NEW EVIDENCE ON THE FORMATION OF TRADE POLICY PREFERENCES

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ABSTRACT

This paper revisits the issue of people's preferences for international trade protection examining survey data from the American National Election Studies. I first show that both an individual's skills and the international trade characteristics of their employment industry affects their trade policy preferences, in contrast to previous analysis using these data. Second, I document that many people do not feel informed enough to state a preference on trade protection, which is inconsistent with assumptions of standard political economy models. I examine the factors that correlate with being uninformed, and show that inferences from actual trade policy outcomes can be incorrect if one does not account for this uninformed group. Finally, I examine and find that individuals' retirement decisions have systematic effects on both their choice to be informed and their trade policy preferences. This highlights that there are significant life-cycle implications to trade policy preferences.

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1. Introduction

Trade policy outcomes are fundamentally determined by individuals' preferences for trade policies which, in turn, are determined by how trade affects the income and welfare of individuals. While the majority of empirical previous work on trade policy outcomes has examined the position taken by political representatives or lobbies, more recent work has begun to explore individuals' survey responses or votes on trade policies directly. As Rodrik (1995) points out, understanding the formation of individual trade policy preferences is a fundamental input into the modeling of trade policy outcomes.

The recent literature analyzing individual responses has examined whether standard trade models' predictions of who gains and loses from trade protection correspond with individuals' stated preferences regarding trade policies. The almost exclusive focus has been on whether individuals' endowments (primarily their human capital skills) or their current industry of employment are correlated with their trade policy preferences. If workers are (perfectly) mobile across sectors, then their skill endowment matters for trade policy preferences, not their industry of employment. This corresponds to a two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin framework with associated Stolper-Samuelson effects, whereby workers with less (more) skill residing in a skill-abundant (skill-deficient) country will experience real income declines from freer trade and, thus, favor trade protection. In contrast, if workers cannot move between industries, then industry characteristics, not the workers' skill levels will determine how their income varies with trade and their resulting trade preferences. This corresponds to a sector-specific model or what Scheve and Slaughter (2001) call a Ricardo-Viner framework.

Earlier studies of these competing hypotheses do not examine data at the individual level and generally conclude in favor of industry characteristics, not human capital endowments, in

determining trade policies. These include Magee (1980) which examines the position taken by political lobbying groups on a 1973 U.S. trade bill, and Irwin (1994, 1996) which analyze county voting patterns of 1906 and 1923 British general elections and are argued to be essentially referenda about trade policies. However, Kaempfer and Marks (1993), Baldwin and Magee (1998), and Beaulieu (2002b) find some evidence for both human capital endowments and industry composition of representative districts determining votes on trade bills by US and Canadian political representatives.[1]

A smaller recent literature has begun to examine these hypotheses using individuals' votes or stated preferences on surveys about free trade and trade protection. Balistreri (1997) and Beaulieu (2002a) explore survey data on individual Canadians preferences regarding the 1988 Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and find that human capital endowments (proxied by education level or occupation) significantly affect whether an individual supported the CUSFTA. Likewise, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) use U.S. individual responses to a 1992 American National Election Survey (ANES) question about general import restrictions and find that human capital endowments affect an individuals' position on trade protection. Finally, Mayda and Rodrik (2006) find strong support in international survey data that highly-skilled individuals favor open trade in skill-abundant countries, but do not favor (or even oppose) open trade in skill-poor less-developed countries.

In contrast, the effect of the trade characteristics of the individuals' current employment industry is ambiguous across these studies. Beaulieu (2002a) and Mayda and Rodrik (2006) find that employment industry also matters, while Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that the export

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[1] As Beaulieu (2002b) points out, most studies of determinants of trade votes by legislators do not even control for human capital (or other) endowments of the legislators constituents, but simply assume that industry characteristics and composition of the representatives "district" are primary determinants.

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exposure of an individuals' employment industry does not matter. Balistreri's (1997) analysis does not control for individuals' employment industry.

In this paper, I revisit the data on individuals' preferences for trade protection. Like Scheve and Slaughter (2001), I use data on individual's responses to a question posed by the ANES about whether the US should increase or decrease import restrictions. These data have much more detailed data on individual characteristics than other surveys used, including direct information on individuals' employment industry. These data also have a number of features that are unexploited by the Scheve and Slaughter (2001) study. First, the identical question was asked not only in a 1992 survey (the one used by Scheve and Slaughter), but also asked in 1986, 1988, 1996, and 1998. This provides a lengthy time series of data to examine the robustness of the empirical relationships. Second, the posed question also asks respondents whether they feel they know enough about the issue to have an opinion on the matter of import restrictions. Almost 30 percent of respondents answer that they do not know enough to express a stance on import protection and these observations are not included in the Scheve and Slaughter (2001) study. In this paper, I estimate the factors that make an individual "uninformed" on the trade policy issue, as well as control for sample selection on this criterion when examining the factors that affect the opinion of the "informed" respondents.

My analysis uncovers a number of new results that have important theoretical implications. First, I show that the Scheve and Slaughter (2001) result that the import exposure of an individuals' occupation does not affect trade policy preferences is sensitive to expanding the sample beyond 1992. Once other years are added to the sample *both* skills and the trade exposure of an individuals' industry matter for trade policy preferences. This result is robust to a wide

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variety of specifications and control variables, and suggests that, in practice, models with either complete mobility or complete immobility of labor are incorrect representations.

A second finding of this paper's analysis is that a large group of individuals are "uninformed" – almost 30% of the sample – and one can easily find factors that explain which individuals fall into this group. In fact, less-skilled individuals, as well as poor individuals and females, are more likely to feel "uninformed" on the issue of trade protection. Controlling for this systematic selection of individuals affects statistical inferences about which factors make an average "informed" individual more likely to support trade protection. This evidence of uninformed individuals among the population suggests that political economy trade models should consider the effect of systematic "costs" of various populations to inform themselves. Modeling these effects may translate into quite different implications for the economy-wide support for various trade policies.

This point directly relates to a third main finding regarding the non-linearity of trade protection preferences with respect to skills. Recent theoretical work by Blanchard and Willmann (2008) and Costinot and Vogel (2008) endogenize individuals' choices of skill acquisition in general equilibrium models of trade. Their models allow for non-linearities in observed skill and effects of trade liberalization. In particular, Blanchard and Willmann focus on equilibria where "middle-skilled" workers' wages in a skill-abundant country face pressure from trade liberalization, whereas both low- and high-skilled workers potentially gain from trade liberalization. This is consistent with recent work by Bradford (2008) that finds import protection levels across US industries are non-linear in this same manner with respect to the skill composition of the industry. Low- and high-skill industries have low levels of import protection, while industries with medium skill compositions have the highest levels of import protection.

