PHYSICAL DISABILITIES AND POST-SECONDARY
EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES

Robert A. Shakotko

Michael Grossman

NBER CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES

Papers Available from the Conference

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF HEALTH

Palo Alto, California

July 30-August 1, 1980

Conference
Paper
No.

CP 84   "Prenatal Medical Care and Infant Mortality," by Jeffrey E. Harris

CP 85   "The Behavior of Mothers as Inputs to Child Health: The
          Determinatants of Birthweight, Gestation, and Rate of Fetal
          Growth," by Mark R. Rosenzweig and T. Paul Schultz

WP 539   "Time Preference and Health: An Exploratory Study," by Victor
          R. Fuchs

WP 611   "Healthiness, Education and Marital Status," by Paul Taubman and
          Sherwin Rosen

CP 86   "The Status of Health in Demand Estimation: Beyond Excellent,
          Good, Fair, and Poor," by Willard G. Manning, Jr., Joseph P.
          Newhouse and John E. Ware, Jr.

WP 609   "Physical Disabilities and Post-Secondary Educational Choices,"
          by Robert A. Shakotko and Michael Grossman

CP 87   "Employment, Earnings, and Psychiatric Diagnosis," by Lee and
          Alexandra Benham

CP 88   "Children's Health Problems: Implications for Parental Labor
          Supply and Earnings," by David S. Salkever

WP 613   "The Choice of Health Policies with Heterogeneous Populations,"
          by Donald S. Shepard and Richard J. Zeckhauser

CP 89   "Medical Care, Medical Insurance and Survival Probability -- The
          True Cost of Living," by Theodore C. Bergstrom

These papers have been submitted to the University of Chicago Press to be
considered for publication in a volume tentatively titled, Economic Aspects
of Health, edited by Victor R. Fuchs.

List of Participants

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF HEALTH

Palo Alto, California

July 30-August 1, 1980

Name

Affiliation

Kenneth Arrow	Stanford University
Lee Benham	Washington University
Theordore Bergstrom	University of Michigan
Victor Fuchs	Stanford University
Michael Grossman	City University of New York Graduate Center
Jeffrey Harris	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Willard Manning	RAND
Joseph Newhouse	RAND
Sherwin Rosen	University of Chicago
Mark Rosenzweig	University of Minnesota
David Salkever	Johns Hopkins University
Paul Schultz	Yale University
Robert Shakotko	Columbia University
Donald Shepard	Harvard School of Public Health
Paul Taubman	University of Pennsylvania

Physical Disabilities and Post-Secondary
Educational Outcomes

ABSTRACT

This paper is an empirical investigation of the effect of poor
early life-cycle health on post-secondary educational choices and out-
comes. We use panel data for a sample of 10,430 individuals who were
high school seniors in the spring of 1972, and who were re-surveyed in
October of each year through 1976. Various health information was
collected in the base year of the survey, and we use these base year
reports as measures of health which are predetermined with respect to
educational behavior in the subsequent five years. We examine in-
dividuals' choices of post-secondary activities (which include differ-
ent types of post-secondary education and no post-secondary education),
and the rate at which individuals leave educational activities, in an
effort to determine if the behavior of disabled individuals differs
from healthy individuals, and if these differences could be attribut-
able to health problems.

Professor Robert A. Shakotko
Department of Economics
Columbia University
New York, New York 10027

(212) 280-2449

Professor Michael Grossman
Department of Economics
City University of New York
  Graduate School
33 West 42nd Street
New York, New York 10036

(212) 790-4426

National Bureau of Economic Research
15-19 West 4th Street, 8th Floor
Washington Square
New York, New York 10012

(212) 598-3321/3439

1. Introduction

There is a well-documented positive correlation between good health, measured in a number of different ways, and higher levels of formal education (see, for example, Grossman, 1976). Furthermore, it is generally agreed that three potential structural relations could generate this positive correlation. In the first case, poor early life-cycle health may have hampered an individual's education, thereby leading to the subsequent observation that individuals in poor health tend to have lower levels of education. A second potential structural relationship may be that schooling affects subsequent health outcomes. For example, individuals with higher levels of schooling may be able to work at less hazardous jobs, or may be able to make health investments more efficiently. This could be in addition to any income effects which might be indirectly due to schooling (see Grossman, 1972). Finally, the correlation could be generated not by any structural relationship directly linking schooling and health, but by common underlying variables (observed and unobserved) determining each.

