Stereotypes in High-Stakes Decisions Evidence from U.S. Circuit Courts

Daniel L. Chen w/ Elliott Ash (EthZ) and Arianna Ornaghi (British Academy)

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- "he/she is a doctor" (turkish) -> "he is a doctor" (english)
- "he/she is a nurse" (turkish) -> "she is a nurse" (english)
- A truck driver should plan his route carefully.
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Ottaway et al. 2001, Rothermund et al. 2004, Arkes et al. 2004, Blanton et al. 2006

Does it affect real-world decisions?

police (Correll et al. 2002); physicians (Green et al. 2007); resume screening (Bertrand et al. 2005)

• Does it lead to disparate treatment?

patients' feelings (Penner et al. 2010); grocery cashiers (Glover et al. 2017); students (Carlana 2018)

• Does training affect implicit attitudes?

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- Does training affect implicit attitudes?
 - exposure to female leaders (Beaman et al. 2009)

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Does it affect judicial decisions?

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Does it lead to disparate treatment of female judges?

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- Generally measured using Implicit Association Tests (IATs)
- Subjects asked to assign words to categories (Greenwald et al. 1998)



- Comparing reaction times across trials with different pairings
 - subjects are faster and make fewer errors on stereotype-consistent trials
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- Challenge: how can we measure implicit attitudes for the judiciary?
 - We know that ideological/biographical characteristics matter
 * Sunstein et al. 2006, Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010, Kastellec 2013, Glynn and Sen 2015
 - And that judges' decisions are often highly predictable
 - Suggesting that judges' preferences directly affect their decisions..
 - ..and that judges might use snap judgments/heuristics
 - \star Early predictability of asylum decisions Chen, Dunn, Sagun, Sirin 2017
 - But we cannot elicit IAT scores from sitting judges (yet :-))
- Proposed solution: proxy for IAT using large amounts of written text
 - Corpus of U.S. Circuit Court opinions 1870s-2013
 - Use machine learning to measure semantic biases in text corpora
 - Represent judicial language in vector space
 - Are words representing different groups associated to certain attributes?

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- Migraine, hysterical, morbid, obese, terrified, unemancipated, battered
- Reserve, industrial, honorable, commanding, armed, conscientious, duty

Word-Embedding Association Test: $WEAT = \sum_{x \in X} s(x, A, B) - \sum_{y \in Y} s(y, A, B)$ (Caliskan et al. 2017)

- X, Y are male (his, he, him, mr, himself) vs. female words (her, she, ms, women, woman)
- 🔍 A, B are career (company, work, business, service, pay) vs. family (family, wife, husband, mother, father)



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distance between IAT vectors correlate with behavioral delays

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


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
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
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- 700M tokens, 2B 8-grams, 5M citation edges across cases
- 250 biographical features (D/R, law school, age)
- 5% sample, 400 hand-coded features (1-digit topic)
- 6K cases hand-coded for meaning in 25 legal areas
 - Sunstein et al. 2007; Glynn and Sen 2015 (includes information on daughters)
- 677 Circuit judges since 1800 (with \geq 150K tokens)
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- Civil case writings linked to sentencing and defendant characteristics in 94 D




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


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- Life-tenure, appointed by US President (in circuit and district)
- Binding **precedent** within circuit
- In C: Panels of 3, no juries, drawn from a pool of 8-40 judges
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Introduce theories:

- Contract duty posits a general obligation to keep promises vs.
- a party should be allowed to breach a contract and pay damages, if it's more economically efficient than performing (i.e., efficient breach theory) (Posner 7th Cir. 1985)
- Tort law: duty of care is breached when PL > B (i.e., least cost avoider theory)

Shift in standards or thresholds:

- Shift from reasonable person standard to reasonable woman standard for what constitutes sexual harassment.
- Waive need to prove emotional harm in court by plaintiff (to a jury).

Rule on states' laws:

• 5th Circuit allowed Texas law requiring abortion clinics to meet building standards of ambulatory surgery centers. (would reduce to < 10 clinics)

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 - Female and younger judges display less lexical slant
- 2. Identify policy impact of lexically slanted judges using random assignment
 - Fewer pro-women votes in women's rights cases
- 3. Identify *impact on female colleagues* using random panel composition
 - Female judges reversed more and cited less by lexically slanted judges
 - Female judges assigned fewer opinions by lexically slanted senior judges
- 4. Identify *impact of diversity* using quasi-random exposure to females
 - Daughters reduce lexical slant
- 5. Assess whether lexical slant is *implicit or explicit*
 - Correlates with other forms of implicit cognition

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
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


