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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACE, 1940-1964:
THE ADOPTION OF STATE-LEVEL FAIR EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION

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ABSTRACT

This paper traces the diffusion of fair employment legislation at the state level and evaluates the relative importance of various demographic, political, and economic factors in the promotion (or at least the acceptance) of the principle of government-enforced anti-discrimination policy. The empirics indicate that non-southern states with higher proportions of union members, Jews, and Catholics tended to adopt fair employment legislation sooner than other states. There is weaker evidence that after controlling for other characteristics, the likelihood of passage was lower in states dominated by the Republican Party and that there were spillover or contagion effects across states. The proportion of the population that was black does not appear to have shortened the time to adoption.

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By the time Congress passed the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, more than 20 states

had already adopted "fair employment" legislation prohibiting labor market discrimination on the

basis of "race, color, creed, and national origin." These state laws covered 40 percent of the

nation's nonwhite population by 1964, but for the most part, the economics literature has

neglected these laws in its assessment of the link between government policy and black economic

progress.[1] This is unfortunate for several reasons. First, as Landes (1968) and Heckman (1976)

have suggested, the laws might have had direct and significant effects on African-Americans'

well-being. Second, Paul Moreno's history of anti-discrimination measures argues that "these

[state] agencies were the most important shapers of antidiscrimination law and policy" between

World War II and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1997, p. 107). The state laws laid the

institutional and political groundwork for the federal legislation that eventually followed. Third,

analysis of the process and the timing of the adoption of these state laws can provide important

insights into the political economy of the Civil Rights Movement. By leaving aside careful

consideration of the origins of anti-discrimination legislation and instead viewing changes in

race-specific legislation as exogenous events, economists have foregone the study of a crucial

part of the story of black economic progress.

This paper traces the diffusion of fair employment legislation at the state level and

evaluates the relative importance of various demographic, political, and economic factors in the

promotion (or at least the acceptance) of the principle of government-enforced anti-

discrimination policy. More specifically, I draw on the existing historical, sociological, and

political science literatures to form hypotheses regarding the factors that contributed to the Civil

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[1] The literature focuses on the effect of the federal legislation. See Freeman 1973, Ashenfelter and Heckman 1976, Leonard 1984, Smith and Welch 1989, Heckman and Donohue 1991, Chay 1998.

Rights Movement's legislative successes (and failures). Then, after assembling data on the timing of adoption and various state-level characteristics including union membership, the religious and racial composition of each state's population, NAACP membership, and the competitiveness of each state's political system, I examine these hypotheses empirically.

Whether one views the process of policy formation in a simple median voter framework or in a more complex framework of competing special-interest groups, African-American efforts to secure fair employment legislation surely would have benefitted from the cooperation of other politically active groups. In fact, empirically, the cooperation of other groups appears to be central to explaining differences in the timing of adoption across states. Non-southern states with higher proportions of union members, Jews, and Catholics passed fair employment legislation earlier than other states. These findings are not driven by differences across states in average education levels, nor by unobserved differences between (southern) border and non-border states. Interestingly, after controlling for other factors, non-southern states with higher proportions of blacks or NAACP membership were *not* more likely to enact fair employment legislation in the early stages of the Civil Rights Movement.

Of course, the Civil Rights Movement was fighting on more than just the fair employment front. The dramatic series of Supreme Court victories, the efforts to end segregation in public accommodations, and the registration of black voters were all important elements of the movement's strategy and achievements. Moreover, legislative reform was pushed simultaneously at the local, state, and federal levels, and so the analysis of state legislation offered here cannot be viewed as (and does not purport to be) a comprehensive evaluation of the political economy of the Civil Rights Movement. Nevertheless, the analysis does provide important clues about the nature and the strength of the forces that combined to push the

Movement's legislative agenda forward.

A Brief History of Fair Employment

The notion that the government should not discriminate in employment emerged long before the 1940s. The basis of this nondiscriminatory stance is found in most state constitutions where religious tests for public officials are banned. Over time, this view expanded to cover other government employees, as well as other forms of discrimination (Bonfield 1967). What made the state-level fair employment legislation of the post-1940 period revolutionary was that it applied broadly to private employment, even when there was no direct connection to government funds, and it was typically enforced by independent agencies with recourse to the courts to ensure compliance.[2] Consequently, both the scope of coverage and the method of enforcement of non-discrimination policies took giant leaps forward in the post-war fair employment legislation.

Ironically, although many states adopted fair employment legislation before the federal government did, the model for the state anti-discrimination efforts was assembled at the federal level during World War II. Dissatisfied with discrimination in war-industry employment and with segregation in the military, A. Phillip Randolph formed the March on Washington Movement and threatened to lead 100,000 blacks in a protest march through the capitol in 1941.[3] In response, President Roosevelt agreed to issue an executive order that declared "there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or national origin." The Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC) was

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[2] Supreme Court decisions in regulation-related cases in the 1930s widened the scope for government interference in private enterprise (Maslow and Robison 1953, p. 393).

[3] A. Phillip Randolph led the most influential black labor organization of the time, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters.

designed to enforce the executive order by fielding, investigating, and resolving complaints

submitted by aggrieved workers. The FEPC settled thousands of cases through consultation and

persuasion of discriminatory employers and unions (Ruchames 1953, Reed 1991, Kryder 2000),

and cross-city empirical evidence supports the claim that the wartime FEPC opened a substantial

number of jobs to black workers (Collins 1999).

Despite some vigorous efforts by congressional proponents of fair employment, the

federal anti-discrimination measures were never passed into law during the war, and the

committee was dismantled at the war's end. Until the Civil Rights Act of 1964, congressional

bills prohibiting discrimination in employment were routinely detained in committee, and on the

few occasions when the bills made it to the floor for debate, they expired under the weight of

Senate filibusters. When the 1964 Civil Rights Act finally passed, it was only after the Senate

voted for cloture on the southern filibuster – that is, after a two-thirds majority vote was achieved

to end the filibuster and to clear the way for a vote on the bill.[4]

During these two decades of legislative frustration at the federal level, states began

crafting and implementing their own fair employment initiatives. New York led the way in 1945,

and within two years was followed by New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. Table 1

reports the timing of the adoption of state fair employment laws up to 1964 as well as public

accommodation and private housing laws for the sake of comparison. Interestingly, aside from

the obvious distinction of the South, the diffusion of the laws does not follow a simple

geographic pattern from that initial cluster of northeastern states. For example, Pennsylvania

passed its law ten years after New York did; California passed its law ten years after Washington

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[4] Prior to the cloture vote in 1964, there had been 11 consecutive failed cloture attempts
on bills related to civil rights, beginning with proposed anti-lynching legislation in 1938. See the
Congressional Quarterly Almanac of 1964 for a legislative history of civil rights bills.

and Oregon did; and Illinois passed its law six years after Michigan.

