i) \mid < \infty$ for any i. More precisely, existence also requires a weak homogeneity condition on the network structure implied by the map g; e.g., translation invariance on a lattice is sufficient; see Follmer (1974) and Horst and Scheinkman (2006). This assumption is always satisfied in the examples and we avoid making it formally explicit.

To guarantee that the probability distribution $P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$ is ergodic (and that it preserves the homogeneity property) it is sufficient that preferences in society satisfy a *Moderate Social Influence condition*,[40] which bounds the strength of the local interactions. In the case Y is a continuous space, for instance, these conditions require, for any $j \in g(i)$, that $\mid \frac{\partial V\left(y_i, x_i \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, \varepsilon_i, z_n, u_n\right)}{\partial y_j} \mid$ has a uniform (in the arguments of V) and small enough bound k; see Horst and Scheinkman (2006), Theorem 19 (ii).

Uniqueness of such a $P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$ requires a stronger *Moderate Social Influence condition*, e.g., bounding the $\sum_{j \in g(i)} \mid \frac{\partial V\left(y_i, x_i \mathbf{y}_{g(i)}, \pi_n, \varepsilon_i, z_n, u_n\right)}{\partial y_j} \mid$; see Horst and Scheinkman

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[40]Such conditions, and the associated terminology, have been introduced by Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001, 2003).

(2006), Theorem 19 (iii). Furthermore, a straightforward extension of Theorem 3.1.2 in Follmer (1974) to our context implies that uniqueness is also guaranteed if the network induced by the map g is one-dimensional; that is, if agents $i \in I_n$ can, without loss of generality, be disposed on a line.

Ergodicity of $P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$ implies that

$$\lim_{|I_n| \to \infty} \frac{1}{|I_n|} \sum_{i \in I_n} A\left(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right) = E_P\left[A\left(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)\right], \text{ for any } i \in I_n,$$

so that π_n is well defined; in particular, if

$$\pi_n = \lim_{|I_n| \to \infty} \frac{1}{|I_n|} \sum_{i \in I_n} y_i.$$

More generally, existence of π_n requires e.g., the standard boundary conditions on $A\left(y_i, x_i, \pi_n, z_n, u_n\right)$ which are typically satisfied by excess demand functions in general equilibrium theory; see e.g., Mas Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Chapter 17, C, D.

A.3 The correspondence $L(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$

Recall that

$$L(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta}) = \int \left[\Pi_{n \in N} \mathbf{P}(z_n, u_n; \theta_n)\right] p\left(\mathbf{u}\right) d\mathbf{u}$$

where $\mathbf{P}(z_n, u_n; \theta_n) = \mathbf{P}(\pi_n(z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{eq}), z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc})$ and $\int$ denotes the Aumann integral, since $\mathbf{P}(z_n, u_n; \theta_n)$ is a correspondence. The Aumann integral is constructed by taking the union of the Riemann integrals of all measurable selections of the correspondence; it coincides with the Riemann integral when applied to a measurable function; see Aumann (1965) and Molchanov (2005) for details.

A.4 Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1. It is straightforward to check that the conditions in Proposition 1 guarantee identification.

If $\mathbf{P}(\pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc})$ maps $(\pi_n, u_n, \theta_n^{foc})$ onto $P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc}\right)$, the inverse

map from $P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n; \theta_n^{foc}\right)$ to $(\pi_n, u_n, \theta_n^{foc})$ is one-to-one. Therefore, given z_n,

$$(\pi_n, u_n, \boldsymbol{\theta}_n^{foc}) \neq (\pi_n', u_n', \theta_n^{foc\prime}) \Rightarrow P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n, z_n, u_n; \boldsymbol{\theta}_n^{foc}\right) \neq P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid \pi_n', z_n, u_n'; \boldsymbol{\theta}_n^{foc\prime}\right).$$

Moreover, If $\pi_n(\theta_n^{eq}, z_n, u_n)$ maps (θ_n^{eq}, u_n) onto π_n (given z_n), then the inverse map from π_n into (θ_n^{eq}, u_n) is one-to-one.