Using data on stated trade policy preferences, I find in my data this same non-linear relationship when examining who supports trade protection across all individuals (both informed and non-informed), however no such relationship across only informed individuals. This suggests that actual trade policy decisions may be non-linear in skills, not because trade liberalization would not hurt low-skill workers, but because a disproportionate number of them are not informed on the issue.

Finally, I find large effects of a life-cycle change, retirement, on an individual's trade policy preferences. Retirement may affect both an individual's decision to inform themselves and their trade policy preference once they are informed. Importantly, retirement means that the individual is no longer in the workforce which likely means a significant change in their source of income. For example, individuals who were in trade sensitive industries are now likely have income sources that are less trade-sensitive. In addition, non-participation in the workforce may make it more costly for an individual to inform themselves. My empirical estimates show that retired individuals are much more likely to be uninformed about trade policy, and that neither their skills nor the trade exposure of their former occupation industry matter anymore for their trade policy preferences. These results have obvious implications in the coming years as the baby boomer generation hits retirement age.

2. Hypotheses

2.1. Skills, occupation industry, and trade preferences

Trade-focused political economy models either assume that labor is freely mobile across sectors within a country or that agents (laborers or capitalists) have endowments that are specific to their own industry and cannot be transferred across industries/sectors. An example of the

former model is the standard Heckscher-Ohlin 2×2×2 framework which yields the well-known

Stolper-Samuelson result -- a rise in the price of one of the two goods will increase the real return

of the factor endowment that the good uses relatively intensely, and lower the real return of the

other factor. Thus, for example, in a model with skilled and unskilled labor as the two factors of

production, a rise in the price of the good employing relatively more unskilled labor will benefit

all unskilled laborers (regardless of sector). And by the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, a country with

a relatively greater proportion of skilled labor in its workforce (i.e., a developed country) would

be exporting the skilled-labor-intensive good and importing the unskilled-labor-intensive good.

Thus, if you ask workers in a developed country, such as the US, whether they prefer new import

limits, a model with freely mobile workers across sectors predicts that unskilled workers will

favor such limits (which would raise the domestic relative price of the unskilled-intensive

product), while skilled workers will oppose new import limits.

This is in contrast with a model where factors are sector-specific, not mobile across

sectors. In these models, workers and/or capital owners will only lobby for import protection

when their sector faces greater imports from other countries. If they are successful, price

increases from the import limits will provide benefits to only the factors of production being

employed in the sector at the expense of factors in other sectors. In contrast, factor owners (either

labor or capital) in exporting sectors will oppose limits on imports. In these models then, whether

an individual's occupation industry faces competitive pressure from imports will determine their

stance on import limits.

In summary, correlation between trade policy preferences and individuals' skills (or

human capital endowment), with no correlation between the individual's industry of occupation

(and the import competition it faces), rejects the sector-specific model in favor of a model with

freely mobile labor. Alternatively, evidence that industry of occupation, not skills, correlates with individuals' trade policy preferences supports sector-specific models and rejects models of freely-mobile factors. Evidence for both suggests that mobility of factors across sectors is only partially true in some manner, and calls for further investigation.[2] No evidence for either skills or occupation industry correlating with trade policy preferences would suggest that trade policy models need to begin anew in their assumptions.

2.2. Costly information

Current political economy models used to address trade policy issues almost invariably assume that individuals have full information about the state of the world. In reality, this means that an individual knows, depending on the assumed underlying model, their relative skill type and their countries relative factor endowment differences, or the nature of import competition for their occupation industry. In practice, however, obtaining this information may involve non-trivial costs and may lead an individual to choose to be uninformed on the issue. The decision to become informed then depends on expected costs and benefits of information acquisition.

For simplification, assume the *ex ante* expected benefits of acquiring information are identical across individuals, but costs of information acquisition may vary. I hypothesize that a number of observed individual characteristics will correlate with higher costs of information acquisition. First, lower education levels will increase the personal cost of an individual to obtain and understand the relevant information. Second, controlling for education levels, lower income will make individuals less likely to inform themselves. In other words, these two hypotheses simply follow from the idea that both intellectual and financial resources are necessary to inform

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[2] The sector-specific model can be seen as a short-run version of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Thus, Mayda and Rodrik (2006) suggest that evidence for both is consistent with a world where some voters have a short-run

one self. These predictions are in line with a recent political economy literature on the role of information and individuals' decisions to vote in an election.[3]

It is now straightforward to see that costly information acquisition can lead to a much different mapping of welfare effects of trade policy outcomes to expressed trade policy preferences, particularly if skills drive individual welfare effects, than a world where everyone is fully informed. For example, suppose that there is sufficient labor mobility that skills matter for individuals' trade policy outcomes and that individuals' differing skills are distributed continuously over an interval of finite length. Further, assume that in a skilled abundant country such as the United States, the net costs of eliminating import restrictions and adopting free trade (changes in wage income plus changes in consumer prices) are continuously decreasing in skill – the costs of free trade are highest for the least-skilled. This is depicted in the top panel of Figure 1, which graphs the net cost of free trade by skill level.[4] This graph represents the extent to which an individual of a certain skill level will favor or oppose import restrictions, assuming all agents are informed about this relationship. The individual with the skill level associated with a zero personal cost of free trade is indifferent to trade protection.

Now assume that the costs of information acquisition about free trade costs are decreasing in skill, while benefits are constant, as discussed above. This is depicted graphically in the lower panel of Figure 1. Individuals with skill levels below s* will choose to not inform themselves and, by default, have an expected net cost of free trade equal to zero. This creates a non-linearity in expected net costs of free trade, which is shown by the wider lines in the upper panel of Figure 1. If the critical s* occurs before the skill level where actual net costs of import protection are

zero, we get a pattern whereby the medium-skill individuals (ones who are high-skilled enough to be informed, but low-skilled enough to have a net cost of free trade) will be opposed to free trade, whereas the low- and high-skilled individuals will not oppose (or even favor) free trade. If less-skilled individuals are more likely to be hurt by trade, but less likely to inform themselves on the issue, they may not be any more likely to vote for trade protection than skilled workers. Translating this into a representative democracy setting, legislators representing less-skilled workers may not be more likely to vote for trade protection even if freer trade would hurt less-skilled workers.

