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ABSTRACT

Low-skill workers are comparatively immobile: when labor demand slumps in a city, low-skill workers are disproportionately likely to remain to face declining wages and employment. This paper estimates the extent to which (falling) housing prices and (rising) social transfers can account for this fact using a spatial equilibrium model. Nonlinear reduced form estimates of the model using U.S. Census data document that positive labor demand shocks increase population more than negative shocks reduce population, this asymmetry is larger for low-skill workers, and such an asymmetry is absent for wages, housing values, and rental prices. GMM estimates of the full model suggest that the comparative immobility of low-skill workers is not due to higher mobility costs per se, but rather a lower incidence of adverse labor demand shocks.

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1 Introduction

When a city experiences an adverse labor demand shock, the share of the adult population with a college degree tends to decline (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). A standard explanation for this pattern is that barriers to mobility are greater for low-skill workers (Topel, 1986; Bound and Holzer, 2000).¹

This paper proposes and tests an alternative explanation which focuses on why low-skill workers may be disproportionately compensated during adverse labor demand shocks, rather than why it may be disproportionately costly for them to out-migrate. This explanation has two components. First, as documented below, adverse shocks substantially reduce the cost of housing. This fact and the existing evidence that the expenditure share on housing declines with income imply that low-skill workers are disproportionately compensated by housing price declines.² Second, means-tested public assistance programs disproportionately compensate low-skill workers during adverse shocks. I document below that, not surprisingly, aggregate transfer program expenditures are highly responsive to local labor market conditions.

These two different types of explanations – one based on mobility costs and one based on compensating factors – are not incompatible; however, their relative importance ultimately determines the actual incidence of local labor demand shocks. If out-migration of workers is low primarily because of mobility costs, then the incidence of local labor demand shocks will be primarily borne by workers; additionally, to the extent that mobility costs are greater for low-skill workers, they may disproportionately bear the incidence of the adverse shock. Alternatively, if the incidence of adverse local labor demand shocks is primarily

¹The existence of greater barriers to mobility for low-skill workers is consistent with a large empirical literature that has documented that the local labor supply elasticity is larger for high-skill workers than for low-skill workers. For example, Bound and Holzer (2000) find that the elasticity of local labor supply with respect to wages is significantly higher for college-educated workers than for workers with no more than a high school education. Similarly, Topel (1986) finds that local labor demand shifts generate much smaller wage differentials among more educated workers. Topel writes “consistent with the greater geographic mobility of more educated workers, their wages are less sensitive to both current and future changes in relative employment.”

²Of course, if low-skill workers are homeowners and not renters, then there is a negative wealth effect in addition to the decline in the user cost of housing following a negative local labor demand shock. Consistent with much of the recent urban economics literature (e.g., Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and Moretti (2009)), I assume in the model below that everyone is a renter. I also explore alternative specifications which assume that the demand for housing is homothetic, so that the expenditure share on housing is assumed to be the same for high-skill and low-skill workers.

borne by immobile housing and social insurance programs, then low-skill workers will be disproportionately compensated and, consequently, less likely to out-migrate.

In this paper, I develop and estimate a spatial equilibrium model which captures how wages, population, housing prices, and transfer payments re-equilibrate following a shift in local labor demand. The model is based on the spatial equilibrium model in Roback (1982). Following Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), the model in this paper allows for a concave local housing supply curve, arising from the durability of the local housing stock.³ While the Glaeser and Gyourko model assumes perfect mobility, I allow for heterogeneous mobility costs which limit spatial arbitrage, as in Topel (1986). Unlike the preceding models, I explicitly model local labor demand.

To give the basic intuition of the model, consider the following simplified version.⁴ The main conceptual experiment in the model is that a single city experiences a (positive or negative) labor demand shock while a large number of other cities remain unchanged. Figures 1 and 2 provide graphical representations of the different equilibrium responses of wages, population and housing prices for four scenarios, depending on whether housing supply is constant elasticity or asymmetric and whether workers are perfectly mobile or face mobility costs when out-migrating.

Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium response when the elasticity of supply of housing is constant.⁵ The figure shows a positive shift in the labor demand curve which raises wages by Δ . This increase in wages causes in-migration, which bids up housing prices until the increase in housing costs exactly offsets the wage increase (thus restoring the equilibrium no-arbitrage condition for workers). If workers are perfectly mobile, then the figure shows that the effect of a negative shock ($-\Delta$) is *symmetric*; i.e., wages, housing prices, and population adjust by equal and opposite magnitudes (as shown by L_-^A in the figure). This

³Throughout the paper I use the term “concave housing supply curve” to imply that positive housing demand shocks increase housing prices less than equal-sized negative shocks reduce housing prices. More formally, a concave housing supply curve implies that $\partial^2(\text{housing price})/\partial(\text{housing supply})^2 < 0$.

⁴In this simplified version of the model, workers in a city inelastically supply labor so that net migration fully determines local labor supply. Workers also do not differ in productivity, and there are no transfer payments. The full model below introduces high-skill and low-skill workers as well as transfer payments. Firms are perfectly mobile so that labor demand is perfectly elastic. Homogeneous housing units are supplied by absentee landlords who live in other cities, and workers consume a fixed expenditure share of housing (s_h).

⁵This is equivalent to assuming that the housing supply curve is log-linear.

symmetry comes from the log-linearity of the housing supply curve and the perfect mobility of workers. If, alternatively, workers face non-negligible mobility costs, then there will be less out-migration following a negative shock. With non-negligible mobility costs, the no-arbitrage condition is now that the marginal worker must be indifferent between staying and paying c to out-migrate. In this case, both the population and housing price responses are *asymmetric*: positive shocks increase population and housing prices more than negative shocks reduce them (see L_-^B in the figure). Intuitively, while mobility costs constrain out-migration, they do not similarly constrain in-migration because there are a large number of potential in-migrants with negligible mobility costs (since the single city is assumed to be small relative to the rest of the world). Therefore, the increase in population following a positive shock is the same whether or not workers face heterogeneous costs of out-migration (see L_-^+ in the figure)

In Figure 2, the housing supply elasticity is no longer constant. Specifically, housing is more elastically supplied following an increase in housing demand than a decrease in demand. As discussed in greater detail in the main text below and in Online Appendix Section A.2, this asymmetric housing supply curve is consistent with a simple model of durable housing where housing units are not destroyed once created (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). When workers are perfectly mobile, housing prices respond symmetrically (despite the asymmetry in the housing supply curve). Intuitively, housing costs still must adjust to exactly offset the wage changes. Only population responds asymmetrically (as shown by L_-^C in the figure). However, if workers have heterogeneous mobility costs to out-migrate as described above, then in this case the asymmetry of the population response is even greater (see L_-^D in the figure), and housing prices also respond asymmetrically.

These scenarios give the intuition for the following two implications of the full model derived below: (1) if positive labor demand shocks increase population more than negative shocks reduce population, this suggests the existence of a concave housing supply curve and/or heterogeneous mobility costs, and (2) if positive shocks increase housing prices more than negative shocks reduce housing prices, that is consistent with the existence of heterogeneous mobility costs. The full model below shows that these implications continue to hold in a richer setting with transfer payments and two types of workers.

The model guides the empirical strategy, which consists of two steps. In the first step,

I test for asymmetric responses of wages, employment, population, and housing prices to symmetric labor demand shocks. The validity of this exercise requires constructing plausibly exogenous positive and negative shifts in local labor demand of equal magnitude. This paper follows Bartik (1991) in constructing an instrumental variable for local labor demand shocks by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares. I find robust evidence using U.S. Census data that positive local labor demand shocks increase population (and employment) more than negative shocks reduce population (and employment) and that this asymmetry is greater for low-skill workers. These robust asymmetric relationships for local population and employment contrast sharply with the absence of any evidence of a similar asymmetric relationship for (any measure of) wages, housing values, and rental prices, though all of these other variables respond strongly to local labor demand.⁶ As the spatial equilibrium model makes clear, these results are consistent with a concave local housing supply curve and limited mobility costs. While the Bartik (1991) procedure has been widely used in labor economics and urban economics, to my knowledge this is the first paper which uses this procedure to explicitly test for asymmetric responses of wages, employment, and population to local labor demand shocks.

To quantitatively estimate the magnitude of mobility costs by skill and the shape of the housing supply curve, in the second step of the empirical analysis, I estimate the full spatial equilibrium model using a nonlinear, simultaneous equations GMM estimator. The GMM estimates suggest that the housing supply curve is concave and that mobility costs (defined as a fraction of income) are at most modest and are comparable for both high-skill and low-skill workers. The GMM results reveal several other important findings. First, the observed asymmetric population responses are primarily accounted for by an asymmetric housing supply curve rather than due to substantial barriers to mobility. Second, the results

⁶The model in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) predicts a concave relationship between housing prices and the exogenous labor demand, and these authors find supportive evidence of this prediction using an exogenous shock based on climate. As discussed in more detail in the Online Appendix Section A.4, the key difference between the model in this paper and the model in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) is that the model in this paper assumes that housing units are homogeneous, while in the Glaeser and Gyourko model housing units have heterogeneous, location-specific amenities. In other words, in the Glaeser and Gyourko model, exogenous shocks induce compositional changes in the distribution of location-specific amenities in the housing stock, and these compositional changes affect the (unconditional) average housing price. The difference in empirical results comes from the fact that Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) use mean temperature to construct local amenity shocks based on a dummy variable for whether or not the January mean temperature is greater than 29.1 degrees whereas I use variation in local labor demand.

suggest that the observed difference in out-migration by skill is primarily accounted for by transfer payments rather than to differences by skill in housing expenditure shares. Third, the results suggest that the primary explanation for the comparative immobility of low-skill workers is not higher mobility costs per se, but rather a lower incidence of adverse local labor demand shocks. Consequently, much of the incidence of adverse labor demand shocks is diffused to homeowners, landlords, and public assistance programs.⁷

Finally, I use the GMM estimates to construct counterfactual estimates of how local labor markets would adjust to shocks if the system of means-tested transfer payments was replaced with a system of mobility subsidies for both high-skill and low-skill workers. In this alternative system, the skill composition of the local labor force is much less responsive to shifts in local labor demand, but population continues to respond strongly asymmetrically due to the asymmetric housing supply curve.

The estimation of the full model necessarily requires stronger assumptions than were needed to test for asymmetric responses to shocks. In order to be able to consistently estimate the *relative* magnitude of mobility costs by skill, I must assume that unobserved changes in local amenities induced by local labor demand shocks are not differentially valued by high-skill and low-skill workers. To be able to consistently estimate the *absolute* magnitude of mobility costs, however, a stronger assumption is needed; namely, that unobserved changes in local amenities are uncorrelated with local labor demand shocks. Because of this, the analysis of the absolute magnitudes of mobility costs should be interpreted more cautiously.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy and the data. Section 4 presents the reduced form empirical results. Section 5 investigates the robustness of these results. Section 6 presents GMM estimates of the full model. Section 7 concludes.

⁷There is a related literature on the effect of income on migration (Kennan and Walker, 2009) and the effect of welfare decisions on the individual migration decision (Kennan and Walker, 2008). Both of these papers are highly complementary to this paper, as they employ a very different empirical approach. Kennan and Walker (2008) use NLSY data to estimate a rich structural model of migration. Their data set of welfare-eligible women with a high-school education contains 88 moves (out of 3,466 person-year observations and 694 individuals), and the data are used to identify the effect of income on migration probability. Also related to this paper is the recent literature on the causal effect of education and geographic mobility (Wozniak, 2006; Malamud and Wozniak, 2008).

2 Theoretical Framework

This section presents a simple spatial equilibrium model of a local labor market that captures how wages, population, housing prices, and transfer payments re-equilibrate following a local labor demand shock.⁸ The heart of the model is a no-arbitrage condition in which the marginal worker is indifferent between remaining in the city receiving the shock and moving away (Roback, 1982). This condition implicitly defines a local labor supply curve which determines the amount of migration in response to a labor demand shock. The model below allows for mobility costs, which limit spatial arbitrage and cause the incidence of the labor demand shock to fall at least partially on workers (Topel, 1986).⁹ Additionally, the model admits two types of workers (high-skill and low-skill) who differ in productivity, imperfectly substitute in production, and may potentially differ in their housing expenditure shares, eligibility for transfer payments, and mobility costs. If an adverse labor demand shock causes relatively greater out-migration of high-skill labor, the model clarifies when this is because the incidence of the shock is borne by other factors that disproportionately compensate low-skill workers and when this is due to greater barriers to mobility for low-skill workers.

The conceptual experiment is that a single city (out of a large universe of cities) experiences a labor demand shock between the first and second period. For simplicity, the model is presented as a two-period model in order to rule out the effects of long-run expectations, the differences between temporary and permanent shocks, the option value from moving, and other issues arising in dynamic spatial equilibrium models. I focus on decadal changes in the empirical analyses below in order to minimize the influence of these other factors, and I leave a rigorous treatment of these dynamics for future work.

To give the general intuition of the model, consider an adverse local labor demand shock in a city. This shock will reduce wages, which encourages out-migration and, ultimately, lowers housing prices until the no-arbitrage condition is restored for the marginal worker. The amount of out-migration is determined by the magnitude of mobility costs, the generosity of

⁸The model is a “local general equilibrium” model in the sense that labor demand shocks affect non-labor markets within the city; however, it is not a full general equilibrium model because when the single city is shocked, the (minimal) effects on the rest of the universe are ignored.

⁹Topel (1986) is primarily concerned with understanding differences between permanent and transitory shocks; in the simple two-period model in this paper, all shocks are necessarily permanent.

transfer payments, and the elasticity of supply of housing in response to a decline in housing demand.

The four main components of the model (labor demand, transfer payments, housing market, and labor supply) are now discussed in detail.

2.1 Labor Demand

Assume a large number of cities indexed by i , and define the (large) number of high-skill and low-skill workers in city i and time t as H_{it} and L_{it} . Production of the homogeneous tradable good y is given by the following CES aggregate production function:¹⁰

$$y_{it} = \theta_{it}((1 - \lambda)L_{it}^\rho + \lambda(\zeta H_{it})^\rho)^{\alpha/\rho}$$

where λ is a share parameter, α measures the returns to scale of the labor aggregate, ζ is the relative efficiency of high-skill labor and ρ is related to the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill labor by $\sigma_{H,L} \equiv 1/(1 - \rho)$.¹¹ The θ_{it} term is a city-specific index of local labor demand. In the empirical section below, I argue that my instrumental variable for local labor demand is a plausibly exogenous source of variation in θ_{it} .

Assuming wages are set on the demand curve, then they are given by the following marginal productivity conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} w_{it}^H &= \alpha \theta_{it} ((1 - \lambda)L_{it}^\rho + \lambda(\zeta H_{it})^\rho)^{(\alpha-\rho)/\rho} \lambda \zeta (\zeta H_{it})^{\rho-1} \\ w_{it}^L &= \alpha \theta_{it} ((1 - \lambda)L_{it}^\rho + \lambda(\zeta H_{it})^\rho)^{(\alpha-\rho)/\rho} (1 - \lambda) (L_{it})^{\rho-1} \end{aligned}$$

Totally differentiating the above wage expressions results in the following conditions for the evolution of wages in terms of exogenous labor demand shock ($\Delta\theta_{it}$) and the endogenous

¹⁰For simplicity, capital is not included in the model. This could be important if part of the incidence of labor demand shocks falls on owners of capital. Since the empirical results are based on decadal changes, it seems reasonable to assume that the elasticity of supply of capital over this time period is fairly large.

¹¹Let μ be the share of high-skill workers in the labor market. Then if $\lambda = (1 - \mu)^{\rho-1} / ((\zeta\mu)^{\rho-1} + (1 - \mu)^{\rho-1})$, ζ will give the equilibrium wage premium.

migration responses (ΔH_{it} and ΔL_{it}):

$$\Delta w_{it}^H = \Delta \theta_{it} + ((\rho - 1) + (\alpha - \rho)(\pi)) \Delta H_{it} + (\alpha - \rho)(1 - \pi) \Delta L_{it} \quad (1)$$

$$\Delta w_{it}^L = \Delta \theta_{it} + ((\rho - 1) + (\alpha - \rho)(1 - \pi)) \Delta L_{it} + (\alpha - \rho)(\pi) \Delta H_{it} \quad (2)$$

where $\pi = \lambda(\zeta H)^\rho / ((1 - \lambda)L^\rho + \lambda(\zeta H)^\rho)$, and the Δ operator represents the percentage change over time.