As a consequence, then

$$(\boldsymbol{\theta}_n, u_n) \neq (\boldsymbol{\theta}_n', u_n') \Rightarrow P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid z_n, u_n; \boldsymbol{\theta}_n\right) \neq P\left(\mathbf{y}_n, \mathbf{x}_n \mid z_n, u_n'; \boldsymbol{\theta}_n'\right),$$

and hence identification is satisfied. ∎

Furthermore, conditions for the non-parametric identification of $p(\mathbf{u})$, from the observation of u_n, for all $n \in N$, can be obtained as an application of the previously cited results on interacting systems of conditional probabilities in Follmer (1974), Section 3, and Preston (2008). In particular, it is required that the process u_n has a Markovian (and homogeneous) structure across populations $n \in N$ and that it satisfies *Moderate Social Influence* conditions.

Proof of Proposition 2. Under our assumptions the correspondence $L(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$ is compact valued and measurable selections are non-atomic. It follows that the set induced by Aumann integration, $\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$, is compact.

Consider now the problem $\max_{l(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}|\mathbf{z};\boldsymbol{\theta}) \in \mathbf{L}(\mathbf{z};\boldsymbol{\theta})} l(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{x}|\mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$ Because of compactness of $\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{z}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$ a maximum exists and the argmax is a upper-semi-continuous function of θ.

Consistency of the maximum-likelihood estimator (for an identified set of parameters) now follows along the standard path of arguments: i) the strong Law of Large Numbers in fact holds for upper-semi-continuous functions; see Lebanon (2008), Proposition 1 (from Ferguson, 1996, Theorem 16(a); and non-negativity of the KL divergence applies to arbitrary densities (see Lebanon (2008)). ∎

The **Proof of Proposition 3** is straightforward. Consistency of the second step, given π_n P, does not require any extension of the standard result for maximum-likelihood estimators. As long as π_n and P are estimated consistently, then θ_n will be as well.

B Appendix: Simulation results for all schools

School ID	N	Local int. (J)	Percentage of smokers					Pct. Diff.
			Data	Simulated eq.	Equil. 1	Equil. 2	Equil. 3	
13	444	7.78	15.5	15.1	0.2	15.4	100.0	15.3
18	417	3.48	19.7	20.1	2.4	18.9	100.0	16.6
23	427	6.40	22.2	18.3	0.1	22.1	100.0	22.0
29	602	7.28	15.9	13.1	0.2	15.8	100.0	15.7
31	866	4.25	23.7	23.7	0.7	23.3	100.0	22.6
33	479	3.19	23.2	24.4	2.2	22.6	100.0	20.4
34	418	3.48	16.3	13.6	4.3	15.3	100.0	11.1
35	501	3.52	19.2	16.2	2.3	18.8	100.0	16.5
40	458	5.75	22.9	19.7	0.2	22.8	100.0	22.6
41	1056	2.67	5.9	5.3	5.9	17.2	99.9	0.0
42	679	5.01	18.9	18.6	0.6	18.7	100.0	18.2
44	939	2.37	18.2	16.9	7.8	17.3	99.8	9.5
47	452	3.79	24.6	24.3	1.1	24.2	100.0	23.2
49	896	3.97	19.0	17.3	1.6	18.5	100.0	16.9
50	1085	3.63	18.3	19.0	2.1	18.1	100.0	16.0
52	479	2.66	7.1	9.2	8.0	13.5	99.9	0.0
53	935	2.32	19.8	17.2	7.5	19.0	99.7	11.5
54	448	4.05	25.2	26.6	0.6	25.0	100.0	24.4
56	1093	6.50	18.7	17.6	0.2	18.5	100.0	18.3
57	421	2.73	21.6	18.8	4.5	20.8	99.9	16.3
58	578	2.95	33.6	32.5	1.4	33.0	99.9	31.6
60	1105	3.87	21.2	18.6	1.4	20.7	100.0	19.3
62	1510	2.45	22.7	20.5	5.6	22.0	99.7	16.4
65	1225	3.45	6.4	7.0	7.9	100.0	—	0.0
67	449	3.91	24.9	24.3	0.8	24.7	100.0	24.0
71	549	3.24	20.9	22.8	2.5	20.6	100.0	18.2
72	899	0.14	24.4	25.0	24.8	—	—	0.0
73	422	3.41	15.2	17.1	4.1	14.4	100.0	10.3
74	435	3.53	20.7	20.5	2.1	20.1	100.0	18.0
76	662	5.50	16.2	17.4	0.7	16.0	100.0	15.3
77	818	2.44	9.0	8.8	9.3	13.9	99.8	0.0
82	452	6.64	20.6	16.8	0.1	20.3	100.0	20.2
86	911	2.72	19.5	17.1	5.4	18.4	99.9	13.1
87	450	2.88	23.3	21.3	3.9	22.2	99.9	18.4
91	862	2.09	25.3	25.2	7.6	24.4	99.2	16.8
149	484	6.74	9.1	9.7	1.3	8.8	100.0	7.6
259	936	5.11	26.3	24.8	0.2	26.0	100.0	25.8
267	402	2.85	17.9	13.9	5.8	16.6	99.9	10.8
268	792	2.50	9.6	10.0	9.8	99.9	—	0.0
269	711	7.48	26.6	25.5	0.1	26.5	99.9	26.4
271	552	5.67	9.1	7.6	2.3	8.6	100.0	6.3
Simple average								15.0
Weighted average (by n. of students)								14.3

