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SELF-ESTEEM, MORAL CAPITAL, AND WRONGDOING

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ABSTRACT

In order to help understand adherence to moral principles and the force of intrinsic motivation, we present an infinite-horizon model where an individual receives random temptations (such as bribe offers) and must decide which to resist. Individual actions depend both on conscious intent and a type reflecting unconscious drives. Temptations yield consumption value, but keeping a good self-image (a high belief of being the type of person that resists) yields self-esteem. We identify conditions for individuals to build an introspective reputation for goodness ("moral capital") and for good actions to lead to a stronger disposition to do good. Bad actions destroy moral capital and lock-in further wrongdoing. Economic shocks that result in higher temptations have persistent effects on wrongdoing that fade only as new generations replace the shocked cohorts. Societies with the same moral fundamentals may display different wrongdoing rates depending on how much past luck has polarized the distribution of individual beliefs. The model illustrates how optimal deterrence may change under endogenous moral costs and how wrongdoing may be compounded as high temptation activities attract individuals with low moral capital.

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1 Introduction

We investigate the dynamics of wrongdoing in a model where individual moral standards emerge endogenously. We develop our framework in two parts. In the first part we investigate individual-level incentives to adhere to a moral objective, and in the second part we aggregate behavior to the level of a society in a demographic steady state. In our model, an infinitely lived individual receives a sequence of stochastic consumption opportunities (“temptations”) and must decide which to resist, if any. The model is rooted on two fundamental assumptions. The first is that individual actions when facing temptation depend not just on conscious intentions but also on unconscious impulses. The second is that the individual, although aware that temptations are enjoyable, also derives utility from thinking she has “a good heart.” In other words, she would like to be the type of person whose unconscious nature is geared towards rejecting temptations.

The basic idea behind the model, namely that people may have an incentive to behave morally because they want to maintain a high opinion of themselves, is old – it goes back at least to Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. But it poses immediate challenges. How are opinions on the self anchored, and when will individuals prefer to forgo enjoyable consumption for the sake of self-image? After all, a life of mischief may be rewarding, too. Second, will behavior that is driven by an introspective reputation be self-reinforcing? Third, what are the implications for the social dynamics of wrongdoing when individuals balance self-esteem with consumption-based utility?

We solve for the individual’s optimal policy and isolate conditions under which (i) individuals resist actions that are deemed immoral even when they yield consumption value, (ii) individuals improve their self-image by resisting immoral actions, and (iii) an improvement in self-image strengthens the inclination to resist immoral actions, while events that damage self-image weaken the inclination to act morally. A self-reinforcing path of wrongdoing results. An example is that of a person who, perhaps because the country is going through hard times, faces a surge in temptations. Under hardship, a person may do things that erode her self-image, such as taking a bribe. A damaged self-image reduces the incentive to behave morally, even after economic conditions have returned to normality.¹ These results require specific conditions, both in terms of the preferences over self-image as well as in terms of what actions are more likely to reveal information about the self.

In the second part of the paper we solve for the aggregate wrongdoing rate in a society in demographic steady state. We then perform comparative statics and impulse-response type exercises. For instance, a higher distribution of temptations yields more wrongdoing

¹Tirole (1996) offers a theory of corruption persistence related to the impact of stereotyping on extrinsic incentives.

not just because temptations are in average higher, but because it triggers an endogenous decrease in individual moral standards. This result highlights how small differences in fundamentals across societies may create relatively large differences in wrongdoing rates. We also show how shocks that trigger wrongdoing during a “crisis” period will continue to raise wrongdoing rates well after the economy has got back to normal. Also, wrongdoing across societies may not respond solely to “moral fundamentals” such as the share of “good” vs “bad” people, but to events in the past that have polarized the beliefs that individuals hold about themselves. Moreover, the model yields conditions for the emergence of some social regularities such as taboos and the use of harsher punishments for repeat offenders. We also explain why “high temptation” activities (such as politics) could attract individuals with low moral standards, making such activities conducive to high wrongdoing not just through their stronger temptations but also because they attract the individuals least equipped to resist them.

It is important to note that we do not attempt to explain the content of morality. We take it as given that individuals believe that utilizing certain consumption opportunities is wrong, and that goodness is the feature of types who do not do wrong. The content of morality may follow from evolutionary forces, and be transmitted by culture and parental authority. The question of why people derive utility from thinking that they are good and what counts as wrongdoing is beyond the scope of our enquiry. We study the determination of moral standards, seen as the degree of adherence to established moral principles. This is important because there is indication that moral standards are both endogenous and important for behavior.

First, there is evidence that intrinsic motivations, and in particular notions of what is right and what constitutes a duty, can be important determinants of behavior. For example, experimental evidence indicates that people are willing to give up consumption in exchange for avoiding telling lies (Gneezy 2005), and for imparting justice in the form of punishment against those who “misbehave” (Fehr and Gächter 2002).² Second, there is a revealed preference argument for the idea that moral costs are both important and predictably sensitive to intervention. Nontrivial amounts of resources are spent with the objective of shaping moral costs. Parental discourse toward children, and expenditures in education (from the elementary level to MBA Ethics courses) are arguably serving the purpose of having individuals internalize moral standards. Many models in economics and politics studying wrongdoing (crime, tax evasion, corruption) tend to consider “moral costs” a given.³ As will be illustrated

²Considerations of fairness appear to vary across cultures, and affect behavior when subjects can determine the distribution of resources (Heinrich and Smith 2004). Fisman and Miguel (2007) show that traffic violations respond to cultural norms even when individuals share the same environment.

³A classic reference in the economic theory of crime is Becker (1968). His model (and much subsequent

by our model, the optimal design of deterrence mechanisms may change once we incorporate the fact that moral standards are endogenous.

The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section offers an overview of our model and of the related literature. Section 3 presents our basic model featuring the problem of an individual. Section 4 aggregates the problem of individuals and studies determinants of wrongdoing rates at the social level. Section 5 provides applications and Section 6 concludes.

2 Overview of the model and related literature

In our model, infinitely-lived individuals have time-consistent preferences and an unconscious type that may be good or bad. Good types always adhere to the moral principle of resisting temptations. Individuals do not know their type, but hold beliefs about the probability that they are good. These beliefs constitute individuals' self-image, an introspective reputation that gets tarnished when deviating from what good types would do. Similarly to Kőszegi (2006), we assume that individuals derive utility not just from consumption but also from self-image and that they may be risk averse with respect to the self-image.

An important aspect of our model is the possibility of moral growth, which is tightly connected to actions conveying information about one's type. To see this, think of the Weberian account of the Calvinist Ethic, according to which individuals are born saved or damned, but do not know their predestination status. Given that uncertainty, the account goes, individuals resist mundane temptations in order to reduce the threat of finding out that they were born damned. In other words, individuals resist temptations in order to maintain and even improve their self-image. An immediate question is: how can the Weberian Calvinist improve her own confidence of having been born saved when her good actions were deliberately chosen to convince herself that she is saved?⁴

The reason why confidence can improve is that the individual does not select her actions exclusively through the process of conscious deliberation. Choice is not pure. Rather, she can only select her intent. In each period, she may suffer an independent random disturbance that makes her intent irrelevant, letting her type define the action. Not knowing whether type or intent was responsible for her action, the individual will make inferences about her type upon observing her own actions. An example of actions being affected by forces beyond the control of conscious designs is when the ability to control a visceral impulse is diminished by a shock to external circumstances or even to an internal organic disposition. We will refer to the nondeterministic connection between intent and action as "imperfect free will"

work) posits an exogenous parameter for an individual's inherent disposition to commit crimes.

⁴This question has been studied by Prelec and Bodner (2003) and Bénabou and Tirole (2004). We discuss their work in the following section.

throughout the paper.⁵ Even after observing their own behavior individuals cannot be sure whether it was their intent or their underlying type that was responsible for the action. This mechanism, though substantively different, works in a way that is similar to forgetfulness in Bénabou and Tirole (2004). In their model, individuals forget their past actions with some probability and therefore learn from outcomes, despite understanding that they had acted under an incentive to manipulate their own beliefs. In our model, the imperfect free will associated with unconscious drives is the condition for good behavior to improve self-image. Self-image, in turn, is costly to improve (it requires forgoing temptations) but improvements have lasting benefits, so it works as a form of capital, which we call moral capital. The model accounts for the emergence of morality as a cumulative process of habituation through action, which parallels Aristotle’s account of the attainment of virtue.

Is it reasonable to assume that individuals are not in full control over their own actions? A large literature in psychology has documented the role of visceral impulses and unconscious bias in decision-making. For example, Berridge (2003) discusses how the mesolimbic dopamine system causes ultimate decisions to reflect unconscious drives, thereby introducing a wedge between what we ‘like’ (or what we would like to want) and what we actually ‘want.’ (For a previous model where decisions are affected by unconscious ‘gut’ feelings, see Prelec and Bodner 2003. On visceral impulses see also, i.a., Loewenstein 1996, and Bernheim and Rangel 2004 for a model of addiction rooted in the neuroscience of impulse control). The permanent nature of unconscious drives is what is captured in one’s type, and the view in the paper is that people may select an intent that could override, and generate good news about, that type. People presumably care about being the type who “misbehaves” precisely because society condemns such misbehavior. This is consistent with the Calvinist view that what matters is one’s predestination status, and that human actions only count to the extent that they convey information about that status.⁶

A number of recent papers offer insights that help understand the shaping of moral standards. Kaplow and Shavell (2007) focus on the relative convenience of investing in instilling guilt and virtue versus using incentives to induce good behavior. Tabellini (2007) studies investments in the transmission of cooperative values in an overlapping generations framework. In a related model, Baron (2008) investigates different social arrangements for

⁵The ability to transform intentions into actions could also naturally be associated with the idea of self-control. In economics the idea of self-control is mainly related to time-inconsistent preferences (which are absent from our model) while in criminology it is thought to encompass various traits, from pure impulse-control abilities to impatience. These two features are present but kept separate in our model.

⁶This does not imply that one could not endorse a more benign ethical view where what counts is not one’s type, which is after all a given, but one’s attempts at dealing with it, which are the result of a choice. From a positive point of view, the model seeks to capture the regularity that people appear to value having a “good nature.”

ensuring high levels of cooperation and compares the attractiveness of generalized vs local morality. These studies address important aspects of moral behavior, but abstract from the internal process that makes individuals want to adhere to received moral objectives. In all of these models adherence to values responds directly to a given investment in their inculcation. Our model illustrates that although moral objectives might be internalized, inculcation should also target the determinants of the degree of adherence to those objectives, such as beliefs about one’s goodness and one’s ability to transform intent into actions.

Intrinsic motivation and the need to manipulate beliefs about oneself are strongly connected, as made clear in the literature on cognitive dissonance, which has provided evidence that the need to preserve a good image about self affects behavior. In this connection, Rabin (1994) relies explicitly on a link between self-image and moral behavior, as do Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg (2003) in their model of voluntary contributions, as well as Cervellati, Esteban and Kranich (2006) in their model of moral sentiments and redistribution.⁷ The operationalization of self-image in those papers is very different from ours, which follows Kőszegi’s (2006) formulation of ego-utility. Kőszegi studies the emergence of overconfidence and the choice of tasks – he isolates conditions under which an agent may engage in an “ambitious” task depending on whether information on her type is welcome to the agent or not. In his model, agents who are risk-averse about their beliefs about their own ability will choose tasks that are less informative.⁸ The demand for information about self also plays a crucial role in our model: when good behavior is relatively uninformative about one’s type, risk-averse individuals will be willing to forgo temptations in order to preserve their introspective reputation, causing self-restraint to emerge. Risk aversion is necessary for individuals to be willing to sacrifice consumption for the sake of self-esteem because, beliefs being a martingale, no individual would sacrifice consumption for no expected improvement in her self-image. An implication is that when individuals’ priors match objective probabilities they cannot affect their moral capital on average. Then wrongdoing rates at the social level will depend on the dispersion of individual moral capital. This is similar to findings by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) who study a model where an individual manipulates her beliefs in order to avoid falling prey to her dynamically inconsistent behavior. They note that beliefs cannot be manipulated in expectation, but higher moments can be.

In our paper, the individual is concerned with manipulating her beliefs for purely intrinsic reasons. The models by Prelec and Bodner (2003), by Bénabou and Tirole (2006, 2007) and

⁷Rabin (1995) offers a model where agents face exogenous moral constraints and engage in belief manipulation not about self but about the impact of different actions.