2.2 Transfer Payments

Means-tested public assistance programs are available only to low-skill workers and are modeled as a constant elasticity function of wages:¹²

$$t_{it} = \bar{T} \cdot (w_{it}^L)^\Psi$$

where t_{it} is the transfer income for the representative low-skill worker, \bar{T} is a constant, and Ψ is the elasticity of public assistance income with respect to low-skill wages. The constant elasticity assumption is a simplification; empirically, I do not find robust evidence of a nonlinear or asymmetric effect of labor demand shocks on aggregate expenditures on transfer programs, so this assumption appears to be a reasonable approximation. The equations above imply the following expression for the evolution of transfer income in response to changes in low-skill wages:

$$\Delta t_{it} = \Psi \Delta w_{it}^L \quad (3)$$

I assume $\Psi < 0$, which implies that transfer programs provide wage insurance, and I define s_t^L as the share of total income that comes from transfer programs for low-skill workers; for high-skill workers, $s_t^H = 0$.

¹²Using PSID data from 1990, I calculate that 0.5% of households receiving AFDC income during the past year had a household head with at least a college degree. Among households receiving food stamps during the past year, the fraction is 0.7%. The percentages for a household head with a high school education or less are 79.1% (AFDC) and 82.6% (Food Stamps).

2.3 Housing Market

A homogeneous housing stock is supplied by absentee landlords, and the aggregate housing supply curve is given by $H^S(p_{it}^h)$, where p_{it}^h is the price of housing. Workers have identical preferences over housing and the homogeneous tradable consumption good. Existing empirical estimates suggest that housing consumption is a normal good with an income elasticity of demand less than one; for example, Polinsky and Ellwood (1979), find a (permanent) income elasticity of 0.80 – 0.87. These results imply that the demand for housing is non-homothetic and suggest that the expenditure share of housing should be lower for high-skill workers. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, this is evident in the cross-section: in 1995, the housing expenditure share declines by more than 8 percentage points going from bottom 20% in income to top 20% in income distribution, declining from 38.5% to 30.0%.¹³ Defining s_h^H and s_h^L as the housing expenditure shares for high-skill and low-skill workers, respectively, then these facts indicate that $s_h^L > s_h^H$. In the GMM estimates below, I report results assuming $s_h^L > s_h^H$ and results which assume $s_h^L = s_h^H$.

Instead of assuming a specific utility function to derive the demand for housing, I instead approximate aggregate demand for housing as follows

$$H^D(p_{it}^h) = \frac{s_h^H w_{it}^H H_{it} + s_h^L (s_t^L t_{it}^L + (1 - s_t^L) w_{it}^L) L_{it}}{p_{it}^h}$$

This expression is an approximation since I am implicitly assuming that any changes in income induced by a shift in labor demand are small so that income effects can be ignored. Empirically, the changes in wages within skill groups are small relative to the differences in wages across skill groups, so this assumption is sensible.

The initial supply-demand equilibrium in housing market in the first period is given by $H^S(p_{it}^h) = H^D(p_{it}^h)$. Totally differentiating this equilibrium condition gives the following expression for the housing market response:

$$\Delta p_{it}^h + \Delta H^S(\Delta p_{it}^h) = \nu(\Delta y_{it}^H + \Delta H_{it}) + (1 - \nu)(\Delta y_{it}^L + \Delta L_{it}) \quad (4)$$

¹³Expenditure share by quintile (going from lowest to highest income quintile) is the following: 38.5%, 32.9%, 31.8%, 30.0%, and 30.0%.

where ν is the high-skill share of aggregate housing demand and Δy_{it}^j gives the change in total income for skill group j ($\in \{H, L\}$); i.e., $\Delta y_{it}^j = s_t^j \Delta t_{it}^j + (1 - s_t^j) \Delta w_{it}^j$. If the housing supply curve has constant elasticity, then $\Delta H^S(p_{it}^h) = \sigma \cdot \Delta p_{it}^h$. Since housing is a durable good, however, the housing supply elasticity is not likely to be constant. Instead, the housing supply elasticity will be larger for increases in housing demand than for decreases in housing demand due to the durability of the housing stock (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). Formally, durable housing implies that $\Delta H^S(\Delta p_{it}^h)$ is increasing in Δp_{it}^h . The Online Appendix Section A.4 presents a simple model which provides microfoundations for a concave housing supply curve based on slow depreciation of the housing stock and a heterogeneous distribution of costs of supplying housing.

2.4 Labor Supply

For simplicity, I assume that workers inelastically supply labor to their local labor market, so that all variation in local employment comes only from migration decisions. The local labor supply curve is then implicitly defined by a mobility condition which states that the marginal migrant must be indifferent between remaining in city i and moving to any other city.

I introduce costly spatial arbitrage by assuming that workers have heterogeneous mobility costs. I construe mobility costs broadly to encompass both financial and psychic barriers to out-migration as well as heterogeneous tastes and distastes for a given location. Thus unlike Topel (1986), I allow mobility costs to take on positive and negative values. Positive values encompass both actual moving costs as well as preferences for the current city, while negative values represent distaste of potential in-migrants for a given area. Formally, I model this by assuming that mobility costs for workers in city i are independently drawn from distributions $M_i^H(m)$ and $M_i^L(m)$ (with support $[0, \infty)$), while the mobility costs of in-migrating into city i for the workers living in all of the other cities are drawn from the distributions $M_{-i}^H(m)$ and $M_{-i}^L(m)$ (with support $(-\infty, 0]$). Mobility costs are defined as a fraction of total income, so that the marginal migrant receiving $(w + t)$ in city i will pay $(w + t)m$ to out-migrate. These mobility cost distributions imply mobility cost functions $c^H(\Delta H_{it})$ and $c^L(\Delta L_{it})$, which return the mobility cost of the marginal migrant given the change in population between the first and second period. For a smooth distribution of

mobility costs, the mobility cost function will be strictly decreasing, so that the mobility cost of the marginal migrant increases as more workers out-migrate.¹⁴

To derive the (implicit) labor supply curve for low-skill workers, let $v_i(w_{it}^L + t_{it}^L, p_{it}^h)$ be the indirect utility function for the marginal low-skill worker in city i . Spatial equilibrium in the first period requires that the following condition holds for the marginal low-skill migrant in city i :

$$v_i(w_{it}^L + t_{it}^L, p_{it}^h) = v_j(w_{jt}^L + t_{jt}^L, p_{jt}^h) \quad \forall j \neq i$$

Now consider a shock to θ_i in city i . The shock will cause a wage differential which will encourage costly migration to arbitrage the wage and employment differential, and the price of housing and transfer payments will also adjust as a local general equilibrium response to the shock. Differentiating the above spatial equilibrium condition and applying Roy's Identity results in the following expression:

$$(1 - s_t^L)\Delta w_{it}^L + s_t^L \Delta t_{it}^L - s_h^L \Delta p_{it}^h + c^L(\Delta L_{it}) = 0 \quad (5)$$

where s_t^L ($= t^L/(w^L + t^L)$) is public assistance income as a share of total income. An analogous expression holds for high-income workers (where $s_t^H = 0$):

$$\Delta w_{it}^H - s_h^H \Delta p_{it}^h + c^H(\Delta H_{it}) = 0 \quad (6)$$

Equations (5) and (6) are implicit labor supply curves because net migration is determined by the spatial equilibrium condition for the marginal migrant. In words, the conditions above state that the change in indirect utility in response to changes in wages, transfer payments, and housing prices must equal the mobility costs of the marginal migrants. The ΔL_{it} and ΔH_{it} terms represent the amount of net migration that needs to occur to make these two equations hold.

¹⁴Note that this two-period model contains two important simplifications which make it straightforward to study mobility costs. First, following Topel (1986), gross migration will always equal net migration, so that there is only one marginal migrant per worker type in each city. The work of Artuc, Chaudhari, and McLauren (2009) and Chaudhari and McLauren (2007) suggest a tractable way to relax this assumption and allow gross migration flows to exceed net migration flows. Second, the mobility cost function is allowed to be asymmetric, but since this is a two-period model the shape of this function does not depend on the history of past shocks. In a fully dynamic model, the history of past shocks may affect the elasticity of supply of in-migrants and out-migrants.

These two equations highlight the three reasons discussed in the introduction why net migration rates may differ by skill. First, public assistance programs are means-tested, so that $s_t^L > s_t^H$. Second, low-skill workers consume a larger fraction of their income on housing $s_h^L > s_h^H$, meaning that housing price declines disproportionately compensate low-skill workers. Finally, the mobility cost functions may differ by skill. If low-skill workers typically face higher mobility costs following a negative shock, then $c^L(x) > c^H(x) \forall x < 0$.

2.5 Equilibrium

Following an exogenous shock to local labor demand ($\Delta\theta_{it}$), the new equilibrium of the model is defined by the following conditions:

- Labor demand adjusts so that high-skill and low-skill wages equal marginal products (equations (1) and (2)).
- Transfer payments adjust according to changes in low-skill wages (equation (3)).
- Housing prices adjust so that the change in housing demand equals the change in housing supply (equation (4)).
- Population adjusts so that the marginal high-skill and low-skill migrant is indifferent between staying and leaving (equations (5) and (6)).

Although the nonlinearities in the housing supply curve ($\Delta H^S(\Delta p_{it}^h)$) and the mobility cost functions ($c^H(\Delta H_{it})$ and $c^L(\Delta L_{it})$) preclude analytical solutions without particular functional form assumptions, Section A.2 in the Online Appendix derives comparative statics for specific scenarios under the special case of constant returns to scale of production ($\alpha = 1$).

Figure 3 reports results from simulating the model.¹⁵ The figure shows that if population responds asymmetrically, it suggests the existence of a concave housing supply curve and/or the existence of heterogeneous mobility costs. The responsiveness of housing prices isolates the importance of heterogeneous mobility costs, since mobility costs cause immobile workers to bid up the price of housing during negative shocks, causing housing prices to respond

¹⁵The details of the simulation are given in Section A.3 in the Online Appendix.

asymmetrically. Therefore, the model suggests that it is possible to identify both mobility costs and the shape of the housing supply curve by using information on the joint responses of wages, population, housing prices, and transfer payments to exogenous labor demand shocks.

These simulations motivate the two-part empirical strategy below. First, I will estimate nonlinear reduced form regressions to test for asymmetric responses to labor demand shocks. Second, I will carry out a full estimation of the model to recover the parameters which govern the distribution of mobility costs and the shape of the housing supply curve.

3 Empirical Strategy and Data

As the model makes clear, the reduced form relationships between each of the endogenous variables (Δw^H , Δw^L , ΔH , ΔL , Δp^h , Δt^L) and the labor demand shock $\Delta\theta$ are informative about the shape of housing supply curve and the presence of heterogeneous mobility costs. This motivates the following reduced form estimating equation:

$$\Delta x_{it} = g^x(\Delta\theta_{it}) + \alpha_t + \Delta\varepsilon_{it}$$

where i indexes cities, t indexes time periods, x is one of the endogenous variables above, α_t captures proportional shocks to all cities in a given time period, ε_{it} is an error term, and $g()$ is a function to be estimated. Nonparametric estimates of $g()$ are reported graphically below. In addition to the nonparametric estimates, I also parameterize $g^x(\Delta\theta)$ as $\beta(\Delta\theta) + \delta(\Delta\theta)^2$ which leads to the following baseline reduced form empirical specification that is reported in the tables:

$$\Delta x_{it} = \beta \times \Delta\theta_{it} + \delta \times (\Delta\theta_{it})^2 + \alpha_t + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{7}$$

where x is the endogenous variable of interest, β and δ are the coefficients on a quadratic in $\Delta\theta_{it}$, and α_t are year fixed effects. This reduced form specification is estimated by OLS using a proxy for local labor demand (described below). The quadratic specification allows the elasticity of x_{it} with respect to θ_{it} to vary: specifically, the elasticity at $\Delta\theta_{i,t} = 0$ is given by $\hat{\beta}$, while $\hat{\beta} + 2\hat{\delta}\Delta\theta_{it}$ is the elasticity at $\Delta\theta_{it}$. Since the equation is estimated in first differences it implicitly controls for time-invariant differences across geographic areas,

while the inclusion of year fixed effects captures any (proportional) changes in x_{it} common to all cities. Formally, the statistical test of $\delta \neq 0$ is sufficient to establish that positive and negative shifts in labor demand of equal magnitude have unequal effects. However, this test is evaluating the null hypothesis of a linear relationship against a specific parametric alternative. Therefore, I will also report nonparametric specification tests which test the null hypothesis of a linear relationship against a nonparametric alternative (Ellison and Ellison, 2000).

Lastly, I also estimate the full model developed above to recover flexible estimates of the mobility cost functions of high-skill and low-skill workers and the housing supply curve parameters. The estimation is a nonlinear, simultaneous equations problem, and it is implemented using a two-step GMM estimator. The details of the GMM procedure are described in more detail below.

3.1 An Omnibus Instrumental Variable for Local Labor Demand

In order to estimate equation (7) above, a valid instrumental variable for local labor demand is needed. I follow the empirical strategy of Bartik (1991) and construct a measure of plausibly exogenous labor demand shocks derived by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares.¹⁶ This relative demand index can be used to predict changes in wages and employment. The identifying assumption is that changes in industry shares at the national level are uncorrelated with city-level labor supply shocks and therefore represent plausibly exogenous (demand-induced) variation in metropolitan area employment. This predicted employment variable (\hat{E}_{it}) is used to create a predicted change in local area employment ($\Delta\hat{\theta}_{it}$) as follows: $\Delta\hat{\theta}_{i,t} = (\hat{E}_{it} - E_{i,t-\tau})/E_{i,t-\tau}$. This measure is used as a proxy for $\Delta\theta_{it}$.¹⁷

The key identifying assumption is that this proxy is uncorrelated with unobserved shocks

¹⁶See Blanchard and Katz (1992), Bound and Holzer (2000), Autor and Duggan (2002), and Luttmer (2005) for other applications of this instrumental variable.

¹⁷Formally, predicted employment growth is computed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_{it} &= \sum_{k=1}^K \varphi_{i,k,t-\tau} \left(\frac{v_{-i,k,t} - v_{-i,k,t-\tau}}{v_{-i,k,t-\tau}} \right) \\ \hat{E}_{it} &= (1 + \pi_{i,t})E_{i,t-\tau} \\ \Delta\hat{\theta}_{it} &= (\hat{E}_{it} - E_{i,t-\tau})/E_{i,t-\tau}\end{aligned}$$

to local labor supply. In this paper a stronger assumption is also needed – specifically, I must assume that $\Delta\theta_{i,t} = X$ and $\Delta\theta_{i,t} = -X$ represent shifts in local labor demand of plausibly equal magnitude. This requirement gives a clear advantage to the Bartik procedure over other identifiable shocks to local labor demand, as this instrumental variable is an *omnibus* measure of changes in local labor demand. By contrast, if one were to use identifiable shifts to labor demand such as movements in oil prices, coal prices, or other natural resource shocks it would require that equal-sized positive and negative price changes represent equal-sized shifts in local labor demand. This may be difficult to justify in natural resource industries that are typically characterized by high amounts of specific capital and/or irreversible investments. A related benefit of the Bartik procedure is that subsets of industries can be excluded when constructing the instrumental variable to verify that the results are not driven by particular sectors.

3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics

The data sources are briefly described here. The Data Appendix (Online Appendix Section A.1) gives more detail on how the data set was created.

Census Integrated Public Use Microsamples (IPUMS) The basic panel of metropolitan area data comes from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census individual-level and household-level extracts from the IPUMS database (Ruggles et al., 2004).¹⁸ The baseline data are limited to individuals and households living in metropolitan areas. The IPUMS data are used to construct estimates of local area wages, employment, population, housing prices, and rental prices in each metropolitan area. The primary advantage of the Census data is the ability to construct city-level measures disaggregated by skill. These data are also used to construct the predicted labor demand instrumental variable by using the industry categories of the individuals in the labor force. See the Data Appendix for remaining details.