Table 12: Equilibrium smoking, actual smoking, and percent difference with lowest smoking equilibrium in every school

| School ID | N | Percentage of smokers | | | Pct. Diff. |
		Data	Simulated eq.	Equilibrium	
13	444	15.5	100.0	99.8	-84.4
18	417	19.7	93.4	93.5	-73.7
23	427	22.2	99.6	99.3	-77.4
29	602	15.9	99.9	100.0	-84.0
31	866	23.7	95.7	96.5	-72.0
33	479	23.2	89.3	88.1	-66.1
34	418	16.3	91.8	90.7	-75.5
35	501	19.2	93.9	90.8	-74.7
40	458	22.9	99.0	99.3	-76.1
41	1056	5.9	85.4	86.8	-79.5
42	679	18.9	99.1	98.5	-80.2
44	939	18.2	81.4	80.8	-63.1
47	452	24.6	91.5	91.2	-66.9
49	896	19.0	96.1	96.1	-77.1
50	1085	18.3	95.5	94.9	-77.1
52	479	7.1	86.2	85.4	-79.1
53	935	19.8	78.6	74.4	-58.8
54	448	25.2	94.6	94.9	-69.4
56	1093	18.7	99.8	99.6	-81.1
57	421	21.6	83.9	80.8	-62.2
58	578	33.6	74.1	72.0	-40.5
60	1105	21.2	94.3	93.7	-73.1
62	1510	22.7	78.3	79.2	-55.5
65	1225	6.4	95.3	96.5	-88.9
67	449	24.9	93.9	92.9	-69.0
71	549	20.9	91.0	91.3	-70.0
72	899	24.4	27.3	27.3	-2.9
73	422	15.2	94.0	94.8	-78.8
74	435	20.7	92.5	93.3	-71.8
76	662	16.2	99.5	99.8	-83.3
77	818	9.0	82.6	82.5	-73.5
82	452	20.6	99.6	99.6	-79.0
86	911	19.5	84.6	83.0	-65.1
87	450	23.3	81.1	80.7	-57.7
91	862	25.3	70.4	70.4	-45.1
149	484	9.1	100.0	99.8	-90.9
259	936	26.3	97.2	97.5	-70.9
267	402	17.9	86.3	86.3	-68.3
268	792	9.6	85.0	85.9	-75.4
269	711	26.6	99.8	99.7	-73.1
271	552	9.1	99.8	99.8	-90.7
Simple average					-70.7
Weighted average (by n. of students)					- 69.8

Table 13: Simulation with global interactions set to zero; equilibrium smoking, actual smoking, and percent difference with lowest smoking equilibrium in every school

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