⁸Kőszegi is concerned with the emergence of overconfidence rather than with moral standards. In his model the agent prefers to think she is of a type for whom extrinsic payoffs are higher, while in our model the opposite holds.

by Kőszegi (2006) can also be understood this way. In other papers, the manipulation of beliefs is present for instrumental reasons. In Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and in Bénabou and Tirole (2004) the individual manipulates her beliefs in order to help herself overcome time-inconsistency.⁹ Bénabou and Tirole introduce several aspects that we revisit, such as self-reputation playing a role, and past actions of the individual having the power to affect that reputation, thereby opening the door to self-reinforcing patterns of behavior. But, even aside from our focus on dynamics, the setups have important differences, notably that the individual in their model has time-inconsistent preferences, and is modeled as a sequence of selves who play a noncooperative game (our setup is decision-theoretic).¹⁰ In addition, unconscious forces play a central role in our model. In this regard our model lies closer to Prelec and Bodner’s (2003) where the ‘gut’ makes decisions under the constraint that the conscious mind may disapprove of the gut’s tendencies. They study a self-signaling game in which the gut makes a decision with an eye to concealing its own nature as evidenced by the decisions made. We model unconscious biases as a type having an impact on behavior that may at times be overridden by conscious thought, but which is otherwise fixed in its orientation. In other words, the unconscious forces in our model are just firing away (like behavioral types in reputation models), and the individual, not fully aware of their nature, may do well or badly at overriding them. We believe this is an attractive modeling choice to capture unconscious impulses. In Prelec and Bodner’s model the ‘gut’ can be seen as a fully strategic player, with a similar cognitive and game-theoretic sophistication to that of the conscious part of the individual.

To summarize, most previous work contains one or more of the following traits: individuals have time-inconsistent preferences; the individual is conceptualized as a sequence of different selves who play a non-cooperative game amongst themselves; models are static or have finite horizons; unconscious bias, when modelled, acts as a strategic player. Our model features an individual that contains a single self, uses Bayes’ rule to update beliefs, and has time-consistent optimal plans. The individual has an unconscious bias and a preference for feeling confident that such a bias is compatible with received morality. We characterize the full dynamics of individual behavior over an infinite horizon. This is convenient in relation to our analysis of the accumulation of moral capital, as finite horizon settings will confound the effects of a state variable that evolves over time (beliefs about self) with those of a terminal

⁹Beliefs are manipulated for instrumental reasons also in the model of Compte and Postlewaite (2004), in which an individual wants to stay optimistic because such psychological state will improve her performance at a given task. Hermalin and Isen (2008) offer a model where mood affects the choice of actions and vice versa, leading to potential multiple equilibria in individual behavior.

¹⁰Prelec and Bodner (2003), Brocas and Carrillo (2005) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006) also adopt a non-cooperative approach to modeling intra-personal conflict in dynamic settings. The latter model can be expressed in decision-theoretic terms, although it abstracts from self-image considerations.

date.

3 The Model

The individual lives in an infinite horizon discrete time world and discounts the future by a factor $\lambda \in (0, 1)$. The individual is characterized by a type, good or bad, that is unknown to her, and she is born with an initial belief that she is good with probability μ_0 . She has two additively separable sources of utility: “self-esteem,” which depends on her belief that she is good, and consumption. What matters for our purposes is the additional consumption that the individual could gain by dishonest means. We call this additional consumption utility a “temptation.”

In each period t the individual faces a temptation x_t , drawn randomly from nonnegative numbers according to a distribution function F , with associated density f . We assume that F is continuous, $f(0) > 0$, and $Ex < \infty$. For concreteness, think of a bureaucrat facing an opportunity of taking a bribe each period. The temptation is the additional consumption utility obtained by consuming the bribe.

Given the lack of restrictions on the shape of F , we can assume without loss of generality that utility is linear in x . To see what our reduced-form temptation x means, denote the consumption utility function $v(\cdot)$, the consumption available by honest means by c_h , and the additional consumption available by dishonest means by c_w . Then $x \equiv v(c_h + c_w) - v(c_h)$ measures the additional utility from the bribe that is tempting the individual. For example, a period when c_h is lower—say because an inflationary shock lowers real wages in the public sector—results in a higher x due to concave v . A shift in the distribution F towards higher values of x reflects a harsher environment where wrongdoing opportunities are relatively more attractive.

An individual can take one of two actions in a given period: yield to the temptation or resist. However, the individual cannot select her action directly, but rather can select her intent. We will talk of “positive intent” when the individual is actively attempting to resist temptation, and of “no intent” or “giving up” when the individual is not trying. When selecting a positive intent, a bad individual will in fact resist the temptation only if her free will works in that period. The individual has free will with probability $\phi \in (0, 1)$, drawn independently each time. When free will works then intent determines the action, and when free will fails then the underlying type determines the action. This formulation separates an agent’s intentions from her actions. One interpretation of imperfect free will is that an external shock alters the ability of the individual to transform her intent into her action. Another possibility is that of an internal shock, as humans have biological and subconscious

impulses that may thwart the designs of conscious thought.¹¹ The role of imperfect free will in our model is that actions may reflect not just the agent’s intention, but also her type. As a result, the agent may learn about her type by observing her own actions. Note that in a world without free will there would be no choice. And in a world with perfect free will ($\phi = 1$) it would be impossible to learn anything about one’s own type by looking at one’s own actions. When there are limitations on free will then self-discovery will have a role.

The individual can consciously perceive utility from temptations, and utility from self-esteem. The individual with belief μ_t in period t enjoys a self-esteem $u(\mu_t)$ during that period. We assume that

$$u(\mu) = \mu^{1-\rho}, \quad (1)$$

where $\rho \in [0, 1)$ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Preferences over beliefs are not standard in economics, but can be rationalized on the basis of psychological evidence that people care about their own attributes for non-instrumental reasons – that is, for reasons that are not connected to outcomes, but to the experience of living with a certain degree of self-worth.

Conditional on t , individual beliefs can only take one of three values, $\mu_t = \{0, \hat{\mu}_t, 1\}$. We call individuals with a belief $\hat{\mu}_t \in (0, 1)$ *unaware*, while those who know their type for sure, $\hat{\mu}_t \in \{0, 1\}$, are called *aware*. An unaware person who enters period t with beliefs $\hat{\mu}_{t-1}$ and who successfully resists a temptation in period t will, applying Bayes’ rule, update her belief to $\hat{\mu}_t = \hat{\mu}_{t-1} / (\hat{\mu}_{t-1} + (1 - \hat{\mu}_{t-1})\phi)$. Thus, having been born with the initial belief μ_0 , an individual who has successfully resisted t times remains unaware and has the belief

$$\hat{\mu}_t = \frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0)\phi^t}. \quad (2)$$

The beliefs about one’s goodness improve when seeing oneself do good, even when knowing that one has selected a positive intent. Note that, in any given period, the individual obtains utility $U_t = x_t + u(0) = x_t$ if taking the temptation, or $U_t = u(\mu_t)$ if never having taken one. Figure 1 shows the timeline in any given period t .

Our formulation of types and free will can be rationalized in an expanded setting following Bernheim and Rangel (2004). They model individual actions as being automatically triggered whenever a level of sensitivity to a cue goes beyond some threshold level. Building on their premise, now assume that the realized level of sensitivity at a point in time depends additively on a baseline, permanent level, and a temporary sensitivity disturbance.¹² Individuals differ

¹¹There is a large literature in psychology emphasizing the impact of such impulses. And a growing literature in economics has incorporated insights from psychology and neuroscience to model personality as a result of an interplay of conscious and unconscious factors. On the precise issue of visceral impulses, see for example Loewenstein (1996).

¹²The additive formulation parallels the approach in Prelec and Bodner (2003).

in their baseline sensitivity. “Good types” have a very low baseline sensitivity, while “bad types” have a very high baseline sensitivity. If the baseline sensitivity of good (bad) types is low (high) enough relative to the extent of the support of temporary factors, we will obtain good (bad) types that always (never) resist. The workings of a positive intent can then be rationalized as raising the threshold for falling into temptation, so that bad types with favorable temporary shocks will get an overall realized sensitivity below the threshold and resist. The measure of those temporary disturbances that, under positive intent, would bring the realized sensitivity of bad types below the threshold is what is captured by ϕ . This representation is clearly a simplification of the biological basis of behavior. However, it is related to views in neuroendocrinology of how hormones may affect behavior (for instance in connection with aggression and sexual differentiation – see i.a. Hays 1981 and Sussman et al. 1987). Hormones are seen to have two types of impact on behavior: an organizing and a situational impact. The former is due to influences before birth and in the first few years of life (which may or may not have a genetic basis), which shape the central nervous system in a permanent way, thus fixing the baseline sensitivity. The situational impact is related to hormonal changes due to circumstantial, contemporary shifts, providing the changing disturbance that completes the determination of realized sensitivity. The operation of such biological factors is unconscious.

3.1 The individual’s objective

The problem of the agent is to select a policy $\hat{x}_1, \hat{x}_2, \hat{x}_3, \dots$ to maximize expected lifetime utility. The policy specifies cutoff values such that temptations above them will be met with a positive intent to avoid them. For now we assume that the optimal policy will take such a cutoff form, and when we obtain the solution later we show that the optimal policy must indeed have such a form.¹³

To set up the expected lifetime utility as a function of the cutoffs, it is useful to first consider the contribution of just one generic future period t . (Later we combine these contributions into the present value of expected utility.) At the end of period t the agent could be in four different states in terms of the expected utility contributed by period t : (i) she could remain unaware about her type, (ii) she could have found out she has a good type, (iii) she could have found out in period t that she has the bad type, (iv) she could have found in a period previous to t that she has the bad type. To calculate the probability for each of the states we introduce the following

¹³We opt for the direct approach of analyzing the present value of an infinite horizon problem, because the recursive solution is not as informative for our purposes.

Definition 1 *The term*

$$H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) \equiv \prod_{s=1}^t F(\hat{x}_s), \quad (3)$$

$$H_0 \equiv 1,$$

denotes the probability that the agent has received shocks that she meets with positive intent in all periods up to, and including, t .

We can now move towards writing the expected utility from a generic period $t \geq 1$ as perceived at the beginning of period 1, before the realization of x_1 .

An agent who is aware of being good will enjoy the self-esteem rewards of her certainty, with value $u(1) = 1$. Someone who ends period t unaware of her type is someone who has not yet fallen for a temptation and who has beliefs $\hat{\mu}_t \in (0, 1)$ that she is good. Her utility will be $u(\hat{\mu}_t)$. Conditional on being good (which has prior probability μ_0), the two relevant states have probability

$$\Pr(\text{unaware}|\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) = H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) \quad (4)$$

$$\Pr(\text{aware}|\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) = 1 - H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t). \quad (5)$$

Combining these probabilities with the respective conditional utilities, the contribution to the expected utility of a good type from future period t is,

$$EU_t|\text{good} = H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) u(\hat{\mu}_t) + [1 - H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)] u(1).$$

Someone who had already learned that she has the bad type before period t will enter the period with no self-esteem, $u(0) = 0$, and will take any temptation x_t . Her expected utility is just Ex . However, in the event that she finds out in period t that she is bad entails a different expected utility depending on the circumstances. One possibility is that she faces a temptation above her cutoff \hat{x}_t , does not attempt to resist, and sees herself seize the temptation. This provides full evidence that she is bad, so $u(0) = 0$, and the expected consumption utility conditional on this event is $E[x|x \geq \hat{x}_t]$. But it could also be that the agent faces a temptation below \hat{x}_t , selects a positive intent, but lacks free will. Her bad type chooses the action for her, providing full evidence of being bad. Conditional on this instance the expected utility is $E[x|x < \hat{x}_t]$. Conditional on being bad, these four alternatives have probabilities given by,

$$\Pr(\text{unaware}|\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) = \phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) \quad (6)$$

$$\Pr(\text{aware before}|\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) = [1 - \phi^{t-1} H_{t-1}(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_{t-1})] \quad (7)$$

$$\Pr(\text{newly aware, high } x|\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) = \phi^{t-1} H_{t-1}(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) [1 - F(\hat{x}_t)]. \quad (8)$$

$$\Pr(\text{newly aware, low } x|\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) = \phi^{t-1} H_{t-1}(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) [F(\hat{x}_t) (1 - \phi)] \quad (9)$$

Combining these probabilities with the respective expected utilities (suppressing the arguments of H_t for brevity) yields an expression for the expected utility accruing to a bad type from some future period t :

$$EU_t|_{\text{bad}} = \left(\begin{array}{c} \phi^t H_t u(\hat{\mu}_t) + \\ [1 - \phi^{t-1} H_{t-1}] Ex + \\ \phi^{t-1} H_{t-1} (1 - F(\hat{x}_t)) E[x|x \geq \hat{x}_t] + \\ (1 - \phi) \phi^{t-1} H_{t-1} F(\hat{x}_t) E[x|x < \hat{x}_t] \end{array} \right).$$

Because at the beginning of period 1 the agent attaches probability μ_0 to being good, her expected utility from period t is

$$EU_t = \mu_0 [H_t u(\mu_t) + (1 - H_t) u(1)] + (1 - \mu_0) \left(\begin{array}{c} \phi^t H_t u(\hat{\mu}_t) + \\ [1 - \phi^{t-1} H_{t-1}] Ex + \\ (1 - \phi) \phi^{t-1} H_{t-1} F(\hat{x}_t) E[x|x < \hat{x}_t] + \\ \phi^{t-1} H_{t-1} (1 - F(\hat{x}_t)) E[x|x \geq \hat{x}_t] \end{array} \right). \quad (10)$$