The details of the laws' provisions varied somewhat from state to state, but the prohibitions and means of enforcement were rather uniform because they were based on the original New York law. In general, it became unlawful for employers, unions, or employment agencies to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or national origin in decisions concerning employment, discharge, referral, compensation, or other conditions and privileges of employment.[5] The "standard package" of enforcement powers included the power to receive and investigate complaints of discrimination, to eliminate any unlawful discrimination by conference and persuasion, and to issue cease and desist orders (backed by state courts) to non-compliant parties (Norgren and Hill 1964, pp. 94 - 98).[6] Landes (1968) and Heckman (1976) have argued that these state laws had a positive impact on the economic status of black workers.

The composition of the committees formed to oversee the enforcement of the state fair employment laws was quite similar across states. Nearly all state FEPCs included black and Jewish members; clergymen were often included (from a variety of sects); and union officials and business executives were usually included as well (Lockard 1968, p. 96-97). The federal FEPC during WWII was similar in its composition, and the mix helped the wartime FEPC achieve a balance that was essential to its political legitimacy and economic effectiveness. On one hand, the committee represented the groups who perceived the greatest degree of

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[5] The New York law excluded social and fraternal clubs, charitable, educational, and religious non-profit associations, and establishments with less than six employees from coverage (Bonfield, p. 1072).

[6] One distinction worth noting is that in some states the FEPC could respond only to complaints received whereas in other states the FEPC could initiate investigations on its own (Norgren and Hill 1964, p. 98). This would be an important consideration in measuring the effect of a FEPC on, say, industry-level employment, but it is less important in this paper's context.

discrimination, pushed for the committee's creation, and felt entitled to a voice in its operation.

On the other hand, by ensuring representation for unions and business leaders, the committee

could maintain an air of impartiality and could more effectively persuade discriminatory unions

and employers to change their employment practices.[7] The presence of clergy to lay claim to the

moral high ground helped too.

In sum, the Civil Rights Movement's progress in discouraging labor market

discrimination followed a circular route from the federal government's first effort to enforce a

wide-ranging anti-discrimination policy (during World War II) to the federal government's most

celebrated effort to do so again (after the 1964 Civil Rights Act). That route ran through the

houses of the state legislatures, and the next section describes some features of the political

landscape that unfolded along the way.

The Political Economy of Fair Employment

The theoretical political economy literature has argued that policy formation can be

modeled as the outcome of a process in which competing groups vie for the favor of

policymakers by offering votes and/or campaign contributions. On the basis of this theoretical

approach, a growing empirical literature has provided a better sense of how economic interests

are translated into policy outcomes by the intervening political institutions.[8] However, relatively

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[7] For example, in several cases local unions were found to be discriminatory even when the national organization espoused a nondiscrimination policy. Having relatively high ranking union officials on the committee helped reconcile the gap between union policy and union practice.

[8] Seminal theoretical work includes Olson 1965, Stigler 1974, Brock and Magee 1978, Becker 1984, and Mayer 1984. Interesting empirical applications in economic history include Shughart and Tollison 1985, Goldin 1994, Fishback and Kantor 1998, Irwin 1998, Alston and Ferrie 1999.

few studies in economics have explicitly examined race-specific government policy formation (Roback 1986, Margo 1990, Anderson and Halcoussis 1996, Wright 1999). Of the economics studies which have done so, most have focused on the South in the early twentieth century, leaving the non-South and the postwar period underexplored. Empirical studies in the political science and sociology literatures have investigated postwar race-specific policy formation several times, but the emphasis has been on the federal legislation (Black 1979, Burstein 1985, Whitby and Gilliam 1991). When the state legislation has been studied, the explicit consideration of underlying economic motives has been sidelined (e.g., Erikson 1971, Gray 1973).

Heckman (1976) has addressed directly the endogeneity of state fair employment laws in his assessment of the laws' effect on black labor market outcomes. Taking indices constructed by George Stigler (1973) to measure the proportion of the labor force that might have expected to benefit from such legislation and the proportion that might have expected to lose, Heckman estimated an equation describing "sentiment" in favor of fair employment legislation.[9] He found that the indices did not help predict the existence of laws in a cross-sectional probit framework where the dependent variable was set equal to 1 if the state had adopted a law before 1959.

Heckman went on to assess two alternative considerations: that unskilled black workers and skilled white workers might be complementary factors of production (and that therefore skilled whites might support fair employment legislation); and, building on Ashenfelter (1972), that unions might support the legislation in an attempt to control the supply of potentially competing laborers. Although Heckman found some support for the union hypothesis, the complementary worker hypothesis received no econometric support, and ultimately, he

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[9] Stigler's indices are based on the occupational and education distributions of the labor force for blacks and whites in each state.

concluded that "Much further work needs to be done on determining the sources of legislation" (1976, p. 265).

This paper picks up the line of inquiry, and it builds on the work of Stigler, Ashenfelter, and Heckman by paying closer attention to the history of state fair employment legislation, by drawing on previously neglected sources of data, and by exploiting variation in the timing of the legislation's adoption across states. This last item is a key improvement over the cross-sectional probit approach which discards so much useful information contained in the timing of passage.

One can surmise from the laws' language which groups might expect to gain from fair employment: African-Americans, Asians, and Hispanics would be protected under the "race" and "color" panels of the fair employment umbrella; Jews, Catholics, and other religious minorities would be protected under the "creed" panel; and the foreign-born would be protected under the "national origin" panel. Thus, even though discrimination against blacks was at the center of the discussion of fair employment laws, the extension of the coverage to other minority groups could have widened the base of legislative support. From an economic standpoint, however, it is not clear *a priori* that non-black minority groups would have strongly favored such legislation. For example, if blacks and other minority groups were close substitutes in labor markets, and if other minorities perceived relatively weak discrimination against themselves but strong discrimination against blacks, then they might have opposed fair employment legislation even though they were covered by it. Essentially, support from non-black minority groups would hinge on whether the expected gains to reduced discrimination against those groups exceeded the expected losses from increased labor market competition with blacks.

As the group experiencing the most intense degree of discrimination, blacks clearly had something to gain from effective fair employment legislation. Although the geographic

clustering of blacks in central cities ought to have facilitated some political representation, the

proportion of the total non-southern population that was black was relatively small, and urban

residents were often under-represented in state legislatures (David and Eisenberg1961).