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$$\cos \theta = \frac{v_1 \cdot v_2}{||v_1||||v_2}$$

Uses neural networks

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 - In 2SLS, orthogonality of instruments and prediction error
 - In structural econometrics, means of the data
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


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
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
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- GloVe (Global Vectors)
 - Based on intuition that co-occurrence probabilities convey meaning
 - Begins by contructing a co-occurence matrix using a fixed window
 - Obtains word vectors $w_i \in (-1,1)^{300}$ that minimize

$$J(\boldsymbol{w}) = \sum_{i,j} f(X_{ij}) \left(w_i^T w_j - \log(X_{ij}) \right)^2$$

- ▶ X_{ij} is the co-occurrence count between words *i* and *j*
- $f(\cdot)$ is a weighting function that down-weights frequent words
- Objective function J(·) trains word vectors to minimize squared difference between dot product of vectors representing two words and their empirical co-occurrence
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
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Word embeddings identify cultural dimensions

• Identify cultural dimension by taking difference between pairs of words




• $\overrightarrow{man} - \overrightarrow{woman}$ identifies a step in masculine direction

$$\overrightarrow{male} - \overrightarrow{female} = \frac{\sum_{n} \overrightarrow{male word_{n}}}{|N_{male}|} - \frac{\sum_{n} \overrightarrow{female word_{n}}}{|N_{female}|}$$

where $|N_{male}|$ is number of words used to identify the male dimension, e.g. $\overrightarrow{boy} - \overrightarrow{girl}, \overrightarrow{he} - \overrightarrow{she}$, etc.

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


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
• Validation: Correctly identifies 96.5% of names as male or female



 Understand connotation of words along gender dimension by looking at cosine of angle between vector representing word and the dimension itself

$$sim\left(\vec{x}, \vec{y}\right) = cos\left(\theta\right) = \frac{\vec{x} \cdot \vec{y}}{\|\vec{x}\| \|\vec{y}\|} = \frac{\sum x_i y_i}{\sqrt{\sum x_i^2} \sqrt{\sum y_i^2}}$$


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
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
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
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Figure: Measuring Gender Stereotypes using Cosine Similarity



- Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count Dictionaries (LIWC) provide human-validated list of word and word stems corresponding to concepts
 - male, female, work, and family
- From each list, select the 10 most frequent words in full judicial corpus


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Reinterpreting NLP as Discrete Choice

• Utility for judge *i* at year *t*:

$$u_{it} = \widetilde{\alpha}_t + \mathbf{x}'_{it}\widetilde{\gamma}_t + \sum_{(c,c')\in c_j\times c_j: c\neq c'}\widetilde{\nu}_{c,c',t}\mathbf{1}_{i\in R_t},$$

See also Athey et al. SHOPPER model

- Arbitrary pattern of complements/substitution across phrases
 - \blacktriangleright \Rightarrow word embeddings

• We consider opinions authored by a certain judge as a separate corpus

- We train embeddings using bootstrap approach (Antoniak and Minmo 2018)
 - ▶ 10 bootstrapped samples of size N_i
 - N_j is number of sentences written by judge j
- Lexical slant of judge j = median slant across bootstrap samples
- Do we correctly identify male vs. female names for each judge corpus?


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
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Notes: The graphs show the distribution of the coefficient and the t-statistic resulting from a regressions of a dummy for whether the name is male on the median cosine similarity between the vector representing the name and the gender dimension across bootstrap samples, for sets of judges with different number of tokens. Each observation corresponds to a different judge.

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- Based on these stats, preferred specification includes 139 judges with >1.5M tokens.

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


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- For interpreting as a judge's lexical slant, judges must be randomly assigned
- Interviews of courts and orthogonality checks of observables
 - ▶ (1) 2-3 weeks before oral argument, computer:
 - * randomly assigns available judges including visiting judges
 - * ensures judges are not sitting together repeatedly
 - $\star\,$ senior judges reduced frequency entered into the program
 - ▶ (2) randomly assign panels on yearly basis, then randomly assign cases
 - \star judges can occasionally recuse
 - * panel sees case again on remand
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• Omnibus test: how similar string of panel assignments is to random strings

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
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 - \star senior judges reduced frequency entered into the program
 - (2) randomly assign panels on yearly basis, then randomly assign cases
 - \star judges can occasionally recuse
 - ★ panel sees case again on remand
 - \star exceptions for specialized cases like death penalty

• Omnibus test: how similar string of panel assignments is to random strings

- Not accounting for vacation, sick leave, senior status, en banc, remand, and recusal can lead to the inference that judges are not randomly assigned.
- ▶ We assume these deviations from randomness are Rubin-ignorable.