The sequence of utilities conditional on remaining unaware, $u(\hat{\mu}_1), u(\hat{\mu}_2), \dots$, is just a known increasing sequence of numbers that converges to $u(1)$, hence we denote these numbers as u_t . Summing up and discounting the expected utilities (10) from all periods $t = 1, 2, \dots$ gives (after rearrangement) the individual objective function

$$V_0(\hat{x}_1, \hat{x}_2, \dots) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^{t-1} EU_t = \frac{\mu_0 u(1) + (1 - \mu_0) Ex}{1 - \lambda} + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^{t-1} \left\{ \begin{array}{c} [\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi^t] H_t u_t \\ -\mu_0 H_t u(1) - (1 - \mu_0) \phi^t H_{t-1} \int_0^{\hat{x}_t} x f(x) dx \end{array} \right\}. \quad (11)$$

3.2 Optimal policy

The problem of the individual is to select a sequence of cutoffs $\hat{x}_1, \hat{x}_2, \dots$ to maximize the objective function (11). The cutoff \hat{x}_t gives the highest temptation that she will intend to resist in period t conditional on remaining unaware at the beginning of period t . (If she is aware of her type in period t there is nothing to choose; good types are unable to do bad, and bad types get zero utility from self-esteem so they take every temptation). The first order condition with respect to the cutoff in an arbitrary period s is

$$\frac{\partial V_0}{\partial \hat{x}_s} = \lambda^{s-1} H_{s-1} f(\hat{x}_s) \{u_s [\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi^s] - \mu_0 u(1) - (1 - \mu_0) \phi^s \hat{x}_s\} + \frac{f(\hat{x}_s)}{F(\hat{x}_s)} \sum_{t=s}^{\infty} \lambda^t H_t \left\{ \begin{array}{c} F(\hat{x}_{t+1}) [\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi^{t+1}] u_{t+1} - \\ -\mu_0 F(\hat{x}_{t+1}) u(1) - (1 - \mu_0) \phi^{t+1} \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+1}} x f(x) dx \end{array} \right\} = 0. \quad (12)$$

Substantially rearranging this condition yields the extremum

$$\hat{x}_s^* = \frac{g_s}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi^s} + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^{t+s-1} \frac{H_{t+s-1}}{H_s} \left\{ \frac{F(\hat{x}_{t+s}) g_{t+s}}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi^s} - \phi^t \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+s}} x f(x) dx \right\}, \quad (13)$$

where $g_s \equiv [\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi^s] u_s - \mu_0 u(1)$.

This last expression (13) characterizes a sequence $\hat{x}_1^*, \hat{x}_2^*, \dots$ of solutions to the problem where each threshold is a function of future (but not past) policies. (The optimal policy is thus time-consistent). Note that $H_{t+s-1}/H_s = F(\hat{x}_{s+1}) \times \dots \times F(\hat{x}_{t+s-1})$. Using the generic expression for \hat{x}_s^* , we then obtain the particular case of \hat{x}_1^* :

$$\hat{x}_1^* = \frac{g_1}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^t \left(\prod_{s=2}^t F(\hat{x}_s) \right) \left\{ F(\hat{x}_{t+1}) \frac{g_{t+1}}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} - \phi^t \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+1}} x f(x) dx \right\}. \quad (14)$$

Remark 1 *The structure of expected lifetime utility at any period t , conditional on being unaware, is identical to the problem of a newborn individual, with the only difference that a newborn individual has prior belief μ_0 whereas an unaware individual has the belief $\hat{\mu}_{t-1}$. Therefore \hat{x}_1^* is identical to that of \hat{x}_s^* up to the time indices.*

The problem of selecting the optimal policy from period 1 onwards is entirely analogous to that of selecting a policy, while unaware of type, from some period $t > 1$ onwards. So the problem of a person who is born with initial belief μ' is identical to the problem facing a person who has, after t periods of successful resistance to temptations, obtained the updated belief equal to μ' .

A number of important questions arise: Does the sequence $\hat{x}_1^*, \hat{x}_2^*, \hat{x}_3^*, \dots$ constitute a maximum, and if so, is this maximum unique? Are any of those thresholds strictly positive? The following proposition characterizes optimal individual behavior.

Proposition 1 *There exists a unique solution to the agent's maximization problem. If the agent is risk averse in the utility over beliefs about herself ($\rho > 0$) then the solution is a strictly positive and convergent sequence of cutoffs $\hat{x}_1^*, \hat{x}_2^*, \dots$ such that, while she remains unaware of her type, she selects a positive intent to pass on every temptation x_t such that $x_t \leq \hat{x}_t^*$, and give up otherwise.*

This result indicates that risk aversion is a necessary condition for self-restraint - the intuition for this is explained in the next subsection. From now on we assume $\rho > 0$. We assumed that the optimal policy in each period would adopt the cutoff structure. The fact that the FOCs have a unique solution \hat{x}_s^* in each period and that the objective function is concave in each cutoff shows that the optimal policy has to adopt the cutoff form.

Because the problem at hand is time-consistent, the cutoffs that the agent “plans” for future periods will still characterize her behavior if she were to reach those periods in a state of unawareness. Conversely, if the agent reaches period t unaware of her type, it doesn’t matter what cutoffs she chose in the past.

Note that we did not assume that larger temptations are harder to resist: The probability of intended resistance turning into actual resistance is independent of the size of the temptation. The fact that individuals are more likely to resist small temptations is thus entirely due to their optimizing behavior.

3.3 Characteristics of individual behavior

3.3.1 The role of risk aversion

As shown above, a necessary and sufficient condition for the agent to be interested in attempting to resist temptations is for her to have risk averse preferences over beliefs about her type. Let us go back to the example of the behavior that Weber associated with the Calvinist ethic. We mentioned earlier a problem with the Weberian view. Why would one want to incur a cost in terms of forgone consumption in order to maintain any conviction one may have, when this conviction cannot change in expectation? An attractive alternative could be to just find out the truth about one’s type and then live accordingly. According to our model, individuals who fit the Weberian account must dislike risk over their own beliefs about their salvation. Why is risk aversion a requirement for such behavior? The reason is related to beliefs being a martingale, which means that the agent cannot alter her beliefs in expectation. Why would then she attempt to pass on a positive temptation? The intuition is that by resisting individuals reduce the risk over their beliefs, which is valuable to a risk averse individual. A similar logic arises in Kőszegi’s (2006) model of task choice.

To see the logic in the most clear way possible, consider an individual who lives only for one period and faces a temptation x . Lack of intent buys the agent a gamble with payoff $u(1)$ with probability μ_0 and payoff $u(0) + x$ with probability $(1 - \mu_0)$. Selecting a positive intent buys a gamble that yields $u(\hat{\mu}_1)$ unless she is bad and free will fails, which takes place with probability $(1 - \mu_0)(1 - \phi)$ and yields the payoff $u(0) + x$. From these gambles one can show that for any concave utility over self-image there are temptations low enough that the individual wants to resist. With CRRA utility in particular, the individual wants to resist any temptation below $\frac{\mu_0}{\phi(1-\mu_0)} \left(\frac{\hat{\mu}_1^{1-\rho}}{\hat{\mu}_1} - 1 \right) \equiv \hat{x}^*$, a strictly positive cutoff for any $\rho > 0$.

Are people really risk averse regarding their beliefs? While we do not know of systematic evidence, the behavior of individuals facing a probable worrying medical diagnosis is suggestive that risk aversion over beliefs may play a role in human behavior. Most individuals who have a parent with Huntington’s disease, and therefore a 50% probability of having the

disease themselves, prefer not to take the genetic test.¹⁴ If these individuals were typical expected utility maximizers that only care about outcomes, they would want to find out whether they have the disease, in order to make adjustments prior to the onset of this incurable disease that sets in during middle age and is ultimately lethal. The fact that so many refuse the test is suggestive of risk aversion over beliefs.

There is a second puzzling aspect to the Weberian account of the Calvinist ethic. It is not obvious how one should interpret favorably any good acts that one has undertaken with the known objective of producing favorable evidence of one's own salvation. One possibility is that individuals may forget why they took an action in the past, as highlighted by Bénabou and Tirole (2004). But if an individual remembers her motivation to produce just that evidence of salvation, she could attribute the good acts to these deliberate attempts, and not to any underlying unknown type. The next subsection discusses the role of imperfect free will in allowing for learning.

3.3.2 The role of imperfect free will

If intents always turn into actions ($\phi = 1$) then individuals cannot learn about their type when they choose a positive intent. As long as they always choose a positive intent, they remain unaware and keep the prior belief μ_0 . However, by choosing no intent, they expose themselves to a gamble related to learning their type. A high enough temptation can lure them to accept the gamble. The agent now faces an optimal stopping problem in a stationary environment. As there is no growth in self-image, \hat{x}^* is the same in every period as long as the individual remains unaware. Therefore it is defined by a stationary version of (14), where $\hat{x}_s^* = \hat{x}^*$ for all s and $g_s = g = u(\mu_0) - \mu_0 u(1)$ which is positive for risk averse individuals.

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{x}^* &= \frac{g}{1 - \mu_0} + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^t (F(\hat{x}^*)^{t-1}) \left\{ F(\hat{x}^*) \frac{g}{1 - \mu_0} - \int_0^{\hat{x}^*} x f(x) dx \right\} \\ \Leftrightarrow \hat{x}^* &= \frac{g}{1 - \mu_0} + \left(\frac{1}{1 - \lambda F(\hat{x}^*)} \right) \left(\frac{g}{1 - \mu_0} - E[x|x < \hat{x}^*] \right) \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

This fixed point equation defines the optimal stationary cutoff. The LHS is a 45-degree line. The RHS begins at a positive value $2g/(1 - \mu_0)$ and grows towards

$$\frac{g}{1 - \mu_0} + \left(\frac{1}{1 - \lambda} \right) \left(\frac{g}{1 - \mu_0} - Ex \right) \quad (16)$$

which is finite. Therefore there has to be at least one solution. This shows that, while risk aversion is necessary to have individuals pass on temptations, imperfect free will is not. Imperfect free will is however necessary for people to learn from past actions of resistance.

¹⁴“Facing Life With a Lethal Gene.” New York Times, March 17, 2007.

3.3.3 Endogenous moral standards, moral capital, and Aristotelian virtue

The individual that behaves as described in Proposition 1 is someone who will attempt to pass on temptations that are low enough. An important question is whether a person who begins by selecting a positive intent has more or less of a reason to keep doing that as time goes by and she sees herself resist. In his treatment of moral virtues in *Nicomachean Ethics*,¹⁵ Aristotle held that a moral disposition is developed by the performance of moral acts. In his view, learning plays a role in moral development, and the more a person behaves virtuously, the easier it gets to continue to behave that way. Is this true of the individual in our model?

In our model, a person who, having selected a positive intent at time t , resists, will update her prior $\hat{\mu}_{t-1}$ to a higher level $\hat{\mu}_t$. This makes the utility to be had in terms of self-esteem even higher, suggesting that higher beliefs over time should push the individual to attempt to resist higher temptations. On the other hand, selecting a positive intent is counter-productive in the event that one is truly good (a state that is now deemed more likely), because the self esteem return will be only $u(\hat{\mu}_t)$ instead of $u(1)$. Another way of seeing the problem is as follows: a risk averse individual will pass on sufficiently low temptations if this buys a sufficient reduction in the riskiness of the updated beliefs. However, those reductions will become very small when the agent becomes close to certain of having a good type. As a result, it is not obvious that individuals who resist temptations make their moral standards, as captured by \hat{x}_t^* , more stringent over time. We now state,

Proposition 2 *Individuals who are successful in resisting temptations become more predisposed to resist further temptations. Formally, the sequence $\hat{x}_1^*, \hat{x}_2^*, \dots$ is increasing.*

Proof. See Appendix. ■

This proposition relies on the fact that individuals who are successful in resisting temptations become more confident about having the good type. This higher confidence, which we call *individual moral capital*, in turn predisposes them to resist even larger temptations. The key to the proof is that although gains from reducing the variance of beliefs get smaller as beliefs get close to certainty, the expected cost in terms of forgone consumption goes to zero faster. To see that the latter costs must decrease, note that the agent's intent will get in the way of her enjoying a temptation in period t only if she is bad and has free will in t . This event has a joint probability $(1 - \hat{\mu}_{t-1}) \phi$. Therefore, as beliefs $\hat{\mu}_t$ get close to one the cost in terms of forgone temptations gets close to zero.