Moreover, African-Amercans were a relatively poor group, comprised largely of fairly recent

migrants from the South.[10] Any model of policy formation would suggest that mustering

effective legislative support from such a political base is difficult. Accordingly, despite the

existence and efforts of the Urban League, the NAACP, and the March on Washington

Movement, Lockard argues that African-Americans were not a strong force in state politics early

in the period under study and that for the most part the initiative for legislation came from other

pro-fair employment groups (1968, p. 29). This situation changed somewhat over the course of

the 1950s as more blacks moved into positions of political leadership and as the broader Civil

Rights Movement gathered momentum, but it highlights the fact that cooperation and support

from other groups could play a substantial role in the drive for legislation.

Unions have been undeniably important players in the arena of economic legislation,

including race-specific legislation, and Ashenfelter (1972) developed a conceptual framework

describing the formation of union policy on racial issues. In Ashenfelter's analysis, an important

distinction emerges between the predicted policy outcome for industrial unions (which generally

try to organize all workers in particular industries) compared to that for craft unions (which

organize workers on an occupational/skill basis). In this period's context, because blacks were

relatively unskilled, they were likely to form a larger proportion of the constituents of industrial

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[10] In future work, I plan to examine the adoption and impact of city-level ordinances. In
this period, most non-southern blacks lived in central cities, and so these cities are the logical
place to look for both the exercise and the impact of black political power. See Keech (1968) on
black voting in cities.

unions, and, as evidenced by the history of strikebreaking practices, they formed a large pool of potential labor market competitors for unskilled whites.[11] Excluding potential competitors from the union would weaken the effectiveness of industrial strikes (or the threat of such strikes), and so instead, industrial unions had an incentive to absorb the potential competitors and represent their interests.

Skilled craftsmen, on the other hand, typically did not rely on strikes to extract rents, but rather on control of entry into the craft. Ultimately, industrial unions would be expected to pursue more inclusive and egalitarian racial policies both internally and in their legislative agendas, a hypothesis that is strongly supported by the histories of AFL (primarily craft unions) and CIO (primarily industrial unions) policy positions (Northrup 1944). The hypothesis is also supported by historical accounts of which organizations spoke in favor of fair employment legislation at the state level (Gray 1970, Lockard 1968), and it can be tested empirically using the data described in the next section.[12] Although it is possible that the merger of the AFL and CIO in 1955 might make it difficult to distinguish empirically between the groups' activities, it appears the constituent unions retained a substantial degree of independence after the merger (Lester 1964, p. 108).

Religious organizations, particularly those representing groups that were or had been subject to substantial degrees of discrimination and persecution, tended to support the anti-discrimination legislation. The role of black churches and black church leaders in the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s was so prominent that the relative lack of church-based activism

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[11] See Whatley (1993) on African-American strikebreaking.

[12] For example, Gray (1970) notes that the Pennsylvania CIO Council devoted more money to the State Council for a Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Commission (in 1953) than any other group and also that "the state CIO organization made most valuable contributions in the form of political knowledge and lobbying" (p. 64).

in the early years of the movement is sometimes forgotten (Kesselman 1948, Fowler 1985). In the early 1940s, Myrdal cited the potential power of black churches; they were, after all, the strongest and most pervasive black institutions in existence. But he also noted that "the Negro church is, on the whole, passive in the field of intercaste power relations" (1944, p. 873). This passivity was shed over time, especially after the establishment of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1957, led by Martin Luther King, Jr. Nonetheless, in his discussion of the Civil Rights Movement, Ernest Morial (former mayor of New Orleans) concluded that "While black religion has been indispensable in the successful crusade for civil rights, it has rarely led the fight and only became involved when forced to do so" (1978, p. 30).

The American Jewish Congress and other Jewish groups were strong and early proponents of anti-discrimination legislation. According to Lockard, "In every state there is evidence of some major contribution from Jewish groups: money to finance campaigns, staff to coordinate and direct activities, lobbying and intralegislative assistance, substantial legal advice and assistance in the drafting and in the defense of civil rights laws" (1968, p. 41).[13] Indeed, in 1946 a Massachusetts state legislator publicly and derisively characterized the fair employment bill under consideration as "of Jewish origin" (Lockard 1968, p. 42). Supposing that these legislative efforts and their effectiveness were greater in states with proportionately larger Jewish populations, this paper can assess empirically the effect of Jewish population size on the timing of fair employment enactment.

White Christians, on the other hand, were more ambivalent in their stance. Since the 1920s, churches had steered clear of direct, active involvement in political debates (Findlay 1990). In the 1940s, although there were some outspoken Catholic and Protestant clergymen,

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[13] Also see Kesselman (1948, pp. 101-109).

support for civil rights legislation was uneven even within sects. The most active pro-fair

employment Protestant group, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, was

composed of several independent denominations, some of which were quite large. But Robert

Booth Fowler has noted that there was a large gap between the liberal Protestant clergy and the

laity on matters of civil rights and on the proper role of the church in promoting civil rights

(1985).[14]

Responding to encouragement from Pope Pius XII in the early 1940s, the Catholic church

in the U.S. issued a statement that explicitly advocated racial equality in political, economic and

educational opportunities (Kesselman 1948, p. 139). More concretely, Monsignor Francis J.

Haas, the dean of social sciences at Catholic University, served briefly as the chairman of

Roosevelt's federal FEPC in 1943, and several church leaders advocated permanent federal

FEPC legislation in the 1940s. Fowler asserts that after Jews, Catholics were the strongest non-

black supporters of Civil Rights legislation (1985, p. 159). If so, states with larger Catholic

populations might be expected to have passed fair employment legislation sooner than others, an

empirical proposition that will be examined below.[15] However, to the extent that Catholics

viewed blacks as potential competitors in markets for jobs and housing, their support for anti-

discrimination legislation would have been tempered.[16]

Lockard notes that there was "great variation from state to state in the extent to which

political parties affect[ed] civil rights legislation" (1968, p. 46). Conceptualizing the role of

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[14] See Singer (1975) for a history of the Federal Council of Churches (which eventually
became the National Council of Churches).

[15] It deserves mention that in Pennsylvania, the Society of Friends (Quakers) played an
important role in generating and supporting anti-discrimination legislation (Lockard 1968, p. 41).