This paper is an empirical investigation of the first potential structural relationship above. We use panel data for a sample of 10430 individuals who were high school seniors in the spring of 1972, and who were re-surveyed in October of each year through 1976. Various health information was collected in the base year of the survey, and we use these base year reports as measures of health which are predetermined with respect to educational behavior in the

subsequent five years. We examine individuals' choices of post-secondary activities (which include three different types of post-secondary education and no post-secondary education), and the rate at which individuals leave educational activities, in an effort to determine if the behavior of disabled individuals differs from healthy individuals, and if these differences could be attributable to health problems. We find no firm evidence that the disabled differ significantly in either their choices or their rate of leaving, but there is weak evidence that the disabled choose certain types of post-secondary education more frequently, but leave sooner. An important caveat should be appended: we find that the disabled score significantly lower on standardized tests, which are also good predictors of educational choices and outcomes. It may be that the effects of a physical disability are already embodied in an individual's skills and abilities by the post-secondary stage, and that subsequent effects may actually be minimal, or may not be observed because of a prior selection process. Finally, we find weak evidence for higher rates of return to education for the disabled.

As in many previous studies, the issue of defining and measuring disability is troublesome. One constraint is the data, which contain no detailed descriptions of health, but do contain several qualitative ratings. For this study, we concentrate on the high school's decision as to whether or not a student is disabled: individuals with mental or emotional problems were excluded from the sample, and slightly over one percent of the remaining sample were classified as disabled students. The criteria whereby such classifications were made are not known. Nevertheless, there are

two advantages to using such an indicator. First, school-reported disabilities arc likely to reflect health problems of a more permanent and identifiable nature than, say, self-rated health status. Second, school-reported disabilities would likely be used by the school to apply for federal or state aid for disabled students; in other words, this indicator is likely to have been used to identify a target population for a particular policy, and one might argue that a similar type of indicator would be used to identify problems and target populations for future policy. The disadvantages are that such an indicator may reflect "true health" no better than self-rated health, or any other measure, and that even school-reported disabilities may be subject to some selection bias on the basis of underlying socioeconomic variables.

Section II below outlines a convenient model in which to analyse educational choices and outcomes. We show that the hazard rate for leaving a particular educational pursuit may not be independent of the selection rule which led to the choice of that pursuit initially. The model presented resembles that of Rosen and Willis (1979). In Section III, the data are briefly described, and in Section IV, estimates of choice, hazard, and earnings functions are presented.

II. Education as Sequential Choice

In human capital models with perfect foresight, or those in which certainty equivalence can be invoked, a direct solution for the optimal amount of education of a certain type can be computed by equating the present costs incurred with appropriately discounted future gains. Costs are typically divided into direct and indirect costs, with the former representing explicit educational expenditures and the latter accounting for the foregone income (or at least the valuation of time) during the educational period. The effects of a physical disability on these costs are not unambiguous. Direct costs will likely be higher per unit of education, relative to healthy individuals, and in the absence of special assistance, due to requirements for special equipment or extraordinary provisions, for instance. Indirect costs may be higher or lower: lower opportunity costs for the disabled (because of restricted market opportunities) would encourage higher levels of educational, but this may be partially or wholly offset by greater calendar time requirements to complete a given level of education. Similarly, the benefits of higher levels of education for disabled persons, compared to those without a disability, are also ambiguous. One must remember that benefits are individual-specific, and are measured by the individual-specific benchmark of earnings had a particular educational choice not been made. If higher education is a substitute for other more physical aspects of human capital, such as good health, then the rate of return to higher education could be

higher for the disabled. Conversely, if higher education is complementary to good health, the rate of return would be lower. In short, while conventional theoretical models are useful insofar as they are convenient vehicles for illustrating the dimensions of the problem, they provide little guidance for what one might expect to find in data, so that the question of the effects of a physical disability on educational choices is largely empirical.

A useful extension to these models for purposes of analyzing educational decisions is to postulate that post-secondary education is regarded by individuals as a problem in sequential choice, whereby individuals may choose to participate in one of several types of education, or to not participate at all. Such choices may be re-evaluated periodically, with the result that education may be commenced after a period of absence, terminated, or continued in some different program. Relative to the initial period, these decisions may be either anticipated or unanticipated, since it is reasonable to assume that decisions will be made conditional on new information (e.g. successes or failures in different alternatives). In terms of utility maximization, a particular alternative A_i will be chosen in a given period if the expected stream of lifetime utility, appropriately discounted, given that A_i is chosen, is greater than the expected stream of utility given that any other alternative is chosen.[1]

Consider the following two-period model with alternatives A_i, $i=1,2,\ldots,m$. Let utility in period j under state A_i be denoted

$$V_{1j} = V_{1j}(A_{1j}, X_j, e_{1j}) \ , \ j=1,2 \ ,$$

where X_j is a vector of predetermined variables (which may include previously chosen alternatives and their results, and where e_{1j} is a random component specific to individuals and unrelated to X_j. This representation for utility may be viewed an an indirect utility function embodying the costs and benefits associated with different alternatives. Then, expected lifetime utility, evaluated in the first period and given that A_1 is chosen in the first period, is given by

$$(1) \qquad EU(A_{11}) = V_{11} + r \ E \ \max_k (V_{k2}/A_{11})$$

where r is a discount factor, and where the second term on the right hand side is the expected maximal second period utility, given that A_1 was chosen in the first period, that a number of alternatives are available in the second period, and that second period utility is random (because of the e_{k2}). It follows that A_{11} will be chosen if and only if $EU(A_{i1})$ is maximal with respect to the set of first period alternatives. Formulated in this fashion, this choice problem is an example of a discrete-time/discrete-state dynamic programming problem, which can easily be extended to more than two periods.