An important aspect of the last proposition is that the effective propensity of (bad) individuals to submit to temptations is endogenous. In other words, we can interpret the

¹⁵See especially Book II.

sequence of cutoffs \hat{x}_t^* as the individual's moral standards, and we see that these standards evolve over time, depending on the history of temptations, intent decisions, and actions. Bad individuals who have always received temptations below their thresholds, and who have always had free will, will become morally robust over time. However, their high standards owe nothing to any underlying superiority in terms of fixed individual traits, and owe much to having had a quiet life in terms of temptations and luck at having been in control of their actions. Any bad type may suddenly lose her moral capital for two reasons: (i) having selected a positive intent, she may lack free will and see herself take the temptation; (ii) alternatively, she may receive a temptation above her current cutoff, and select no positive intent, which will also trigger her taking the temptation. This will immediately take her posterior to zero. After that, she will take every temptation coming to her because her standards, as measured by cutoffs in the space of temptations, have dropped to zero. After discussing some modelling features and comparative statics, the following section analyzes a society of individuals and comments on the dynamics of beliefs and wrongdoing.

3.3.4 Discussion on modelling features

Now that the basic characterization of individual behavior is complete, we make a few remarks regarding our modelling approach.

Infinite horizon

The point that risk averse individuals will resist some temptations can be made in simpler finite horizon settings. But investigating whether past good behavior has the effect of strengthening moral dispositions requires our using an infinite horizon model. The reason is as follows. An individual's decision to resist a temptation takes into account the value of the current temptation against the stream of self-esteem returns net of future expected temptations. A shorter future diminishes that net value of future self-esteem returns. Thus, the stream of payoffs associated with good behavior depends both on the state variable capturing moral capital as well as on the remaining lifetime. Because individuals accumulate moral capital over time, isolating the effects of moral capital in a finite horizon model would be difficult, as these effects would be confounded with those of a shortening horizon. An infinite horizon model offers a setting that is stationary up to the value of the state variable, and hence allows us to isolate the effect of interest.

Dichotomous types

We assumed that good types always behave, while bad types may not, so types are very different. In a more general version of the model, one could imagine that both types may misbehave, with good types having a lower chance of wrongdoing when deciding to resist. In fact, the model we use is a limit case of a richer one where, in the absence of an active

intent to resist, good types behave with a probability α_g while bad types resist with a lower probability α_b . When attempting to resist, both types will behave for sure if their free will works, and only with their type-related chance if their free will fails. That is, good types will behave with probability $\alpha_g(1 - \phi) + \phi$ while bad types behave with the lower probability $\alpha_b(1 - \phi) + \phi$. This model would again imply that good behavior leads to a higher self-image, while bad behavior leads to a lower self-image, although beliefs do not go down to zero in the event of wrongdoing. Working out the full dynamics in this richer model is very difficult because the number of states explodes, while dynamic programming methods are unable to deal with our model. This is due to the fact that the conditions usually invoked in order to characterize policy functions when using dynamic programming are much stronger than necessary and are not met in our model.¹⁶ However, the basic facts of the static version of the model with a single period can still be proved: a decision to resist yields a lower variance gamble in terms of future beliefs and therefore risk averse individuals will choose to resist temptations.

We have, however, simulated this richer model. According to our numerical results, even if $\alpha_b > 0$ the policy function is monotonic and the results in the paper remain. If $\alpha_g < 1$ good types may at times err, so the policy function becomes eventually decreasing for high enough beliefs. The reason is that for very high beliefs that one has the good type, a fall is interpreted as a tremble from one's type, rather than as evidence of having the bad type. Therefore the dynamic path of the unaware contains a part where eventually the individual becomes sanctimonious while lowering his own standards. In this version of the model the results in the paper can be established as possibility results for a subset of initial priors.

Deciding to be bad

We assumed that free will only gets in the way when attempting to resist. In other words, there is no symmetric decision to actively seek to commit a crime, decision which could be thwarted by a lack of free will. We believe the version we have used better captures the essence of wrongdoing: most of morality is defined around trying to control impulses towards self-serving goals. But a symmetric version of the model is possible, where imperfect free will may cause an attempt to misbehave to fail. Our results go through in this formulation provided one condition on parameter values is met. That condition ensures that selecting a positive intent leads to a lower-variance gamble in terms of future beliefs about self.

¹⁶To prove monotonicity of the policy function through a dynamic programming approach we would have to rely on results hinging on two sufficient conditions: that the per period expected payoff function and the transition function describing the probabilities over future beliefs be supermodular in x_t and $\hat{\mu}_t$. The first condition can be met with a minimal change in the utility function we use. The second condition is violated.

3.3.5 Comparative statics

We now examine the role of the initial prior μ_0 and of beliefs in the effectiveness of free will ϕ . We also analyze the role of a brighter future in the form of an alternative distribution of temptations G that is first order stochastically dominated by F (i.e., G tends to generate lower temptations than F). For example, G could capture a better environment where the individual does not need bribes to live well. We then have

Proposition 3 *The sequence $\hat{x}_1^*, \hat{x}_2^*, \dots$ is higher when*

- (a) *temptations x are drawn from G rather than F , where $G(x) > F(x)$ for all x .*
- (b) *the initial belief μ_0 is higher.*
- (c) *the effectiveness of free will ϕ (or the belief in it) is higher (shown under exponential distribution of temptations).*
- (d) *the discount factor λ is higher.*

Proof. See Appendix. ■

Part (a) tells us that when the individual expects lower temptations in the future she will choose more stringent moral standards today.

Part (b) tells us that an individual with higher initial beliefs will also choose more stringent standards. This suggests that if parents desire that their offspring resist temptations they would want to inculcate in their offspring a high belief in their own goodness.

Part (c) tells us that when individuals believe that they have more control over their actions they will choose more stringent standards. This result could only be shown numerically for exponential distributions over temptations. This result is far from obvious. Stronger free will makes it more likely that intent will count, leading to higher cutoffs, but at the same time it reduces the positive updating that will take place in case temptation is resisted, introducing a force towards lower cutoffs.

These results imply that a better environment (in terms of higher μ and ϕ , if we take the beliefs to be rooted in the true values, and in terms of the distribution of temptations) reduce the probability that the individual has done wrong by a given date due to two effects. Taking the case of the distribution of temptations, the direct effect is that, given the individual's standards, a better environment makes it less likely that a high enough temptation will materialize so as to induce the individual to give up. The indirect effect is that the expectation of a better environment leads the individual to resist even larger shocks, complementing the direct effect. This positive feedback suggests that small differences in the environment could generate relatively large departures in the propensity to do wrong.

Finally, part (d) states that when the individual cares more about the future she will attempt to resist more temptations.

4 Moral capital and wrongdoing in a society

In this section we consider a society consisting of individuals who each face the problem introduced in the previous section. We assume that shocks are independent across individuals and that the society is large in the sense that the law of large numbers can be used to derive the wrongdoing rates in the society. We first analyze the evolution of the wrongdoing rate within a cohort of individuals. Then we introduce an exogenous death rate in order to analyze wrongdoing rates in a society that is in a demographic steady state.

Our analysis of individual behavior proceeded without specifying the actual probability that an individual has a good type, because individual decisions depend only on subjective probabilities. In what follows, the individual choice variables \hat{x}_t should be interpreted as having been optimized given beliefs μ_0 and ϕ . While the individual intent to resist temptations depends on \hat{x}_t , the ability to actually resist temptations conditional on intent depends on whether one really is a good type. We denote the actual share of good types by μ and assume that ϕ is a correct belief.

4.1 Wrongdoing rate within a cohort

Consider a cohort of individuals born into age $t = 1$ with initial belief $\mu_0 \in (0, 1)$ that may or may not be equal to μ . The share of aware individuals—those with the belief $\hat{\mu}_t \in \{0, 1\}$ —increases over time, and a fraction $1 - \mu$ of the aware individuals will do wrong. We know from Proposition 2 that as a cohort ages the resistance cutoff \hat{x}_t increases. The only ones to resist temptations at age t are those who either have the good type, or those who, despite being bad, end up the period continuing to be unaware of their type. Those who end age t aware of being bad did wrong at age t . (This includes individuals who only became aware during age t , i.e., after doing wrong for the first time). Thus the population wrongdoing rate at age t is the probability that an individual has become aware of being bad by the end of age t :

$$\begin{aligned} w_t &= (1 - \mu) (1 - \Pr(\text{unaware}|\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t, \text{bad})) \\ &= (1 - \mu) (1 - \phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)). \end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

As the cohort ages, the term $\phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)$ approaches zero and the wrongdoing rate w_t increases monotonically converging to the share of bad types $1 - \mu$. (All convergence in this model is only asymptotic, in this case because $\phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)$ is strictly positive for any finite t .) Resisting individuals must become less numerous because those who have the bad type eventually become aware of it – either because a very high temptation eventually materializes, or because their free will fails them in some period.

The evolution of wrongdoing rates is linked to the evolution of the distribution of beliefs, which we now characterize. Notice first that, at age t , there are only three possible beliefs. The aware either know for sure that they are bad or that they are good. All of the unaware people have used the Bayesian updating formula t times and so hold the same belief.

Type	Belief μ_t	Population share
Aware good	1	$\mu [1 - H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)]$
Aware bad	0	$(1 - \mu) [1 - \phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)]$
Unaware	$\hat{\mu}_t = \frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + \phi^t(1 - \mu_0)}$	$\mu H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) + (1 - \mu) \phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)$

The average belief at age t is therefore

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{\mu}_t &= [\mu + (1 - \mu) \phi^t] H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) \hat{\mu}_t + \mu [1 - H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)] \\ &= \mu + (\mu_0 - \mu) H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) .. \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

Recall that $H_0 = 1$ and $H_t > H_{t+1}$, so clearly $\bar{\mu}_t$ starts from $\bar{\mu}_0 = \mu_0$ and converges monotonically to μ as $t \rightarrow \infty$. If $\mu_0 > \mu$ then the average belief in society converges to μ from above, while if $\mu_0 < \mu$ then it converges to μ from below. The limiting distribution of beliefs is the true distribution of types: A share μ of individuals will have beliefs $\mu_t = 1$, and a share $1 - \mu$ have beliefs $\mu_t = 0$. The variance of beliefs at age t is

$$\begin{aligned} S_t &= [\mu + (1 - \mu) \phi^t] H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) (\hat{\mu}_t - \bar{\mu})^2 + \\ &\mu [1 - H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)] (1 - \bar{\mu})^2 + (1 - \mu) [1 - \phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)] \bar{\mu}^2. \end{aligned}$$

By inspection, the variance of beliefs starts at $S_0 = 0$ and converges to $\mu(1 - \mu)$ as t goes to infinity. Gathering the above results we get

Proposition 4 *As a cohort ages,*

- (a) *the wrongdoing rate increases and converges to the share of bad types $1 - \mu$,*
- (b) *the average belief converges monotonically to μ , and*
- (c) *the variance of beliefs converges to $\mu(1 - \mu)$.*

In particular, if initial beliefs are consistent with reality ($\mu_0 = \mu$) then the average belief can never change. Regardless of how incorrect the initial beliefs may be, the wrongdoing rate keeps increasing as beliefs become more polarized. The reason is simple: good types do good regardless their awareness state, but bad types do wrong less often when unaware. This proposition also implies that, if the initial prior is pessimistic ($\mu_0 < \mu$) then the average self-image will improve (as $\bar{\mu}_t$ increases towards μ) while the wrongdoing rate increases.

In light of Proposition 3(b), and recalling (18)

Proposition 5 *Inculcating a higher confidence in individuals’ own type by inducing a higher initial belief μ_0 leads to lower wrongdoing rates at all ages. This benefit disappears asymptotically as the wrongdoing rate of an infinitely old cohort converges to the share of bad types.*

A successful inculcation requires individuals to not observe the behavior of more than a finite number of other people. If individuals observed a large sample of others’ behavior while knowing the structure of the model, they could back out the true share of good types μ and should then use that as the initial prior μ_0 . People could then only be inculcated if they could all be convinced to have a higher-than-average chance of having the good type. Such inculcation does not require the existence of a deliberate policy or a planner. Features that give rise to a widespread overly optimistic perception of μ_0 could historically have been a factor in the “natural selection” between competing societies. Note that the steady-state patterns of wrongdoing are not qualitatively different even if the existence of “good types” is purely imaginary, i.e. if $\mu = 0$.

4.2 Wrongdoing rate of a society in steady state

In this section we show that, in a world where people have finite lifetimes and are replaced by births of new unaware individuals, the wrongdoing rates of two societies with the same share of bad types can have different wrongdoing rates. Thus even long run corruption rates across countries do not necessarily and exclusively reflect “deep” moral fundamentals captured by the share of bad types.

Interpret now the parameter λ not as a discount factor stemming from impatience but as a constant survival probability facing each individual. Assume survival to be independent of all other features in the model. This interpretation of λ is immaterial for the individual decision, and makes no difference to the wrongdoing rate within a cohort. Suppose also that a new cohort is born in every period, and that the size of newborn cohorts has always been the same. These simplifying assumptions allow for a tractable steady state analysis, as they mean that the size of every age group is constant over time.