This is obviously a very particular example to show just one way in which information acquisition can affect the expected costs of free trade and, ultimately, trade policy outcomes. As mentioned, prior literature has constructed trade models with perfect information where net costs of free trade may not be a continuously decreasing function of skill. However, as we will show below, our data are consistent with the model depicted in Figure 1, where stated preferences for trade protection are decreasing in skill for fully informed individuals, but the overall sample of stated preferences by individuals take this specific non-linear shape because so many low-skill individuals in the sample are uninformed.

2.3. Life-cycle considerations: Retirement

Standard political economy models assume that agents have a consistent source of labor (or capital) income. However, retirement represents a real-life event where individuals significantly reduce or completely stop employment and, hence, their source of income significantly moves away from employment income to other sources. Statistics calculated by the

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Pesendorfer, 1996), but this is the first I am aware of that examines a particular policy question, rather than election turnout.

Employee Benefit Research Institute using data from the 2004 U.S. Consumer Population Survey shows retirees' income sources to consist of the following primary components on average: 1) 40% from social security benefits from the federal government, 2) 19.4% from continued employment, 3) 16.8% from personal asset holdings, 4) 9.3% from public-sector defined-benefit (i.e., pension) plans, and 5) 9.2% from private-sector defined-benefit plans.[5]

From these statistics, it is clear that the majority of a retirees' income source is no longer tied to an employment industry – it is only important for income coming from continued employment (19.4%) or from a private-sector defined-benefit plan (9.2%), where presumably the private sector entity is their former employer. Likewise, their skill would only matter for their income from employment (19.4%) after retirement. These us, we data suggest that there will be a significant reduction of skills and employment industry as determinants of an individual's income after retirement towards income sources (social security, personal-asset holdings, and public-sector defined-benefit plans) that should roughly correlate with the overall growth of the economy. Since trade theories generally suggest that trade protection is harmful for overall welfare and growth of an economy, I hypothesize that retirement should significantly decrease the effect of an individual's skill and/or trade exposure of their (former) employment industry on their trade policy preferences.

Retirement may also affect whether individuals inform themselves about trade policies. On one hand, it may be more costly to inform themselves once they are no longer (or significantly less involved) in the workforce. Relatedly, the expected benefit of informing themselves about returns to their own skill set or employment industry from certain trade policies will have gone down considerably. This leads to the hypothesis that retirement will lead individuals to be less

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[4] I thank Scott Taylor for suggesting the construction of this graphical model to better illustrate these concepts.
[5] These calculations can be found at: http://www.ebri.org/pdf/programs/policyforums/may2004/ristats.pdf.

likely to acquire information about trade policy impacts, everything else equal. Potentially

mitigating or reversing these effects, is the notion that the opportunity cost of time has declined

for retirees, making them more likely to acquire information on public policy questions.

3. Data and Empirical Specification

To test these various hypotheses, I create a dataset from the ANES surveys that follows

Scheve and Slaughter (2001) as closely as possible, while expanding beyond year 1992 (which is

the only year they examine) to include survey years 1986, 1988, 1996, and 1998. In all these

years the ANES asked the same following question:

> ''Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect
> American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt
> American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports, or haven't you
> thought much about this?''[6]

Scheve and Slaughter (2001) construct a dependent variable for their analysis which assigns a "1"

when the individual responded that they favor new limits on imports, and a "0" when they oppose

new limits. In my analysis below, I begin with this same dependent variable construction. Given

that the dependent variable is binary, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) use a logistic regression as

their empirical specification. I use a probit specification which yields qualitatively identical

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[6] In 1990, the ANES survey asked a similar, but not identical, question that asked respondents to rank their
preferences for new import limits over a range from 1 to 7, where "1" indicated "increase limits a lot", while "7"
indicated "decrease limits a lot." Since it is not obvious how to correspond these responses into a binary variable in
analogous fashion to my other survey years, I do not include this survey year. In 1986, the ANES survey first asked
respondents if they had thought about import issues, then if they responded that they had, they were asked the same
question about whether they favored or opposed new limits. I include respondents from this year in my sample as it
easy to construct a dependent variable in analogous fashion to my other survey years. Finally, I exclude the year
2000, the final year the question was asked, because the individual's county of residence is not reported in this
year's survey. County residence is necessary for construction of a couple key independent variables discussed
below.

empirical estimates, but more easily allows a specification extension to address the issue I raise next.

Constructing a dependent variable in the manner just described leaves out a potentially important group of respondents – those who do not feel they know enough about the issue to express a "favor" or "oppose" opinion. I label these individuals as "uninformed" on the issue of import limits and, in fact, they comprise a significant portion of the overall sample – 27.2%. Modeling whether an individual is informed or not is important for two reasons. First, understanding the attributes that correlate with an individual's choice to be uninformed is important and has direct implications for models of political economy that invariably assume informed agents. Second, if there is correlation between the types of individuals who choose to be uninformed and those that favor or oppose new import limits, then statistical inferences on only the informed groups (as in Scheve and Slaughter, 2001) will suffer from sample selection bias. To directly address these issues, I run a probit specification with a Heckman-style sample selection that first estimates the determinants of whether an individual has thought about new import restrictions and, second, whether they favor such import restrictions conditional on whether they have thought about the topic..

I use identical control regressors as those employed by Scheve and Slaughter (2001), constructing them in analogous fashion to the greatest extent possible. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) use two alternative measures of an individual's skill and two alternative measures for the trade exposure of the industry in which the individual works.

Their measures of skill are years of education and wage levels. Years of education are directly asked of the individual in the ANES surveys across all years. Wage levels are not asked

of ANES respondents, but instead they are asked to identify their occupation.[7] Following Scheve

and Slaughter (2001) I take U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data on average weekly wages

by occupation to assign wage levels to individuals in the surveys based on their stated occupation.

Because I have multiple years of surveys in my sample, I construct my wage data as a "Relative

Wage" variable that is an occupation's average wage relative to the average wage across all

occupations in a given survey year. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) simply used wage levels which

is appropriate (and equivalent to my construction) because they only examine a single survey

year.