Regional Economic Information System (REIS) The metropolitan-area measures of expenditures on public assistance programs are computed by aggregating the county-level aggregate data in the REIS. The REIS contains annual county-level data on total

where $\varphi_{i,k,t-\tau}$ is the employment share of industry k in city i and $v_{-i,k,t}$ is the national employment share of industry k excluding city i .

¹⁸The 2007 American Community Survey (ACS) is included as a robustness check. The 1970 Census is not used at all because it identifies only a small subset of the MSAs that appear in later years.

expenditures broken down by transfer program (e.g., food stamps, income maintenance programs, public medical benefits, veterans benefits, SSI benefits). Counties are aggregated into metropolitan areas using the 1990 Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) definitions. Because of the difficulty in aggregating counties into MSAs within Alaska and Virginia during this time period, MSAs in these states are dropped from the baseline sample. Though the data are not disaggregated below the county-level, the data are based on government agency reports and are therefore quite reliable. According to recent work by Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009), aggregate expenditure data may be sometimes preferable to individual or household survey data due to substantial underreporting in the latter.¹⁹ All transfer program measures are adjusted per low-skill capita based on the non-college adult population.

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the final data set.

4 Results

4.1 Graphical Evidence

Figures 4 and 5 report nonparametric reduced form estimates for the primary dependent variables. In addition to the nonparametric estimates, linear estimates are graphed for comparison. The figures also display bootstrapped (uniform) 95% confidence intervals.²⁰ The confidence intervals are very wide at the extremes, making it difficult to reject the null hypothesis that the data are described by any linear relationship. However, in some cases the confidence intervals reject the specific linear relationship estimated using a parametric linear model, though this visual test ignores estimation error in the linear model. Consequently, the nonparametric specification tests reported below will be useful in assessing whether the data reject the null hypothesis that the parametric linear model is appropriate.²¹

¹⁹Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009) find substantial underreporting of benefit receipt in a wide range of data sets, including the CPS, PSID, SIPP, PSID, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey for a wide range of transfer programs. They also document that the under-reporting is not consistent over time.

²⁰The bootstrapped confidence intervals are computed based on 10,000 replications, where MSAs are sampled with replacement. In each bootstrap step, an undersmoothed local linear bandwidth is chosen following Hall (1992). That paper reports Monte Carlo results which suggest that undersmoothing produces confidence interval estimates with greater coverage accuracy than confidence intervals obtained by explicit bias correction. The bandwidth of the Epanechnikov kernel used for point estimation is 0.041; the undersmoothed kernel bandwidth is $0.75 \cdot 0.041 = 0.031$.

²¹In all figures, the nonparametric estimates are local linear regressions. The nonparametric reduced form estimates are also constrained to be monotonic following the rearrangement procedure of Chernozhukov,

Overall, across all of the graphs the only clear evidence of an asymmetric response is for employment and population. The population and employment graphs show a convex relationship with the labor demand instrumental variable. By contrast, there is no evidence of a similar asymmetric relationship for housing values, rental prices, or any measure of wages (wage measures are defined below). As shown by the simulated data in Figure 3, these results are consistent with a concave housing supply curve and limited mobility costs. In order to formally test for the existence of an asymmetric response (and measure the magnitude of the asymmetry when it exists), the next subsection reports results from quadratic specifications and nonparametric specification tests.

4.2 Reduced Form Results

This section reports estimates of equation (7) above to investigate the responsiveness of wages, employment, and population to changes in local labor demand. The baseline reduced form estimating equation is reproduced below:

$$\Delta x_{it} = \beta \times \Delta \hat{\theta}_{it} + \delta \times (\Delta \hat{\theta}_{it})^2 + \alpha_t + \Delta \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

The baseline results are reported in Tables 2 through 4. Table 2 presents results for overall population, employment, and wages. Column (1) shows the results for the total population between the ages of 18 and 64.²² The estimate of β is precise and strongly statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), which verifies that the measure of predicted employment changes strongly predicts actual shifts in local population. The estimate of δ is also economically and statistically significant ($\hat{\delta} = 28.010$, s.e. 7.905). One way to interpret the magnitude of this estimate is to calculate the marginal effect at one standard deviation greater than zero and one standard deviation less than zero; these estimates are -0.152 and 3.757 , respectively, and the difference between these estimates is strongly statistically significant ($p < 0.001$).²³ Additionally, a nonparametric specification test strongly rejects

Fernandez-Val, and Galichon (2003). The rearranged estimates are more efficient under the null hypothesis that the true relationship is (weakly) monotonic. In general, the unconstrained nonparametric estimates are very similar.

²²Results using the population between the ages of 25 and 54 are very similar.

²³Note that the p-value for the test of whether the marginal effects are the same at one standard deviation above and below zero is exactly the same as the p-value for the test of whether the quadratic term is

the null hypothesis that the relationship is linear in favor of a nonparametric alternative ($p < 0.001$).²⁴ In other words, the results in this column suggest that positive changes in local labor demand increase population more than negative changes reduce population. The results for employment in column (2) show evidence of a similar convex relationship. The results in column (3) using the percentage point change in the employment-to-population ratio show that not all of the reduction in local employment from an adverse shock comes from net out-migration; there is also a decline in labor force participation.

The remaining columns of Table 2 explore the consequences of local labor demand shifts on wages. There are (at least) two difficulties in constructing an appropriate wage measure. The first difficulty is that the labor demand shock may induce compositional changes in the population, so that the change in the average wage will be confounded by composition effects. The second difficulty is that changes in labor force participation reduce income per adult, but would be excluded using a measure of average wages based only on employed workers.

I approach these problems by first presenting two measures of changes in wage income which should represent upper and lower bounds of the true change in income holding characteristics of the workers fixed. The first measure (following Bound and Holzer (2000)) is the total wage income per 18-64 adult. This measure will account for demand-induced changes in labor force participation but will also include compositional changes. The results are in column (4) and show a large effect of local labor demand on wages ($\hat{\beta} = 0.959$, s.e. 0.137). The second measure (following Shapiro (2003) and Albouy (2009a, 2009b)) uses the individual-level census data and regresses log wages of employed workers on a large set of controls and MSA fixed effects (see Data Appendix for details). The MSA fixed effect estimated from this regression is a composition-adjusted measure of the wage premium which I define as the “residualized wage”.²⁵ The results in column (5) using this measure show

statistically significantly different from zero.

²⁴I use the nonparametric specification test procedure suggested by Ellison and Ellison (2000), which groups the data into “bins” and creates a test statistic that is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal random variable. To my knowledge, there is not a data-driven procedure to select the proper bin width; therefore, I view the nonparametric specification test as complementary to the quadratic specification. While the nonparametric specification test does not rely on a specific parametric alternative, it is not possible to ensure that I have the right size and power in constructing my statistical tests. In almost all of the results that follow, inference based on the quadratic specification and the nonparametric specification test is similar.

²⁵This measure is similar to the local wage premiums calculated in Shapiro (2003) and Albouy (2009a,

a much smaller wage response ($\hat{\beta} = 0.353$, s.e. 0.086). However, this second measure does not account for changes in labor force participation. Assuming that at least some of the observed change in labor force participation is involuntary, then this measure will understate the total effect of the demand shock. To address this concern, I take the residualized wage measure and multiply it by the observed labor force participation rate.²⁶ I call this the “adjusted wage” and use this as the preferred wage measure. This measure accounts for both compositional changes in the labor force in response to the shock as well as changes in labor force participation, and therefore essentially assumes that reservation wages are negligible. Consequently, I expect this measure to provide an overestimate of mobility costs when I ultimately estimate the full model via GMM. As a way of bounding the estimated magnitude of mobility costs, I also report GMM estimates which use the residualized wage instead of the adjusted wage. The residualized wage will give a lower bound on the estimated magnitude of mobility costs, as it assumes reservation wages are approximately equal to accepted wages for all employed workers.

As expected, the magnitude of the effect of local labor demand for adjusted wages lies in between the other two wage measures ($\hat{\beta} = 0.520$, s.e. 0.109). Since the magnitude of changes in labor force participation is modest, the estimates for adjusted wages are closer to the estimates for residualized wages than the estimates using the per capita income measure. Regardless of the measure of wages used, however, the important conclusion that emerges from columns (4) through (6) is that there is no evidence of an asymmetric response of wages to shifts in local labor demand in any of the wage measures. It is only population and local employment which respond asymmetrically.

Table 3 reports results on population, employment and wages separately for high-skill and low-skill workers. I define low-skill workers as those without a college degree, and high-skill workers as those with at least a college degree. The patterns in Table 2 are reproduced when looking separately within each skill group: population and employment respond asymmetrically, and there is no evidence of a similar asymmetric response for either

2009b). This measure does not control for unobservable changes in the composition of labor force. If unobservable changes in composition of labor force move in the same direction as observable changes, then the measured response of wages will be upward biased, and estimates of mobility costs will be conservative.

²⁶Note that when I present results by skill below, I use the labor force participation rate in the given skill group to adjust the residualized wage measure.

high-skill or low-skill wages. Furthermore, the magnitude of the wage effects are similar across high-skill and low-skill workers, consistent with the assumption that the labor demand shifts are factor-neutral.²⁷ Additionally, columns (5) and (6) show that the skill composition of the adult population and labor force also responds asymmetrically. In other words, negative shocks reduce college share of adult population more than positive shocks increase college share.

Next, Table 4 looks at three important non-labor outcomes: real estate rental prices, housing values, and aggregate expenditures on public assistance programs. The measures of average rental prices and housing values are purged of observable changes in the quality of the housing stock following a similar procedure to the one used to create the residualized wage measure (see Data Appendix for details). Column (1) in Table 4 reports results for rental prices, which respond strongly to local labor demand. The results for housing values in column (2) are similar in magnitude, though somewhat less precise. As with the wage results, there is no evidence of an asymmetric response in either column; the estimates of δ are statistically insignificant and at most modest in magnitude, and the nonparametric specification tests fail to reject the parametric (linear) model in both columns.²⁸ Appendix Table A2 reports similar results using the unconditional average rental prices and average housing values, as well as results using the repeated-sales housing price index (HPI) published by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), formerly the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). Consistent with the results in Table 4, there is no evidence of an asymmetric response in any of these alternative specifications.

Lastly, column (3) reports estimates using aggregate expenditures on Food Stamps and Income Maintenance Programs. The results show that expenditures on these programs respond strongly to local labor market conditions. The estimated magnitude of the response is large ($\hat{\beta} = -2.367$) and implies that a 1% decline in local labor demand increases aggregate expenditures on these two programs by 2.4%. Though the quadratic term is marginally significant ($p = 0.074$), the nonparametric test does not reject the linear model ($p = 0.241$),

²⁷Results from stacked regressions do reject that the average wage response for high-skill workers is the same as the average wage response for low-skill workers ($p = 0.523$).

²⁸Additionally, results from stacked regressions reject that the quadratic terms are the same for population and rental prices ($p = 0.0004$) and reject that the quadratic terms are the same for population and housing values ($p = 0.001$).

suggesting that the nonlinear relationship estimated in the quadratic specification is not robust.²⁹

A setting in which population and employment respond asymmetrically to positive and negative labor demand shocks while wages, rental prices, and housing values respond symmetrically is consistent with the model simulation where mobility costs are limited and the housing supply curve is concave. Before moving beyond this qualitative conclusion to quantitative estimates of mobility costs and housing supply curve parameters, I next document that these reduced form results are not driven by unobserved trends, outliers, sample selection, or heterogeneous industry-specific effects. After that, I conclude by estimating the full model above using a nonlinear GMM estimator.

5 Robustness

5.1 Industry Trends

The main results in Table 2 emphasize the importance of asymmetric employment and population responses to local labor demand shocks, and the absence of a similar asymmetric response for wages, housing prices, and transfer payments. The key identifying assumption in interpreting these results is that equally-sized positive and negative predicted changes in local employment represent shifts in local labor demand of plausibly equal magnitude. Because the predicted changes are formed by interacting cross-sectional variation in industrial composition with national changes in industry shares, an obvious concern is that qualitatively different industries are declining and expanding. If these industries would not be expected to have otherwise identical responses to shifts in local labor demand (perhaps because of differences in relative demand for high-skill labor, the amount of specific human capital in the industry, or the ability of firms in the industry to respond and adjust to shocks), then this would cast doubt on the interpretation of the results as tracing out an asymmetric local labor supply curve.

To investigate this concern, I categorize industries based on their decadal changes in total

²⁹Appendix Table A3 reports estimates for various other transfer programs, including Medicare, Disability Benefits, SSI, and Veterans Benefits, and the results are qualitatively similar. I focus on Food Stamps and Income Maintenance income because these programs are explicitly designed to smooth consumption.

national employment. Industries are grouped into one of four categories:

1. *Persistently expanding/declining industries.* Industries where employment either increased in every decade or decreased in every decade.
2. *Stable industries.* Industries where employment did not increase or decrease more than 20% in any of the decades.³⁰
3. *Volatile industries.* Industries that experienced employment growth of more than 20% and decreases of more than 20% during the sample period.
4. *Other industries.* Industries not otherwise categorized.

The top twenty industries according to average national employment share in each of these categories are listed in Appendix Table A1. The industries in each of the categories conform to expectations given the secular industry trends during this time period. Persistently expanding industries are concentrated in services, health care, data processing, and leisure goods, while persistently contracting industries are in apparel, publishing, manufacturing, and tobacco. Volatile industries include natural resource industries such as oil and gas extraction as well as defense industries. I begin by constructing predicted employment excluding variation in national employment shares for industries that are persistently expanding or persistently declining.³¹ The resulting relative demand index is purged of any variation caused by secular trends in health care, services, and manufacturing. Table 5 reports results from estimating equation (7) using this alternative measure of predicted employment as an instrumental variable for local labor demand. Panel A reports results with the change in adult population as the dependent variable. Column (1) reproduces the results from column (1) in Table 2 for comparison. Column (2) reports results using the predicted employment measure that does not use any variation from industries which are persistently

³⁰If industries are classified as both persistently expanding/declining and stable, I categorize the industry as stable. This definition and the cutoff of 20% were chosen to give roughly equal-sized categories. Results are similar with nearby cutoffs.

³¹Formally, predicted employment growth is computed by using only the subset of industries which pass a given filter:

$$\pi'_{i,t} = \sum_{k \in K' \subset K} \varphi_{i,k,t-\tau} \left(\frac{v_{-i,k,t} - v_{-i,k,t-\tau}}{v_{-i,k,t-\tau}} \right)$$

where K is the set of all industries and K' is the set of industries which pass the filter.

expanding or persistently declining. The point estimates in column (2) are fairly similar to the baseline estimates reproduced in column (1). Columns (3) through (5) report results excluding each of the other industry categories when constructing predicted employment, and the results are also quite similar to the baseline results in column (1). I interpret these results as suggesting that the estimated asymmetric population response is not primarily caused by heterogeneous industry-specific effects.

A related concern is that because of the way that the IPUMS creates consistent industry codes across time, there are “catch-all” industry codes that collect industries which are not otherwise categorized. I label an industry code a catch-all industry code if it contains the word “miscellaneous” or contains the suffix “not elsewhere categorized.” These catch-all industry codes make up roughly 10% of the industry codes. These catch-all categories may represent different collections of industries in different decades, which may bias the main estimates. To investigate this concern, I create an alternative measure of predicted employment which does not use any variation in national employment shares of these industries. The estimates using this predicted employment measure are reported in column (6) and are similar to the results in column (1), suggesting that there is no significant bias from including these catch-all categories.