[16] McGreevy (1996) discusses the policy dilemmas of urban Catholic parishes, especially
in response to housing issues.

political parties in the passage of fair employment legislation is complicated by the endogeneity

of party strength. In a sense, state population characteristics are more primitive variables than

state political characteristics because the population's preferences should underpin election

outcomes. At the same time, however, the relative strength of political parties may be

determined by issues and events that are exogenous from the standpoint of the fair employment

issue – that is, fair employment might be considered a small issue in a big political pond. If so,

then relative party strength might have an independent influence on the likelihood of fair

employment's passage, though it is not clear on theoretical grounds whether that influence would

be positive or not. For the sake of a simple example, suppose that black voters care primarily

about establishing government-enforced anti-discrimination policies, but that white voters are

largely apathetic about such policies and are roughly evenly split between two parties on the

basis of other issues. Then politicians could take the positions of white voters as given, and

could court the black vote by promising fair employment legislation. The outcome when a single

party dominates the state is less clear. Given dominance, there is no incentive to court the

minority vote by promising fair employment legislation if there is any cost to doing so. If,

however, a dominant state party is responsive to cues from the national party organization on

racial issues, then the state party might establish fair employment legislation even in a non-

competitive political environment.

Identifying groups opposed to fair employment legislation is somewhat more difficult

than identifying the advocates. The opposition seems to have been rather diffuse, especially as

time passed. Early in the period, state business and employer groups were often actively opposed

to the bills, generally on the grounds that the government should not be allowed to interfere with

a private employer's hiring, firing, training, or promotion decisions. For example, in 1945 the

director of the Portsmouth, Virginia Chamber of Commerce warned that "Snooping government men would have a continuous field day . . ." while "making sweeping investigations of any concern." Adding an anti-left twist to the argument, a 1945 letter from the secretary-treasurer of the National Association of State Chambers of Commerce to the organization's members claimed that the call for fair employment legislation "is the result of a concerted effort by certain radical elements to sow the seeds of discord into our economic and political system . . ." (both quotes are from Kesselman 1948, pp. 171-172). Lockard specifically cites employer opposition in New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and California (1968, p. 62); Kesselman additionally mentions such opposition in Illinois, Michigan, and Massachusetts (1948, p. 171). Outside the South, the strength of such conservative sentiment may be reflected in the strength of the Republican Party which can be measured and incorporated into the econometric analysis below.

One might also suppose that white workers with relatively low levels of education or skill would feel most threatened by labor market competition from blacks and consequently be most opposed to laws promoting black employment. It is interesting to note, however, that a 1945 Gallup poll found that 52 percent of manual workers favored a state fair employment law compared to only 43 percent of business and professional workers.[17] In any case, the hypothesis can be investigated empirically by accounting for the average number of years of education for whites (over 20 years old) in each state.

Empirical Framework

The basic empirical strategy is to use differences across non-southern states in the timing

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[17] The poll's results are reported in aggregate form, so it is not possible to separate white from white manual workers.

of the adoption of fair employment legislation to identify the relative importance of various characteristics in facilitating the passage of such legislation. This approach assumes that the characteristics themselves are exogenous and (with one exception) fixed over the period of study.[18] First, for the sake of comparison, I estimate a probit model for the presence of an enforceable fair employment law in 1958, the same year Heckman (1976) used as a cutoff date.[19] Although the econometric approach is similar in spirit to Heckman's, the list of independent variables differs in accordance with the hypotheses suggested in the previous section. For example, I will include variables for the religious composition of each state, and since the AFL and CIO are known to have differed in their degree of support for anti-discrimination policies, I will assess their influence on legislation separately. I also include a variable for the average number of years of education for whites whereas Heckman used a measure of the proportion of the white labor force with more than 12 years of schooling.[20]

The real shortcoming of using the probit approach to identify the connection between state characteristics and state legislation is that a great deal of useful information is discarded when the timing of passage is collapsed into the dichotomous dependent variable. In such a framework, the legislative outcome in New York is observationally identical to the outcome in Wisconsin, even though New York passed its law twelve years earlier. Hazard (duration) models provide a means of exploiting information on the timing of passage, and they will form the basis

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[18] Given the data that exists, some of the variables (religion and union) cannot be entered in a time-varying form and others (from census) would have to be interpolated to do so. However, a time-varying form of the model will be estimated for the sake of identifying potential "contagion" effects.

[19] Heckman chose 1958 because he was ultimately interested in estimating the effect of fair employment legislation on 1959's income.

[20] Because of the relatively small sample size, I do not include the political competition measure in the probit.

of this paper's empirical exploration.[21] Essentially, the hazard models will detect whether or not

certain demographic, economic, and political characteristics tended to shorten the time to

adoption of fair employment laws.

Briefly (and roughly), the hazard rate at a particular time is the rate at which spells of

something end, given that they have lasted until that time: in this case, the "spell" is the time

between 1940 and the time of legislative adoption.[22] Thus, the hazard function, h(t), is a

conditional density function. Empirically, we are interested in how a vector of state

characteristics, X, might affect the hazard function. Letting $h(t) = h_0(t)e^{X\beta}$, $h_0(t)$ is the baseline

hazard function which is proportionally scaled by the $e^{X\beta}$ term. In this paper, the focus is on the

estimated β parameters which indicate whether or not the state characteristics affect the timing of

adoption, but the baseline hazard is also of interest since it may reflect the increasing momentum

of the broader Civil Rights Movement over the 1940 to 1964 period. In economic applications of

duration models, it is often supposed that the baseline hazard has a Weibull distribution, so that

$h(t) = pt^{p-1}e^{X\beta}$ and p and β are estimated by maximum likelihood using the available data.[23] If p

> 1, then the hazard rate tends to rise over time. Alternatively, one can avoid making

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[21] See Fishback and Kantor (1996) or Pavalko (1989) for applications of hazard models
to the timing of the passage of workers' compensation laws across states.

[22] The choice of 1940 as the starting date is somewhat subjective. The idea for fair
employment legislation clearly existed by 1941 when the wartime FEPC was established, and in
1945 at least 20 state legislatures debated fair employment laws. As early as 1932, something
quite similar to a fair employment bill was proposed to New York's legislature (Bonfield 1967,
p. 1068 footnote). Ultimately, the choice of starting date does not matter in Cox estimates, and
although the choice could matter in Weibull estimates, the Weibull coefficients in this paper
appear to be rather insensitive to slight changes in the starting date.

[23] The simplest version of a Weibull hazard function has $p = 1$ implying a baseline hazard
rate which is constant. Normal and lognormal distributions imply hazard functions which do not
allow for the possibility of a constant hazard rate, and consequently the Weibull is a popular
choice (Kiefer 1988, p. 649). See Allison (1984) or Kiefer (1988) for an introduction to hazard
models.