Denote the population’s share of age- t individuals by z_t . In steady state, entry and exit from each age group must balance out. The steady state relations are

$$z_1 = (1 - \lambda) \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} z_t \tag{19}$$

$$z_t = \lambda z_{t-1} \quad \text{for } t = 2, 3, \dots \tag{20}$$

The first equation balances out the “currently born” and the “currently dying,” while the second equation takes into account that the mass of individuals in all age groups $t \geq 2$ is

equal to the mass of survivors from the previous age. Taking into account that $\sum_t z_t = 1$, the steady state relations can be solved for

$$z_t = (1 - \lambda) \lambda^{t-1} \quad \text{for } t = 1, 2, 3, \dots \quad (21)$$

The steady-state rate of wrongdoing in society (call it W) is the weighted average of wrongdoing rates w_t with the weights given by the population shares of the cohorts.

$$W = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} z_t w_t = (1 - \lambda) \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^{t-1} w_t, \quad (22)$$

Using the expression for w_t from (17), the steady-state rate of wrongdoing is

$$\begin{aligned} W &= (1 - \lambda) \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^{t-1} (1 - \mu) (1 - \phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)) \\ &= (1 - \mu) \left\{ 1 - (1 - \lambda) \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^{t-1} \phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) \right\} \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

The proportion of bad types $1 - \mu$ gives the worst-case potential for the wrongdoing rate in society so W must obviously be strictly below $1 - \mu$ since at least some bad types sometimes resist temptations. But just how much short of $1 - \mu$ the steady state wrongdoing rate falls depends on the parameters of the model.

Proposition 6 *The steady state rate of wrongdoing in society W ,*

(a) *is lower when the initial beliefs μ_0 of the newly born are higher,*

(b) *is lower when the distribution of temptations F is lower in the first order stochastic dominance sense,*

(c) *is lower when the probability that free will works ϕ is higher (under exponential distributions of temptations).*

(d) *responds ambiguously to a higher survival rate λ .*

Proof. Part (a) follows from Proposition 3(a); part (b) follows from Proposition 3(b); part (c) follows from

$$\frac{dW}{d\phi} = - (1 - \mu) (1 - \lambda) \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^{t-1} t \phi^{t-1} H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^{t-1} \phi^t \frac{dH_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t)}{d\phi} \right\} < 0,$$

where the sign follows from the fact that $dH_t/d\phi > 0$ from proposition 3(c).

Part (d): $\frac{dW}{d\lambda}$ cannot be signed. From Proposition 3(d), a higher λ will increase cutoffs and hence reduce wrongdoing. But a higher survival rate also means that people live longer

and have a longer time to find out their types, which as seen in the cohort analysis tends to increase wrongdoing. Therefore, the overall impact of a higher λ is ambiguous. ■

It is clear from (23) that a higher true share of good types results in a lower wrongdoing rate. And it is also easy to see that regardless of the true population share of good types, the social wrongdoing rate is lower whenever μ_0 and ϕ are higher (even if these are incorrect beliefs), as well as when the distribution of temptations is lower. This follows from the results in Proposition 3, showing that such parametric changes make individuals more resistant to temptations. This suggests a useful social role for indoctrination in terms of inculcating favorable beliefs.

4.3 Response to shocks: wrongdoing across societies

Now let's consider how a society responds to aggregate shocks in the distribution of temptations. For example, a period with adverse macroeconomic conditions would likely expose the population to higher temptations in utility terms. Two otherwise similar societies who face different macroeconomic shocks may end up with different wrongdoing rates.

The case of a cohort Consider first two initially identical cohorts in similar environments, one of which encounters a temporary shock to its distribution of temptations. By shock we mean that, for one period, individual temptations are drawn from some distribution G instead of the usual F . Call the shock “bad” if G stochastically dominates F (i.e., $G(x) < F(x)$ for all $x > 0$) and “good” if the opposite is true. The shock comes as a surprise and is not expected to be repeated, so individuals use \hat{x}_t from Section 2 as their optimal policy. Suppose that the shock takes place s periods after the birth of the cohorts. Obviously behavior before period s is identical across the two cohorts.

Proposition 7 *Of two otherwise similar cohorts, one that has encountered a bad (good) shock in the past has a permanently higher (lower) wrongdoing rate. The difference in wrongdoing rates converges to zero as the cohort becomes infinitely old.*

Proof. Using the expression for w_t in (17), and the definition of H_t from (3) where G replaces F at the time of the shock, the wrongdoing rate at ages $t \geq s$ for a cohort that experienced the shock at age $s \geq 1$ is

$$w_{t,s} = (1 - \mu) \left\{ 1 - \phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) \frac{G(\hat{x}_s)}{F(\hat{x}_s)} \right\}. \quad (24)$$

Clearly $w_{t,s} > w_t$ for all $s \geq t$ if $G(\hat{x}_s) < F(\hat{x}_s)$, and vice versa if $G(\hat{x}_s) > F(\hat{x}_s)$. As $t \rightarrow \infty$, $\phi^t H_t \rightarrow 0$ so $w_{t,s} \rightarrow 1 - \mu$. ■

The wrongdoing rates of the shocked cohorts converge to $1 - \mu$ just as they do for a cohort that was not shocked, so eventually the effects of the shock wash out. Nevertheless, history

matters, as wrongdoing rates are determined by a process that has memory. Bad shocks that prompted a higher share of people to give in to temptations in one period accelerate the polarization of beliefs and yield higher wrongdoing rates for every subsequent period. This underscores that moral capital at the level of society is not about the average belief of individuals. Instead, it depends on how beliefs are distributed across individuals.

The case of a society in demographic steady state Now consider a whole society that faces the shock G in some period; call that period zero without loss of generality. We are interested in the level of wrongdoing in society s periods after the shock. At that point the cohorts born less than s periods ago are not affected by the shock so their wrongdoing rate is given by (17), while those that were born during or after the shock have the wrongdoing rate given by (24). Combining the cohort wrongdoing rates with the population shares (21), the aggregate rate of wrongdoing s periods after the shock is

$$\begin{aligned} W_s &= \sum_{t=1}^s z_t w_t + \sum_{t=s+1}^{\infty} z_t w_{t,s} \\ &= (1 - \mu) \left\{ 1 - (1 - \lambda) \left(\sum_{t=1}^s \lambda^{t-1} \phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) + \sum_{t=s+1}^{\infty} \lambda^{t-1} \phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) \frac{G(\hat{x}_{t-s})}{F(\hat{x}_{t-s})} \right) \right\} \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

where we define $\sum_{t=1}^0 \text{term}_t \equiv 0$ for convenience to cover also the case $s = 0$. The direction of the shock depends on the ratios $G(\hat{x}_t)/F(\hat{x}_t)$ in the natural way. Clearly the wrongdoing rate must eventually return to the steady state value, as ever fewer survivors remain from the shocked period.

Proposition 8 *Of two otherwise similar societies, one that has encountered a bad (good) shock in the past has a permanently higher (lower) wrongdoing rate. The difference in wrongdoing rates converges asymptotically to zero over time.*

Proof. The difference of the wrongdoing rates in (25) and (23) is the deviation of society's wrongdoing rate from steady state s periods after the shock:

$$\Delta_s = W_s - W = (1 - \mu)(1 - \lambda) \sum_{t=s+1}^{\infty} \lambda^{t-1} \phi^t H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) \left(1 - \frac{G(\hat{x}_{t-s})}{F(\hat{x}_{t-s})} \right). \quad (26)$$

This is positive if the shock is bad (i.e., if $G(x) < F(x)$), and negative if the shock is good. As the shock becomes more distant, $s \rightarrow \infty$, the factors $\lambda^{s-1} \phi^s H_s(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_s)$ converge to zero. ■

If the shock is bad (i.e., $\frac{G(\hat{x})}{F(\hat{x})} < 1$ for all \hat{x}) then the deviation from steady state $W_s - W$ is positive. History matters through its impact on the stock of unaware individuals. Bad shocks accelerate learning, lower that stock, and augment wrongdoing. Tirole (1996) offers a model

corruption persistence based of stereotyping, where the extrinsic marginal cost of corruption to individuals (namely the marginal impact on the probability of getting caught) is assumed to be decreasing under repeated acts of corruption. His model generates a form of strong persistence of corruption in the form of multiple steady states. In our model self-reinforcing effects are permanent at the individual level and arbitrarily long lasting, but not eternal, at the social level. The effects of any shock will die out asymptotically for two reasons: First, and more obviously, because the dying are replaced by new cohorts who did not experience the shock, and second, because among the survivors the remaining unaware types eventually find out the truth which some of their unlucky peers found out prematurely due to the bad shock.

5 Applications

5.1 Two policy instruments: taboo and punishment

5.1.1 Enhanced punishment for repeat offenders

In this subsection we consider a planner who is interested in minimizing wrongdoing and who can offer incentives to agents. These incentives could be in the form of payments contingent on good behavior or punishments contingent on bad behavior. For concreteness, we will focus on the latter case and assume the planner can detect bad behavior with some exogenous probability. We do not try to characterize optimal incentive schemes in all generality, but simply to show that optimal extrinsic incentive schemes are shaped by the fact that moral standards are endogenous.

An important margin that we investigate here is whether punishment should differ between those who do wrong for the first time and those who are repeat offenders. In order to isolate the effect of interest we impose the following simplifications. The planner knows past behavior by all agents in a single cohort and has a one-time capability to impose punishment on those who do wrong in the current period. Denote with N_a and N_u the punishment to be imposed respectively on the aware and the unaware that are caught doing wrong. These punishments should be interpreted as expected punishments - in other words, N_a and N_u incorporate the probability of detection. The net expected return from seizing a temptation x is therefore $x - N_a$ for the aware and $x - N_u$ for the unaware.

A planner that wants to minimize wrongdoing would certainly have an easy task if punishment were costless. So assume that increasing expected punishment is costly to the planner as captured by an increasing and convex cost function $c(N_a + N_u)$. Our cost formulation captures a world where threatening with more likely and intense punishment is costly be-

cause it requires stronger detection and punishment capabilities.¹⁷ Lastly, we assume that the planner discounts the future according to the factor $\delta < 1$, while individuals have a survival rate λ and do not further discount time.

To construct the objective of the planner, we first characterize the impact of punishment on wrongdoing. Because those who are good never do wrong, it is sufficient to concentrate on the behavior of the bad types; to simplify notation we normalize their mass to 1. We know from previous sections that, absent punishment, those who are bad and aware of it do wrong for sure. But threatened with a punishment N_a they would attempt to resist whenever the realized temptation satisfies $x < N_a$. Therefore, given a punishment N_a , the rate of wrongdoing among the aware will be $1 - \phi F(N_a)$. That means the punishment on the aware obtains a reduction in wrongdoing of exactly $\phi F(N_a)$ in the current period. As the punishment is for the current period only, and the aware learn nothing regardless of their action, N_a has no further impact on wrongdoing.

The impact of current period punishment on wrongdoing by the unaware is more complex and is captured in the following,

Lemma 1 *A one time punishment N_u attains a reduction in the expected wrongdoing of unaware individuals equal to $\phi(F(\hat{x}_1 + N_u) - F(\hat{x}_1)) \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} (\delta\lambda)^{s-1} \phi^{s-1} \frac{H_s}{H_1}$.*

Proof. See appendix. ■

The proof shows how under punishment N_u the cutoff of the current period satisfies $\hat{x}_1^p = \hat{x}_1 + N_u$, so current punishment raises the optimal cutoff of the unaware in the current period one for one. Thus, punishment achieves a reduction in current wrongdoing equal to $\phi(F(\hat{x}_1 + N_u) - F(\hat{x}_1))$. But because punishment complements the effects of moral capital it raises the share of unaware individuals who resist and remain unaware, leading to lower wrongdoing in future periods. Specifically, of those who are saved from temptation in the current period, $\phi\lambda F(\hat{x}_2)$ are saved again in period 2, and $(\phi\lambda)^2 F(\hat{x}_2) F(\hat{x}_3)$ are saved in period three, and so on, explaining the expression in the last lemma, where $\sum_{s=1}^{\infty} (\delta\lambda)^{s-1} \phi^{s-1} H_s/H_1 = 1 + \delta\lambda\phi F(\hat{x}_2) + (\delta\lambda)^2 \phi^2 F(\hat{x}_2) F(\hat{x}_3) + \dots$ captures the present and future (discounted) reductions in wrongdoing. All future cutoffs are unchanged.