Like Scheve and Slaughter (2001), the two measures of industry trade exposure I construct

are the tariff level and net export share of output (or sales) for a survey respondent's industry of

employment. The ANES asks respondent's to identify the industry they work in, which are

classified into 3-digit Census of Industry Codes (CIC). For tariff levels, I use the applied tariffs

(duties collected divided by customs value of imports) found in U.S. trade data, available through

the Schott and Feenstra datasets at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) website. I

construct the weighted average tariff by 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes

from the NBER data and then concord to 3-digit CIC codes. Non-traded sectors, as well as all

service sectors, are assigned an import tariff of zero. Net export shares for manufacturing are

straightforward to construct using the NBER data for the trade flows (exports and imports by

sector), and U.S. Census data for value of shipments. These data are constructed by SIC codes

and then concorded to the CIC codes. Constructing net export shares for non-manufacturing

sectors relied on a variety of sources, primarily U.S. Census data for shipments, NBER trade data

for tradeable agriculture and mining sectors, and BEA data for tradeable service sectors. A data

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[7] Retired and unemployed persons in the sample are asked to identify the occupation of their last job. I get
qualitatively identical results throughout my analysis whether I sample all individuals or sample only working

appendix describes the construction of this variable (and all my variables) in more detail. Non-tradeable sectors were assigned a net export share of zero. I expect a positive correlation between average tariffs in an individual's employment industry and their preference for import protection, and a negative correlation between their employment industry's net export share and their preference for import protection.

Scheve and Slaughter (2001) have a secondary focus of their paper which examines the hypothesis that home owners in trade-sensitive locations will be more likely to prefer trade protection. This is because houses are often an important asset for individuals and home values depend on economic activity in the immediate location. Following Scheve and Slaughter (2001) I then use Census data to calculate the share of the individual's county's employment in two-digit SIC sectors with above-median tariffs (called *County 1 Exposure*) or with net-import balances (*County 2 Exposure*).[8] I then interact these two county exposure share variables with a binary variable indicating whether the individual owns a house, which is asked directly by the ANES survey in all my sample years. This creates two alternative interaction variables - *County 1 Exposure × House* and *County 2 Exposure × House*. By the hypotheses developed in Scheve and Slaughter, I expect a positive correlation between these variables and the likelihood that an individual prefers new import limits.

Finally, after initial estimates, I will also include other individual characteristics in my regression specifications, including age, gender, race, political party affiliation, and union membership which come directly from the ANES survey questions. Table 1 provides summary statistics of all the variables used in this study's analysis.

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individuals.
[8] The county location of an individual is identified by the ANES survey. I use the same 2-digit SIC industries as used by Scheve and Slaughter (2001) for these variables which are based 1992 data.

4. Empirical Results

In this section, I present my statistical results. I begin with estimates that stem from identical specifications as those in Scheve and Slaughter (2001) using only 1992 data, as in that paper, and obtain qualitatively identical results to their paper. I then examine the robustness of these results by first expanding the sample to all available years. I next model the uniformed individuals, providing evidence of the characteristics that correlate with whether or not an individual is uninformed or not, as well as exploring the robustness of other results when accounting for uninformed individuals. I then explore the relationship between skills and trade policy preferences, allowing for a non-linear relationship. Finally, I examine the impact of retirement on information acquisition and trade policy preferences.

4.1. Base Results

In columns 1 through 4 of Table 2 I provide probit estimates of the determinants of an individual's preference for higher import restrictions using identical specifications to that in Scheve and Slaughter (2001), where I alternate using education and relative wages as measures of an individual's skills and using tariff rates or net imports as a share of sales as measures of the trade exposure of an individual's employment industry. For ease of understanding the economic significance of my regressors on the dependent variable, I show marginal effects and their associated standard errors in these tables, where the reported marginal effects provide the change in the dependent variable (probability of favoring new import restrictions in decimal form) for a one-unit change in the regressor.

My results are qualitatively identical to those in Scheve and Slaughter (2001) –

specifically, models 9, 10, 13, and 14 in Table 6 of their paper.[9] Both measures of skill are

statistically significant and indicate important effects on trade policy preferences. As found by

Scheve and Slaughter (2001), trade exposure of an individual's employment industry is not

significant in explaining trade policy preferences. Thus, the evidence is consistent with a model

with intersectoral factor mobility assumed in Heckscher-Ohlin models where skills determine

welfare impacts of trade policy, while inconsistent with a sector-specific (or Ricardo-Viner)

model where factors are not mobile between sectors and trade exposure would affect individual

welfare and, hence their trade policy preferences. As in Scheve and Slaughter (2001), I also find

that individuals who own homes in trade sensitive areas are much more likely to favor new import

restrictions.

4.2. Expanding the sample

I next run the same specification, but this time with the full sample of years available, and

report these estimates in columns 5 through 8 of Table 2. I also add dummy variables for each

year to control for any common year-specific effects on all individuals' trade policy preferences.

The surprising result is that while the skill variables come in with similar magnitude and

statistical significance, the industry trade exposure variables are now correct sign and generally

statistically significant – the exception is the *Sector Tariff* variable in the column 7 specification

which has a p-value of 0.168. These findings that both skill and industry matter contrast with

Scheve and Slaughter (2001), but are consistent with Beaulieu's (2002a) results using Canadian

survey data, and suggest that labor is neither perfectly mobile nor perfectly immobile.

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[9] I get qualitatively identical results to Scheve and Slaughter for all specifications reported in their paper, but just
show these for the sake of brevity. Full "replication" results are available upon request.

The magnitude of the both the skill variables and industry trade exposure variables are economically significant as well. A one-standard deviation increase in the *Relative Occupation Wage* of an individual decreases their likelihood to favor new import limits by 5.8 percentage points (from a mean of about 55%), while a one-standard deviation increase in *Education Years* decreases an individual's likelihood of favoring trade protection by 10.8 percentage points, ceteris paribus. Using column 5's estimates, a one-standard deviation in the *Sector Tariff* increases an individual's likelihood of favoring trade protection by 2.4 percentage points. Using column 6's estimates, a one-standard deviation in the *Sector Net Export Share* decreases an individual's preference for trade protection by 4.7 percentage points.[10]

For the rest of the paper's analysis, I now only use *Education Years* as my measure of skill and the *Sector Net Export Share* as the industry trade exposure measure. *Relative Occupation Wage* and *Sector Tariff* yield qualitatively identical sign patterns throughout, though sometimes slightly weaker statistical significance.