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assumptions about the form of $h_0(t)$ and still estimate the β parameters by using a Cox model which relies on the order of adoptions to identify the coefficients of interest.

The year of passage of fair employment laws is reported in Landes (1968). In the probit model, the dependent variable takes on a value of one if the state has passed an enforceable law before 1959, where "enforceable" implies the existence of some kind of administrative apparatus to pursue investigations and settle complaints. In the hazard models, the date of passage marks the timing of the "failure," and the states that had not passed laws before the 1964 Civil Rights Act are treated as censored observations.

I used the 1950 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) to estimate the proportion of each state's adult population that was black and the average white education level.[24] *Ceteris paribus*, a larger black population ought to translate into more political influence either through sheer voting power or through the generation of a greater pool of economic and political resources. At the same time, however, the presence of a large black population might be viewed as a threat by white workers who are insulated from competition by discriminatory hiring practices. So, whether a large black population accelerated the adoption of legislation or not is essentially an empirical question. White education levels might capture the degree of complementarity between unskilled blacks and the existing white labor force and could also reflect any attitudes toward race which were correlated with years of schooling.

Leo Troy (1957) provides union membership levels for each state in 1953. On the basis

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[24] The sample includes everyone over 20 years of age. Using the non-white rather than the black proportion has little discernible impact on the econometric results. The foreign-born proportion is highly correlated with both the Catholic and the Jewish proportion of the population, and it is not entered into the hazard models. Including the foreign-born proportion separately yields a statistically insignificant coefficient and has little effect on the size of the other variables, though it slightly reduces the significance of the Catholic proportion.

of Troy's figures, I calculated the proportion of each state's population that belonged to the AFL and the CIO separately. Because the CIO had a longer and more determined record of support for anti-discrimination measures, one would expect a larger CIO presence to speed the adoption of legislation more so than a larger AFL presence.

I constructed state-level measures of the proportion of the population that was Jewish and the proportion that was Catholic from the National Council of Churches' survey of "Churches and Church Membership in the United States." The survey's membership data pertain to 1952 and cover 114 different religious bodies (Landis 1959, p. 342).[25] Jewish organizations were more active than Catholic organizations in promoting fair employment legislation, especially in the early years of the period under consideration, but the Catholic population was substantially larger than the Jewish population, and so it is possible that any pro-fair employment sentiment among Catholics translated into substantial political leverage.

Using state government data covering the 1946-1963 period, Austin Ranney (1965) calculated an index of inter-party competition for each state which runs from 0 (complete Republican control) to 100 (complete Democratic control). Thus, an index value of 50 represents the most competitive party system. Ranney's index is formed by a simple average of four components: the average percent of the popular vote won by Democratic gubernatorial candidates, the average percent of seats in the state senate held by Democrats, the average percent of seats held in the state house of representatives held by Democrats, and the percent of

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[25] For the sake of comparison, I constructed estimates of the Jewish and Catholic proportions of the state populations from the 1936 Census of Religious Bodies. In both cases, the correlation between the 1936 estimates and the 1952 estimates for the non-southern states is 0.98.

all terms for governor, senate, and house in which Democrats had control.[26] Reflecting the

discussion of party power in the previous section, the variable is entered into the models as a

quadratic. This allows the variable's effect to increase as the index becomes more competitive,

and, if dictated by the data, fall as the index value moves away in either direction from the

competitive range. The southern states were characterized by a very high degree of Democratic

control, and among the non-southern states, places like Oklahoma and Arizona had the highest

index values; Vermont had the lowest index value; and Colorado and Massachusetts had the

values closest to 50.

Empirical Results

Table 2 reports summary statistics for the full 32 (non-southern) state sample, as well as

separate statistics for the states that passed fair employment laws by 1964 and those that did not.

Clearly, the states that passed laws are different in many dimensions from those that did not. It is

less clear, however, which differences really mattered and how much they mattered. After

estimating probit and hazard models, I propose some counterfactuals to provide perspective on

the magnitude of the econometric measures.

The results from three different econometric approaches are presented in Table 3. The

probit model reported in column 1 is presented primarily for comparison with Heckman (1976)

and with the results obtained in subsequent columns from the hazard models. Like Heckman, I

examine whether union membership and white education levels influenced the likelihood of a

state having a fair employment law in 1958. Unlike Heckman, I also include variables for the

---

[26] Minnesota and Nebraska have non-partisan legislatures and so their indices rest
entirely on the gubernatorial elections.

black, Jewish, and Catholic proportions of the population, I separate the union variable into AFL and CIO components, and I exclude the South. The coefficients in column 1 represent the slope of the cumulative density function (dF/dX) at the sample means. Roughly, each coefficient may be interpreted as the estimated change in the probability of having a law by 1960 associated with a unit increase in the independent variable's value, where a unit is usually a percentage point.

Union membership, particularly CIO membership, had a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of adoption. A one percentage point increase in CIO membership as a proportion of the population raised the probability of adoption by approximately 19 percent. I find a negative correlation between the average level of white education and likelihood of passage. Thus, the notion that more highly educated whites viewed blacks as complementary factors of production and the notion that more highly educated whites had more liberal attitudes towards race do not receive any empirical support in the state level probit estimates.[27] A larger Jewish population tended to increase the likelihood of passage, and although the probit coefficient is large, it is not statistically significant. The proportion of the population that was Catholic has no discernable effect in the probit approach.

Somewhat surprisingly, conditional on the other variables, a larger black population tended to lower the probability of passage, a correlation that is not dispelled by adding a dummy variable for southern border states (not shown). This is consistent with the hypothesis that whites viewed blacks as potential economic competitors and that consequently whites were somewhat more resistant to fair employment in places where more blacks lived. However, the finding is also consistent with the hypothesis that non-southern blacks tended to reside in states that were

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[27] This finding squares with the results from a Gallup poll taken in 1945 in which 52 percent of "manual workers" were in favor of fair employment legislation compared to 43 percent of "business and professional people" (Kesselman 1948, pp. 176-177).

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less discriminatory to begin with and that therefore, blacks perceived less need for fair employment laws in those states. This second interpretation is not supported by the distribution of complaints to the federal government's FEPC during World War II: across non-southern states, there is no correlation between the number of complaints (a gauge of perceived need for government intervention) and the size of the state's black population in 1940, after controlling for the state's total population.[28]

Finally, up to an index value of near 60, as Democrats increased their share of power, the likelihood of passage increased. This accords with the hypothesis that states with more competitive political systems were more likely to pass the legislation and the hypothesis that *ceteris paribus* (nonsouthern) Democrats were more supportive of government-enforced anti-discrimination legislation than Republicans.