Since utility is random (because of the individual/state factors e_{1j}), the choice of A_1 for any particular individual is a random event, and the probability that A_1 will be chosen is given by

(2) $P(A_1) = P[EU(A_1) > EU(A_j), j \neq 1]$,

where the time index is discarded for notational simplicity.
The difficulty, however, is that (1) is difficult to parameterize excep
for a few special cases. In the first instance, the distribution of
the random variable EU(.) is difficult to derive. Even under the
assumptions that the $V..(.)$ are linear and the e_{ij} are normal, this
normality will not be preserved in the random variable $\max(V_{k2}/A_{i1})$.
In the second instance, even if the marginal distributions for
each of the EU(.) can be derived, the probability given by (2) is
the probability of a maximal event, and its evaluation requires the
derivation of the joint distribution for the set of random variables
$EU(A_k)$, $k=1,2,\ldots,m$. These random variables will not in general be
independent, even if the e_{ij} are independently distributed across
states, because valuations of future period utility under different
current states are likely to be correlated.

This illustrative model is intended not so much to show the
difficulty of parameterizing the choice problem as to indicate a
possible relationship between the choice probabilities and the
subsequent hazard rates, due to a self-selection bias. The hazard
rate (i.e. the probability of leaving an activity) is determined by
the individual's valuation of second period utility in this simple
model, and the hazard function would express the relationship of V
to the event of leaving the initial state. Leaving, of course, may
be anticipated or unanticipated, depending on both observed
variables and random effects. The problem is that only a subsample
is observed to ever have entered a particular initial state, and

that this subsample is self-selected on a basis that may prejudice estimation of the hazard function.

Self-selection is only a problem if the random component oF utility is not independent between periods; otherwise, we might think of each period's choices as constituting independent events, after conditioning on the observed variables determining these choices. However, if utility is serially correlated in its random component, the independence of intertemporal choices vanishes. For example, an individual may value a particular alternative highly because of certain predetermined variables X, or because of a particular configuration of the e_{i1}, $i=1,2,\ldots,m$. It follows that the expectation of these random variables will not in general be zero, given that A_{jr} for instance, is chosen: the expectation of e_{j1} is likely to be positive, while the expectations of $e_{k1}, k \neq i$, are likely to be negative. For the subset of individuals who have chosen A_j, if the $e_{i.}$ are serially correlated, then $E(e_{i2}/A_{jr}) \neq 0$. Moreover, it is not hard to see that this conditional expectation may be related to the set of predetermined variables X, so that failure to take account of this non-zero expectation may bias estimation of the hazard function.[2]

Given the difficulty even in this simple two-period case of parameterizing the distributions associated with the events A_j, $j=1,2,\ldots,m$, it would seem to be nearly impossible to derive an exact representation for the above conditional expectation. However, a linear (wide sense) conditional expectation in the sense of Doob (1953) is not difficult to write, and has the advantage of being empirically tractable in cases when exact representations are n

Let z be a set of sufficient statistics for the choice of
first period alternatives A_{j1} j=1,2,...,m; then, from the definition
of Bayesian sufficiency,

(3) $E(e_{j2}/z) = E(e_{j2}/A_{k1})$ ∀ j,k .

Assuming that the underlying distribution generating the events A_{k1}
is regular in the sense of Dynkin,[3] then by Dynkin's lemma the log
likelihood function is a sufficient statistic for the event A_{k1} for
each observation.[4] Letting L denote the log likelihood function
for a particular individual, the linear conditional expectation
can be written

(3') $\tilde{E}(e_{j2}/A_{k1}) = a + bL$,

where a and b are in this case unknown parameters. While (3')
may not be a completely accurate representation of the "true"
conditional expectation (3), it is computationally convenient,
especially in cases of non-dichotomous or non-normal selection
rules. Furthermore, since L is a sufficient statistic for the
prior selecting event, a Taylor series expansion of (3) is
equivalent to a polynomial function in L, and (3') can be viewed
as the special case where only the first two terms are included.

III. Data

The data used for this study is a subset of the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972. In this panel survey, approximately 21,000 high school seniors were surveyed in the spring in 1972 just prior to graduation, and re-surveyed in October of each year through 1976. The criteria for inclusion in the sample analyzed in this paper are that the individual is a non-minority student and that relevant information from all panel waves exist. In addition, students with reported mental or emotional handicaps are excluded. The final sample size is 10,430.