Social planner's problem

Using lemma (1), the planner's objective is to maximize,

$$\phi F(N_a) + \phi [F(\hat{x}_t + N_u) - F(\hat{x}_t)] Z_t - c(N_a + N_u) \quad (27)$$

¹⁷Costs may also increase with the number of people who do wrong and who must eventually be punished. We abstract from this possibility which would introduce a form of increasing returns to punishment, as larger punishments could pay for themselves through a lower number of inmates. Our results in this subsection are robust in the face of those effects if we impose a technical condition on the distribution of temptations to ensure that overall punishment costs continue to be convex.

with respect to N_a and N_u , where

$$Z_t = \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} (\delta\lambda)^{s-1} \phi^{s-1} \frac{H_s}{H_1}, \quad (28)$$

which only contains future cutoffs and does not involve \hat{x}_1^p . Given this program, we can now state,

Proposition 9 *If the planner's patience or the agents' survival rate are low enough and larger temptations are less frequent than smaller ones, then the planner imposes harsher punishment on repeat offenders relative to first-time wrongdoers. Formally, if δ or λ are low enough and $f(x)$ is decreasing, then $N_a > N_u$.*

Proof. The first-order conditions for N_a and N_u are,

$$\phi f(N_a) - c'(N_a + N_u) = 0, \quad (29)$$

$$\phi f(\hat{x}_t + N_u) Z_t - c'(N_a + N_u) = 0. \quad (30)$$

Solving for $c'(N_a + N_u)$ and combining yields

$$f(N_a) = f(\hat{x}_t + N_u) Z_t. \quad (31)$$

Note from (28) that Z_t approaches 1 as λ or δ approach zero. Recall that $\hat{x}_1 > 0$. Therefore, in the neighborhood of $Z_t = 1$, $f(x)$ being decreasing yields the result. ■

An intrinsic disposition to resist temptations allows individuals to behave honestly even when there are no extrinsic incentives in place. And extrinsic incentives can obviously help to keep individuals behaving honestly. Proposition 9 tells us that the design of extrinsic incentives should reflect the strength of intrinsic dispositions to avoid wrongdoing. In this extension of our model, a planner spends less resources trying to deter agents that already have intrinsic self-deterrent motives, and chooses to punish more harshly those who have lost their moral capital and are willing to take any temptation that comes their way. Moreover, the optimal harshness differential gets larger when the underlying parameters (μ_0, ϕ) make endogenous moral standards more stringent. This design resembles the very common penal profile of heavier sentences on wrongdoers with a criminal record, and rules such as the “three strikes and you are out” that apply in many US states. Notably, in California there is a second strike provision according to which a second felony triggers a sentence twice as heavy (Clark, Austin, and Henry 1997). Note however that our last proposition does not support those institutions in an unconditional way. The planner should be sufficiently impatient, or agents die fast enough, so as to forgo an added benefit of imposing punishment on those

who still have their moral capital. That added benefit is the wider preservation of intrinsic incentives, which will lower wrongdoing in future periods.

This result carries over to the case where punishments are permanent. To see why, note first that future punishments make no difference to the decision of an aware person. Note next that higher permanent punishments N_a in the future would increase \hat{x}_t today by making the life of wrongdoing less attractive (recall Proposition 3.a). This would further decrease the marginal deterrence value of N_u today by pushing the range of temptations where the punishment can affect individual behavior by the unaware even further to the tail of the distribution. This would reinforce the planner’s incentives to increase the punishment on the aware.

5.1.2 Moral taboos and rituals

Moral taboos and rituals are sometimes sanctioned by religions or cultural norms and typically stipulate prohibitions to engage in certain acts. Very often, the taboos are against acts that convey satisfaction without imposing any obvious harm, such as eating and drinking certain things. For our purposes, a “taboo” can also be against deviations from some proscribed but avoidable inconvenience or “ritual”, such as costly religious ceremonies, or other mandated behavior that deducts from otherwise available consumption utility. Here we analyze a rationale for such taboos.¹⁸

Suppose that individuals live for a period before they enter society and face the temptations we have considered so far. Before the initial period individuals have the possibility to consume a good (tea, say) that yields positive utility. Consider a tradition stipulating that consuming tea amounts to falling for a temptation (an example of a group placing tea in a forbidden category is the mormons). Now suppose that, as in our model, individuals who partake in the tradition consider such fall to reveal a bad type.

The size of the taboo temptation does not matter as long as individuals will attempt to resist it, so suppose the taboo is a temptation of size $x < \hat{x}_1$. Compared to a world without the taboo, the immediate benefit is that those who successfully resist the taboo will enter their first period with a resistance threshold \hat{x}_2 instead of \hat{x}_1 . So, of all those bad types who had free will when facing the taboo (a fraction ϕ), a fraction $1 - \phi F(\hat{x}_2)$ will engage in wrongdoing in period 1 instead of a higher fraction $1 - \phi F(\hat{x}_1)$ which would engage in wrongdoing without the taboo (i.e., in a situation where consuming tea is not thought to convey information on one’s type). The cost is that share $1 - \phi$ of individuals will fall to the

¹⁸For a different conception of taboos, see Fiske and Tetlock (1997), and Benabou and Tirole (2007). In the latter, the agent may decide to avoid information about the price of a “taboo” transaction (e.g., for a sexual service), as part of a self-control strategy. See also the study of moral placebos in Prelec and Bodner (2003).

temptation even before their first period because their free will fails them. Therefore, the gain from the taboo in terms of reduced wrongdoing in period 1 is,

$$1 - \phi F(\hat{x}_1) - [\phi(1 - \phi F(\hat{x}_2)) + (1 - \phi)] > 0,$$

which is positive whenever $\phi F(\hat{x}_2) > F(\hat{x}_1)$. The gain is increasing in the probability that a shock falls in between the original and the improved threshold. For the taboo to decrease wrongdoing the increase has to be sufficiently high to compensate for those who fall to the taboo temptation due to the failure of free will.

The taboo has a lasting impact on wrongdoing rates since survivors will carry with them a higher \hat{x}_t in every subsequent period than what they would have had without the taboo. (Eventually this advantage fades away as \hat{x}_t converges to its limiting value.) Assuming, for simplicity, that the breaking of the taboo does not count as actual wrongdoing, the wrongdoing rate of a cohort of age t that faced the taboo is

$$w'_t = (1 - \mu) \left(1 - \phi^{t+1} H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t) \frac{F(\hat{x}_{t+1})}{F(\hat{x}_1)} \right) \quad (32)$$

The impact of the taboo on steady-state wrongdoing in the society is

$$W' - W = -(1 - \mu)(1 - \lambda) \phi \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} (\phi\lambda)^{t-1} \left(\phi \frac{F(\hat{x}_{t+1})}{F(\hat{x}_1)} - 1 \right) H_t(\hat{x}_1, \dots, \hat{x}_t). \quad (33)$$

The taboo will lower the steady-state rate of wrongdoing in society when (33) is negative. Note that the choice of offering the taboo before the first period was mostly a normalization for the age index. A similar analysis would apply to an older cohort who could be exposed to a taboo in between ages $\tau - 1$ and τ , but with the above summation beginning at $t = \tau$.¹⁹

5.2 Moral capital and career choice

How do individuals select into careers in an economy where individual beliefs vary and different careers offer different distributions of temptations? For concreteness, consider two occupations where one has a higher distribution of temptations, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. For example, one could consider politics as a high temptation activity and academia as a low temptation activity. The population consists of a continuum of individuals holding different initial beliefs μ that they have the good type. We want to know how individuals will self-select into different occupations depending on their μ . When individuals can choose between careers with different mean temptations, they will require

¹⁹Unadjusted, this formula would then mean that the artificial taboo period in the middle of the lifespan also comes with a risk of non-survival, and that the taboo was unanticipated by the individual.

compensation to enter a career that would otherwise promise them a lower expected utility. We assume that the economy has a need for workers in both careers, hence compensation has to adjust so that each career is preferred by some types. The mechanism of this adjustment is immaterial for our exercise; what is important is that in equilibrium individuals who require a lower compensating differential will self-select to the low-temptation career.

To make things simple, suppose individuals will live for only one period and must make their occupational choice as soon as they are born. We then have,

Proposition 10 *Consider an economy where individuals differ in their initial self-image, and where two occupations offer each a different distribution of temptations, with one distribution first-order stochastically dominating the other. In equilibrium individuals get divided into two convex sets in the self-image space; each set self-selects into a different activity, with individuals with higher self-image entering the occupation with lower temptations.*

Proof. See appendix. ■

For aware types the selection is obvious: An individual with $\mu = 1$ will be indifferent between the two careers, and will prefer the low-temptation career under any positive compensating differential. An individual with $\mu = 0$ only cares about temptations and will choose the high-temptation activity in the absence of a compensating differential. In between, the result is not obvious, because the unaware types have an incentive to protect their self-image by choosing a low-temptation activity. Low self-image individuals, judging themselves vulnerable, could be interested in protecting whatever little self-esteem they have by choosing a low temptation activity. As it turns out, the population can always be divided into just two segments by their beliefs μ so that types in the lower segment of self-beliefs will enter the high-temptation professions.

Are politicians more corrupt than academicians because they are inherently less moral types or because they have more opportunities for corrupt behavior? In our model both arguments are correct. Even if people were divided randomly between occupations, the higher temptations would cause there to be more wrongdoing in the high-temptation sector, because the opportunity cost of attempting to preserve a positive self-image is higher. However, the higher rate of wrongdoing in the high-temptation sector is further reinforced by the selection of types.

6 Conclusion

We propose a model where an individual faces a sequence of temptations which, if taken, would yield positive payoffs. The individual obtains self-esteem from her self-image, modeled

as a flow utility from her beliefs about her type, which captures an unconscious drive toward temptation. Individuals who are risk averse about their self-image will attempt to resist temptations, hence lowering their extrinsic payoffs, in order to protect their self-image.

When intent does not fully determine actions, a history of resistance improves self-image and increases the disposition to resist temptations, yielding a view of morality as a cumulative process of habituation through action. This view of morality parallels Aristotle’s account of the development of virtue. We view the improvement of the individual’s self-image as a process of moral capital formation. When individuals perform actions that damage their self-image, durable damage is also done to their ability to resist such actions in the future, creating hysteresis in wrongdoing at the individual level.

Stronger initial beliefs about having the good type, lower expected temptations, and a lower discount rate induce more stringent moral standards. Moreover, we show numerically that a higher perceived ability to transform intentions into actions will increase individuals’ endogenous moral dispositions. This matches the understanding of self-control by criminologists, who emphasize the role played both by the ability to control impulses and to take the future into account (see, i.a., Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990 and Nagin and Paternoster 1993).

At the social level, the wrongdoing rate is determined not just by the average self-image but more generally by its distribution across individuals. Societies with the same distribution of types but who have faced less fortunate histories involving larger temptation shocks will have to endure a more polarized distribution of individual self-images. This polarization will cause more wrongdoing even if the average self-image is the same across societies. Therefore, cross-country measures of wrongdoing and cultures of corruption may not reflect differences in deep moral fundamentals but simply different histories.

Our model offers some detail about the workings of identity (see also Bénabou and Tirole 2004). Akerlof and Kranton (2000) posit that identity affects behavior because it poses costs to an individual doing things that are deemed inappropriate for people with a given identity. Our model suggests that “identity-based costs” may not be constant, but respond to past actions and to the person’s beliefs that the identity is truly hers. The model can also rationalize taboos and why societies punish repeat-offenders more harshly. This application illustrates that the optimal design of deterrence schemes may change when the disposition toward wrongdoing is endogenized. Lastly, we consider the problem of who will be attracted to high temptation activities, of which politics may be a good example. We find that individuals with low moral capital have a comparative advantage at high temptation activities and will tend to self-select into them. As a result, high temptation activities generate high wrongdoing for two reasons that compound each other: they generate higher temptations on average, and they attract people for whom resistance is less often optimal.

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1. We prove a series of lemmas (2, 3 and 4), that jointly yield Proposition 1. The first lemma shows that optimal behavior is attached to a single sequence of cutoffs, the second one says that the first order conditions of the individual's problem identify the optimal cutoff sequence, and the third lemma says cutoffs will be positive iff $\rho > 0$.

Lemma 2 *There is a unique sequence $\hat{x}_1^*, \hat{x}_2^*, \hat{x}_3^*, \dots$ characterizing optimal behavior.*

Proof of Lemma 2: Inspection of the equation (13) reveals that each cutoff is uniquely determined as a sum of two terms: the first one captures the trade-off facing an individual in the contemporary period ($\frac{g_s}{(1-\mu_0)\phi^s}$) and the second one captures the continuation value of the game up to a constant (the term $\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^{t-s+1} \frac{H_{t+s-1}}{H_s} \left\{ \frac{F(\hat{x}_{t+s})g_{t+s}}{(1-\mu_0)\phi^s} - \phi^t \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+s}} x f(x) dx \right\}$ equals V_s minus a constant). Then the uniqueness of an optimal sequence characterized by the FOCs in (12) follows. To see this, suppose not. Then starting in some period $n \geq 1$ there is a number of periods in which there is more than one cutoff forming part of a sequence satisfying the FOCs. Take any period s where there is more than one cutoff. If there are future periods with more than one cutoff, all the optimal subsequences starting in period $s+1$ must yield the same continuation value. If not, following s the agent would choose the one subsequence yielding the highest expected payoff. But if all subsequences starting in $s+1$ yield the same continuation value, then there cannot be more than one cutoff in period s , because as said earlier the FOC at s determines \hat{x}_s uniquely as a function of the continuation value at $s+1$ and the term $\frac{g_s}{(1-\mu_0)\phi^s}$. ■

One implication of this lemma is that the effects of any changes in future thresholds (around the latter's optimal value) on the objective function cancel out and do not affect the optimal value of earlier thresholds.