4.3. Controlling for information acquisition

To this point, my specification has not controlled for whether an individual has thought about the issue. In Table 3, I present estimates from a probit regression where the dependent variable is "1" if the individual has thought about trade protection and "0" if they have not. As discussed in section 2, I assume that whether an individual has thought about trade protection depends largely on the costs of information acquisition, which are decreasing in education and

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[10] I obtain results that are nearly quantitatively identical for the skill and industry trade when using the *County 2 Exposure* and *County 2 Exposure × House* variable. This is the case throughout the results reported in this paper and I, therefore, only show specifications with "County 1" variables throughout. Interestingly, coefficient estimates on these "County 2" variables are significantly different than the coefficient estimates on the "County 1" variables when all sample years are included, which contrasts with Scheve and Slaughter (2001) results using only data from 1992. I find that using "County 2" variables suggests that all individuals in a county with significant trade exposure are more likely to support trade protection, not just those that own homes. Results available upon request.

income. To control for income, I use ANES reported household income to construct and include dummy variables for whether an individual's household income is in the lower quartile, second quartile, or third quartile for that sample year.[11] As robustness checks, I also include other variables from the trade policy preference equation, including the *Sector Net Export Share* and "*County 1 Exposure*" variables. These could possibly come in significantly if expected benefits of information acquisition depend on how individuals are affected by trade policy. Finally, I also include a number of demographic variables that are readily available from the ANES survey, including age, gender, ethnicity, political affiliation and labor union participation.[12]

Table 3 provides results from the probit estimation using the dependent variable indicating whether an individual has thought about trade protection. The variables used to proxy for information costs come in with expected signs and are statistically significant. The estimated marginal effects suggest that each additional year of education adds 2.8 percentage points to the likelihood that an individual will have thought about trade protection (from a mean around 70%). Individuals in the lowest household income quartile are 7.7 percentage points less likely to have thought about trade protection than the highest household-income quartile, while those in the second quartile are 5.5 percentage points less likely. There is no statistical difference between those in the third and fourth household-income quartiles. Thus, as hypothesized, low-education and low-income individuals are less likely to acquire information about trade protection.

The expected benefit variables – the ones that proxy for how trade may affect the welfare of an individual – do not come in statistically significant. This is consistent with my assumption that expected benefits of information may be *ex ante* identical across individuals.

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[11] I exclude a dummy variable for household income in the top quartile to avoid perfect multicollinearity with an included constant term in the regression.
[12] These are the same demographic variables that Scheve and Slaughter (2001) use for robustness checks in their work.

Finally, the demographic variables provide quite interesting statistical results. First, an individual is more likely to have thought about trade protection as they age – ten years of age makes an individual about 2 percentage points more likely to have informed themselves enough to provide an opinion on new import limits. Ethnicity is estimated to have some impact as well, with African Americans and Hispanics less likely to have thought about trade protection, ceteris paribus. Both political affiliation and union membership do not have any statistical impact. Finally, gender has an unexpectedly large effect, with women almost 15 percentage points lower in their likelihood of thinking about trade protection than men, ceteris paribus (i.e., after controlling for age, income, race, and education). Such a large gap brings up the possibility of an alternative interpretation for my results. Perhaps these estimates are not only uncovering who becomes informed about trade policies, but also who is confident enough to feel sufficiently informed to offer an opinion on trade policies.

To examine this further, I collect data on a couple variables from the ANES survey that may be good proxies of whether individuals inform themselves: 1) whether an individual has discussed politics with friends or family in the past week, and 2) whether the individual has read a newspaper in the past week. I then run a probit specification using these two variables separately as dependent variables on the same regressor matrix used in the specification used to explain whether an individual has thought about import restrictions. The marginal effects from these separate probit regressions are reported in with the Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3. I find that all three dependent variables have many correlates in common. Age, education and income are positively correlated with all three, while being female means a significantly lower probability for all three. These results then provide some confirmatory evidence that information acquisition

(not simply some other factor such as an individual's confidence) is a true underlying reason why some individuals suggest they are not informed enough to offer an opinion on import restrictions.

In summary, variables proxying for information acquisition costs, as well as some interesting demographic variables, are quite significant in explaining variation in individuals' likelihoods of being informed about trade policies. I next want to explore how this selection of individuals affects both my estimates of trade policy preferences, as well as some evidence on trade outcomes.

Table 4 provides re-estimates of the determinants of individuals' trade policy preferences after controlling for sample selection bias due to conditioning on only those who have thought about trade policy. In technical terms, I re-estimate the same specification as columns 5 through 8 using a two-step Heckman sample selection correction, where the sample selection equation is the one used in Table 3. While statistical tests confirm that there is a sample selection bias[13], I find that the bias is fairly small in economic magnitude, as I get qualitatively identical results on the determinants of trade policy preferences with or without a sample selection correction.

4.4. Is there a non-linear relationship between skills and trade policies?

As mentioned in the introduction, Bradford (2008) recently shows that trade policy outcomes in the U.S. are non-linear in skills, with the lowest- and highest-skilled industries having significantly lower tariff rates than medium-skilled industries. Are individuals' trade policy preferences, like these trade policy outcomes, also non-linear in skills in this same way? In answering this question with my data, I show that information acquisition is a key factor in explaining this non-linear pattern and is consistent with the model results depicted in Figure 1.

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[13] A likelihood ratio test rejects independence of the two equations at the 1% significance level in all specifications.

To explore this issue, I first categorize individuals into standard education classifications that represent progressively higher degrees of education: 1) less than high school, 2) high school degree, 3) some college, 4) college bachelor's degree, and 5) graduate or professional degree beyond college degree.[14] I then replace *Education Years* in my specification with dummy variables for whether an individual falls into one of these categories (excluding the last category to avoid perfect multicollinearity with the constant term) and run this on alternative data samples and dependent variables in Table 5.

Column 1 of Table 5 provides estimates when I estimate this new specification on only those individuals in my sample who felt sufficiently informed to provide an opinion on whether they favor new import limits. Column 2 provides estimates when I also include a sample-selection correction when estimating preferences for this informed group. In both sets of estimates, I see that support for new import limits are simply decreasing in education. There is not a non-linear relationship in trade policy preferences amongst the informed individuals in my sample, as found by Bradford (2008) with respect to trade policy outcome patterns.

