
Best to be Last:

Order effects in legal decisions in the field and in the lab

Ori Plonsky

With Daniel L. Chen, Liat Netzer, Talya Steiner, and Yuval Feldman



- Many decisions involving rights-interests balancing are made sequentially
 - Parole judges
 - Police officers
 - Prosecutors
- Each case is independent
- But is it treated with complete independence?



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 - Parole judges
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- Each case is independent
- But is it treated with complete independence?
- In **non-legal** domains, step-by-step judgements are often **more favorable with serial position**





Bruine de Bruin (2005)



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Glejser & Heynelds (2001)

Colton & Peterson (1967)



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Editorial

How to Make Sure Your Paper is Desk Rejected

A Practical Guide to Rejection in *EJPA*

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Orazbayev (2017)




Bruine de Bruin (2006)




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But...



Danziger, Levav, & Avnaim-Pesso (2011)

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
- Is the effect different in [legal contexts](#)?
- What is the effect of serial position on sequential legal decisions?

Field observational data

- US Asylum courts data
- 53 immigration courts
- 1980-2013
- 425 judges, 8.54 avg. years of experience
- $N = 386,109$
- Within courts, cases randomly assigned to judges
- Judges handle cases first-come-first-served
- 1-5 cases heard each day

Results


Results



OR = 1.054, 95% CI [1.04.1.07]

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Effect robust to:



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Effect robust to:

- Hour of day




OR = 1.054, 95% CI [1.04.1.07]

Results

Effect robust to:

- Hour of day
- Case length




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Results

Effect robust to:

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


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Results

Effect robust to:

- Hour of day
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- Case attributes (nationality, lawyer, case type)




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Results

Effect robust to:

- Hour of day
- Case length
- Judge experience
- Case attributes (nationality, lawyer, case type)
- Within-day comparisons



OR = 1.054, 95% CI [1.04.1.07]

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- Decisions get **more favorable with serial position**
 - Legal context
 - But, this is observational data
 - Parole judges data criticized for unobservables
 - We **cannot know for sure** that cases are randomly ordered
 - Does the effect replicate in both
 - ✓ legal contexts; and
 - ✓ when we **do know for sure** cases are randomly ordered

3 controlled experiments

- Laypeople
- Sequences of legal vignettes
 - Conflicts between the public interest and an individual's right
 - Randomly ordered
- For each vignette:
 1. Read
 2. Decide to restrict the right (unfavorable decision) or not (favorable)
 3. Move to next vignette

Experiment 1

Goals:

1. Replicate the effect in the lab
 - 6 hypothetical vignettes
 - Set bail or not
2. Test if it corresponds with the field
 - 3 conditions
 - Main (as if the judge)
 - 2 Checking if the effect in the lab is related to lack of experience


$N = 901$

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Experiment 2

Goals:

1. Replicate in another context
 - 6 hypothetical vignettes
 - Issue administrative restraining orders
2. More favorable or less unfavorable?
“Best to be last” or “worst to be first”?
 - Sequence of decisions /
Single decision

Experiment 2

Goals:

1. Replicate in another context
 - 6 hypothetical vignettes
 - Issue administrative restraining orders
2. More favorable or less unfavorable?
“Best to be last” or “worst to be first”?
 - Sequence of decisions /
Single decision


$N = 470$

Experiment 2

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“Best to be last” or “worst to be first”?
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Single decision

$N = 470$



Experiment 3

Goals:

1. Double length
 - 12 hypothetical vignettes
 - administrative restraining orders
2. Check if effect is driven by fatigue or quotas
 - 8 “Normal” cases
 - 4 “Extreme” cases

Experiment 3

Goals:


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Experiment 3

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- $N = 501$

Possible explanation: “Direction of comparison”

In sequential decisions:

- Each case is implicitly compared to previous cases
- Decision makers focus on **novel** features of the case
 - That they do not remember seeing in previous cases
- But, negative features are more easily remembered than positive features
- Positive features of a case more likely considered **novel**
- New cases are perceived more favorably

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Summary

- In **non-legal** domains, step-by-step judgements are often **more favorable with serial position**
- Both real world observational data and controlled experiments show that in **legal domains as well**, decision get **more favorable with position**
- An attention/memory account may explain the results, and interventions targeting it may help debias decisions
- Till then... It is best to be last