Several health questions were asked in the base year survey, although a professional evaluation of the student's health was not part of the survey. Limited health information (as it related to post-secondary activities) was also collected in the follow-up surveys, but since this study aims at estimating the effect of poor health on post-secondary activities, we ensure that our measures of health are predetermined with respect to these activities by using base year measures only. For the reasons mentioned earlier, primary emphasis is on a school-reported disability indicator, which also includes limited information on the nature of the disability. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables for the sample as a whole, and for those subsets of the sample which are school-reported disabled and self-reported disabled.

Self-reported disabled is defined as the student responding positively to the question of whether poor health interferes with

[handwritten margin note: Table 1 about here]

TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Variables

Variable	Full Sample n = 10430	School-Reported Disabled n = 120	Self-Reported Disabled n = 461
Female dummy	.508	.475	.345
SAT-Verbal score (for those with valid SAT scores)	466.345 (333.518)	446.464 (365.075)	451.758 (367.081)
SAT-Quantitative score (for those with valid SAT scores)	499.656 (356.687)	476.107 (389.405)	480.590 (390.103)
No valid SAT dummy	.679	.767	.777
Reading score	52.322 (9.259)	47.908 (10.777)	49.751 (9.792)
Math score	52.397 (9.324)	48.267 (10.489)	49.855 (9.650)
Parent's income (1972; 100's)	132.94 (56.64)	132.86 (61.75)	132.94 (56.58)
Rural dummy (1972)	.066	.075	.100
Large city dummy (1972)	.759	.742	.720
Father - some p-s education dummy	.437	.425	.447
Mother - some p-s education dummy	.358	.383	.377
school-reported disability dummy	.012	1.0	.089
Self-reported disability dummy	.044	.342	1.0
First p-s education at 4-year college or university dummy	.366	.258	.260
First p-s education at junior college dummy	.175	.217	.176
First p-s education at vocational/ technical school dummy	.145	.167	.171
No p-s education dummy	.314	.358	.393
Years out before starting p-s education (for those with some p-s education)	.343 (0.774)	.221 (0.468)	.421 (0.953)

his/her education. Not surprisingly, a significantly higher proportion of students self-report a disability than are "officially" disabled, according to school records. This may be indicative of transitory health problems, or perhaps a self-reporting bias induced by other school-related difficulties and not actual health problems. What is more surprising is that the two categories are only mildly correlated: only 34 percent of those who are school-reported disabled classify themselves as disabled. This may be a reflection on the validity and accuracy of self-reported health data.

Aside from their post-secondary actvities, the major differences between the full sample and the disabled subsamples are in test scores, in both SAT scores for those who took the test, and in the reading and mathematics tests administered by the survey. There are no large differences in either parental education or family income between the disabled and healthy. This is a somewhat surprising finding which runs counter to previous evidence.[5] Besides test scores, the other major differences between the disabled and healthy are in post-secondary activities. Rather than index each post-secondary activity by time as well as type, we choose to define activity streams according to first experience with post-secondary education, and then record the duration of particular streams. Specifically, we define four post-secondary alternatives: (1) university education; (2) junior college education; (3) vocational or technical education; and (4) no post-secondary education. Since timing aspects of education are ignored, an individual is defined to

have chosen a particular educational stream (i.e. one of the first three above) if the first experience with education is of that type. The fourth alternative is a residual category, and also presumed to be an absorbing state.

It is apparent from Table 1 that the educational choices of the disabled, as defined by place of first experience, are different than those of the full sample. In particular, university choices are made less often, and other educational and non-educational choices more often. Whether this is due to disability, or to other variables (such as the lower test scores) is a central empirical question; the first part of this empirical analysis deals explicitly with this question.

Since the focus of this study is on school-reported disabilities, and since the number of individuals in this category is relatively small, the power of any tests attempting to distinguish differential behavior of the disabled and the healthy will be low. Consequently, inferences must be made at lower levels of statistical significance, or else empirical results can be taken as suggestive only. For example, with regard to low testing power, despite the indication from Table 1 that post-secondary educational choices of the school-reported disabled are different, the null hypothesis that the disabled and the healthy have the same choice probabilities can be rejected only at the 70% level, based on a χ^2 test with three degrees of freedom.

The second part of the empirical analysis focusses on the time spent in each defined educational state. Time is accounted by

counting one year for each year of full-time study, and one-half
year for each year of part-time study. As mentioned above,
educational states are defined as streams, so that cases where
subsequent education is of a different type than first
post-secondary education are in a sense misclassified.
Investigation of these data has shown that instances of such
education switching occur relatively infrequently, except for
individuals who move from junior colleges to universities. For
example, between the first and second year after high school, about
six percent of first year enrollments switch type in the second
year, and one-third of these switch from junior college to
university. The proportion between the second and third years is
two percent (of second year enrollments), and two-thirds of these
make the junior college to university switch. In subsequent years,
about two percent switch type. While the analysis of duration
assumes constancy of educational type, this imperfect assumption
seems unlikely to seriously affect any main results. It is
nevertheless important to remember especially that the junior
college alternative in this analysis is for some individuals a
combined junior college and university education.