Lemma 3 *A sequence $\hat{x}_1^*, \hat{x}_2^*, \hat{x}_3^*, \dots$ satisfying the FOCs is a global maximizer of V_0 .*

Proof of Lemma 3: First we show that a sequence $\{\hat{x}_i^*\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$ satisfying the FOCs constitutes a maximum. Later we show it is the only one.

Because the cross partial of V_0 with respect to any two cutoffs \hat{x}_s, \hat{x}_t is zero (this can be shown through tedious but straightforward computation of the cross-partial), concavity of the objective function around each cutoff is sufficient for a maximum. Wlog we focus on the FOC for \hat{x}_1 ,

$$\frac{\partial V_0}{\partial \hat{x}_1} = f(\hat{x}_1) \left\{ \frac{1}{F(\hat{x}_1)} \left(\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^t H_t \left\{ \begin{array}{l} u_1 [\mu_0 + (1-\mu_0)\phi] - \mu_0 u(1) - (1-\mu_0)\phi \hat{x}_1 \\ F_{t+1} u_{t+1} [\mu_0 + (1-\mu_0)\phi^{t+1}] \\ -\mu_0 F_{t+1} u(1) - (1-\mu_0)\phi^{t+1} \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+1}} x f(x) dx \end{array} \right\} \right) \right\} = 0. \quad (34)$$

Inspection reveals that $V_0(\hat{x}_1^*, \hat{x}_2^*, \dots)$ is concave in \hat{x}_1 : first, because the density is positive everywhere in the support of x we have that $f(\hat{x}_1) > 0$. Second, the large product involving $\frac{1}{F(\hat{x}_1)}$ can in fact be shown to be independent of \hat{x}_1 by canceling $\frac{1}{F(\hat{x}_1)}$ out with the factor $F(\hat{x}_1)$ inside H_t . Therefore, at the optimum, any reduction in \hat{x}_1 below \hat{x}_1^* would make $\{u_1[\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0)\phi] - \mu_0 u(1) - (1 - \mu_0)\phi\hat{x}_1\}$ larger, making the entire left hand side of the FOC positive. A similar argument shows the entire LHS of the FOC would be negative for any $\hat{x}_1 > \hat{x}_1^*$.

To show that the sequence $\{\hat{x}_i\}_{i=1}^\infty$ constitutes a global maximum, note that this sequence is the unique interior extremum. So we just need to make sure it yields higher expected utility than some sequence where one or more thresholds take extreme values. Because the cross partials on cutoffs are zero, we can consider deviations in one threshold at a time. Can the agent gain by setting one threshold to the min in the support of x , or by increasing the threshold without bound? Suppose she can. Then, when a threshold \hat{x}_s is getting close to zero or arbitrarily large the objective function would be increasing. Consider the first case when the objective function attains another maximum at $\hat{x}_s = 0$. Because the objective function is increasing for \hat{x}_s below but close to \hat{x}_s^* and is continuously differentiable, the objective function must have a minimum somewhere in $(0, \hat{x}_s^*)$, a contradiction. A similar contradiction arises when considering the possibility of increasing \hat{x}_s^* without bound. ■

Lemma 4 *A necessary and sufficient condition for the sequence $\hat{x}_1^*, \hat{x}_2^*, \hat{x}_3^*, \dots$ to be strictly positive and to converge asymptotically to a finite strictly positive limiting value is that $\rho > 0$.*

Proof of Lemma 4: We show first that the sequence $\{\hat{x}_t\}_{t=1}^\infty$ is positive iff $\rho > 0$. From Remark 1 all cutoffs are analogous up to μ_t . Thus, with no loss of generality, we focus now on showing that $\hat{x}_1 > 0$ iff $\rho > 0$. Recall that the solution for \hat{x}_1^* is given by (14), which involves a lengthy second term that is the value of the objective function as of period 2 (up for the constant $\frac{\mu_0 u(1) + (1 - \mu_0)Ex}{1 - \lambda}$ which does not depend on any choice variable). That expression must be nonnegative because by inspection it is clear one can always attain zero by setting all future thresholds to be zero. Therefore, it is sufficient that $g_1 > 0$ to get $\hat{x}_1^* > 0$. Note that $g_1(\mu_0) > 0$ means that,

$$u(\mu_1)[\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0)\phi] - \mu_0 u(1) > 0, \quad (35)$$

or, in other words, that

$$\left(\frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0)\phi}\right)^{1-\rho} [\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0)\phi] - \mu_0 > 0, \quad (36)$$

or,

$$\mu_0 \left(\frac{\mu_1^{1-\rho}}{\mu_1} - 1\right) > 0,$$

which is clearly met if and only if $\rho > 0$. This does not show necessity, however, because the second term in \hat{x}_1^* may be positive, so in principle \hat{x}_1^* could be positive even if $\frac{g_1}{(1-\mu_0)\phi}$ is not. But note that for the second term of \hat{x}_1^* to be positive it must have some positive terms $\frac{g_{t+1}}{(1-\mu_0)\phi}$. These have the same structure as $\frac{g_1}{(1-\mu_0)\phi}$, and also require $\rho > 0$ to be positive. If the second term of \hat{x}_1^* is not positive then it is zero, and $\rho > 0$ becomes necessary for $g_1 > 0$.

Now we show $\{\hat{x}_i^*\}_{i=1}^\infty$ converges to a positive limit whenever $\rho > 0$. We need to show two things. First, that if $\{\hat{x}_i^*\}_{i=1}^\infty$ converges it does it to a unique limit that exists. We then show it converges. To see the first point, note that as μ converges to unity the problem becomes stationary, so \hat{x}^* should also be stationary and equal in all future periods. The limiting value of \hat{x}^* must satisfy the following fixed point equation:

$$\hat{x}^* = G_1 + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^t \left(\prod_{s=2}^t F(\hat{x}^*) \right) \left\{ F(\hat{x}^*) G_{t+1} - \phi^t \int_0^{\hat{x}^*} x f(x) dx \right\} \quad (37)$$

$$\hat{x}^* = G_1 + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^t F(\hat{x}^*)^t \{ G_{t+1} - \phi^t E[x|x \leq \hat{x}^*] \} \quad (38)$$

where $E[x|x \leq \hat{x}^*] = \frac{1}{F(\hat{x}^*)} \int_0^{\hat{x}^*} x f(x) dx$ was used and

$$G_t = \frac{u\left(\frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + (1-\mu_0)\phi^t}\right) [\mu_0 + (1-\mu_0)\phi^t] - \mu_0 u(1)}{(1-\mu_0)\phi}. \quad (39)$$

The functional form of the utility function (as long as it is concave) affects \hat{x}^* only via G_t .

Because $u(\mu) = \mu^{1-\rho}$, we have $\lim_{\mu \rightarrow 1} G_t = \rho \phi^{t-1}$. We can simplify, from (38), the limiting value as the solution of

$$\hat{x}^* = \rho + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^t F(\hat{x}^*)^t (\rho \phi^t - \phi^t E[x|x \leq \hat{x}^*]) \quad (40)$$

$$\hat{x}^* = \rho + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^t F(\hat{x}^*)^t \phi^t E[\rho - x|x \leq \hat{x}^*]. \quad (41)$$

Alternatively this can be written as,

$$\hat{x}^* - \rho = \lambda \phi F(\hat{x}^*) E[\hat{x}^* - x|x \leq \hat{x}^*]. \quad (42)$$

Note the right hand side of the last equation is nonnegative. Therefore, the left hand side yields $\hat{x}^* \geq \rho > 0$ leaving $\hat{x}^* > 0$. To see that this limit value \hat{x}^* exists, is positive for all $\rho > 0$, and is unique, note that the left hand side in the last equality has slope equal to one, and the right hand side has slope $\lambda \phi F(\hat{x}^*) < 1$. This establishes that the limit value for $\{\hat{x}_i^*\}_{i=1}^\infty$ exists and is unique and therefore that if the sequence converges it does it to a unique limit.

To see it converges, note that the sequence is bounded. This is clear from the fact that the continuation value is bounded for all t . Because the sequence is bounded, it has a convergent subsequence. Besides, because \hat{x}^* is unique, every convergent subsequence converges to that point, and then the sequence converges. ■

Proof of Proposition 2: Note first that the resolution of the problem of determining the optimal sequence $\{\hat{x}_i^*\}_{i=s}^\infty$ is the same as solving for the sequence $\{\hat{x}_i^*\}_{i=1}^\infty$ up to the fact that one's beliefs will be higher in period s than they are in period 1. In other words, the problem of finding the optimal \hat{x}_1 is analogous to the problem of finding the optimal \hat{x}_s for any $s > 1$ up to the change in beliefs. Therefore, if we can show that \hat{x}_1^* is increasing in the initial beliefs μ_0 , then we will know that the sequence $\{\hat{x}_i^*\}_{i=1}^\infty$ is increasing over time.

As said earlier, $\partial^2 V_0 / \partial \hat{x}_1^* \partial \hat{x}_t^* = 0$, the indirect effect of μ_0 on \hat{x}_1 through changes in future thresholds \hat{x}_s is zero. This means that we are interested in $\frac{d\hat{x}_1}{d\mu_0}$ as given by the direct effects, plus the indirect effect that μ_0 has through its impact on the future values of $u(\mu_t)$, which depend on μ_0 . Now recall that \hat{x}_1 can be written as,

$$\hat{x}_1^* = \frac{g_1(\mu_0)}{(1-\mu_0)\phi} + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^t \left(\prod_{s=2}^t F_s \right) \left\{ F_{t+1} \frac{g_{t+1}(\mu_0)}{(1-\mu_0)\phi} - \phi^t \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+1}} x f(x) dx \right\}. \quad (43)$$

so we just need to show that $\frac{g_t(\mu_0)}{(1-\mu_0)\phi}$ is increasing in μ_0 . So,

$$\frac{d\left(\frac{g_t(\mu_0)}{(1-\mu_0)\phi}\right)}{d\mu_0} = \frac{\left\{ \frac{du}{d\mu_t} \frac{d\mu_t}{d\mu_0} [\mu_0 + (1-\mu_0)\phi^t] + u_t(1-\phi^t) - u(1) \right\}}{(1-\mu_0)\phi} + \frac{g_t(\mu_0)}{(1-\mu_0)^2\phi}. \quad (44)$$

The first term can be shown to equal,

$$\frac{u_t [\mu_0 + (1-\mu_0)\phi^t - \rho\phi^t] - u(1)}{\mu_0(1-\mu_0)\phi}, \quad (45)$$

so plugging this into $\frac{d\left(\frac{g_t(\mu_0)}{(1-\mu_0)\phi}\right)}{d\mu_0}$ and using the definition for $g_t(\mu_0)$ we get,

$$\frac{d\left(\frac{g_t(\mu_0)}{(1-\mu_0)\phi}\right)}{d\mu_0} = \frac{[\mu_0 + (1-\mu_0)\phi^t - \rho\phi^t] u_t - \mu_0 u(1)}{\mu_0(1-\mu_0)\phi} + \frac{[\mu_0 + (1-\mu_0)\phi^t] u_t - \mu_0 u(1)}{(1-\mu_0)^2\phi}, \quad (46)$$

and rearranging,

$$\frac{d\left(\frac{g_t(\mu_0)}{(1-\mu_0)\phi}\right)}{d\mu_0} = \frac{u_t \{ [\mu_0 + (1-\mu_0)\phi^t] - (1-\mu_0)\rho\phi^t \} - \mu_0 u(1)}{\mu_0(1-\mu_0)^2\phi}. \quad (47)$$

Therefore, we need to show

$$\left(\frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi^t} \right)^{1-\rho} > \frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) (1 - \rho) \phi^t}. \quad (48)$$

Tedious algebra shows us that,

$$\left(\frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi} \right)^{1-\rho} > \frac{\mu_0}{\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) (1 - \rho) \phi}, \quad \phi \in (0, 1), \rho \in (0, 1), \mu_0 \in (0, 1), \quad (49)$$

which is identical to the expression we need to prove, except for the fact that the latter expression contains ϕ where we should have ϕ^t . Because the latter expression is true for any value of ϕ in $(0, 1)$, it must also be true for ϕ^t . ■

Proof of Proposition 3: (a) Follows from Remark 1 and the proof of Proposition 2.

(b) Again we ignore indirect effects and compute only the partial derivative due to $\partial^2 V_0 / \partial \hat{x}_1^* \partial \hat{x}_t^* = 0$. Wlog we focus on \hat{x}_1 , and compare its optimal value when the temptation in period k is expected to be drawn from G instead of F .