However, in column 3 of Table 5, I sample all individuals (informed and uninformed) and create a dependent variable that simply takes the value of "1" if an individual favors new import limits, and a "0" if they do not, which includes individuals who explicitly say they oppose new limits, as well as those that simply say they have not thought about trade protection enough to offer an opinion. Estimates using this sample show the same pattern across skills/education as Bradford (2008) found for trade policy outcomes. The least skilled group (those with less than high school education) do not express their preference for new import limits any more than those with a college (or higher) degree, while the medium-skilled groups (high school education or

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[14] I get qualitatively identical results by simply adding a term that squares an individual's *Education Years*, but find this construction of education categories is easier for immediate interpretation and presentation.

some college) express preference for new import limits in rates that are about 7-8 percentage points higher than the other skill groups. These results suggest that while low-skill workers are more likely to want new import limits when they are informed about trade policy outcomes, since a disproportionately large share of them are not informed, they do explicitly favor trade protection any more than high-skill workers. To the extent that political representatives only respond to voiced opinions by their constituents, the low information acquisition by low-skill workers can explain the non-linear trade policy outcomes across skill levels documented by Bradford (2008). Importantly, this evidence is not supportive of the recent theory papers by Blanchard and Willman (2008) and Costinot and Vogel (2008) to the extent that they predict a non-linear relationship between welfare impacts of trade policies and skills. Informed low-skill individuals in my sample, who presumably have a reasonable sense of trade protection impacts on their own welfare, are among the most protectionist individuals in my sample.

4.5. Life-cycle effects: Retirement

A final aspect of my data that I explore is the effect of retirement. Standard political economy models do not consider life-cycle changes and retirement is a significant life-cycle change which may affect both whether an individual acquires information on issues such as trade protection, and whether they favor or impose trade protection with the significant change in the source of their annual income. The ANES survey asks individuals of their retirement status allowing us to easily explore this issue.[15]

I first include a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is retired in the specification that examines the determinants of whether an individual has thought about trade

protection (reported in Table 3). The coefficient on retirement status comes in negative and highly statistically significant. In fact, retired individuals are about 8 percentage points less likely to have thought about import limits, ceteris paribus. Thus, just as with low-skill workers, this suggests that legislators with a higher proportion of retired individuals in their districts are less likely to have constituents voice their opinion for trade protection.

I next turn to an examination of whether retired individuals who acquire information on trade policies are more or less likely to favor new import limits. As discussed in section 2, retirees experience a significant de-linking of their income source from their (former) occupation industry and workforce skills. Thus, I hypothesize an individual's skill and trade exposure of their (former) industry have a much weaker effect an individual's trade policy preferences once they are retired.

Importantly, the ANES survey gathers data on retirees' last occupation industry in which they were employed. This allows me to interact the skill and industry trade exposure variables with retirement status to examine the hypothesis that retirement will decrease support for trade protection from those previously exposed to harm from freer trade. Table 6 presents results when I add the *Retired* dummy variable, as well as its interactions with the skill and trade exposure variables, to the same specifications examining the determinants of support for new import limits after controlling for sample selection (as reported in Table 4). The results provide support that retirement leads those that formerly supported new import limits to decrease that support. In every instance the sign of the coefficient of an interaction term is opposite of the associated skill or industry trade exposure variable, indicating that retirement mitigates these variables' effect on an individual's trade policy preference. Table 7 shows this more clearly by providing marginal

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[15] The survey actually gathers information on whether individuals are fully retired or partially retired and still working part-time. I aggregate these two types into one "retired" category and my estimates are qualitatively

effects of the skill and industry occupation variables separately for retired individuals and those not retired. In virtually every case the effect of a skill or industry trade measure is statistically insignificant for a retired individual,[16] while its independent effect (on all non-retired individuals in the sample) are generally statistically significant and of the same magnitude as those reported in Table 4.

In summary, the life-cycle change of retirement has a significant impact on expressed trade policy preferences. First, retirees are much less likely to be informed on the issue of trade policy. Second, skill and industry trade exposure variables are generally no longer significant in explaining their trade policy preferences. This life-cycle change effect on trade policy preferences is, of course, important for the United States and many other countries as their population ages.

5. Conclusion

This paper provides new empirical evidence for important features of trade policy preference formation that current models of political economy rarely, if ever, address. First, information acquisition by individuals on policy matters is potentially costly and the data suggest that many do not feel sufficiently informed to state an opinion on trade policy. These "uninformed" individuals are systematically those with less education and income, and I show that this can explain why trade policy <u>outcomes</u> may be non-linear in skills (with low-skill and high-skill have lower preferences for trade protection than medium-skill workers), even though freer trade may be progressively more harmful to one's income the lower skill one has. Second, I

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identical to when one classifies retired individuals as only those fully retired.
[16] The effect of a skill or industry trade exposure for a retired individual is the coefficient on the skill or industry trade exposure variable plus the coefficient on the interaction term of that variable with the variable *Retired*. A

show that the life-cycle change surrounding retirement has significant impacts on individuals'

stated trade policy preferences, lowering the likelihood that an individual will acquire information

on trade policies, and fully mitigating any effects of skill or industry trade exposure effects on an

individuals' preferences for trade protection. Thus, the evidence in this paper suggests that future

political economy modeling of trade policy outcomes will need to incorporate these features to

obtain realistic predictions of trade policy formation. Another contribution of the paper is to

show that both an individual's skills and the trade exposure of their occupation industry matter,

which contrasts with the Scheve and Slaughter (2001) study using these same ANES data, and

which suggests that workers are neither freely mobile nor freely immobile in their ability to

switch occupation industries.

A final result is the puzzlingly large impact of gender on trade policy preferences. This

paper confirms that women are much more likely to favor trade protection, as also found in

Beaulieu and Napier (2008). But it also documents that women are much more likely to be

uninformed about policy matters. Unlike the other results in this paper, there are no clear

theoretical reasons for why such large gender differences exist on the topic of trade policy.

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simple Chi-squared test of the sum of these two coefficients determines if it is statistically significant at
conventional levels.