Figure: Gender Slant, by Demographic Characteristics



Notes: The graphs show the distribution of the slant measure (cosine similarity between the gender and career-family dimensions), by judge gender. (p=0.012)

Democrat	0.109				0.308
	(0.261)				(0.303)
Female		-0.502*			-0.621***
		(0.288)			(0.181)
Minority			-0.098		-0.128
			(0.329)		(0.184)
Born in 1920s				-0.069	0.122
				(0.191)	(0.208)
Born in 1930s				-0.765***	-0.682***
				(0.203)	(0.226)
Born after 1940				-0.537**	-0.518**
				(0.229)	(0.243)
Observations	139	139	139	139	139
Outcome Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Adjusted R2	-0.006	0.020	-0.007	0.087	0.447
Circuit FE					х
Demographic Controls					Х

Female judges and younger judges display less lexical slant

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	(0.261)				(0.303)
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Circuit FE					х
Demographic Controls					Х

Female judges and younger judges display less lexical slant

Lexical slant and judicial decisions

We study whether judges with different levels of lexical slant vote differently in women rights' cases

feminist vote_{ijct} = β lexical slant_j + $X'_{j}\gamma + \delta_{ct} + W'_{i}\eta + \epsilon_{ijct}$

- i case, j judge, c circuit, t year
- feminist vote_{ijct}: vote in favor of female plaintiff or plaintiff representing women's interest
- lexical slant_j: gender lexical slant of judge j
- X_j: gender, party, race, cohort, religion, law school attended, prior experience, state of birth
- ▶ *W_i*: dummies for specific topic (sexual harassment, abortion..)
- δ_{ct} : circuit-year fixed effects
- Standard errors clustered at the judge level

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- Standard errors clustered at the judge level

Dataset	Epstein et al. (2013) Data			Glynn and Sen (2015) Data		
Gender Slant	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.066***	-0.053***	-0.054***	-0.058**
Democrat	0.150***	0.142***	0.185***	0.257***	0.259***	0.263***
				(0.044)		
Female	0.122***	0.143***	0.089***	0.079**	0.105***	0.096**
Democrat * Female						
Observations				1719	1719	1719
Clusters	112	112	112	109	109	109
Outcome Mean	0.4167	0.417	0.417			
Circuit-Year FE	×	×	×	X	X	Х
Topic FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
+ Interactions		Х			Х	
Career FE (judge bio)			Х			Х

Judges with more lexical slant are less likely to vote in favor of women's interests


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Gender Slant	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.066***	-0.053***	-0.054***	-0.058**
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.023)
Democrat	0.150***	0.142***	0.185***	0.257***	0.259***	0.263***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.056)
Female	0.122***	0.143***	0.089***	0.079**	0.105***	0.096**
	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.041)
Democrat * Female		0.038			0.010	
		(0.057)			(0.070)	
Observations	2335	2335	2335	1719	1719	1719
Clusters	112	112	112	109	109	109
Outcome Mean	0.4167	0.417	0.417	0.383	0.383	0.383
Circuit-Year FE	х	x	x	x	x	x
Topic FE	х	х	х	х	х	х
Demographic Controls	х	х	х	х	х	x
+ Interactions		х			х	
Career FE (judge bio)			х			х

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Circuit-Year FE	х	x	x	x	x	x
Topic FE	х	х	х	х	х	х
Demographic Controls	х	х	х	х	х	x
+ Interactions		х			х	
Career FE (judge bio)			х			х

Judges with more lexical slant are less likely to vote in favor of women's interests

Judges with more lexical slant also vote conservative across some other issues



.. but not across all issues

Dataset	Songer-Auburn Data
Gender Slant	
Democrat	0.012*
Female	0.012
	(0.015)
Observations	39172
Clusters	544
Outcome Mean	0.405
Circuit-Year FE	Х
Topic FE	Х
Demographic Controls	Х

Songer-Auburn is 5% random sample from 1925-2002; whereas Epstein is 1982-2008, Glynn-Sen is 1996-2002 using precedent or keyword searches "gender", "pregnancy", or "sex"

Previous results also hold controlling for Liberal % (Songer-Auburn)

.. but not across all issues

Dataset	Songer-Auburn Data
Gender Slant	-0.002
	(0.002)
Democrat	0.012*
	(0.006)
Female	0.012
	(0.015)
Observations	39172
Clusters	544
Outcome Mean	0.405
Circuit-Year FE	Х
Topic FE	Х
Demographic Controls	Х

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	(0.006)
Female	0.012
	(0.015)
Observations	39172
Clusters	544
Outcome Mean	0.405
Circuit-Year FE	X
Topic FE	Х
Demographic Controls	Х