Panels B and C of Table 5 report results which repeat this exercise using adjusted wages and rental prices as the dependent variables, respectively. Consistent with the baseline results in Tables 2 and 4, none of the estimates in any of the columns show evidence of an asymmetric relationship between adjusted wages or rental prices and labor demand.³²

5.2 Alternative Specifications

I next turn to an investigation of the robustness of the main results by reporting alternative specifications which vary the sample definition and the set of time-varying controls used. The purpose of these specifications is primarily to investigate the possibility of sample selection bias and the potential bias from unobserved trends that are correlated with shifts in local labor demand. As with Table 5, Table 6 reports results using population, adjusted

³²Interestingly, the magnitude of the (linear) response of adjusted wages and rental prices to local labor demand varies somewhat depending on the industries used to generate predicted changes in employment, suggesting that the strength of the proxy for local labor demand may vary depending on the set of industries used to generate the proxy.

wages, and rental prices (respectively) as the dependent variables in each of the panels. All columns report results from estimating variants of equation (7). In all panels, column (1) reports the baseline results for comparison. Column (2) reports results from adding data on the 2000-2007 changes.³³ Column (3) creates “pseudo-MSAs” by grouping together all individuals in a state who are not in an MSA. Column (4) reports long-difference results (using the 1980-2000 change) rather than the stacked decadal changes as in the baseline specification. Columns (5) and (6) report results including alternative sets of geographic and time fixed effects. Column (5) includes region fixed effects for each of the nine census regions which control for region-specific linear time trends, while column (6) includes controls for MSA-specific linear time trends. Column (7) reports results which test for the importance of outliers. This column drops the 5% of the data with the largest magnitude changes in local labor demand. Finally, column (8) uses the County Business Patterns (CBP) data set to construct the local labor demand instrument rather than using Census data (see Data Appendix for details). The CBP data contain finer industry categories, which in principle could reduce measurement error, but there are two primary drawbacks: first, there is a high rate of suppressed data at the county-by-industry level, and, second, the county-level data must be aggregated.

Panel A of Table 6 reports results using population as the dependent variable. Across all of the columns, the point estimates are very similar to the baseline specification in column (1). The results in column (6) which include MSA-specific linear time trends show a substantial loss of precision, but the point estimates remain stable. The results in column (7) show that the estimated asymmetric response is robust to dropping outlying observations, suggesting that the convex population response is not primarily driven by outliers. The results in column (8) show the results are similar using CBP data to construct the labor demand instrument.

Panels B and C of Table 6 report results using adjusted wages and rental prices (respectively) as the dependent variables. The estimates of δ are never statistically significant at conventional levels, nor are even consistently the same sign across columns. In other words, there is no consistent evidence of an asymmetric response of adjusted wages or rental prices

³³The 2000-2007 changes are translated into implied decadal changes by first calculating annual percentage changes.

to local labor demand shocks.

Lastly, Appendix Table A4 reports specifications which drop each one (of nine) census regions. This table confirms that the results do not appear to be driven by any particular region.

In summary, the reduced form patterns of a significant asymmetric response of population and employment to changes in local labor demand appear robust and contrast sharply with a lack of similar asymmetric responses for wages, housing values, and rental prices.

6 GMM Estimates

The reduced form results presented above directly test for the existence of asymmetric responses of wages, population, employment, and housing prices to symmetric labor demand shocks. While revealing, these results do not estimate any of the economic parameters in the theoretical model and are therefore not quantitatively informative about the distribution of mobility costs by skill and the actual incidence of labor demand shocks. This section reports results from a joint estimation of the full model using a nonlinear, simultaneous equations GMM estimator. The econometric setup follows from the theoretical model presented above and imposes moment conditions which can be used to identify the parameters of interest. In particular, the GMM estimator can recover flexible estimates of the housing supply curve and mobility cost functions for high-skill and low-skill workers. These estimates can be used to assess the relative importance of housing expenditures, transfer payments, and mobility costs in generating the observed migration patterns in the data. Additionally, because I parameterize the model so that there are more moment conditions than (remaining) parameters to estimate, the GMM estimator admits a chi-squared overidentification test of the full model.

To implement the GMM estimator, the following equations (derived from equations (1)

through (6) in the model above) are used:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta e_{it}^{wH} &= \Delta w_{it}^H - (\Delta \theta_{it} + ((\rho - 1) + (\alpha - \rho)(\pi)) \Delta H_{it} + (\alpha - \rho)(1 - \pi) \Delta L_{it}) \\
\Delta e_{it}^{wL} &= \Delta w_{it}^L - (\Delta \theta_{it} + ((\rho - 1) + (\alpha - \rho)(1 - \pi)) \Delta L_{it} + (\alpha - \rho)(\pi) \Delta H_{it}) \\
\Delta e_{it}^t &= \Delta t_{it}^L - \Psi \Delta w_{it}^L \\
\Delta e_{it}^h &= \Delta p_{it}^h + \Delta H^s(\Delta p_{it}^h) - (\nu(\Delta w_{it}^H + \Delta H_{it}) + (1 - \nu)((1 - s_t^L) \Delta w_{it}^L + s_t^L \Delta t_{it}^L + \Delta L_{it})) \\
\Delta e_{it}^H &= \Delta w_{it}^H - s_h^H \Delta p_{it}^h + c^H(\Delta H_{it}) \\
\Delta e_{it}^L &= (1 - s_t^L) \Delta w_{it}^L + s_t^L \Delta t_{it}^L - s_h^L \Delta p_{it}^h + c^L(\Delta L_{it})
\end{aligned}$$

where i indexes cities, t indexes time, and Δe_{it}^j represent error terms uncorrelated with shifts in labor demand.³⁴ These equations jointly solve the local general equilibrium problem of how wages, employment, housing prices, and transfer payments respond to an exogenous labor demand shift $\Delta \theta_{it}$. The six endogenous variables are the following: Δp_{it}^h , Δw_{it}^H , Δw_{it}^L , ΔH_{it} , ΔL_{it} , and Δt_{it}^L . Note that the error terms are allowed to be freely correlated with each other, which gives rise to simultaneity bias that the GMM estimator is intended to address. The unknowns in the model are the following parameters and functions:

- Transfer income and housing expenditure shares (s_t^L , s_h^L , s_h^H)
- Aggregate share parameters (μ , ν)
- Labor demand parameters (α , ρ , π , ζ)
- Transfer payment elasticity (Ψ)
- Mobility cost functions ($c^L(\cdot)$ and $c^H(\cdot)$)
- Housing supply function ($\Delta H^s(\cdot)$)

³⁴Each of these equations can be derived formally by including error terms which proportionally shift production, housing demand, housing supply, transfer payments, and indirect utility. For example, re-define the equilibrium condition for transfer payments as follows: $t_{it}^L = e_{it}^t \cdot \bar{T}^L (w_{it}^L)^{\Psi^L}$, where e_{it}^t is a random variable which represents unobservable shocks to transfer payment expenditures (and $E[e^t] = 1$). Totally differentiating this condition gives the following expression: $\Delta t_{it}^L = \Psi^L (\Delta w_{it}^L) + \Delta e_{it}^t$, which is the equation used in the GMM estimation.

In order to reduce the number of parameters to estimate, I first impose values of s_t^L , s_h^L , s_h^H based on external information. I compute $s_t^L = 0.05$ by dividing aggregate expenditures on Food Stamps and Income Maintenance Programs by the sum of these expenditures and aggregate low-skill wage income. For the housing expenditure shares, I use $s_h^L = 0.34$ for non-college households and $s_h^H = 0.30$ for college-educated households based on the data presented in Section 2.³⁵

For the labor demand curve, I compute $\pi = 0.37$ based on average wages for high-skill and low-skill workers and average share of high-skill workers in the adult population.³⁶ I compute $\nu = 0.34$ based on the average wages, the skill share, and the housing expenditure shares from above.³⁷ I choose $\rho = 0.29$ based on Katz and Murphy (1992).³⁸ This leaves the returns to scale parameter (α) to be estimated. Although this parameter will be estimated from functional form assumptions, it is still useful to include the two moments of the labor demand curve to check the overall fit of the model.³⁹ I also report results below which drop the labor demand moments.⁴⁰

Finally, I choose the following functional forms for the mobility cost functions and housing

³⁵Average household income is \$82,439 for high-skill households in the baseline sample and is \$48,456 for low-skill households. Assuming $s_h = 0.30$ for high-skill households and income elasticity of 0.8, then $s_h = 0.34$ for low-skill households.

³⁶I compute the wage premium (ζ) as 1.75, which is the average wages of college-educated workers divided by the average wages of non-college workers. I next compute the average share (over this time period) of college-educated workers in the labor force (μ) as 0.25. Using the formula for π in Section 2, this gives $\pi = 0.37$.

³⁷The aggregate housing demand share parameter is computed using given by $\nu = \mu\zeta s_h^H / (\mu\zeta s_h^H + (1-\mu)s_h^L)$.

³⁸Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill labor ($\sigma_{H,L}$) to be 1.4. This gives $\rho = 1 - 1/\sigma_{H,L} = 0.29$.

³⁹Since the instrumental variable shifts the labor demand curve, parameters of the labor demand curve itself are identified from functional form assumptions.

⁴⁰Because the labor demand instrument is measured with error, when using it in the GMM estimation, I rescale it by regressing adjusted wages on the instrument and scale the instrument so that this regression with the rescaled instrument would give a coefficient of 1.0. A more rigorous alternative is to modify the labor demand moments to include an additional parameter (κ) as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta e_{it}^{wH} &= \Delta w_{it}^H - (\kappa\Delta\theta_{it} + ((\rho - 1) + (\alpha - \rho)(\pi)) \Delta H_{it} + (\alpha - \rho)(1 - \pi)\Delta L_{it}) \\ \Delta e_{it}^{wL} &= \Delta w_{it}^L - (\kappa\Delta\theta_{it} + ((\rho - 1) + (\alpha - \rho)(1 - \pi))\Delta L_{it} + (\alpha - \rho)(\pi)\Delta H_{it})\end{aligned}$$

This procedure yields very similar results.

supply elasticity:

$$c^j(x) = \frac{\sigma^j(\exp(\beta^j x) - 1)}{\beta^j} \quad j \in \{L, H\}$$

$$\Delta H^s(x) = \frac{\sigma^h(\exp(\beta^h x) - 1)}{\beta^h}$$

These functions are the exponential transformations suggested by Manly (1976), which represent Box-Cox transformations of exponentiated variables and are defined so that if $\beta^j = 0$, then the functions simplify to $\sigma^j x$. These functions are flexible enough to accommodate interesting curvature with only two parameters, and they are everywhere monotonic and have continuous first derivatives, which greatly simplifies the computation. Ultimately, there are eight remaining parameters to estimate $\{\sigma^h, \beta^h, \sigma^L, \beta^L, \sigma^H, \beta^H, \Psi, \alpha\}$: two housing supply curve parameters (σ^h, β^h) , two low-skill mobility cost parameters (σ^L, β^L) , two high-skill mobility cost parameters (σ^H, β^H) , the responsiveness of transfer payments to low-skill wages (Ψ), and the returns to scale parameter (α).

The resulting GMM estimator solves a nonlinear, simultaneous equations problem, so in order to estimate the nonlinear parameters I need to take nonlinear functions of the instrumental variable ($\Delta\theta$) to achieve identification. I use $\Delta\theta$, $(\Delta\theta)^2$, $(\Delta\theta)^3$, $(\Delta\theta)^4$, and $(\Delta\theta)^5$ as instrumental variables.⁴¹ This results in 30 moment conditions (the five polynomial functions of the instrument \times the six error terms). The full model is estimated using a standard two-step GMM procedure (see Section A.5 of the Online Appendix for details of this procedure).

The GMM estimates are presented in Table 7. The first row presents the preferred specification using the external estimates discussed above. Columns (1) and (2) report estimates of the housing supply curve. The estimates suggest that the housing supply curve is concave ($\beta^h = 6.306$, s.e. 1.774). One way to interpret the housing supply coefficients is to compute the increase in housing supply when housing prices exogenously rise by 20% (24.1%) and compare it to the decrease in housing supply when housing prices decline by 20% (−6.8%). In other words, the magnitude of housing supply response is about four times larger for an increase in housing prices than for an equal-sized decrease in housing prices.

⁴¹Instead of using simple polynomial functions, I have experimented with various orthogonal polynomials (Chebyshev polynomials, Legendre polynomials, and Hermite polynomials), and the results are very similar.

The estimates of the mobility cost function parameters (columns (3) through (6)) give no evidence of an asymmetric mobility cost function for either high-skill or low-skill workers; the estimates suggest that the mobility cost functions are approximately linear. The point estimates for σ^L and σ^H are precisely estimated and statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting the existence of non-negligible mobility costs. To get a sense of the magnitudes, the point estimates imply that the 10th percentile of mobility costs in a city (i.e., the marginal migrant after 10% of the population has out-migrated following a negative shock) is roughly 17.4% of annual income for high-skill workers and 17.0% of annual income for low-skill workers.⁴² In other words, despite the fact that low-skill workers are disproportionately likely to remain in declining cities following negative shocks, the point estimates imply that high-skill workers have very similar mobility costs as a fraction of income (and therefore that low-skill workers have lower absolute mobility costs on average). Column (8) reports the estimated transfer payment elasticity, which is quantitatively large and precisely estimated; the coefficient implies that a 1% decline in low-skill wages increases transfer payment expenditures by 3.8% (s.e. 0.5%). Column (9) reports estimates of the returns to scale parameter ($\alpha = 1.038$, s.e. 0.025), which suggests that returns to scale are approximately constant; this is also consistent with the reduced form results, which found no evidence of an asymmetric response of wages.⁴³ Lastly, the results in column (10) show that the overidentification test does not reject the null hypothesis that the deviations of the empirical moments from the model are due to chance ($p = 0.515$).

The remainder of Table 7 reports estimates of the full model under alternative economic assumptions. The second row reports estimates assuming that both housing expenditure share and public assistance expenditures do not differ by skill and are negligible (i.e., $s_h^H = s_h^L = 10^{-6}$ and $s_t^H = s_t^L = 10^{-6}$). These estimates verify that ignoring the welfare effects of housing price adjustments and changes in expenditures on public assistance programs results in much larger estimates of mobility costs for both high-skill and low-skill workers. In this scenario, the mobility cost estimates for low-skill workers are significantly larger

⁴²I assume the marginal migrant has 25 years of working life remaining and thus must trade off remaining to face permanently lower wage and employment opportunities against paying the one-time mobility cost to out-migrate and avoid the adverse wage and employment consequences.

⁴³Wages did not respond asymmetrically but population and employment did, which suggests constant returns to scale. If there were decreasing returns to scale, then the asymmetric response of employment to the local labor demand shock would imply an asymmetric wage response, as well.

in magnitude ($\sigma^L = -0.201$ versus $\sigma^H = -0.107$). Also, the difference between these coefficients is highly significant ($p < 0.001$). To compare to the baseline estimates, the mobility costs are roughly three times larger for low-skill workers and two times larger for high-skill workers when ignoring housing costs and transfer payments.⁴⁴

The third and fourth rows report model estimates when only housing and only transfers are “shut down”, respectively. The estimated mobility cost functions from these rows and the first two rows are graphed in Figure 6. Both the figure and the model estimates (see column (9)) suggest that transfer payments are responsible for a majority of the relative difference in mobility by skill. However, the magnitudes of mobility cost estimates are much larger for both types of workers when housing expenditures are ignored. In other words, the asymmetric population response for both high-skill and low-skill workers is primarily due to the asymmetric housing supply curve, while the differential response by skill is primarily due to transfer payments.

The fifth row assumes the demand for housing is homothetic so that the housing expenditure shares are the same across the two skill groups. I choose $s_h^L = s_h^H = 0.33$ to match the average housing expenditure share across the entire population. The results are fairly similar to the baseline results in the first row, implying that the non-homotheticity assumed in the baseline model does not substantially account for the differential out-migration rates by skill.

Rows 6 and 7 in Table 7 report estimates which impose alternative values of $\sigma_{H,L}$. First, I impose $\sigma_{H,L} = 20$, which corresponds to the two types of labor being close to perfect substitutes, and the results are fairly similar. The next row imposes $\sigma_{H,L} = 0.1$, which corresponds to the two types being close to perfect complements, and the housing supply curve estimates are much noisier. Interestingly, the fit of the model is best when using $\sigma_{H,L} = 1.4$ (row 1) following Katz and Murphy (1992), as opposed using either of the two extreme values of $\sigma_{H,L}$.