As noted already, the probit approach to studying the factors that facilitated passage discards useful information about the timing of adoption. The hazard models in columns 2 through 7 exploit that information to provide a richer assessment of which factors sped adoption. Columns 2-4 assume that the baseline hazard function can be characterized by a Weibull distribution, whereas columns 5-7 make no such assumption in estimating a Cox model. For the most part, the results from the two techniques are quite similar. To ease interpretation and comparisons across the Weibull and Cox models, the reported coefficients in Table 3 are hazard ratios: they estimate the effect of a unit increase in the independent variable on the hazard rate. In other words, recalling that a proportional hazard model is simply $h(t) = h_0(t)e^{X\beta}$, where β is a vector of coefficient estimates, the hazard ratio for each variable in Table 3 is then e^b, where b is

---

[28] This finding is based on microfilmed records from the WWII FEPC which report the number of complaints filed in each state between July 1, 1943 and June 30, 1944.

an element of β.[29] Hazard ratios greater than 1.0 imply that increases in that variable's value led

to faster adoption, and so a hazard ratio of 2.0 implies that a unit increase in that variable doubles

the hazard rate. Readers accustomed to interpreting hazard models in terms of the β coefficients

directly will find those estimates reported in Table 4.

Columns 2 and 5 of Table 3, which exclude the white education and border state

variables, both find substantial effects for Jewish, Catholic, and CIO membership, as well as a

positive but less statistically significant effect for AFL membership. Columns 3 and 6 include

the average white education level and border state dummy variable. Neither variable is close to

statistical significance, though it is interesting to note that *ceteris paribus* border states appear

more likely to adopt the legislation than others, and higher white education levels seem to

lengthen time to adoption.

Again, a larger black population did not increase the likelihood that a state would adopt

fair employment legislation, a finding that requires some further exploration.[30] Because political

effectiveness might be a function of organizational capability rather than simply population size,

I collected NAACP membership data from the 1951 NAACP Annual Report. Precise

membership figures are reported for the largest branches (more than 2,000 members), and

categorical indications are given for smaller branches (e.g., Boston had between 1,000 and 2,000

members).[31] I formed state-level estimates by assigning branches with categorical indicators the

---

[29] Suppose there is just one X variable and that $h_1(t) = h_0(t)e^{Xb}$ and $h_2(t) = h_0(t)e^{(X+1)b}$.
Then the hazard ratio is $h_2(t)/h_1(t) = e^b$.

[30] One might imagine that black migration to these states between 1940 and 1960 had an
influence on the political process which is not picked up by the 1950 black proportion variable.
However, adding the change in the black proportion of the population between 1940 and 1960 to
the models has little effect on the results. Likewise, using the 1940 rather than the 1950 black
proportion has little effect.

[31] Branches with fewer than 500 members are not reported at all, and so they cannot be
incorporated into the state-level estimates.

midpoint value of that category's range and then adding those figures to the more precise figures for larger branches in the state. Scaled by state population, I entered this variable into the hazard models in place of the black population variable, but the coefficient was very imprecisely estimated (results not shown). Of course, it would be absurd to conclude on the basis of these results that African-Americans had no effect on the adoption of state-level fair employment legislation. It does appear, however, that on a state-by-state basis, the success of the movement for anti-discrimination legislation was strongly influenced by other groups; indeed, after assessing some counterfactuals, the next section suggests that such cooperation was very important to determining the timing of adoption.

It is also worth noting that the Weibull estimate of the p parameter indicates whether or not the baseline hazard rate trended upward over time. Because all of the p estimates are significantly greater than 1, it is evident that as the broader Civil Rights Movement gained momentum, the likelihood of fair employment passage increased. Thus, even if each state's black population size had an undetectable effect, the overall effectiveness of African-American efforts to secure fair employment legislation might be embedded in the rising baseline hazard rate.[32] The cluster of legislation in 1955, for example, might reflect the rising tide of support for civil rights associated with the increasingly visible movement in the wake of the Supreme Court's Brown versus Board (1954) decision.

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[32] In general, inferences about duration dependence (whether the baseline hazard rate rises or falls over time) are confounded by unobserved heterogeneity in the underlying sample (Kiefer 1988, p. 672). In the context of this paper, the concern would be that the composition of the "at risk" pool of states changes over time because the more "liberal" states adopt the laws early. So, on the one hand, if the Civil Rights Movement is becoming increasing powerful, the measured hazard rate should rise (as it does), but as the more liberal states leave the pool of remaining states, the measured hazard rate for those remaining states will tend to fall, tending to cause a downward bias is the estimate of the baseline hazard's trend.

So far, I have made no allowance for interactions between states in the diffusion of fair

employment legislation. If pressure for legislation can spill over from state to state, or if one

state can learn from a neighbor's experience, or if states are reluctant to have policies that

substantially deviate from those of their neighbors, then the adoption of legislation in one state

will influence the likelihood of passage in other states. Columns 4 and 7 of Table 3 make an

effort to capture such "contagion" effects by introducing a dummy variable which switches from

zero to one when a contiguous state adopts a fair employment law.[33] The estimated effect on the

hazard rate is large, doubling the rate in the Cox model where it is close to the conventional

standard for statistical significance.

Counterfactual Implications

A few counterfactual exercises will provide some perspective on the economic

significance of the hazard ratio estimates in Table 3. In particular, by resetting the value of some

state characteristic while taking the coefficient estimates as given, we can estimate a

counterfactual year of adoption.[34] For example, supposing that New York had Pennsylvania's

Jewish population proportion (a 14 percentage point gap), the coefficient estimates underlying

column 3 of Table 3 suggest that New York would have adopted fair employment legislation in

1963 rather than in 1945.[35] This counterfactual is, by definition, rather unrealistic, but it does

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[33] Allowing the value of this dummy to switch from 0 to 1 during the 1940-64 period
requires moving from a model with fixed covariates to one with time-varying covariates.

[34] The counterfactuals are constructed as follows: 1) convert the estimated hazard ratio
(e^b) to a log time metric (-b/p); 2) multiply (-b/p) by the difference in characteristic values [(-
b/p)(x1 - x2)]; 3) subtract that product from the log of the time (T) of adoption (where 1940 is
time = 0), that is {ln T - [(-b/p)(x1 - x2)]}; 4) to get the counterfactual time of adoption, raise e to
the power {ln T - [(-b/p)(x1 - x2)]}; 5) add 1940 to get the counterfactual calendar year.