The third part of the empirical analysis examines 1976 earnings
for those engaged in full-time work in October of that year. Clearly,
this presents a potentially serious selectivity bias, since it in-
cludes only 60 per cent of the original sample, the remainder being
either in school, in part-time employment, or unemployed. This
selectivity could be particularly serious with regard to the disabled,

who are likely to be under-represented in this subsample, so that findings regarding the effects of a disability should be viewed with this possibility in mind.

The measure of work experience was computed in the same fashion as the duration of education measure, with full-time work counting for one year, and part-time work for one-half year. Other variables, such as marriage and marriage plans, are strongly related to post-secondary activities, but have been excluded from this analysis since it is likely that they are part of a more complicated structural model, which is beyond the scope of this study.

IV. Estimates

A . Choice Functions

The model outlined in Section II does not point to any specific statistical methodology for the analysis of the educational choice problem, either in terms of parametric families of distributions or required properties of choice rules. The random utility formulation of the problem, however, has been used in conjunction with a polytomous logit representation of choice probabilities, and we

follow this general methodology in this paper. Two different logistic models are investigated, corresponding to different assumptions regarding independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA); we find the implications of each to be substantially the same, with the model whose null hypothesis is extreme IIA being marginally superior in terms of a comparison of the likelihood functions at their respective maxima.

We assume that, given m alternatives, the probability of choosing the ith alternative, conditional on a variable (or vector of variables) X, is given by

$$(4) \qquad P(A_i) = exp(X\beta_i) / \sum_{k=1}^{m} exp(X\beta_k)$$

where the β_k are conformable to X, and where the β_k satisfy the identifying restriction

$$\sum_{k=1}^{m} \beta_k = 0.$$

Incorporating this restriction into (4), the parameter space for the unconstrained problem can be denoted by $\beta = (\beta_1, \beta_2, . \beta_{m-1})$. Then, for the jth observation, define $c(k,j)=1$ if alternative k is chosen, and $c(k,j)=0$ otherwise. The log likelihood function for the jth observation then can be written

$$(5) \qquad L_j(X, \beta) = \sum_{k=1}^{m} c(k,j) \log P_j(A_k) ,$$

where the probabilities P are given by (4). It follows immediately that given a random sample the sample log likelihood function is

$$L(\beta) = \sum_{j=1}^{N} \sum_{k=1}^{m} c(k,j) \log P_j(A_k) ,$$

where N is the sample size.[6]

We can use the general method of Jennrich (1969) to transform this maximum likelihood problem into one of non-linear least squares. Since the probabilities given by (4) are by construction in the open unit interval, and since (5) contains one and only one non-zero term, L_j is negative definite. Furthermore, from (4), it is easy to verify that L_j is a monotonic function of each of the elements of β. Define

$$f_j(X, \beta) = (-L_j)^{1/2}$$

and let $y \equiv 0$. Since L_j is monotonic in β, so is f_j. Now define

$$u_j = y - f_j(X, \beta) ;$$

it is immediately apparent that minimizing $\sum_{j=1}^{N} u_j^2$ is equivalent to maximizing the sample likelihood function.

Table 2 about here

Table 2 shows the results of this method when applied to two different logistic formulations of the choice problem. In the first, reported as column (a), individuals are presumed to choose among the four defined alternatives when all are in the choice set

TABLE 2
Post High School Choices[a]

Variable	University		Junior College		Vocational/ Technical		No P-S Schooling	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Female dummy	-.057 (.086) [-.018]	-.050 (.068)	-.143 (.102) [-.024]	-.122 (.076)	.140 (.112) [.021]	.172 (-)	.060 (-) [.021]	.036 (.026)
SAT-Verbal	.0014 (.001) [.00048]	.0010 (.001)	.0010 (.001) [-.00019]	-.0013 (.001)	.0007 (.002) [.00009]	.0003 (-)	-.0011 (-) [-.00037]	-.0009 (.0005)
SAT-Quantitative	.0021 (.001) [.00064]	.0020 (.001)	-.0016 (.001) [-.00034]	-.0014 (.001)	-.0001 (.002) [-.00007]	-.0006 (-)	-.0004 (-) [-.00024]	-.0008 (.0005)
No SAT dummy	.660 (.436) [.181]	.762 (.362)	-1.309 (.587) [-.258]	-1.069 (.437)	.304 (.703) [.020]	.307 (-)	.345 (-) [.057]	-.036 (.183)
Reading score	.023 (.006) [.008]	.017 (.005)	.006 (.007) [.001]	-.001 (.005)	-.009 (.008) [-.002]	-.016 (-)	-.020 (-) [-.007]	-.012 (.002)
Math score	.043 (.007) [.014]	.030 (.005)	.009 (.007) [.001]	-.003 (.005)	-.017 (.008) [-.003]	-.027 (-)	-.035 (-) [-.012]	-.022 (.002)
Parent's income (100's)	.0020 (.001) [.00068]	.0013 (.001)	.0014 (.001) [.00022]	.0007 (.001)	-.0014 (.001) [-.00022]	-.0020 (-)	-.0020 (-) [-.00068]	-.0012 (.0002)