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Figure 1: Net costs of import protection and information acquisition by individuals' skills.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obser-vations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Dependent variables					
Thought about import limits?	10143	0.712	0.453	0.000	1.000
Want new import limits (conditional on thought)	6963	0.579	0.494	0.000	1.000
Want new import limits (all individuals)	9892	0.408	0.491	0.000	1.000
Independent variables in trade protection preference regression					
Relative Occupation Wage	8344	1.110	0.339	0.362	1.599
Education Years	9454	12.903	2.802	1.000	17.000
Sector Tariff	8299	0.008	0.025	0.000	0.266
Sector Net Export Share	8090	-0.011	0.221	-15.642	0.534
County Exposure 1	9887	0.063	0.064	0.000	0.450
County Exposure 1 × House	9564	0.041	0.061	0.000	0.444
Additional independent variables in thought regression					
Age (in years)	9636	45.472	17.572	17.000	99.000
Female	9644	0.479	0.500	0.000	1.000
African American	10143	0.150	0.358	0.000	1.000
Asian	10143	0.063	0.243	0.000	1.000
Hispanic	10143	0.117	0.321	0.000	1.000
Native American	10143	0.087	0.281	0.000	1.000
Democrat	9644	0.371	0.483	0.000	1.000
Republican	9644	0.287	0.453	0.000	1.000
Union Membership in Household	9644	0.178	0.383	0.000	1.000
Household Income - Lowest 25th Percentile	9644	0.225	0.418	0.000	1.000
Household Income - 25th-50th Percentile	9644	0.245	0.430	0.000	1.000
Household Income - 50th-75th Percentile	9644	0.224	0.417	0.000	1.000
Retired	9644	0.155	0.362	0.000	1.000

Table 2: Re-estimating Scheve and Slaughter - Marginal Effects for 1992 and Full Sample of Years

Variables	1992 Sample Only				Full Sample of Years			
	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**	**(7)**	**(8)**
Relative Occupation Wage	-0.133***	-0.128***			-0.171***	-0.173***		
	(0.035)	(0.036)			(0.020)	(0.020)		
Education Years			-0.044***	-0.042***			-0.038***	-0.038***
			(0.005)	(0.005)			(0.003)	(0.003)
Sector Tariff	0.471		-0.081		0.970***		0.443	
	(0.661)		(0.687)		(0.323)		(0.322)	
Sector Net Export Share		-0.057		0.025		-0.214***		-0.147**
		(0.129)		(0.132)		(0.068)		(0.067)
County Exposure 1	-0.096	-0.053	-0.392	-0.353	0.148	0.180	0.065	0.075
	(0.321)	(0.032)	(0.352)	(0.350)	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.162)	(0.162)
County Exposure 1 × House	0.911***	0.987***	1.200***	1.253***	0.293*	0.305*	0.340**	0.353**
	(0.330)	(0.333)	(0.356)	(0.358)	(0.166)	(0.167)	(0.169)	(0.170)
Year dummies	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.014	0.015	0.050	0.049	0.045	0.046	0.064	0.065
Chi-squared Statistic	27.77	27.85	91.48	88.09	324.83	322.48	460.51	457.73
(p-value)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1504	1476	1417	1390	5480	5342	5409	5272

Notes: Reported results are marginal effects (not coefficient estimates) of the regressors. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. Columns 1 through 4 correspond to models 9, 10, 13, and 14, respectively, in Table 5 of Scheve and Slaughter (2001)

Table 3: What Factors Explain Whether People Have Thought about Import Restrictions, Discussed Politics in the Last Week or Read the Newspaper in the Last Week? (Marginal Effects)

Variables	Thought about import restrictions	Discussed politics in last week	Read newspaper in last week
Information Cost Variables			
Education Years	0.028***	0.045***	0.024***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Household Income - Lowest 25th Percentile	-0.077***	-0.060***	-0.061***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Household Income - 25th-50th Percentile	-0.054***	-0.031*	-0.025*
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Household Income - 50th-75th Percentile	0.005	0.018	-0.030**
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Information Benefit Variables			
Sector Net Export Share	0.008	0.049	0.002
	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.036)
County Exposure 1	-0.106	-0.480	-0.052
	(0.117)	(0.133)	(0.097)
County Exposure 1 × House	0.185	0.262*	0.019
	(0.126)	(0.141)	(0.104)
Demographic Variables			
Age (in years)	0.002***	0.001**	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.149***	-0.067***	-0.052***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)
African American	-0.047***	0.023	0.024*
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Asian	-0.010	-0.113**	-0.041
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.041)
Hispanic	-0.050**	-0.079**	0.006
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.017)
Native American	0.033	0.048*	-0.041*
	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.024)
Democrat	-0.006	0.017	0.018**
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Republican	0.012	0.036***	0.017*
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Union Membership in Household	0.019	0.021	0.027**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes

Pseudo R^2	0.083	0.072	0.070
Chi-squared Statistic	768.37	745.96	529.72
(p-value)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	7715	7715	7715

Notes: Reported results are marginal effects (not coefficient estimates) of the regressors, where a one-unit change indicates the percentage point change in the dependent variable. 72.7% of individuals in the sample report they have thought about import restrictions, 61.4% have discussed politics with family or friends in the past week, and 82.4% have read the newspaper in the past week. Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Table 4: What Determines Trade Policy Preferences after Controlling for Sample Selection? (Marginal Effects)

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Relative Occupation Wage	-0.062**	-0.066**		
	(0.027)	(0.028)		
Education Years			-0.031***	-0.031***
			(0.004)	(0.004)
Sector Tariff	0.807***		0.481	
	(0.0311)		(0.328)	
Sector Net Export Share		-0.169***		-0.142**
		(0.066)		(0.068)
County Exposure 1	-0.085	-0.051	-0.046	-0.029
	(0.155)	(0.156)	(0.168)	(0.168)
County Exposure 1 × House	0.552***	0.550***	0.498***	0.501***
	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.177)	(0.178)
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chi-squared Statistic	348.45	348.11	387.16	388.20
(p-value)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	7797	7606	7697	7509

Notes: Reported results are marginal effects (not coefficient estimates) of the regressors. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Table 5: Nonlinear Relationship Between Skills and Trade Policy Preferences? The Importance of Modeling Information (Marginal Effects)

Variables	Various dependent variable definitions		
	Want new import limits? (Only those that have thought about it)	Want new import limits? (Full sample conditioning on whether one has thought about it)	Want new import limits? (Full sample <u>not</u> conditioning on whether one has thought about it)
Education – Less Than High School	0.226***	0.216***	0.015
	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Education – High School	0.223***	0.228***	0.087***
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Education – Some College	0.148***	0.161***	0.076***
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Education – College Degree	-0.015	0.012	-0.025
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Sector Net Export Share	-0.141**	-0.137**	-0.054
	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.046)
County Exposure 1	0.135	-0.045	-0.239
	(0.159)	(0.169)	(0.130)
County Exposure 1 × House	0.276	0.525***	0.659***
	(0.167)	(0.178)	(0.136)
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chi-squared Statistic	497.58	433.99	439.29
(p-value)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	5385	7509	7662