The next row of Table 7 (row 8) uses an alternative measure of wages. As discussed above, the preferred measure of wages (“adjusted wages”) assumes that most of the observed

⁴⁴The estimated mobility cost functions are also statistically significantly convex, implying that the mobility cost of the marginal out-migrant rises faster than the marginal in-migrant, although the magnitude of the convexity is not large.

change in labor force participation is involuntary. This measure was chosen to provide an upper bound of estimated mobility costs. As an alternative, row 7 reports results using the “residualized wage” measure (see Section 4 for definition). Since residualized wages do not account for changes in labor force participation, the estimated mobility cost parameters are much lower. In fact, using this alternative wage measure, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that mobility costs are zero for low-skill workers. Overall, I conclude that these results suggest that mobility costs for both high-skill and low-skill workers are at most modest. Even under the extreme assumption that reservation wages are negligible, the estimated mobility costs are still much lower than would be implied by focusing solely on wages.⁴⁵

One use of the GMM estimates is to construct out-of-sample counterfactual simulations of alternative policies regarding social transfers. Figure 7 reports results from one such simulation. In this simulation, the system of means-tested transfers (summarized by the parameter Ψ) has been replaced by a system of mobility subsidies which reduces the mobility costs of all workers by 50%.⁴⁶ Each panel in the figure shows the response of a different endogenous variable. The figure shows that the mobility subsidies increase magnitude of low-skill out-migration following adverse shocks relative to the system of means-tested transfer payments. Therefore, the high-skill population share is much less responsive to shifts in local labor demand with mobility subsidies. One motivation for such a policy would be if there exist strong negative externalities from increasing the concentration of low-skill workers in a particular area; in this case, mobility subsidies appear to provide wage insurance to low-skill workers without differentially reducing their incentive to out-migrate.

⁴⁵The final row reports estimates which drop the labor demand curve moments. The reason why alternative assumptions on the elasticity of substitution did not substantially affect the estimated mobility cost functions is that the labor demand moments contribute to identification only indirectly through the optimal GMM weighting matrix estimated in the first step of the two-step procedure. Therefore, it is not surprising that dropping the labor demand moments entirely does not significantly affect the estimates of the mobility cost functions (Table 7, row 8).

⁴⁶Although this is an obviously stylized form of mobility subsidies, it is not an unrealistic approximation if the policy took the form of a tax credit that was indexed to income. Recall that mobility costs in the model are defined as a fraction of annual income.

7 Conclusion

Low-skill workers are comparatively immobile. When labor demand slumps in a city, college-educated workers tend to relocate whereas non-college workers are disproportionately likely to remain to face declining wages and employment. These facts may indicate that mobility is disproportionately costly for low-skill workers. This paper proposes and tests an alternative explanation, which is that the incidence of adverse labor demand shocks is borne in large part by (falling) real estate rental prices and (rising) social transfers. The spatial equilibrium model developed in this paper illustrates how wages, employment, population, housing prices, and transfer payments re-equilibrate after a local labor demand shock. Appropriately parameterized, this model identifies both the magnitude of unobserved mobility costs by skill and the shape of the local housing supply curve.

Using U.S. Census data, nonlinear reduced form estimates of the effect of plausibly exogenous labor demand shocks document that positive labor demand shocks increase population more than negative shocks reduce population, that this asymmetry is larger for low-skill workers, and that such an asymmetry is absent for wages, housing values, and rental prices.

These facts are consistent with the presence of limited mobility costs for high-skill and low-skill workers and a concave housing supply curve (most likely due to a durable housing stock). Estimates of a full spatial equilibrium model using a nonlinear, simultaneous equations GMM estimator are consistent with the reduced form evidence and suggest that the primary explanation for the comparative immobility of low-skilled workers is not higher mobility costs per se, but rather a lower incidence of adverse local demand shocks.

The finding that mobility costs are limited for both high-skill and low-skill workers is a necessary condition to be able to properly interpret changes in housing values due to changes in observed local amenities as a valid marginal willingness to pay for the amenity (see, for example, Chay and Greenstone (2003)). The results in this paper suggest that the assumption of perfect mobility may be a valid approximation in some of these hedonic studies, especially when evaluating changes in local amenities over decadal time horizons.⁴⁷

⁴⁷It is worth stressing that even over decadal time horizons the assumption of perfect mobility is only an approximation. The preferred GMM estimates in this paper imply non-negligible magnitudes of mobility costs for both high-skill and low-skill workers following large negative shocks, suggesting that it may be appropriate to also consider hedonic models which explicitly incorporate barriers to migration when the underlying changes in local amenities are large. See Bayer et al. (2008) for work in this direction.

One important area of future work is how the incidence of local labor market shocks is shared between homeowners and renters. On the one hand, homeowners' "user cost" of housing has declined following a negative labor demand shock; on the other hand, however, declines in housing values have a negative wealth effect which may affect how responsive the household is to local labor demand shocks. A full assessment of the incidence of local labor market shocks thus awaits further study. Another important area of future work is looking at individual transfer programs. For example, the federal disability insurance program rules suggest that the take-up decision is generally a once-and-for-all choice, so that disability insurance receipt is an absorbing state (Autor and Duggan, 2003). The econometric setup in this paper could be used to test whether positive shifts in local labor demand decrease DI takeup by less than negative shifts increase DI takeup.

Lastly, the finding that mobility costs are limited suggests that transfer payments may be significantly crowding out the individual migration decision for low-skill workers, which is consistent with the results in the recent "welfare magnetism" literature (see, for example, Gelbach (2004)). This implies that the social efficiency of public insurance programs may depend on the geographic breadth of an adverse labor demand shock, since when a shock is geographically broad (as during a recession), the gains to relocation are small and there is less scope for transfer payments to crowd out migration.

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Table 1
Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	Standard Dev.	Percentiles				
				5th	25th	50th	75th	95th
<i>U.S. Census Data (IPUMS)</i>								
Adult population (in millions)	645	0.425	0.856	0.060	0.093	0.177	0.392	1.477
Employment (in millions)	645	0.303	0.596	0.041	0.067	0.127	0.283	1.036
Employment-to-population ratio	645	0.711	0.051	0.625	0.680	0.714	0.748	0.786
Income per adult (in \$000s)	645	14.979	3.167	10.516	12.871	14.664	16.674	20.079
Residualized wage (\$)	645	11.545	1.207	9.801	10.718	11.399	12.304	13.712
Residualized wage, LFP adjusted (\$)	645	8.225	1.131	6.593	7.496	8.142	8.911	10.095
College share of adult population	645	0.190	0.063	0.105	0.143	0.181	0.226	0.305
College share of employment	645	0.221	0.065	0.131	0.173	0.213	0.257	0.341
Average housing value (in \$000s)	645	97.449	45.450	58.005	71.527	84.774	107.212	196.809
Average gross rent (in \$000s)	645	5.229	1.014	4.055	4.579	5.017	5.581	7.196
<i>REIS Data</i>								
Food stamps + Income maintenance (in \$000s per non-college adult)	645	0.652	0.325	0.247	0.429	0.594	0.792	1.286

Notes: Baseline sample is a balanced panel of 215 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), and all observations are MSA-year. IPUMS data are the 1980, 1990, and 2000. The REIS data are county-level and annual, but are aggregated to MSAs using the 1990 MSA definitions. All dollar values in this table are nominal, but all dollar-valued variables are converted to real dollars in the analysis. All specifications in subsequent tables are in first differences, so the three decades in this data set become two 10-year changes (thus, N = 430 in the regressions that follow).

Table 2
The Effects of Local Labor Demand Shocks

Dependent Variable:	(1) Population	(2) Employment	(3) Emp-to-Pop Ratio	(4) Income per 18-64 Adult	(5) Residualized Average Local Wage	(6) Residualized Wage, LFP Adjusted ("Adjusted Wage")
% Change in predicted employment (β)	1.802	2.056	0.089	0.959	0.353	0.520
	(0.445)	(0.465)	(0.038)	(0.137)	(0.086)	(0.109)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.019]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) ² (δ)	28.010	32.537	1.210	0.382	-0.756	1.458
	(7.905)	(9.101)	(0.797)	(2.859)	(1.643)	(2.426)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.130]	[0.894]	[0.646]	[0.549]
Marginal effect at $-\sigma$ (A) (i.e., $\beta - 2\delta\sigma$)	-0.152	-0.214	0.005	0.932	0.405	0.419
	(0.847)	(0.898)	(0.055)	(0.205)	(0.156)	(0.174)
	[0.858]	[0.812]	[0.930]	[0.000]	[0.010]	[0.017]
Marginal effect at $+\sigma$ (B) (i.e., $\beta + 2\delta\sigma$)	3.757	4.327	0.174	0.985	0.300	0.622
	(0.535)	(0.658)	(0.077)	(0.274)	(0.130)	(0.225)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.026]	[0.000]	[0.022]	[0.006]
p-value of test (A) = (B)	0.000	0.000	0.130	0.894	0.646	0.549
p-value of nonparametric specification test	0.000	0.000	0.259	0.492	0.628	0.451
R ²	0.315	0.354	0.605	0.670	0.471	0.340
N	430	430	430	430	430	430

Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods, except for column (3) where it is the percentage point change. The Residualized Wage in column (5) controls for observed compositional changes in the labor force between periods. The Adjusted Wage in column (6) uses the Residualized Wage and additionally accounts for changes in labor force participation. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares. The nonparametric specification test tests the null hypothesis that a linear model is appropriate against a nonparametric alternative. See main text and Data Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.

Table 3
Effects of Labor Demand Shocks by Skill

Dependent Variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Adult Population		Total Employed		College Share of ...		Residualized Wage		Adjusted Wage	
	College	Non-College	College	Non-College	... Adult Population	... Total Employed	College	Non-College	College	Non-College
% Change in predicted empl. (β)	1.925 (0.544) [0.000]	1.609 (0.436) [0.000]	2.196 (0.553) [0.000]	1.860 (0.457) [0.000]	0.051 (0.024) [0.036]	0.039 (0.027) [0.151]	0.296 (0.080) [0.000]	0.346 (0.085) [0.000]	0.467 (0.100) [0.000]	0.514 (0.107) [0.000]
(% Change in predicted empl.) ² (δ)	35.204 (10.363) [0.001]	28.057 (7.692) [0.000]	36.980 (10.993) [0.001]	32.896 (8.834) [0.000]	-0.816 (0.349) [0.020]	-1.022 (0.376) [0.007]	-1.322 (1.399) [0.346]	-0.829 (1.628) [0.611]	-0.498 (2.011) [0.805]	1.525 (2.372) [0.521]
Marginal effect at $-\sigma$ (A)	-0.531 (0.989) [0.592]	-0.349 (0.844) [0.679]	-0.384 (0.999) [0.701]	-0.436 (0.892) [0.625]	0.108 (0.033) [0.001]	0.110 (0.038) [0.004]	0.389 (0.140) [0.006]	0.404 (0.153) [0.009]	0.502 (0.168) [0.003]	0.408 (0.169) [0.017]
Marginal effect at $+\sigma$ (B)	4.382 (0.812) [0.000]	3.566 (0.494) [0.000]	4.777 (0.889) [0.000]	4.155 (0.619) [0.000]	-0.006 (0.035) [0.862]	-0.032 (0.038) [0.397]	0.204 (0.110) [0.066]	0.288 (0.129) [0.027]	0.432 (0.176) [0.015]	0.621 (0.222) [0.006]
p-value of test (A) = (B)	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.020	0.007	0.346	0.611	0.805	0.521
p-value of nonparam. specification test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.134	0.073	0.621	0.612	0.605	0.428
R ²	0.558	0.240	0.569	0.262	0.772	0.751	0.432	0.659	0.472	0.210
N	430	430	430	430	430	430	430	430	430	430

Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods, except in columns (5) and (6) which report percentage point changes in the college share. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares. See Table 2, main text, and Data Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.

Table 4
Effects of Labor Demand Shocks on Housing Market
and Public Assistance Expenditures

Dependent Variable:	(1) Residualized Rental Prices	(2) Residualized Housing Values	(3) Food Stamps + Income Maintenance Expenditures
% Change in predicted employment (β)	0.842 (0.151) [0.000]	0.714 (0.360) [0.048]	-2.367 (0.615) [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) ² (δ)	-0.999 (2.758) [0.717]	-2.765 (6.310) [0.662]	-21.779 (12.139) [0.074]
Marginal effect at $-\sigma$ (A)	0.912 (0.243) [0.000]	0.907 (0.580) [0.119]	-0.847 (1.030) [0.412]
Marginal effect at $+\sigma$ (B)	0.773 (0.247) [0.002]	0.521 (0.558) [0.351]	-3.887 (1.064) [0.000]
p-value of test (A) = (B)	0.717	0.662	0.074
p-value of nonparametric specification test	0.596	0.295	0.241
R ²	0.099	0.144	0.403
N	430	430	430

Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts and the REIS database. The REIS database contains total county-level expenditures on Food Stamps and Income Maintenance programs. These data are aggregated to MSAs using 1990 MSA definition and adjusted per non-college capita using MSA population estimates from the Census. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares. See Table 2, main text, and Data Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.

Table 5
Effects of Alternative Measures of Labor Demand Shocks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Industries Used to Construct Change in Predicted Employment					
	All Industries	Drop Trending	Drop Volatile	Drop Stable	Drop Other	Drop Catch-All
Panel A: Dependent Variable is % Change in Population						
% Change in predicted employment (β)	1.802	3.768	2.170	1.855	1.692	2.196
	(0.445)	(0.667)	(0.538)	(0.455)	(0.578)	(0.545)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.004]	[0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) ² (δ)	28.010	30.589	35.251	30.662	45.861	43.311
	(7.905)	(10.665)	(13.351)	(8.727)	(12.455)	(13.348)
	[0.000]	[0.005]	[0.009]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]
p-value of nonparametric specification test	0.000	0.012	0.002	0.013	0.000	0.000
Panel B: Dependent Variable is % Change in Adjusted Wage						
% Change in predicted employment (β)	0.520	1.180	0.388	0.532	0.478	0.687
	(0.109)	(0.208)	(0.131)	(0.102)	(0.134)	(0.126)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) ² (δ)	1.458	2.543	-0.689	1.909	3.325	0.944
	(2.426)	(4.083)	(2.766)	(2.274)	(3.425)	(2.674)
	[0.549]	[0.534]	[0.803]	[0.402]	[0.333]	[0.724]
p-value of nonparametric specification test	0.451	0.378	0.069	0.211	0.100	0.193
Panel C: Dependent Variable is % Change in Rental Prices						
% Change in predicted employment (β)	0.842	1.328	0.812	0.908	0.727	0.994
	(0.151)	(0.303)	(0.173)	(0.152)	(0.176)	(0.190)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) ² (δ)	-0.999	-6.889	-2.104	0.563	1.012	-4.079
	(2.758)	(5.521)	(3.787)	(2.964)	(3.655)	(3.779)
	[0.717]	[0.213]	[0.579]	[0.850]	[0.782]	[0.282]
p-value of nonparametric specification test	0.596	0.437	0.392	0.556	0.063	0.490

Notes: N = 430. All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares. Column (1) reproduces the baseline specification; remaining columns construct predicted employment changes by excluding alternative sets of industries. See Table 2, main text, Appendix Table A1, and Data Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.