TABLE 2 (concluded)

Variable	University		Junior College		Vocational/Technical		No P-S Schooling	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
School-reported disability dummy	-.081 (.426) [-.018]	-.106 (.334)	.229 (.417) [.046]	.185 (.309)	-.024 (.484) [-.001]	-.079 (-)	-.124 (-) [-.029]	-.086 (.113)
Rural dummy (1972)	.025 (.413) [.005]	.011 (.285)	-.202 (.402) [-.037]	-.167 (.262)	.107 (.299) [.014]	.156 (-)	.070 (-) [.018]	.024 (.052)
Large city dummy (1972)	.077 (.211) [.352]	.470 (.146)	.451 (.196) [.076]	.041 (.131)	-.167 (.168) [-.027]	-.511 (-)	-1.261 (-) [-.401]	-.805 (.031)
Father - some p-s education dummy	.280 (.094) [.095]	.174 (.075)	.185 (.111) [.029]	.091 (.083)	-.187 (.127) [-.030]	-.265 (-)	-.278 (-) [-.094]	-.186 (.030)
Mother - some p-s education dummy	.273 (.093) [.095]	.181 (.075)	.057 (.113) [.007]	-.032 (.085)	-.047 (.130) [-.009]	-.149	-.283 (-) [-.093]	-.192 (.031)

[a]Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Derivatives are in brackets.

simultaneously (extreme IIA). Most of the effects of socioeconomic variables appear as expected, particularly in the equations defining the probability of university enrollment and no post-secondary education. Higher quantitative ability measures, family income, parents with some post-secondary education, and urban residence are all significant positive contributors to choosing university enrollment, and to a lesser extent, junior college enrollment.

The coefficients indicate that disability has no effect on educational choices which is significant at conventional levels, once other variables are controlled for. At much lower levels of significance, there is some evidence that a disability encourages junior college enrollment and discourages the alternative of no post-secondary education. There may be two interpretations of this finding. One is purely statistical, in that the standard errors associated with the disability coefficients are inflated because disability is a relatively rare event in the sample, and the information passed in the "disabled" observations is swamped by that from the "healthy" observations, so that the power of statistical tests on these coefficients is low.

The second and more straightforward interpretation is that the post-secondary choices of the physically disabled are not

systematically different than those of healthy individuals. An
intensive examination of the disabled subsample alone seemed to
indicate that this lack of systematic effect may stem not from there
being no differences in the behavior of the disabled and healthy,
but from the choices of the disabled being more difficult to
predict: the logit model applied to the disabled subsample alone
was not significantly different than a pure random choice model with
no predisposing variables. This lack of systematic behavior was
also present even when different types of disabilities, including
vision problems, speech and hearing problems, and crippling
disabilities, were added to the set of predicting variables.

Column (b) in Table 2 reports the parameter estimates of a
model which partially relaxes the extreme IIA assumption of the
original logit model. The model (modified IIA) presumes a two-stage
decision procedure on the part of individuals, with the
probabilities at each stage being described by the logistic
distribution. The first stage decision is whether or not to engage
in some kind of post-secondary schooling, with the second stage
determining what type of schooling conditional on the first stage
decision. Accordingly, the estimates reported for the "No
Post-Secondary Schooling" alternative are dichotomous logit
coefficients, and those reported for the three schooling
alternatives are polytomous logit coefficients, again assuming IIA
among these three alternatives.

The same qualitative picture emerges for all variables, and
again there is weak evidence that some schooling alternative is

preferred by the disabled, particularly junior college. The two models, of course, do not constitute a nested hypothesis, so that one cannot be tested as a restriction on the other. In any case, their predictive power is nearly the same (with the same number of degrees of freedom), with the log likelihood of the extreme IIA model being -10893.2 and that of the modified IIA model being -10910.5 at their respective maxima.

B. Hazard Functions

Most economic work has treated education (post-secondary or otherwise) as a homogeneous good, and has focussed instead on duration of educational activities. In this section, we estimate the effect of a physical disability on duration for each of the three defined educational alternatives. Since the data contain censored observations (approximately 35 percent of the individuals ever enrolled in post-secondary education were studying in October, 1976 -- those not studying in 1976 were presumed to have completed their education), methodologies for analyzing completed spells, such as those suggested by Heckman and Borjas (1980) are inappropriate, and we are forced to draw inferences regarding duration from an analysis of the hazard rate and its dependence on disability and other variables.