Notes: Reported results are marginal effects (not coefficient estimates) of the regressors. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Table 6: The Role of Retirement in Trade Policy Preferences (Marginal Effects)

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Relative Occupation Wage	-0.075***	-0.081***		
	(0.023)	(0.023)		
Education Years			-0.036***	-0.037***
			(0.004)	(0.004)
Sector Tariff	1.040***		0.883**	
	(0.339)		(0.382)	
Sector Net Export Share		-0.164**		-0.147*
		(0.074)		(0.081)
County Exposure 1	-0.093	-0.041	-0.051	-0.007
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.170)	(0.169)
County Exposure 1 × House	0.554***	0.541***	0.489***	0.473***
	(0.162)	(0.163)	(0.178)	(0.178)
Retired	0.069	0.029	-0.260***	-0.310***
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.073)
Retired × Relative Occupation Wage	0.012	0.033		
	(0.050)	(0.050)		
Retired × Education Years			0.025***	0.028***
			(0.006)	(0.006)
Retired × Sector Tariff	-2.088***		-1.760**	
	(0.640)		(0.754)	
Retired × Sector Net Export Share		0.074		0.010
		(0.127)		(0.149)
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chi-squared Statistic	374.11	367.17	407.44	407.99
** (p-value)**	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	7468	7468	7509	7509

Notes: Reported results are marginal effects (not coefficient estimates) of the regressors. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Table 7: Differences Between Retired Individuals and Those Not Retired with Respect to the Effects of Skill and Occupation Industry on Trade Policy Preferences.
(Marginal Effects)

	Not Retired	Retired
Column 1, Table 6		
Relative Occupation Wages	-0.075***	-0.063
	(pval=0.00)	(pval=0.19)
Sector Tariff	1.040***	-1.048*
	(pval=0.00)	(pval=0.06)
Column 2, Table 6		
Relative Occupation Wages	-0.081***	-0.049
	(pval=0.00)	(pval=0.31)
Sector Net Export Share	-0.164**	-0.090
	(pval=0.03)	(pval=0.40)
Column 3, Table 6		
Education Years	-0.036***	-0.010*
	(pval=0.00)	(pval=0.08)
Sector Tariffs	0.883**	-0.876
	(pval=0.02)	(pval=0.18)
Column 4, Table 6		
Education Years	-0.037***	-0.009
	(pval=0.00)	(pval=0.15)
Sector Net Export Share	-0.147*	-0.137
	(pval=0.07)	(pval=0.28)

Notes: Reported results are marginal effects (not coefficient estimates) of the regressors and come from Table 6 specifications as noted. The "pval" reported in parentheses is the probability value of a chi-squared statistic that the marginal effect is statistically different from zero. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.

Data Appendix

Many of the variables used in this study come directly from questions in the ANES survey, including our dependent variables, as well as the following regressors: *Education Years*, *House*, *Age*, *Female*, *African American*, *Asian*, *Hispanic*, *Native American*, *Democrat*, *Republican*, *Union Membership*, and *Retired*. The income variables I use come from household income questions which had respondents report where the income fell across a number of given ranges. I use the information on how many in the survey fell into each range, to construct variables indicating whether an individual's household income as in the first, second, or third quartile of income range responses for the given survey year.

A number of the variables used required combining ANES survey responses with other data. *Relative Occupation Wage* is constructed by combining individuals' responses on their occupation, which are coded according to 1980 Census Occupation Codes and matching that to U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on average weekly wages by occupation from their Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. This is identical to the procedure used by Scheve and Slaughter (2001). However, because we have multiple years in the sample, I normalize these by dividing each of the occupation wages by the average wage across occupations for a given year.

To construct the *Sector Tariff* variable I first obtain data on applied tariff rates at the 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification (duties divided by customs value of imports) reported in U.S. trade data. These data, compiled by Robert Feenstra and co-authors from official U.S. Customs data, can be found at the data page of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER): www.nber.org/data. I then create a concordance between 4-digit SIC and the 3-digit Census Industry Code reported in the ANES survey to match tariff data to the survey respondents' reported industry/sector. (Concordance available upon request) The data construction for this variable differs from Scheve and Slaughter (2001) in using applied tariff rates, rather then tariff rate schedules, due to the relative inaccessibility of tariff rate schedules over my sample years. Like Scheve and Slaughter (2001), I record a "0" tariff for all non-traded goods, as well as traded service sectors.

Construction of the *Net Export Share* variable follows Scheve and Slaughter (2001) closely, but was more involved than any of the other variables and relied on a variety of data sources due to having to span many years of data. Import and export data by 4-digit SIC sector are available for traded industries in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing from the NBER data mentioned above. Data on imports and exports for traded service sectors come from an October 2001 *Survey of Current Business* article titled "Cross-border trade in services, 1986-2000." All other sectors are considered non-tradeable and are assigned a "0" for their net export share. For the traded sectors, we also needed a measure of sector size to normalize the net export data in order to create our measure of *Net Export Share*. For manufacturing industries, we use the value of shipments of a sector reported annually in the U.S. Census' *Annual Survey of Manufactures*. For non-manufacturing sectors, the Census has, at best, 5-year censuses which we used to interpolate and extrapolate shipment values for years corresponding to our sample. These include the *Census of Mining*, *Census of Construction*, and censuses of a variety of service sectors which one can access at the following U.S. Census webpage: http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/economic.html. Ship-

ment value data for our agricultural sectors were proxied by "cash receipts" and were taken from http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmIncome/FinfidmuXls.htm.

Finally, our measures of county exposure to trade, primarily *County Exposure 1* in this paper, follows Scheve and Slaughter's (2001) methodology. I use the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data provided in their Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, which provides employment by U.S. county by SIC sectors covering agriculture, manufacturing and mining. I then calculate the employment share of the ten 2-digit SIC sectors with the highest tariffs in total county employment – these ten sectors by Scheve and Slaughter's calculations are SIC 21, 22, 23, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 38, and 39. *County Exposure 2* is calculated in the same manner, except using the fourteen 2-digit SIC sectors that Scheve and Slaughter find have the highest net imports – SIC 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, and 39.