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{x}_1^*(G) &= u_1 \left[\frac{\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} \right] - \frac{\mu_0}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} u(1) + \\ &\sum_{t=1}^{k-2} \lambda^t \left(\prod_{s=2}^t F_s \right) \left\{ \begin{aligned} &F_{t+1} u_{t+1} \frac{[\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi^{t+1}]}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} \\ &- \frac{\mu_0}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} F_{t+1} u(1) - \phi^t \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+1}} x f(x) dx \end{aligned} \right\} + \\ &+ \lambda^{k-1} \left(\prod_{s=2}^{k-1} F_s \right) \left\{ \begin{aligned} &G_k u_k \frac{[\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi^k]}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} \\ &- \frac{\mu_0}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} G_k u(1) - \phi^{k-1} \int_0^{\hat{x}_k} x f(x) dx \end{aligned} \right\} \\ &+ \sum_{t=k}^{\infty} \lambda^t \left(\prod_{s=2}^t F_s \frac{G_k}{F_k} \right) \left\{ \begin{aligned} &F_{t+1} u_{t+1} \frac{[\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi^{t+1}]}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} \\ &- \frac{\mu_0}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} F_{t+1} u(1) - \phi^t \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+1}} x f(x) dx \end{aligned} \right\}. \quad (50) \end{aligned}$$

Note that $\hat{x}_1(F)$ is the same expression, only we should write F wherever we wrote G in the last expression. Then we can compute,

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{x}_1^*(G) - \hat{x}_1^*(F) &= \lambda^{k-1} \left(\prod_{s=2}^{k-1} F_s \right) \left\{ (G_k - F_k) \left[u_k \frac{[\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi^k]}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} - \frac{\mu_0}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} u(1) \right] \right\} + \\ &\sum_{t=k}^{\infty} \lambda^t \left[\left(\prod_{s=2}^t F_s \frac{G_k}{F_k} \right) - \left(\prod_{s=2}^t F_s \right) \right] \left\{ \begin{aligned} &F_{t+1} \left[u_{t+1} \frac{[\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0) \phi^{t+1}]}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} - \frac{\mu_0}{(1 - \mu_0) \phi} u(1) \right] - \\ &- \phi^t \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+1}} x f(x) dx \end{aligned} \right\}. \quad (51) \end{aligned}$$

Note if a future threshold \hat{x}_t is set to a positive value, it is because doing so must yield a positive payoff, which implies that all the terms in the summation inside \hat{x}_1 are nonnegative. This, together with $G_k > F_k$ implies that the last expression is positive.

c) This result is extremely hard to prove analytically. We have solved the model numerically covering the whole parameter space using exponential distributions for temptations and shown that the sequence of cutoffs increases in ϕ . These solutions are available upon request.

d) The proof is relatively straightforward and relies on showing that V_0 is supermodular on (\hat{x}_s, λ) .

Proof of Lemma 1: The optimization problem for an unaware person facing punishment N_u (note the unaware person does not care about N_a because punishment only occurs in the current period) is to maximize,

The unaware person chooses the sequence of cutoffs $\{\hat{x}_1^p, \hat{x}_2^p, \dots\}$ to maximize,

$$V = \frac{\mu_0 u(1) + (1 - \mu_0)(Ex)}{1 - \lambda} + F_1 \{u_1 [\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0)\phi] - \mu_0\} + (1 - \mu_0) \left[\phi F_1 N_u - \phi \int_0^{\hat{x}_1^p} x f(x) dx - N_u \right] + \quad (52)$$

$$+ \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^t H_t \left\{ F_{t+1} u_{t+1} \{ [\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0)\phi^{t+1}] - \mu_0 \} + \right. \\ \left. - (1 - \mu_0)\phi^{t+1} \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+1}^p} x f(x) dx \right\}, \quad (53)$$

where F_t and H_t are functions respectively of \hat{x}_t and the sequence of cutoffs $\{\hat{x}_1^p, \hat{x}_2^p, \dots\}$. The first order condition for \hat{x}_1^p is,

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial \hat{x}_1^p} = f(\hat{x}_1) \{u_1 [\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0)\phi] - \mu_0\} - \quad (54)$$

$$- (1 - \mu_0)\phi \hat{x}_1 f(\hat{x}_1) + (1 - \mu_0)\phi f(\hat{x}_1) p N_u + \quad (55)$$

$$+ \frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{x}_1} \left(\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^t H_t \left\{ F_{t+1} \{u_{t+1} [\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0)\phi^{t+1}] - \mu_0\} - \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. - (1 - \mu_0)\phi^{t+1} \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+1}^p} x f(x) dx \right\} \right) = 0,$$

from which, after some manipulation, we can solve for \hat{x}_1^p ,

$$\hat{x}_1^{*p} = u_1 \left[\frac{\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0)\phi}{(1 - \mu_0)\phi} \right] - \frac{\mu_0}{(1 - \mu_0)\phi} + p N_u \quad (56)$$

$$\frac{1}{(1 - \mu_0)\phi} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \lambda^t \left(\prod_{s=2}^t F_s \right) \left\{ F_{t+1} \{u_{t+1} [\mu_0 + (1 - \mu_0)\phi^{t+1}] - \mu_0\} - \right. \\ \left. - (1 - \mu_0)\phi^{t+1} \int_0^{\hat{x}_{t+1}^p} x f(x) dx \right\}. \quad (57)$$

Comparing this expression with the FOC for \hat{x}_1 in (14) tells us that $\hat{x}_1^{*p} = \hat{x}_1 + N_u$, implying that punishment N_u achieves a reduction in wrongdoing equal to $\phi(F(\hat{x}_1 + N_u) - F(\hat{x}_1))$ because current punishment raises the optimal cutoff of the unaware one for one in period 1. The first order conditions in (13) tells us that the cutoffs for all periods following the first depend on the static payoffs in each respective period, and on the continuation payoffs that depend on yet future cutoffs. Because punishment applies only to the current period,

the cutoffs $\{\hat{x}_2^p, \hat{x}_3^p, \dots\}$ are just like in the original problem. This does not mean however that one time punishment does not affect wrongdoing in future periods. But it does mean that the only effect that current punishment has on future wrongdoing is through its impact on the share of unaware individuals who resist and enter the future unaware. Specifically, of those who are saved from temptation in the current period, $\phi\lambda F(\hat{x}_2)$ are saved again in period 2, so $\phi\lambda F(\hat{x}_2)$ is the reduction of wrongdoing in period 2 as a result of punishment N_u having been present in period 1. Next, $(\phi\lambda)^2 F(\hat{x}_2) F(\hat{x}_3)$ are saved in period three, and so on. As a result, the one time punishment N_u leads to an expected wrongdoing reduction equal to $\phi(F(\hat{x}_1 + N_u) - F(\hat{x}_1)) [1 + \phi\lambda F(\hat{x}_2) + (\phi\lambda)^2 F(\hat{x}_2) F(\hat{x}_3) + \dots]$. And because the planner discounts future reductions in crime according to the factor δ , we obtain the expression in the lemma. ■

Proof of Proposition 10: Recall the optimal policy in the one-period case $\hat{x}^* = \frac{\mu_0}{\phi(1-\mu_0)} \left(\frac{\hat{\mu}_1^{1-\rho}}{\hat{\mu}_1} - 1 \right)$. We now drop the star from the notation, so that \hat{x} stands for the optimal cut-off. Notice that \hat{x} is increasing in μ and ρ but independent of θ , and that $\lim_{\mu \rightarrow 1} \hat{x}(\mu) = \rho$.

The expected utility of an individual with belief μ going to a profession with mean temptation θ is

$$\begin{aligned}
V(\mu, \theta) &= F(\hat{x}|\theta) ([\mu + (1 - \mu)\phi] u(\hat{\mu}) + (1 - \mu)(1 - \phi)E[x|x < \hat{x}, \theta]) \\
&\quad + (1 - F(\hat{x}|\theta)) (\mu u(1) + (1 - \mu)E[x|x \geq \hat{x}, \theta]) \\
&= F(\hat{x}|\theta) ([\mu + (1 - \mu)\phi] u(\hat{\mu}) - \mu) + \mu \\
&\quad + (1 - \mu) \left(\theta - \phi \int_0^{\hat{x}} x f(x|\theta) dx \right) \\
&= F(\hat{x}|\theta) \mu (\hat{\mu}^{-\rho} - 1) + \mu + (1 - \mu) \left(\theta - \phi \int_0^{\hat{x}} x f(x|\theta) dx \right). \tag{58}
\end{aligned}$$

The distribution with higher temptations is defined in terms of first order stochastic dominance, so $F_\theta(x|\theta) < 0$. Recall that \hat{x} is independent of θ . Denote the mean temptation in the two careers by $\theta_H > \theta_L > 0$. The compensating differential for type μ for entering the low-temptation career is

$$\begin{aligned}
V(\mu, \theta_H) - V(\mu, \theta_L) &= (F(\hat{x}|\theta_H) - F(\hat{x}|\theta_L)) \mu (\hat{\mu}^{-\rho} - 1) + (1 - \mu) (\theta_H - \theta_L) \\
&\quad - (1 - \mu) \phi \int_0^{\hat{x}} x [f(x|\theta_H) - f(x|\theta_L)] dx. \tag{59}
\end{aligned}$$

Now hold any $\theta_L > 0$ as fixed and consider the difference $V(\mu, \theta_H) - V(\mu, \theta_L)$. To prove the proposition it suffices to show that this difference is decreasing in μ because then, for any $\theta_H > \theta_L$, the compensating differential required to attract individuals into the low-temptation sector is decreasing in μ . Denote $H(\mu) \equiv \mu (\hat{\mu}^{-\rho} - 1)$. Noting that the envelope theorem helps us eliminate all terms involving $\hat{x}'(\mu)$, the differentiation of (59) with respect

to μ yields

$$V_\mu(\mu, \theta_H) - V_\mu(\mu, \theta_L) = \tag{60}$$

$$(F(\hat{x}|\theta_H) - F(\hat{x}|\theta_L)) H'(\mu) - (\theta_H - \theta_L) + \phi \int_0^{\hat{x}} x [f(x|\theta_H) - f(x|\theta_L)] dx.$$

Using integration by parts to transform $\int_0^{\hat{x}} x f(x|\theta) dx = \hat{x} F(\hat{x}|\theta) - \int_0^{\hat{x}} F(x|\theta) dx$ then (60) becomes

$$(F(\hat{x}|\theta_H) - F(\hat{x}|\theta_L)) H'(\mu) - (\theta_H - \theta_L) \tag{61}$$

$$+ \phi \hat{x} (F(\hat{x}|\theta_H) - F(\hat{x}|\theta_L)) - \phi \int_0^{\hat{x}} [F(x|\theta_H) - F(x|\theta_L)] dx \tag{62}$$

$$= (F(\hat{x}|\theta_H) - F(\hat{x}|\theta_L)) (H'(\mu) + \phi \hat{x}) - (\theta_H - \theta_L) - \phi \int_0^{\hat{x}} [F(x|\theta_H) - F(x|\theta_L)] dx \tag{63}$$

The first term of (63) is negative if $H'(\mu) + \phi \hat{x}$ is positive. And since $\partial \hat{\mu} / \partial \mu = \phi (\hat{\mu} / \mu)^2$ we can write

$$H'(\mu) = \frac{\partial}{\partial \mu} [\mu (\hat{\mu}^{-\rho} - 1)] = \hat{\mu}^{-\rho} - 1 - \rho \mu \hat{\mu}^{-\rho-1} \frac{\partial \hat{\mu}}{\partial \mu} \tag{64}$$

$$= \hat{\mu}^{-\rho} - 1 - \rho \mu \hat{\mu}^{-\rho-1} \phi \left(\frac{\hat{\mu}}{\mu} \right)^2 = \hat{\mu}^{-\rho} \left(1 - \rho \phi \frac{\hat{\mu}}{\mu} \right) - 1. \tag{65}$$

Thus

$$H'(\mu) + \phi \hat{x} = \left[\hat{\mu}^{-\rho} \left(1 - \rho \phi \frac{\hat{\mu}}{\mu} \right) - 1 \right] + \phi \left[\frac{\mu}{(1-\mu)\phi} (\hat{\mu}^{-\rho} - 1) \right] \tag{66}$$

$$= \left(\frac{1}{1-\mu} \right) \left[\hat{\mu}^{-\rho} \left(\frac{\mu + (1-\rho)(1-\mu)\phi}{\mu + (1-\mu)\phi} \right) - 1 \right]. \tag{67}$$

This is always positive if

$$\frac{\mu + (1-\rho)(1-\mu)\phi}{\mu + (1-\mu)\phi} > \left(\frac{\mu}{\mu + (1-\mu)\phi} \right)^\rho, \tag{68}$$

which is implied by (49). ■

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Figure 1: Timeline for period t