The hazard probabilities suffer from the same difficulties of parameterization as the initial choice probabilities, for the reason that they are both determined by the same sequential choice model. Complicating the hazard problem yet further is the notion that

education is "lumpy," or has defined units of achievement which may
affect the final distribution of educational duration times. The
implication is that the hazard rate may not be smooth in the usual
sense. For example, in a four-year college program, the hazard rate
may be low after three years, and extremely high after four. All of
this suggests that it would be hardly defensible to impose any
particular parametric scheme either on the hazard rate, or on the
completed durations, should they be observed.

We adopt instead Cox's (1972) proportional hazards model which
is distribution-free, but which still preserves the parametric
notion that different variables may shift some transformation of the
duration (or survival) distribution in a parallel fashion. It
should be noted again that for purposes of this model activities are
defined by first type of post-secondary education, and that exits
are defined only by leaving post-secondary education, and not by
switching types. Finally, as developed in Section II, the
self-selection problem is taken account of by including as an
explanatory variable in the hazards model the log likelihood
function of the choice problem for each observation. The extreme
IIA model was used, so that the log likelihood function reduces to
simply the log of the probability of making the observed choice of
alternative. In addition to the log of the probability, the same
set of predetermined variables as used in the choice problem were
included as explanatory variables. The results are reported in
Table 3.

Table 3
about
here

The largest effects on the hazard rate are generated by the

TABLE 3
Proportional Hazards Model (Years P-S Schooling)

Variable	University n = 3817	Junior College n = 1827	Vocational/ Technical School n = 1509
Female dummy	.147 (.045)	.183 (.062)	.180 (.063)
SAT-Verbal	-.0014 (.0004)	-.0008 (.0008)	-.0003 (.0009)
SAT-Quantitative	.0006 (.0004)	.0002 (.0009)	.0003 (.0009)
No SAT dummy	-.294 (.198)	-.048 (.496)	.454 (.390)
Reading score	-.002 (.004)	-.006 (.004)	-.005 (.004)
Math score	-.010 (.006)	-.021 (.004)	-.101 (.004)
Parent's income (100's)	-.0013 (.0005)	-.0003 (.0006)	.0002 (.0006)
School-reported disability dummy	.132 (.226)	-.226 (.236)	-.061 (.247)
Rural dummy (1972)	.691 (.222)	-.076 (.196)	.175 (.132)
Large city dummy (1972)	-.546 (.184)	-.537 (.154)	-.332 (.091)
Father – some p-s education dummy	-.054 (.053)	-.117 (.065)	.026 (.072)
Mother – some p-s education dummy	-.098 (.051)	-.175 (.063)	-.204 (.070)
Log (probability of making the observed choice)	-.219 (.113)	-.057 (.154)	.285 (.140)
Censored observations	1,659	562	311
χ^2 (13 d.f.)	302.44	159.97	173.42
Average years of p-s education	3.140	2.393	1.553

[a] Standard errors are in parentheses.

female dummy variable (women had a higher hazard rate than men), by
the location dummies (residents of large cities had a lower rate),
and by the parental educational variables, especially for the mother
(a lower rate for those whose mothers had some post-secondary
education). Test scores have some influence in the expected
direction, as does family income for those attending a four-year
college or university.

As in the choice problem, the disability effects are ambiguous,
and in no case significant at conventional levels. It is
interesting to note, however, that junior colleges, which were
marginally more attractive to those with a disability, also have
lower hazard rates for the disabled, significantly different from
zero at the 60 percent level. These two findings, albeit weak,
might be indicative of locational convenience or program flexibility
in junior colleges, thereby making this alternative relatively more
attractive for longer periods of time. The lower hazard rate also
suggests continuation into a four-year college, but the relatively
small sample of disabled choosing this alternative prohibits
comparison of switching rates into four-year colleges.

The estimated probabilities, included to control for possible
self-selection bias, are significant in the university and
vocational/ technical hazard functions, but in the latter with a
positive sign. This implies higher hazard rates for those more
likely to choose that alternative. This result may not be unusual
if the vocational/ technical alternative is predicted to be an
educational choice for the unsuccessful, so that high probabilities

of choice might be associated with poor prospects for performance. The issue may be one, then, of misspecification of the initial choice probabilities.

C. Earnings

The ultimate question of interest which underlies much of this analysis of educational choices is that of final outcomes, in terms of employment and earnings. A typical empirical finding is that the disabled as adults earn significantly less than the healthy, because of both lower wage rates and fewer hours worked. The evidence for this finding in this case is not so clear-cut, as shown by the estimates of a weekly earnings function for those engaged in full-time work in October, 1976. These estimates are presented in Table 4. There is weak evidence for lower earnings, but also evidence that these lower earnings can be partially offset by higher rates of return to education for the disabled. Rates of return average about 3.5 per cent for those who are not disabled, and the point estimates indicate an average incremental rate of return of about 8 per cent for the disabled. This increment, however, was only marginally significant for the university subsample. Moreover, this finding may be an artifact of the selectivity problem mentioned earlier.