Table 6
Alternative Sample Definitions and Alternative Specifications

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Dependent Variable is % Change in Population								
% Change in predicted employment (β)	1.802 (0.445) [0.000]	1.351 (0.309) [0.000]	1.821 (0.414) [0.000]	2.517 (0.511) [0.000]	1.342 (0.547) [0.015]	1.368 (0.947) [0.150]	1.419 (0.674) [0.036]	0.509 (0.360) [0.158]
(% Change in predicted employment) ² (δ)	28.010 (7.905) [0.000]	18.110 (3.823) [0.000]	24.051 (7.528) [0.002]	30.163 (6.297) [0.000]	25.102 (7.842) [0.002]	32.652 (20.344) [0.110]	38.327 (22.388) [0.088]	17.196 (6.200) [0.006]
p-value of nonparametric specification test	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.015	0.003
Panel B: Dependent Variable is % Change in Adjusted Wage								
% Change in predicted employment (β)	0.520 (0.109) [0.000]	1.224 (0.542) [0.025]	0.432 (0.096) [0.000]	0.242 (0.101) [0.017]	0.590 (0.102) [0.000]	0.896 (0.245) [0.000]	0.423 (0.115) [0.000]	0.418 (0.091) [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) ² (δ)	1.458 (2.426) [0.549]	8.948 (6.080) [0.143]	0.925 (2.229) [0.678]	0.745 (1.240) [0.548]	0.246 (2.256) [0.913]	3.840 (4.521) [0.397]	3.885 (3.259) [0.235]	2.129 (1.316) [0.107]
p-value of nonparametric specification test	0.451	0.475	0.299	0.217	0.584	0.153	0.293	0.363
Panel C: Dependent Variable is % Change in Rental Prices								
% Change in predicted employment (β)	0.842 (0.151) [0.000]	0.663 (0.367) [0.073]	0.804 (0.135) [0.000]	0.791 (0.134) [0.000]	0.728 (0.145) [0.000]	0.934 (0.364) [0.011]	0.821 (0.173) [0.000]	0.814 (0.126) [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) ² (δ)	-0.999 (2.758) [0.717]	-4.675 (5.530) [0.399]	0.178 (2.645) [0.946]	-3.422 (1.652) [0.040]	-2.087 (2.546) [0.413]	4.120 (5.974) [0.491]	3.698 (5.080) [0.467]	1.512 (1.948) [0.438]
p-value of nonparametric specification test	0.596	0.162	0.412	0.136	0.591	0.240	0.317	0.184
<i>Alternative Samples and Alternative Specifications</i>								
Baseline sample (N = 430)	X				X	X	X	X
Add 2000-2007 change (N = 586)		X						
Add in non-MSA regions of states (N = 528)			X					
Long differences (N = 215)				X				
Region-specific linear time trends					X			
MSA-specific linear time trends						X		
Drop outlying 5% shocks							X	
Predicted employment from CBP								X


Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares. Column (1) reproduces the baseline specification; remaining columns construct predicted employment changes using subsets of industries. See Table 2, main text, and Data Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.

Table 7
GMM Estimates of Full Model

Row Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Housing Supply Curve σ^h	Housing Supply Curve β^h	High-Skill Mobility Cost Function σ^H	High-Skill Mobility Cost Function β^H	Low-Skill Mobility Cost Function σ^L	Low-Skill Mobility Cost Function β^L	Transfer Payment Elasticity ψ	Returns to Scale α	H ₀ : $\sigma^L = \sigma^H$ $\sigma^L - \sigma^H$	χ^2 test statistic
(1) Baseline Model	1.201 (0.407) [0.003]	6.306 (1.774) [0.000]	-0.066 (0.016) [0.000]	-1.044 (0.766) [0.174]	-0.065 (0.019) [0.001]	-0.861 (0.738) [0.244]	-3.838 (0.447) [0.000]	1.038 (0.025) [0.129]	-0.001 (0.015) [0.951]	21.088 [0.515]
(2) No Housing; No Transfers	1.009 (0.432) [0.020]	6.472 (2.685) [0.016]	-0.107 (0.017) [0.000]	-0.495 (0.408) [0.226]	-0.201 (0.024) [0.000]	-0.900 (0.276) [0.001]	-4.341 (0.577) [0.000]	1.020 (0.021) [0.336]	0.093 (0.016) [0.000]	25.262 [0.285]
(3) No Transfers	0.872 (0.399) [0.030]	5.604 (2.517) [0.027]	-0.060 (0.016) [0.000]	-1.060 (0.839) [0.207]	-0.119 (0.022) [0.000]	-0.938 (0.484) [0.053]	-4.256 (0.572) [0.000]	1.030 (0.023) [0.192]	0.059 (0.016) [0.000]	18.881 [0.653]
(4) No Housing	1.060 (0.413) [0.011]	6.436 (2.478) [0.010]	-0.106 (0.015) [0.000]	-0.504 (0.410) [0.220]	-0.135 (0.019) [0.000]	-0.775 (0.286) [0.007]	-4.225 (0.509) [0.000]	1.020 (0.020) [0.316]	0.029 (0.014) [0.042]	25.593 [0.270]
(5) $s_H = s_L = 0.33$	1.151 (0.413) [0.006]	6.318 (1.875) [0.001]	-0.059 (0.016) [0.000]	-1.141 (0.875) [0.193]	-0.067 (0.019) [0.000]	-1.005 (0.739) [0.174]	-3.889 (0.450) [0.000]	1.035 (0.024) [0.145]	0.007 (0.015) [0.611]	20.406 [0.558]
(6) $\sigma_{H,L} = 20$	2.019 (0.654) [0.002]	5.844 (1.539) [0.000]	-0.033 (0.013) [0.015]	0.847 (0.443) [0.057]	-0.038 (0.015) [0.016]	0.495 (0.541) [0.361]	-3.626 (0.455) [0.000]	0.994 (0.030) [0.849]	0.005 (0.005) [0.360]	25.320 [0.282]
(7) $\sigma_{H,L} = 0.1$	0.601 (0.221) [0.007]	10.748 (2.128) [0.000]	-0.065 (0.013) [0.000]	-1.954 (0.810) [0.016]	-0.066 (0.016) [0.000]	-1.334 (0.667) [0.046]	-3.695 (0.410) [0.000]	1.236 (0.020) [0.000]	0.001 (0.014) [0.939]	38.345 [0.017]
(8) Alternative Wage Measure (Residualized Wages)	0.662 (0.363) [0.069]	8.611 (2.806) [0.002]	-0.032 (0.010) [0.003]	-3.011 (1.304) [0.021]	-0.007 (0.006) [0.286]	-10.391 (2.715) [0.000]	-3.315 (0.497) [0.000]	1.062 (0.011) [0.000]	-0.025 (0.011) [0.026]	26.389 [0.235]
(9) Drop Labor Demand Moments	1.209 (0.700) [0.085]	5.305 (3.291) [0.108]	-0.085 (0.022) [0.000]	-0.604 (0.692) [0.383]	-0.079 (0.023) [0.001]	-0.089 (0.626) [0.887]	-4.270 (0.448) [0.000]	N/A	-0.006 (0.015) [0.677]	11.892 [0.537]


Notes: All rows report estimates of the full model using a nonlinear, simultaneous equations GMM estimator. Alternate specifications are presented in each row; parameter estimates are listed in the columns. See Section 6 of main text and Section A.5 of the Online Appendix for more details. Asymptotic standard errors are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets. In column (8), the p-value reported is for the test of whether the point estimate is statistically significantly different from 1.

Figure 1: Constant Housing Supply Elasticity




Notes: This figure displays the equilibrium response when the housing supply elasticity is constant. The initial equilibrium wages, labor supply, and housing prices are given by the dot in the center of the figure. An exogenous increase in wages encourages in-migration until labor supply rises to L_+ . At this point, housing prices have risen to completely offset the increase in wages, restoring the no-arbitrage condition for workers. If there are no mobility costs, then the equilibrium response of an equal-sized exogenous decrease in wages is *symmetric*, as shown by L_-^A . If out-migration is costly, however, then following a negative shock, the marginal out-migrant must be indifferent between staying and paying c to out-migrate. These mobility costs cause both population and housing prices to respond *asymmetrically*: positive shocks increase population and housing prices more than negative shocks reduce them.

Figure 2: Concave Housing Supply Curve




Notes: This figure displays the equilibrium response when the housing supply curve is concave. As the main text and Appendix describe in more detail, a concave housing supply curve is consistent with a durable housing stock that is not destroyed once created. As in figure 1, the initial equilibrium wages, labor supply, and housing prices are given by the dot in the center of the figure. An exogenous increase in wages encourages in-migration until labor supply rises to L_+ . At this point, housing prices have risen to completely offset the increase in wages, restoring the no-arbitrage condition for workers. If there are no mobility costs, then housing prices still respond symmetrically (p_-^C). Intuitively, housing costs still must adjust to exactly offset the wage changes. Only population responds asymmetrically (as shown by L_-^C). If workers have mobility costs, then the asymmetry of the population response is even greater (see L_-^D), and in this case housing prices also respond asymmetrically.

Figure 3: Model Simulations




Notes: This figure displays simulated data from the model described in Section 2. See the Appendix for more details on the simulation. The graphs clarify that an asymmetric response of population to the labor demand shock ($\Delta\theta$) indicates the existence of a concave housing supply curve and/or the existence of heterogeneous mobility costs. The response of housing prices isolates the importance of mobility costs.

Figure 4: Reduced Form Results




Notes: This figure reports nonparametric reduced form estimates using U.S. Census data and REIS data. See Appendix for details on the data set. All graphs are nonparametric local linear regressions. All results include year fixed effects in the nonparametric model. The estimates are constrained to be monotonic following the rearrangement procedure of Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Galichon (2003). The 95 percent uniform confidence intervals are computed using 10,000 bootstrap replications, resampling MSAs with replacement. In each bootstrap step, an undersmoothed local linear bandwidth is chosen following Hall (1992).

Figure 5: Reduced Form Results, Continued




Notes: This figure reports nonparametric reduced form estimates using U.S. Census data and REIS data. See Appendix for details on the data set. All graphs are nonparametric local linear regressions. All results include year fixed effects in the nonparametric model. The estimates are constrained to be monotonic following the rearrangement procedure of Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, and Galichon (2003). The 95 percent uniform confidence intervals are computed using 10,000 bootstrap replications, resampling MSAs with replacement. In each bootstrap step, an undersmoothed local linear bandwidth is chosen following Hall (1992).

Figure 6: GMM Estimates



Notes: This figure reports GMM estimates of the full model. The top figure presents the housing supply curve that is estimated in the baseline model (Table 7, row 1). The middle and bottom figures report estimated mobility functions under various assumptions about housing expenditure shares and transfer payments. See Section 6 and the Appendix for more details on the GMM estimation.

Figure 7: Counterfactual Simulation



Notes: This figure reports simulations based on GMM estimates of the full model. The GMM estimates are used to run simulations similar to those presented in Figure 3. The graphs report results of two simulations: (1) simulation based on estimates of the baseline GMM model using the existing transfer payment system and (2) counterfactual simulation based on same estimates but transfer payment system is replaced with mobility subsidies which reduce mobility costs by 50%.

ONLINE APPENDIX FOR “THE INCIDENCE OF LOCAL LABOR DEMAND SHOCKS”

June 2011

A Appendix

A.1 Data Appendix

U.S. Census Data

The sample of adults used in the analysis includes all individuals between the age of 18 and 64, were not in group quarters such as prisons and psychiatric institutions, and who lived in a metropolitan area available in the Census IPUMS. All available MSAs are used in analysis except for Biloxi-Gulfport, MS, Flint, MI, and Reno, NV. These MSAs are dropped because of obvious mismeasurement of the labor demand shock. Specifically, in at least one of the decades in the sample, these MSAs experienced a greater than one standard deviation labor demand shock according to the predicted labor demand instrument but experienced a greater than one standard deviation change in population and rental prices of the opposite magnitude. All results including these cities are similar.

Individuals are dropped if they report business income, farm income or work in farming or agriculture. Individual labor supply is measured by multiplying weeks worked times usual weekly hours worked. To be included in the sample of workers used to construct the predicted employment measure, the worker must be in the labor force and have positive and non-missing hours worked and annual income.

Individual hourly wages are computed by dividing yearly wage and salary income by the product of weeks worked and usual weekly hours worked. Topcoded yearly wage income values are multiplied by 1.5 and (following Autor and Dorn (2009)) hourly wages are set not to exceed this value divided by (50 weeks \times 35 hours). Local area wage statistics are computed based on the sample of workers who work at least 35 weeks and at least 30 hours per week. Wages are deflated using the CPI-U series.

In order to construct an estimate of the local area wage premium, log wages of the sample described above are regressed on MSA fixed effects, a quadratic in potential experience (age – years of education – 6), 14 industry dummy variables, 6 occupation category dummy variables, and dummy variables for gender, veteran status, marital status, and race. This regression is run each decade and in each decade is run separately for workers with and without a college degree. In each case, the magnitude of the MSA fixed effects corresponds to the local area wage premium. All regressions and calculations of local area averages are computed using the Census individual sampling weights.

The rental price and housing value local area premiums are computed similarly to the wage premiums; namely, I regress the log of these variables on a quadratic in the number of bedrooms and the number of rooms and an interaction between number of bedrooms and number of rooms. These regressions and calculations of (unconditional) average rental prices and housing values use the Census household weights since the housing value and rental price data are reported at the household level. Topcoded rental prices and housing values are multiplied by 1.5.

Regional Economic Information System (REIS)

The REIS data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.¹ I aggregate the county-level data into MSAs using the 1990 MSA definitions. When a county spans multiple MSAs I use 1990 population weights to assign fractions of the county totals across the various MSAs.

County Business Patterns (CBP)

The County Business Patterns data are available from the U.S. Census Bureau and the ICPSR data repository.² I used the 1979, 1989, and 1997 CBP data to match the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census data described above. The 1997 CBP data were chosen because the 1998 and 1999 CBP data use the NAICS industry codes, while the CBP data before 1997 used SIC codes. I use 3-digit SIC industry codes to construct the alternative measure of predicted employment. Roughly 35 percent of the county-by-industry employment cells are suppressed. In these cases, I observe the number of establishments in each establishment size bin and a flag indicating the range of actual employment. To compute predicted employment for these cells, I run a regression each year using the non-suppressed data and use this regression to compute predicted employment for suppressed cells from the fitted values. I then compare total county employment from the raw CBP data to the total county employment computed using the non-suppressed cells and the predicted employment values. If these two values are not within 1%, then I scale all of the predicted employment values by a scalar so as to make the two totals equal, and I then check again that the predicted values lie within the ranges indicated by the employment flag and I continue to repeat this procedure until the two totals are within 1%.

A.2 Comparative Statics

This subsection derives comparative statics for the model described in Section 2 in the special case when there are constant returns to scale ($a = 1$). The comparative statics are derived for the following three scenarios:

- Case 1: No mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity
- Case 2: No mobility costs; concave housing supply curve
- Case 3: Large mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity

Case 1: No mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity

This case corresponds to the following restrictions on the housing supply curve and the mobility cost functions: $c^L(\Delta L_{it}) = 0$, $c^H(\Delta H_{it}) = 0$, and $\Delta H^S(\Delta p_{it}^h) = \sigma \cdot \Delta p_{it}^h$. With no mobility costs and a constant housing supply elasticity, the model readily admits a closed-form solution. Additionally, in this case all endogenous variables respond *symmetrically* – meaning that equal-sized positive and negative exogenous labor demand shocks cause positive and negative shifts of equal magnitude in all of the endogenous variables (Δw_{it}^H , Δw_{it}^L , ΔH_{it} ,

¹See this website for more information: <http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/default.cfm#step2>.

²I downloaded the 1989 and 1997 CBP data from the following URL: <http://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/historical.htm>. The 1979 CBP data were downloaded from ICPSR at the following URL: <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00022>.

$\Delta L_{it}, \Delta p_{it}^h, \Delta t_{it}$). Mathematically, this means that changes in the endogenous variables are linear functions of the exogenous labor demand shocks; i.e., $\Delta x_{it} = \bar{K}^x \Delta \theta_{it}$ where x is one of the endogenous variables in the model. To derive these results, first note that with no mobility costs, housing prices will respond symmetrically to both high-skill and low-skill wages:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta p_{it}^h &= \frac{1}{s_h^H} \Delta w_{it}^H \\ \Delta p_{it}^h &= \left((1 - s_t^L) + s_t^L \Psi^L \right) / s_h^L \Delta w_{it}^L \equiv (\Gamma^L / s_h^L) \Delta w_{it}^L\end{aligned}$$

Next, note that with constant returns to scale, wages for high-skill and low-skill workers can be written as follows:

$$\pi \cdot \Delta w_{it}^H + (1 - \pi) \cdot \Delta w_{it}^L = \Delta \theta_{it}$$

Combining the three previous expressions gives the following:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta w_{it}^H &= (s_h^H \Gamma^L / (\pi s_h^H \Gamma^L + (1 - \pi) s_h^L)) \Delta \theta_{it} \equiv \bar{K}^{wH} \cdot \Delta \theta_{it} \\ \Delta w_{it}^L &= (s_h^L / (\pi s_h^H \Gamma^L + (1 - \pi) s_h^L)) \Delta \theta_{it} \equiv \bar{K}^{wL} \cdot \Delta \theta_{it} \\ \Delta p_{it}^h &= (\Gamma^L / (\pi s_h^H \Gamma^L + (1 - \pi) s_h^L)) \Delta \theta_{it} \equiv \bar{K}^p \cdot \Delta \theta_{it}\end{aligned}$$

In other words, with no mobility costs for workers and firms, wages and housing prices respond symmetrically. Transfer payments will also respond symmetrically since transfer payments are a log-linear function of low-skill wages: i.e., $\Delta t_{it}^L = \Psi^L \cdot \bar{K}^{wL} \cdot \Delta \theta_{it} \equiv \bar{K}^t \cdot \Delta \theta_{it}$.