[35] I use this column rather than the one with the "neighbor" variable because the
interactive nature of the neighbor variable complicates the counterfactual assessments.

provide some metric for sizing up the importance of the forces at work. Moreover, because so

many Jewish immigrants arrived relatively late in the age of mass migration, and given that tight

immigration restrictions were nearly enacted many times before they were finally implemented in

the 1920s, it is not at all far-fetched to suppose that New York's Jewish population might have

been much smaller.

In a similar counterfactual, if Massachusetts had had the same proportion of Catholics as,

say, Delaware (a 38 percentage point gap), then the estimates suggest that Massachusetts would

have adopted the legislation in 1949 rather than 1946, a much more modest impact. Nonetheless,

these results for the Jewish and Catholic variables' influence on fair employment provide a

counterweight to the notion that mass immigration hindered black economic progress. Collins

(1997) found that high levels of immigration from Europe may have crowded potential black

migrants out of northern labor markets prior to the enactment of immigration restrictions. In this

paper, it looks like these same immigrants and their descendants contributed to the successful

adoption of fair employment legislation.

Unions, and craft unions (primarily AFL) in particular, earned a reputation for obstructing

black economic progress over the course of the twentieth century (Northrup 1944). Again, the

results here provide some qualification to the notion that unions in general have inhibited black

progress. It looks like the CIO especially played a useful role in promoting fair employment

legislation.[36] If CIO membership in California had been at the same level as in Ohio (a 5

percentage point gap), the model suggests that California would have enacted legislation in 1949

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[36] Adding a variable for the proportion of the labor force in manufacturing to the hazard
models does not dispel the effect of union membership on timing of passage, implying that it is
the unions, not manufacturing interests (employers) that drive the results. The manufacturing
variable is statistically insignificant.

rather than waiting until 1959. Similarly, if Illinois had had the same rate of CIO membership as

Ohio, the model suggests that Illinois would have adopted legislation in 1952 rather than waiting

until 1961. Again, although the counterfactuals are unrealistic, it is not outlandish to suppose

that union membership and political influence would have been much weaker in period under

study were it not for the passage of the Wagner (National Labor Relations) Act in 1935 which

protected workers' right to organize.[37] On the other hand, the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 might

have inhibited union growth by encouraging "right to work" laws, thereby diminishing the

potential political power of unions and slowing the passage of fair employment legislation.

Conclusions

This paper exploits differences in the timing of the adoption of fair employment laws

across states to learn about the combination of factors that helped propel the legislative agenda of

the Civil Rights Movement. The empirics indicate that non-southern states with higher

proportions of union members, Jews, and Catholics tended to adopt fair employment legislation

sooner than other states. There is weaker evidence that after controlling for other characteristics,

the likelihood of passage was lower in states dominated by the Republican Party and that there

were spillover or contagion effects across states. A larger black proportion of the population

does not appear to have shortened the time to adoption, suggesting that the connections between

black population size, black political power, and state legislative outcomes were either weak or

were manifested indirectly (i.e., in a way that is uncorrelated with the proportion of black voters

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[37] Although not a true measure of the Wagner Act's effect, it is worth noting that the proportion of nonagricultural employment that was unionized rose from 13.4 percent in 1935 to 34.1 percent by 1944. From 1944 to 1961 the unionization rate varied between 31 and 36 percent (Lester 1964, p. 99).

in a particular state), or that unobserved white resistance to the legislation was stronger in non-southern states where more blacks lived even after controlling for border state status. In any case, the rising hazard rate over time is consistent with a strong indirect connection between the rising tide of the Civil Rights Movement and state legislative outcomes.

Economists have argued that anti-discrimination legislation, at the state level and later at the federal level, had a significant impact on black economic well-being, but few economists have explicitly considered the origins of such legislation. This paper is a start in that direction, but only a start, and I hope to pursue several extensions in future work. In this paper I have not attempted to integrate consideration of the state legislation with consideration of city-level ordinances or federal legislative processes. Essentially, I have ignored potentially important interactions between levels of government in order to keep the scope of the paper reasonably focused. Even at the state level, I have not attempted to scrutinize legislative voting patterns in search of direct connections between legislators' voting behavior and the interests of their constituents. Such detailed study of state legislative processes could shed more light on the micro-level political economy of civil rights legislation. Finally, a great deal of the action in the Civil Rights Movement took place behind the scenes or outside the bounds of this paper: the courtroom battles, the voter registration drives, the integration of schools and places of public accommodation, and so on. An effort to bind this paper's story closer to the larger story of the Civil Rights Movement should enrich scholars' understanding of the movement's origins and consequences.

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Table 1: State Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 1940-1964

	Fair Employment	Public Accommodations	Private Housing
1945	NY, NJ		
1946	MA		
1947	CT		
1948			
1949	NM, OR, RI, WA	CT, NJ	
1950			
1951			
1952		NY, RI	
1953		MA, OR	
1954			
1955	MI, MN, PA		
1956			
1957	WI, CO	WA, CO	
1958			
1959	CA, OH		MA, CT, CO, OR
1960	DE		
1961	IL, KS, MO	OH, PA	NJ, MN, NY, PA
1962			
1963	AK, IN, HI	AK, IN, KS, MI	AK, CA, MI
1964		DE, MD	

Note: Lockard credits Delaware with an enforceable fair employment law in 1960 whereas Landes (1968) does not. In the econometric analysis and in Tables 2 and 3, I treat Delaware the way Landes does; I also omit Hawaii and Alaska because of missing data.
Source: Lockard (1966, p. 24).

Table 2: Unweighted Summary Statistics for Non-Southern States

	All States (32)		With F.E. Law by 1964 (19)		Without F.E. Law by 1964 (13)	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Black	2.6972	2.800	4.0116	2.8476	0.7761	1.1646
Jewish	1.7969	3.1641	2.7368	3.8532	0.4231	0.3855
Catholic	23.4275	12.3688	26.2011	13.8085	19.3739	8.9006
CIO	2.5372	2.3404	3.5408	2.4936	1.0704	0.9474
AFL	6.7041	3.1095	7.9372	2.7466	4.9018	2.7814
Political competition	40.5569	14.5585	43.7284	12.7414	35.9215	16.2732
White education	9.8493	0.3851	9.7579	0.3703	9.9828	0.3806

Notes: States that had laws prior to 1964 include: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. States that did not pass laws prior to 1964 include: Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. Hawaii and Alaska are omitted due to missing data.