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• We have shown evidence that lexical slant affects judicial decisions


- But, if we are indeed measuring attitudes toward women, we should expect implicit attitudes to affect treatment of women more generally
- We study three forms of disparate treatment:
 - 1. Are more slanted judges less likely to **assign opinions** to female judges?
 - 2. Are more slanted judges less likely to cite female judges?
 - 3. Are more slanted judges more likely to **reverse** district court cases when the deciding district judge is female?
- Important: these are career-relevant dimensions
- Refereeing and tenure (Card et al. 2018; Hemel 2018, Sarsons 2019, Bohren et al. 2018)

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10% are women, 20% of panels have at least one female judge

Authorship assignment

• Opinions are assigned to judges by the most senior judge on panel

Identification exploits random assignment of panels to cases
 Lexical slant of most senior judge as good as randomly assigned

• Restrict sample to having at least one female judge on panel

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Panels with more slanted senior judges are less likely to assign opinions to women

Gender Slant	-0.020**	-0.020**	-0.015*	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.026**
Democrat	-0.065**		-0.080**	-0.067**	-0.059**	-0.049
		(0.034)				
Female	0.137***	0.146***	0.160***	0.137***	0.135***	
Democrat * Female		-0.120***				
Observations					36939	19940
Clusters	125	125	125	123	125	125
Outcome Mean						0.4325
Circuit-Year FE	х	х	х	х	х	Х
	X	X	X	Х	Х	X
+ Interactions		X				
Career FE			Х			
Liberal % (Songer-Auburn)				Х		
Includes 2-1					Х	
Excludes Female Senior Judge						X

Panels with more slanted	senior	judges are	less likely	to assign	opinions	to women
Gender Slant	-0.020**	-0.020**	-0.015*	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.026**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Democrat	-0.065**	-0.033	-0.080**	-0.067**	-0.059**	-0.049
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.036)
Female	0.137***	0.146***	0.160***	0.137***	0.135***	
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	
Democrat * Female		-0.120***				
		(0.039)				
Observations	32052	32052	32052	31858	36939	19940
Clusters	125	125	125	123	125	125
Outcome Mean	0.383	0.383	0.383	0.383	0.383	0.4325
Circuit-Year FE	x	x	x	x	x	x
Demographic Controls	х	х	х	х	х	х
+ Interactions		х				
Career FE			х			
Liberal % (Songer-Auburn)				х		
Includes 2-1					х	
Excludes Female Senior Judge						х

Panels with more slanted	l senior	judges are	less likely	to assign	opinions	to women
Gender Slant	-0.020**	-0.020**	-0.015*	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.026**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Democrat	-0.065**	-0.033	-0.080**	-0.067**	-0.059**	-0.049
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.036)
Female	0.137***	0.146***	0.160***	0.137***	0.135***	
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	
Democrat * Female		-0.120***				
		(0.039)				
Observations	32052	32052	32052	31858	36939	19940
Clusters	125	125	125	123	125	125
Outcome Mean	0.383	0.383	0.383	0.383	0.383	0.4325
Circuit-Year FE	х	х	x	x	x	x
Demographic Controls	х	х	х	х	х	х
+ Interactions		х				
Career FE			х			
Liberal % (Songer-Auburn)				x		
Includes 2-1					х	
Excludes Female Senior Judge						х

.. but no more likely to yield unsigned or unanimous opinions

Dependent Variable	Has Author		Per Curiam		Decided	
					Unani	mously
Gender Slant	0.001	0.003	-0.000	-0.001	0.002	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Democrat	-0.000	-0.020	-0.020*	0.009	-0.018	-0.021
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Female	0.000	0.009	0.003	-0.003	0.012	0.009
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Observations	171441	43601	171441	43601	171441	43601
Clusters	139	125	139	125	139	125
Outcome Mean	0.803	0.847	0.092	0.045	0.887	0.874
Circuit-Year FE	х	х	х	х	х	х
Demographic Controls	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х
One Female Judge on Panel		Х		Х		х

Judges with more lexical slant cite female judges less

Dependent Variable	Cite	es at Least C)ne Female Ju	
Gender Slant	-0.009*	-0.008*	-0.010*	-0.010*
Democrat	-0.021	-0.030*	-0.046***	-0.026*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Female	0.123***	0.107***	0.134***	0.122***
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Democrat * Female		0.049*		
Observations	107923	107923	107923	106557
Clusters	139	139	139	136
Outcome Mean				0.381
Circuit-Year FE	Х	Х	Х	Х
Demographic Controls	Х	Х	Х	Х
Interacted Demographic Controls		Х		
Career FE			Х	Х
Liberal % (Songer-Auburn)				Х