Finally, with a constant housing supply elasticity, the migration response is also symmetric, since ΔH_{it} and ΔL_{it} can be written as linear functions of Δw_{it}^H , Δw_{it}^L , and Δp_{it}^h . Simple algebra gives the following two expressions:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta H_{it} &= \bar{K}^H \Delta \theta_{it} \\ \Delta L_{it} &= \bar{K}^L \Delta \theta_{it}\end{aligned}$$

where \bar{K}^H and \bar{K}^L are constants that can be written in terms of the primitive parameters of the model ($\alpha, \rho, \pi, s_h^H, s_h^L, s_t^L$).³ In summary, the log-linearity of the housing supply curve and the absence of mobility costs implies that all endogenous variables respond symmetrically to the exogenous labor demand shock.

Case 2: No mobility costs; concave housing supply curve

Formally, this case can be written as follows: $c^L(\Delta L_{it}) = 0$, $c^H(\Delta H_{it}) = 0$, and $\Delta H^S(\Delta p_{it}^h)$ is increasing in Δp_{it}^h . As in the previous case (and following the same derivation), wages, housing prices, and transfer payments all respond symmetrically, with the same constant terms

³The constants \bar{K}^H and \bar{K}^L are defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{K}^H &= \frac{(\bar{K}^{wH} - \bar{K}^{wL}) - (\rho - 1)(\bar{K}^{wH} + \Gamma \bar{K}^{wL} - \bar{K}^p(1 + \sigma))}{2(\rho - 1)s_h^H} \\ \bar{K}^L &= \bar{K}^H - (\bar{K}^{wH} - \bar{K}^{wL})/(\rho - 1)\end{aligned}$$

as above:

$$\Delta w_{it}^H = \bar{K}^{wH} \Delta \theta_{it}; \Delta w_{it}^L = \bar{K}^{wL} \Delta \theta_{it}; \Delta p_{it}^h = \bar{K}^p \Delta \theta_{it}; \Delta t_{it}^L = \bar{K}^t \Delta \theta_{it}$$

In case 2, however, population no longer responds symmetrically to the exogenous shock. To see this, go back to the housing market equilibrium condition and substitute the expressions above:

$$\bar{K}^p \Delta \theta_{it} + \Delta H^S(\bar{K}^p \Delta \theta_{it}) = (\bar{K}^{wH} + (1 - s_t^L) \bar{K}^{wL} + s_t^L \bar{K}^t) \Delta \theta_{it} + \Delta H_{it} + \Delta L_{it}$$

Since the elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill labor is constant, we know that $\Delta w_{it}^H - \Delta w_{it}^L = (\rho - 1)(\Delta H_{it} - \Delta L_{it})$. Combining these two expressions gives the following expressions for ΔH_{it} and ΔL_{it} :

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta H_{it} &= \frac{1}{2} (\Lambda^H \Delta \theta_{it} + \Delta H^S(\bar{K}_1^p \Delta \theta_{it})) \\ \Delta L_{it} &= \frac{1}{2} (\Lambda^L \Delta \theta_{it} + \Delta H^S(\bar{K}_1^p \Delta \theta_{it})) \end{aligned}$$

where Λ^H and Λ^L are constant terms.⁴ Since $\Delta H^S(x)$ is increasing in x , these expressions imply that ΔH_{it} and ΔL_{it} are increasing in $\Delta \theta_{it}$. In other words, because the housing supply curve is concave, the responsiveness of high-skill and low-skill population to exogenous shocks is convex – positive local labor demand shocks increase population more than negative shocks reduce population. It is also possible to show that if $s_h^H < s_h^L < 1$ and $\Psi^L < 0$, and $s_t^L > 0$, then decreases in local labor demand will reduce the fraction high-skill workers in the population.⁵

Case 3: Large mobility costs; constant housing supply elasticity

Formally, this case can be defined as follows: $c^L(\Delta L_{it})$ and $c^H(\Delta H_{it})$ are declining and convex functions and $\Delta H^S(\Delta p_{it}^h) = \sigma \cdot \Delta p_{it}^h$. In this case, the convexity of the mobility cost functions imply that the mobility cost of the marginal migrant is greater in magnitude for decreases in population than for equal-sized increases in population. As mentioned in the introduction, one way this could arise is if the city is small relative to the rest of the world, so that the mobility cost of the marginal in-migrant is negligible. In this case, $c^H(\Delta H_{it})$ would be defined such that $c^H(\Delta H) = 0$ for all $\Delta H_{it} \geq 0$, but $c^H(\Delta H_{it})$ is decreasing in ΔH_{it} for all $\Delta H_{it} < 0$.

In the case where high-skill and low-skill labor differ only in productivity (i.e., $s_t^H = s_t^L = s_t$, $s_h^H = s_h^L = s_h$, $\Psi^H = \Psi^L = \Psi$, and $c^L(x) = c^H(x) \forall x$), it can be shown that wages still respond

⁴The constants Λ^H and Λ^L are defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \Lambda^H &= \bar{K}^p + \bar{K}^{wH} + \bar{K}^{wL} + (\bar{K}^{wH} - \bar{K}^{wL})/(\rho - 1) \\ \Lambda^L &= \Lambda^H - 2(\bar{K}^{wH} - \bar{K}^{wL})/(\rho - 1) \end{aligned}$$

⁵To see this, note that $\Delta H - \Delta L = (K^{wH} - K^{wL})/(\rho - 1) \cdot \Delta \theta$. If $s_h^L > s_h^H$, $\Psi^L < 0$, and $s_t^L > 0$, then $(K^{wH} - K^{wL}) < 0$. Since $\rho - 1 < 0$ (since $\sigma_{H,L} > 0$), this implies $(K^{wH} - K^{wL})/(\rho - 1) > 0$. Thus declines in $\Delta \theta$ will reduce $\Delta H - \Delta L$.

symmetrically as in the previous two cases. By simplifying the problem to make high-skill and low-skill workers identical except for their efficiency units of labor, it is straightforward to show that $\Delta w_{it}^H = \Delta w_{it}^L = \Delta \theta_{it}$ and that $\Delta H_{it} = \Delta L_{it}$. These simplifications result in the following expressions for housing market and labor supply conditions, respectively:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta p_{it}^h \cdot (1 + \sigma) - 2s_h(\Gamma \Delta \theta_{it} + \Delta H_{it}) &= 0 \\ c(\Delta H_{it}) + \Gamma \Delta \theta_{it} - s_h \Delta p_{it}^h &= 0 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $\Gamma = (1 - s_t) + s_t \Psi$. Combining these expressions gives the following:

$$2s_h \Delta H_{it} - (1 + \sigma)c(\Delta H_{it}) = (1 + \sigma - 2s_h)\Gamma \Delta \theta_{it}$$

Since $c(\Delta H_{it})$ is declining and convex, this implies that ΔH_{it} is convex in $\Delta \theta_{it}$.⁶ Since ΔH_{it} is convex in $\Delta \theta_{it}$, then by equation (1), Δp_{it}^h is convex in $\Delta \theta_{it}$. In other words, unlike the other cases, in this case housing prices respond asymmetrically, where positive shocks increase housing prices more than negative shocks reduce housing prices. The intuition is that the convexity of mobility cost function makes out-migration disproportionately costly (as compared to in-migration). Because of these mobility costs, following negative shocks workers are willing to pay more for housing than they would in the absence of mobility costs, which bids up the price of housing following price declines.

A.3 Model Simulation Details

The data used to create Figure 3 are simulated from the model described in Section 2. The same parameters used in the GMM estimation are used in the simulation; i.e., $s_t^L = 0.05$, $s_h^L = 0.34$, $s_h^H = 0.30$, $\rho = 0.29$, $\pi = 0.37$. The returns-to-scale parameter $\alpha = 1$ is used, and the transfer payment elasticity used is $\Psi^L = -5.0$. The mobility cost functions and housing supply function are parameterized as they are in the GMM estimator: i.e., $c^L(x) = \sigma^L(\exp(\beta^L x) - 1)/\beta^L$, $c^H(x) = \sigma^H(\exp(\beta^H x) - 1)/\beta^H$, $\Delta H^s(x) = \sigma^h(\exp(\beta^h x) - 1)/\beta^h$. The values of these parameters depend on the scenario as follows:

- Case 1: $\sigma^H = \sigma^L = 0$, $\sigma^h = 4.0$, $\beta^h = 0$
- Case 2: $\sigma^H = \sigma^L = 0$, $\sigma^h = 2.0$, $\beta^h = 4.0$
- Case 2: $\sigma^H = \sigma^L = -0.2$, $\beta^H = \beta^L = -100$, $\sigma^h = 4.0$, $\beta^h = 0$

A.4 A Simple Model of Durable Housing

This section outlines a model to provide simple microfoundations for a concave housing supply curve (i.e., housing supply elasticity that is larger for increases in housing demand than for decreases in housing demand). As in Section 2, the model here is a two period model, where a

⁶Formally, a sufficient condition for this result to hold is that $(1 - s_t) + s_t \Psi > 0$ and $s_h < ((1 - s_t) + s_t \Psi)(1 + \sigma)$. In words, transfer payments provide partial wage insurance, and housing expenditure share cannot be so large so that negative shocks would cause net in-migration of low-skill labor.

single city is shocked out of a large number of cities. The model includes a labor market and a housing market. Production of a homogeneous tradable good is constant returns to scale and uses only (homogeneous) labor as an input. All workers have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences for housing and the tradable good, so that expenditure share on housing (s_h) is constant.

Housing is supplied by absentee landlords who live in other cities. The housing supply is homogeneous in terms of workers' willingness-to-pay but there are heterogeneous costs to supplying housing (arising, perhaps, from topographic features of the land). This is modeled by assuming that the maximum housing supply is \bar{H}^S (where \bar{H}^S is assumed to be large enough so that we are not close to a corner solution) and that the cost of supplying an infinitesimal unit of housing is distributed according to the following density function: $f(c) = \frac{\sigma^h}{\bar{c}} (c/\bar{c})^{\sigma^h-1}$, where c is drawn from the closed interval $[0, \bar{c}]$. This results in an aggregate housing supply curve of $H^s(p^h) = \int_0^{p^h} \bar{H}^S f(c) dc = \bar{H}^S \cdot (p^h/\bar{c})^{\sigma^h}$. Thus the initial housing market equilibrium is given by the following supply-demand equilibrium condition: $\bar{H}^S \cdot (p_{it}^h/\bar{c})^{\sigma^h} = \bar{H}^D s_h w_{it} n_{it} / p_{it}^h$.

Using a similar simplifying assumption as in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), I assume that housing is occasionally (and randomly) destroyed, and that the cost of rebuilding is the same as the initial cost of building. Mathematically, I assume that just before the labor demand shock, a random fraction δ of the initial housing supply collapses and needs to be re-built. For increases in housing demand, all housing that collapsed is immediately rebuilt in between periods, and housing supply further expands according to the elasticity of housing supply (σ^h). For decreases in housing demand, however, the "effective" housing supply elasticity is now only $\delta \cdot \sigma^h$ because some of the housing that was previously built does not collapse and cannot be destroyed. Unless $\delta = 1$ (i.e., housing is not durable at all and completely collapses between periods), these assumptions imply that the housing supply curve is nonlinear, asymmetric, and concave.

The equilibrium changes in wages, population, and housing prices following an exogenous labor demand shock ($\Delta\theta_{it}$) are as follows. The wage change in the city receiving the shock is $\Delta w_{it} = \Delta\theta_{it}$. Perfect mobility of workers implies that $\Delta w_{it} = s_h \Delta p_{it}^h$. This implies that $\Delta p_{it}^h = \Delta\theta_{it}/s_h$. In other words, both wages and housing prices respond *symmetrically*. For positive labor demand shocks, population increases by $\Delta n_{it} = (1 + \sigma^h) \Delta p_{it}^h - \Delta w_{it} = (1 + \sigma^h - s_h)/s_h \cdot \Delta\theta_{it}$. For negative labor demand shocks, population decreases by $\Delta n_{it} = (1 + \delta \cdot \sigma^h - s_h)/s_h \cdot \Delta\theta_{it}$. Assuming $s_h > 0$, $\sigma^h > 0$ and $0 < \delta < 1$, then positive shocks increase population more than equal-sized negative shocks reduce population.

The key difference between this model and the model in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) is that the marginal value and the average value of housing are equal in the simple model in this section, while in Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) housing units have heterogeneous, location-specific amenities, which causes average housing prices to respond asymmetrically due to compositional changes in the location-specific amenities in the housing stock. The empirical evidence in this paper suggests that housing prices respond symmetrically to exogenous labor demand shocks, which is more consistent with the model in this paper.

A.5 GMM Estimation

There are 30 empirical moments given by the following vector:

$$\mathbf{m} = (\mathbf{m}^1, \mathbf{m}^2, \mathbf{m}^3, \mathbf{m}^4, \mathbf{m}^5)'$$

where

$$\mathbf{m}^d = \begin{bmatrix} \Delta e^h(\Delta\theta)^d \\ \Delta e^{wH}(\Delta\theta)^d \\ \Delta e^{wL}(\Delta\theta)^d \\ \Delta e^H(\Delta\theta)^d \\ \Delta e^L(\Delta\theta)^d \\ \Delta e^t(\Delta\theta)^d \end{bmatrix}$$

The orthogonality conditions are summarized as $E[\mathbf{m}] = 0$. The parameters to estimate are given by the following vector:

$$\boldsymbol{\beta} = (\sigma^h, \beta^h, \sigma^H, \beta^H, \sigma^L, \beta^L, \Psi, \alpha)'$$

The two-step GMM estimator is implemented by first estimating $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^0$ as follows:

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^0 = \arg \min_{\boldsymbol{\beta}} \mathbf{m}'\mathbf{m}$$

This estimate is then used to form the following:

$$\hat{\Phi}^0 = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbf{m}_i(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^0) \cdot \mathbf{m}_i'(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^0)$$

Next, $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$ is re-estimated as follows:

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{GMM} = \arg \min_{\boldsymbol{\beta}} \mathbf{m}'(\hat{\Phi}^0)^{-1}\mathbf{m}$$

Inference is done by computing the following variance-covariance matrix:

$$\hat{V} = \frac{1}{N} \left(\hat{G}'(\hat{\Phi}^1)^{-1}\hat{G} \right)^{-1}$$

where $\hat{\Phi}^1$ is re-estimated using $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{GMM}$ instead of $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^0$, and \hat{G} is given by the following:

$$\hat{G} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \begin{bmatrix} \partial m_i^1 / \partial \boldsymbol{\beta} \\ \partial m_i^2 / \partial \boldsymbol{\beta} \\ \vdots \\ \partial m_i^{30} / \partial \boldsymbol{\beta} \end{bmatrix}$$

Finally, the overidentification statistic is given by:

$$\mathbf{m}'(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{GMM}) \cdot (\hat{\Phi}^0)^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{m}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}^{GMM}) \rightarrow \chi^2(\text{row}(\mathbf{m}) - \text{row}(\boldsymbol{\beta}))$$

Appendix Table A1
Industry Categories (Top 20 List By Average National Employment Share)