Sources: Black proportion of the population and average years of education for whites are calculated using a sample drawn from the 1950 IPUMS including all those over 20 years of age. Jewish and Catholic population in 1952 are calculated using the National Council of Churches' survey "Churches and Church Membership in the United States." AFL and CIO membership for 1953 are from Troy (1957) and are scaled by state population in 1950 from Eldridge and Thomas (1964). The political competition index is from Ranney (1965).

Table 3: Models of Timing of Fair Employment Law Adoption, Excluding South, 1940-64

	Probit dF/dX	Weibull hazard ratio	Weibull hazard ratio	Weibull hazard ratio	Cox hazard ratio	Cox hazard ratio	Cox hazard ratio
Black	-0.2423	0.7562	0.6623	0.6587	0.8182	0.7403	0.7324
	(3.00)	(1.16)	(1.72)	(1.91)	(1.09)	(1.58)	(1.75)
Jewish	0.2323	1.4172	1.4580	1.4392	1.3409	1.3549	1.3245
	(1.42)	(3.48)	(3.57)	(3.63)	(2.40)	(2.33)	(2.47)
Catholic	0.0009	1.0490	1.0381	1.0249	1.0328	1.0209	1.0051
	(0.05)	(2.18)	(1.66)	(0.97)	(1.60)	(0.96)	(0.21)
CIO	0.1932	1.6151	1.6793	1.6647	1.4645	1.4876	1.4599
	(2.79)	(1.81)	(1.96)	(1.96)	(2.07)	(2.23)	(1.98)
AFL	0.1381	1.3230	1.3715	1.4201	1.2419	1.2841	1.3437
	(2.61)	(1.08)	(1.27)	(1.47)	(1.37)	(1.79)	(2.16)
Political competition	-----	1.1607	1.1921	1.2001	1.1392	1.1812	1.1646
		(0.88)	(0.97)	(1.14)	(0.98)	(1.14)	(1.11)
Political competition^2	-----	0.9988	0.9986	0.9985	0.9989	0.9985	0.9987
		(0.69)	(0.77)	(0.94)	(0.85)	(1.02)	(0.98)
White education	-0.8800	-----	0.4639	0.3050	-----	0.4146	0.2810
	(1.94)		(0.76)	(1.47)		(1.00)	(1.66)
Border state	-----	-----	2.0950	1.8504	-----	1.6389	1.6455
			(1.00)	(0.85)		(0.71)	(0.71)
Contagion	-----	-----	-----	1.7615	-----	-----	2.3220
				(1.21)			(1.89)
Weibull p parameter	-----	3.4577	3.4524	3.1655	-----	-----	-----
		(5.66)	(5.66)	(4.83)			
States	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
States with laws	13	19	19	19	19	19	19

Notes: The probit coefficients can be interpreted roughly as the change in probability of having a law by in 1958 associated with a unit increase in the independent variable. More precisely, the coefficients are the estimated slope of the cumulative density function with respect to the independent variable (dF/dX). If $h(t) = h_0(t)e^{X\beta}$, then each hazard ratios reported above equals e^b where b is an element of β. 1940 is taken as the starting year (time 0). z-statistics are in parentheses and indicate whether the underlying parameters are statistically different from zero (i.e., that the hazard ratios are different from 1). Weibull models assume that the hazard takes the form: $h(t) = pt^{p-1} e^{X\beta}$, and so if $p>1$ the hazard rate tends to rise over time. The z-statistic on the Weibull p reveals whether p is different from 1.

Sources: Black proportion of the population and average years of education for whites are calculated using a sample drawn from the 1950 IPUMS including all those over 20 years of age. Jewish and Catholic population in 1952 are calculated using the National Council of Churches' survey "Churches and Church Membership in the United States." AFL and CIO membership for

1953 are from Troy (1957) and are scaled by state population in 1950 from Eldridge and Thomas (1964). The political competition index is from Ranney (1965).

Table 4: Models of Timing of Fair Employment Law Adoption, Excluding South, 1940-64

	Probit dF/dX	Weibull β Coef.	Weibull β Coef.	Weibull β Coef.	Cox β Coef.	Cox β Coef.	Cox β Coef.
Black	-0.2423	-0.2795	-0.4121	-0.4175	-0.2007	-0.3007	-0.3114
	(3.00)	(1.16)	(1.72)	(1.91)	(1.09)	(1.58)	(1.75)
Jewish	0.2323	0.3487	0.3770	0.3641	0.2934	0.3037	0.2810
	(1.42)	(3.48)	(3.57)	(3.63)	(2.40)	(2.33)	(2.47)
Catholic	0.0009	0.0478	0.0374	0.0246	0.0322	0.0207	0.0051
	(0.05)	(2.18)	(1.66)	(0.97)	(1.60)	(0.96)	(0.21)
CIO	0.1932	0.4794	0.5184	0.5097	0.3815	0.3971	0.3784
	(2.79)	(1.81)	(1.96)	(1.96)	(2.07)	(2.23)	(1.98)
AFL	0.1381	0.2799	0.3159	0.3508	0.2167	0.2500	0.2954
	(2.61)	(1.08)	(1.27)	(1.47)	(1.37)	(1.79)	(2.16)
Political competition	-----	0.1490	0.1757	0.1824	0.1303	0.1665	0.1524
		(0.88)	(0.97)	(1.14)	(0.98)	(1.14)	(1.11)
Political competition^2	-----	-0.0012	-0.0014	-0.0015	-0.0011	-0.0015	-0.0013
		(0.69)	(0.76)	(0.94)	(0.85)	(1.02)	(0.98)
White education	-0.8800	-----	-0.7682	-1.1874	-----	-0.8803	-1.2694
	(1.94)		(0.76)	(1.47)		(1.00)	(1.66)
Border state	-----	-----	0.7396	0.6154	-----	0.4940	0.4981
			(1.00)	(0.85)		(0.71)	(0.71)
Contagion	-----	-----	-----	0.5662	-----	-----	0.8424
				(1.21)			(1.89)
Constant	-----	-18.8362	-11.9198	-7.2676	-----	-----	-----
		(3.47)	(1.18)	(0.85)			
Weibull p parameter	-----	3.4577	3.4524	3.1655	-----	-----	-----
		(5.66)	(5.66)	(4.83)			
States	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
States with laws	13	19	19	19	19	19	19

Notes: The results here are identical to those reported in Table 3. The only difference is that for the hazard models, I report the actual β coefficients here, whereas in Table 3, I report hazard ratios (e^β).
Sources: See Table 3.