To partially correct for such a selectivity problem, the log of the choice probability was included as a regressor in the earnings function, following the similar specification corrections of Heckman (1979) and Rosen and Willis (1979). The estimates, also

Table 4 about here

TABLE 4

Earnings Function[a]
n = 6219

Variable	Equation 1		Equation 2	
	Regression Coefficient	t Ratio	Regression Coefficient	t Ratio
Female	-.274	-26.31	-.273	-26.30
Reading score	-.0011	-1.50	-.0011	-1.57
Math score	.0039	5.38	.0039	5.36
School-reported disability	-.445	-1.76	-.447	-1.77
Rural	.029	1.36	.029	1.37
Large city	-.0032	-0.23	-.0065	-0.45
University education	.029	5.60	.031	5.73
University education and disability interaction	.083	1.23	.082	1.22
Junior college education	.027	4.11	.025	3.80
Junior college education and disability interaction	.017	.0.16	.015	0.14
Vocational/technical education	.036	4.42	.032	3.77
Vocational/technical education and disability interaction	.068	0.90	.068	0.90
Experience	.051	8.90	.050	8.82
Experience and disability interaction	.087	1.27	.087	1.28
Ln. of probability of educational choice	-	-	-.001	-1.20
R^2	.1346		.1348	

[a] Dependent variable is ln (weekly earnings).

reported in Table 4, indicate no substantial difference between the two specifications, and the correction term appears with a small and insignificant coefficient. It should be noted, however, that this lack of effect may be due not to the absence of selectivity bias, but rather the source of such bias, which may arise from the hazard functions and not the initial choices. Since the hazard functions are not explicitly parameterized, a correction for this source of bias is not possible.

In addition to the earnings data, preliminary evidence suggests that the disabled have significantly higher unemployment rates. The implication from all of this is that questions of disability and education cannot be fully answered in isolation from early labor force experiences.

V. Conclusion

Most of the questions addressed in this investigation are descriptive. While it at times is hard to define common wisdom, our findings in response to these descriptive questions do not always agree with what one might think is common wisdom. In particular, at conventional levels of statistical significance, we find no systematic differences in the educational choices and progression between the physically disabled and the healthy, once other variables are accounted for. The disabled do not enroll in universities less frequently, nor do they enroll in vocational or technical programs more frequently. At lower levels of

significance, we find some preference for education beginning at the
junior college level, with longer stays in such programs.
We also find weak evidence for lower earnings for the disabled,
but also higher rates of return to post-secondary education.
Of course, our analysis is only partial. We have ignored
virtually all timing aspects of the educational process, and we have
examined educational choices without regard to finer aspects of
educational quality or to explicit costs and benefits of different
programs.

Footnotes

[1]This multi-period choice problem collapses to a single-period problem in the presence of perfect foresight.

[2]The relationship of the conditional expectation to the predetermined variables X can be briefly argued as follows: suppose A_i is chosen in spite of an unfavorable value for X. It follows that A_i must have been chosen on the basis of a very "favorable" random component, which will be reflected in the conditional expectation. For a more detailed presentation of the selection problem in similar contexts, see Heckman (1979) and Rosen and Willis (1979).

[3]See Zacks (1976), pp. 61-93, for a discussion of sufficiency as it relates to conditional distributions.

[4]Which it will be, provided the distributions of the underlying e_{i1} are continuous and differentiable.

[5]See Grossman and Edwards (1979) and Shakotko (1980).

[6]See Dhrymes (1979) for a more complete discussion of the polytomous logit model, and its relation to models of random utility.

References

Cox, D. R., 1972. "Regression Models and Life Tables." Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, Series B 34: 187-220.

Doob, J. R., 1953. Stochastic Processes. New York: Wiley.

Dhrymes, Phoebus, 1979. Introductory Econometrics. New York: Springler-
Verleg.

Edwards, Linda N., and Grossman, Michael, 1979. "Adolescent Health, Family
Background, and Preventive Medical Care." National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 398.

Grossman, Michael, 1972. The Demand for Health: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation. New York: Columbia University Press for the National
Bureau of Economic Research.

Grossman, Michael, 1976. "The Correlation Between Health and Schooling."
In Household Production and Consumption, edited by N. E. Terleckyj.
New York: Columbia University Press for the National Bureau of Economic
Research.

Heckman, James J., 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error."
Econometrica 47: 153-62.

Heckman, James J., and George Borjas, 1980. "Does Unemployment Cause
Future Unemployment?" University of Chicago. Mimeographed.

Jennrich, R., 1969. "Asymptotic Properties of Nonlinear Least Squares
Estimators." Annals of Mathematical Statistics 40: 633-643.

Shakotko, Robert A., 1980. "Dynamic Aspects of Children's Health, Intellec-
tual Development, and Family Economic Status." National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 451.

References (continued)

Willis, Robert J., and Sherwin Rosen, 1979. "Education and Self-Selection."

   Journal of Political Economy 87: S7-S36.

Zacks, S., 1976. The Theory of Statistical Inference. New York: Wiley.