Industry Name	Industry Code	Average National Empl. Share	National Employment Growth Rates		
			Mean	Min	Max
<i>Persistently Expanding Industries</i>					
Eating and drinking places	641	3.99%	14.17%	1.39%	32.78%
Offices and clinics of physicians	812	0.93%	25.41%	1.28%	42.59%
Legal services	841	0.79%	32.33%	7.54%	63.76%
Computer and data processing services	732	0.75%	75.71%	20.01%	139.09%
Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services	890	0.47%	15.62%	4.93%	34.52%
Services incidental to transportation	432	0.45%	50.41%	1.48%	85.46%
Services to dwellings and other buildings	722	0.43%	30.51%	4.10%	73.12%
Offices and clinics of dentists	820	0.43%	26.94%	13.17%	54.00%
Personnel supply services	731	0.39%	35.46%	0.80%	62.28%
Landscape and horticultural services	20	0.34%	55.19%	5.36%	158.68%
Detective and protective services	740	0.30%	42.85%	17.52%	103.97%
Residential care facilities, without nursing	870	0.27%	86.39%	33.35%	168.29%
Drugs	181	0.27%	12.75%	3.79%	22.01%
Sporting goods, bicycles, and hobby stores	651	0.23%	17.37%	11.76%	24.11%
Veterinary services	12	0.16%	40.92%	26.99%	54.86%
Retail nurseries and garden stores	582	0.12%	61.71%	12.43%	152.46%
Museums, art galleries, and zoos	872	0.11%	56.61%	28.32%	110.27%
Offices and clinics of optometrists	822	0.05%	25.20%	18.55%	37.94%
Offices and clinics of chiropractors	821	0.05%	92.45%	14.21%	191.25%
<i>Persistently Declining Industries</i>					
Apparel and accessories, except knit	151	0.89%	-39.17%	-59.31%	-18.67%
Aircraft and parts	352	0.65%	-26.94%	-40.51%	-10.53%
Blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling and finishing mills	270	0.51%	-26.75%	-52.32%	-10.65%
Radio, TV, and communication equipment	341	0.48%	-35.55%	-42.74%	-27.94%
Railroads	400	0.48%	-28.70%	-51.27%	-6.72%
Yarn, thread, and fabric mills	142	0.44%	-33.50%	-55.91%	-11.45%
Newspaper publishing and printing	171	0.44%	-15.78%	-20.69%	-13.19%
Laundry, cleaning, and garment services	771	0.39%	-25.61%	-49.71%	-6.59%
Metalworking machinery	320	0.31%	-26.67%	-31.42%	-17.49%
Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills	160	0.31%	-18.36%	-32.41%	-2.25%
Motor vehicles and equipment	500	0.26%	-13.26%	-30.43%	-5.03%
Ship and boat building and repairing	360	0.26%	-21.82%	-33.81%	-6.93%
Beverage industries	120	0.20%	-15.67%	-31.90%	-1.72%
Air force	941	0.20%	-29.65%	-46.78%	-12.51%
Paperboard containers and boxes	162	0.18%	-21.47%	-33.70%	-7.28%
Variety stores	592	0.18%	-47.74%	-48.42%	-47.07%
Canned, frozen, and preserved fruits and vegetables	102	0.18%	-17.75%	-26.05%	-8.16%
Other rubber products, and plastics footwear and belting	211	0.18%	-33.14%	-61.17%	-16.64%
Navy	942	0.18%	-27.63%	-41.14%	-14.12%
Other primary metal industries	280	0.17%	-33.08%	-58.09%	-8.57%
<i>Stable Industries</i>					
Elementary and secondary schools	842	6.53%	3.25%	-3.59%	7.45%
All construction	60	5.94%	5.25%	1.61%	7.99%
Colleges and universities	850	2.21%	5.40%	-5.68%	16.30%
Grocery stores	601	2.06%	-0.70%	-18.49%	19.74%
Insurance	711	2.02%	-1.90%	-10.44%	2.60%
Department stores	591	1.78%	-8.54%	-19.40%	11.30%
Trucking service	410	1.54%	5.91%	1.36%	10.47%
Telephone communications	441	1.21%	-9.32%	-19.93%	3.16%
Motor vehicle dealers	612	0.95%	-1.76%	-8.87%	6.85%
Hotels and motels	762	0.95%	6.60%	-9.80%	19.21%
Groceries and related products	550	0.74%	-9.67%	-12.00%	-6.04%
Religious organizations	880	0.65%	10.21%	1.45%	19.39%
Administration of economic programs	931	0.50%	-11.06%	-15.69%	-4.20%
Beauty shops	772	0.44%	-5.35%	-16.45%	6.59%
Furniture and home furnishings stores	631	0.44%	-0.18%	-7.68%	5.36%
Sawmills, planing mills, and millwork	231	0.42%	0.28%	-13.17%	10.24%
Bus service and urban transit	401	0.40%	-8.17%	-18.13%	0.34%
Agricultural production, livestock	11	0.39%	-4.56%	-13.70%	10.29%
Public finance, taxation, and monetary policy	921	0.29%	-4.23%	-8.72%	-0.25%
Water supply and irrigation	470	0.18%	-1.98%	-4.71%	5.08%

<i>Volatile Industries</i>					
Justice, public order, and safety	910	2.08%	-2.02%	-42.53%	26.30%
Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment	351	1.31%	-9.15%	-21.15%	24.42%
National security and international affairs	932	1.02%	-14.28%	-69.36%	50.12%
Automotive repair and related services	751	0.68%	14.32%	-23.44%	30.71%
Apparel and accessory stores, except shoe	623	0.64%	-5.43%	-28.42%	30.70%
Administration of human resources programs	922	0.58%	-0.25%	-38.36%	29.24%
Management and public relations services	892	0.49%	17.01%	-31.54%	54.16%
Radio, tv, and computer stores	633	0.38%	17.95%	-32.45%	102.77%
Oil and gas extraction	42	0.38%	7.56%	-36.31%	55.97%
Computers and related equipment	322	0.37%	-5.86%	-39.46%	48.79%
Research, development, and testing services	891	0.36%	31.34%	-20.44%	106.12%
Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts	362	0.27%	15.85%	-48.89%	62.69%
Iron and steel foundries	271	0.23%	-22.67%	-56.79%	62.60%
Scientific and controlling instruments	371	0.22%	3.56%	-22.68%	34.13%
Savings institutions, including credit unions	701	0.22%	8.96%	-32.44%	44.24%
Administration of environmental quality and housing programs	930	0.21%	1.66%	-50.06%	44.03%
Hardware, plumbing and heating supplies	521	0.20%	-2.08%	-45.76%	31.74%
Drugs, chemicals, and allied products	541	0.20%	0.38%	-26.71%	38.45%
Petroleum refining	200	0.19%	-15.09%	-32.74%	25.77%
Catalog and mail order houses	663	0.16%	11.19%	-23.37%	71.12%
<i>Other Industries</i>					
Hospitals	831	4.63%	5.56%	-8.14%	22.95%
Banking	700	1.76%	0.40%	-20.39%	18.42%
Real estate, including real estate-insurance offices	712	1.26%	11.18%	-14.27%	33.53%
Nursing and personal care facilities	832	1.18%	21.88%	-8.46%	74.03%
Printing, publishing, and allied industries, except newspapers	172	1.07%	-10.11%	-20.00%	10.63%
U.S. postal service	412	0.85%	-10.99%	-28.24%	1.17%
Agricultural production, crops	10	0.78%	-12.45%	-28.96%	9.86%
Engineering, architectural, and surveying services	882	0.72%	29.53%	-6.11%	67.63%
Machinery, equipment, and supplies	530	0.66%	-12.22%	-47.76%	19.83%
Child day care services	862	0.66%	39.53%	-6.98%	82.69%
Security, commodity brokerage, and investment companies	710	0.63%	29.48%	-18.73%	59.34%
Electric light and power	450	0.61%	-0.78%	-9.00%	21.04%
Air transportation	421	0.59%	-8.72%	-22.35%	13.89%
Furniture and fixtures	242	0.56%	-6.62%	-27.01%	4.43%
Drug stores	642	0.53%	4.73%	-13.18%	24.10%
Lumber and building material retailing	580	0.52%	15.50%	-4.47%	48.91%
Gasoline service stations	621	0.48%	-14.80%	-28.20%	9.14%
Fabricated structural metal products	282	0.44%	-13.01%	-27.63%	3.77%
Meat products	100	0.35%	-4.13%	-25.30%	16.68%
Radio and television broadcasting and cable	440	0.33%	21.23%	-5.68%	48.12%

Notes: All industry codes in the Census IPUMS data set are grouped into one of the five categories in this table based on employment growth during 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2007. The industries within each category are then sorted based on average employment share of national population and the top 20 industries in each category are listed in this table. See Section 5 in main text for more details on the industry categories. Industries that are coded as "catch-all" industry codes are excluded from this table.

Appendix Table A2
Alternative Measures of Housing Values and Rental Prices

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) (FHFA)
Dependent Variable:	Residualized Rental Prices	Residualized Housing Values	Average Rental Prices	Average Housing Values	Residualized Rental Prices	Residualized Housing Values	Average Housing Values
% Change in predicted employment (β)	0.842 (0.151) [0.000]	0.714 (0.360) [0.048]	0.808 (0.155) [0.000]	0.633 (0.320) [0.049]	0.943 (0.177) [0.000]	1.155 (0.379) [0.003]	1.142 (0.293) [0.000]
(% Change in predicted employment) ² (δ)	-0.999 (2.758) [0.717]	-2.765 (6.310) [0.662]	-0.742 (2.889) [0.797]	-2.653 (5.647) [0.639]	-2.496 (3.593) [0.488]	-8.769 (7.043) [0.215]	2.804 (4.944) [0.571]
Marginal effect at $-\sigma$ (A)	0.912 (0.243) [0.000]	0.907 (0.580) [0.119]	0.860 (0.254) [0.001]	0.818 (0.511) [0.111]	1.117 (0.304) [0.000]	1.767 (0.563) [0.002]	0.947 (0.390) [0.016]
Marginal effect at $+\sigma$ (B)	0.773 (0.247) [0.002]	0.521 (0.558) [0.351]	0.757 (0.255) [0.003]	0.448 (0.504) [0.376]	0.769 (0.309) [0.014]	0.544 (0.673) [0.420]	1.338 (0.507) [0.009]
p-value of test (A) = (B)	0.717	0.662	0.797	0.639	0.488	0.215	0.571
p-value of nonparametric specification test	0.596	0.295	0.545	0.271	0.486	0.346	0.300
R ²	0.099	0.144	0.182	0.201	0.121	0.172	0.777
N	430	430	430	430	364	364	364

Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data come from IPUMS 1980, 1990, and 2000 census extracts and the OFHEO housing price indexes. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs in columns (1) through (4); in remaining columns the sample is a balanced panel of 182 MSAs with non-missing data from FHFA (formerly OFHEO). Columns (5) and (6) reproduce columns (1) and (2) on the FHFA sub-sample. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares. See Table 2, main text, and Data Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.

Table A3
Results for Various Measures of Public Assistance Expenditures

Dependent Variable:	(1) Food Stamps + Income Maint.	(2) Food Stamps	(3) Income Maint- enance Programs	(4) Medicare Benefits	(5) Public Medical Benefits (Medicaid)	(6) Retirement and Disability Benefits	(7) SSI Benefits	(8) UI Compen- sation	(9) Veterans Benefits	(10) Fraction of Population Disabled
% Change in predicted empl. (β)	-2.367 (0.615) [0.000]	-1.966 (0.613) [0.002]	-4.841 (0.863) [0.000]	-1.738 (0.631) [0.006]	-2.151 (1.130) [0.058]	-1.140 (0.428) [0.008]	-1.725 (0.639) [0.007]	-0.379 (0.739) [0.608]	-0.914 (0.344) [0.008]	-0.099 (0.023) [0.000]
(% Change in predicted empl.) ² (δ)	-21.779 (12.139) [0.074]	-18.727 (11.690) [0.111]	-41.397 (17.540) [0.019]	-22.477 (12.828) [0.081]	-14.332 (19.521) [0.464]	-15.732 (8.953) [0.080]	-3.267 (11.771) [0.782]	-31.143 (11.194) [0.006]	1.725 (7.372) [0.815]	0.428 (0.361) [0.237]
Marginal effect at $-\sigma$ (A)	-0.847 (1.030) [0.412]	-0.659 (1.009) [0.514]	-1.953 (1.394) [0.163]	-0.169 (1.199) [0.888]	-1.150 (1.802) [0.524]	-0.042 (0.841) [0.960]	-1.497 (1.215) [0.219]	1.794 (0.971) [0.066]	-1.034 (0.723) [0.155]	-0.129 (0.030) [0.000]
Marginal effect at $+\sigma$ (B)	-3.887 (1.064) [0.000]	-3.273 (1.031) [0.002]	-7.730 (1.595) [0.000]	-3.306 (0.980) [0.001]	-3.151 (1.737) [0.071]	-2.237 (0.664) [0.001]	-1.953 (0.831) [0.020]	-2.552 (1.170) [0.030]	-0.793 (0.492) [0.108]	-0.069 (0.039) [0.076]
p-value of test (A) = (B)	0.074	0.111	0.019	0.081	0.464	0.080	0.782	0.006	0.815	0.237
p-value of nonparam. specification test	0.241	0.345	0.017	0.193	0.046	0.118	0.457	0.031	0.469	0.081
R ²	0.403	0.438	0.273	0.797	0.697	0.557	0.534	0.017	0.340	0.045
N	430	430	430	430	430	430	430	430	430	430

Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Data for dependent variables come from the REIS, except for column (10) which uses Census data on disability in the adult population. Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Dependent variable is always the percentage change across periods except for column (10) which reports percentage point changes. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares. See Table 2, main text, and Data Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.

Appendix Table A4
Robustness Dropping Each Region

		Dependent Variable: % Change in Population									
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
		All Regions	Drop New England	Drop Middle Atlantic	Drop East North Central	Drop West North Central	Drop South Atlantic	Drop East South Central	Drop West South Central	Drop Mountain	Drop Pacific
% Change in predicted employment	β	1.802 (0.445) [0.000]	1.659 (0.447) [0.000]	2.142 (0.545) [0.000]	1.654 (0.539) [0.002]	1.743 (0.475) [0.000]	1.706 (0.380) [0.000]	1.847 (0.451) [0.000]	1.797 (0.467) [0.000]	1.870 (0.455) [0.000]	1.764 (0.504) [0.001]
(% Change in predicted employment) ²	δ	28.010 (7.905) [0.000]	27.839 (7.982) [0.001]	22.645 (8.989) [0.013]	29.303 (9.266) [0.002]	29.633 (8.377) [0.001]	20.857 (7.491) [0.006]	27.388 (8.019) [0.001]	28.840 (8.168) [0.001]	31.122 (8.562) [0.000]	30.672 (8.188) [0.000]
Marginal effect at $-\sigma$	(A)	-0.152 (0.847) [0.858]	-0.284 (0.879) [0.747]	0.562 (1.044) [0.591]	-0.390 (1.033) [0.706]	-0.325 (0.915) [0.723]	0.251 (0.664) [0.706]	-0.065 (0.864) [0.940]	-0.216 (0.884) [0.807]	-0.301 (0.875) [0.731]	-0.376 (0.892) [0.674]
Marginal effect at $+\sigma$	(B)	3.757 (0.535) [0.000]	3.602 (0.498) [0.000]	3.722 (0.539) [0.000]	3.699 (0.591) [0.000]	3.811 (0.546) [0.000]	3.162 (0.628) [0.000]	3.758 (0.535) [0.000]	3.809 (0.553) [0.000]	4.042 (0.602) [0.000]	3.904 (0.604) [0.000]
p-value of test (A) = (B)		0.000	0.001	0.013	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000
p-value of nonparametric specification test		0.000	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.000	0.149	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000
R ²		0.315	0.324	0.334	0.333	0.322	0.288	0.316	0.323	0.297	0.303
N		430	408	382	342	402	360	404	372	404	366

Notes: All columns report OLS results from estimating equation (7). Final sample is a balanced panel of 215 MSAs. Columns report results from dropping one of the nine Census regions. Dependent variable is always the percentage change in population across periods. The % Change in predicted employment is formed by interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial composition with national changes in industry employment shares. See Table 2, main text, and Data Appendix for more details. All specifications include year fixed effects. Standard errors, adjusted to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix for each metropolitan area over time, are in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.