Judges with more lexical slant cite female judges less

Dependent Variable	Cite	Cites at Least One Female Judge			
Gender Slant	-0.009*	-0.008*	-0.010*	-0.010*	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	
Democrat	-0.021	-0.030*	-0.046***	-0.026*	
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Female	0.123***	0.107***	0.134***	0.122***	
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	
Democrat * Female		0.049*			
		(0.027)			
Observations	107923	107923	107923	106557	
Clusters	139	139	139	136	
Outcome Mean	0.383	0.383	0.383	0.381	
Circuit-Year FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	
Demographic Controls	Х	Х	Х	Х	
Interacted Demographic Controls		Х			
Career FE			Х	Х	
Liberal % (Songer-Auburn)				Х	

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Gender Slant	-0.009*	-0.008*	-0.010*	-0.010*	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	
Democrat	-0.021	-0.030*	-0.046***	-0.026*	
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	
Female	0.123***	0.107***	0.134***	0.122***	
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.015)	
Democrat * Female		0.049*			
		(0.027)			
Observations	107923	107923	107923	106557	
Clusters	139	139	139	136	
Outcome Mean	0.383	0.383	0.383	0.381	
Circuit-Year FE	Х	Х	Х	Х	
Demographic Controls	Х	Х	Х	Х	
Interacted Demographic Controls		Х			
Career FE			Х	Х	
Liberal % (Songer-Auburn)				Х	

.. and cite each other

Dependent Variable	Cites	Cites	Average	Average
	Democrat	Minority	Age	Bias
Gender Slant	-0.011**	-0.005	-0.069	0.112***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.083)	(0.012)
Democrat	0.014	-0.032*	0.010	0.003
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.153)	(0.034)
Female	0.027**	0.049***	-0.017	-0.025
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.156)	(0.020)
Observations	107923	107923	107923	98435
Clusters	139	139	139	139
Outcome Mean	0.607	0.336	61.407	0.052
Circuit-Year FE	Х	Х	Х	Х
Demographic Controls	Х	Х	Х	Х

Reversals

votes to reverse_{ijdct} = α female district judge_i + β female district judge_i * lexical slant_j + female district judge_i * $X'_j \gamma$ + $\delta_j + \delta_{dt} + \epsilon_{ijct}$

- District-year fixed effects
- Circuit judge fixed effects

Judges with more lexical slant reverse female district judges more

Gender Slant * Female District Judge	0.010***	0.010***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Democrat * Female District Judge	-0.009	-0.024**		
	(0.014)		(0.014)	
Female * Female District Judge	-0.009	-0.022***		-0.011
Democrat * Female * Female District Jud		0.152***		
Observations	145862	145862	144965	145563
Clusters	133	133	130	133
Outcome Mean for Male Judges				
Outcome Mean for Female Judges			0.157	
Circuit-Year FE	×	Х	×	Х
Judge FE	×	Х	×	Х
District Judge FE	X	×	X	Х
	X	×	Х	Х
+ Interactions		Х		
Liberal Score Interaction			×	
District-Year FE				Х

Judges with more lexical slant reverse female district judges more Gender Slant * Female District Judge 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.012*** (0.004)(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)Democrat * Female District Judge -0.009 -0.024** -0.006 -0.007 (0.014)(0.009)(0.014)(0.013)Female * Female District Judge -0.009 -0.022*** -0.007 -0.011 (0.009)(0.008)(0.009)(0.010)Democrat * Female * Female District Judge 0.152*** (0.015)Observations 145862 145862 144965 145563 Clusters 133 133 130 133 Outcome Mean for Male Judges 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180 Outcome Mean for Female Judges 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 Circuit-Year FE х х х х Judge FE х х х х District Judge FE х х х х Demographic Controls х х х х + Interactions х Liberal Score Interaction х

District-Year FE

But female judges are 3.6% less likely to be reversed

Gender Slant * Female District Judge	0.010***	0.010***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Democrat * Female District Judge	-0.009	-0.024**	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Female * Female District Judge	-0.009	-0.022***	-0.007	-0.011
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Democrat * Female * Female District Judge		0.152***		
		(0.015)		
Observations	145862	145862	144965	145563
Clusters	133	133	130	133
Outcome Mean for Male Judges	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.180
Outcome Mean for Female Judges	0.157	0.157	0.157	0.157
Circuit-Year FE	х	x	x	х
Judge FE	х	x	x	х
District Judge FE	х	x	x	х
Demographic Controls	х	x	x	х
+ Interactions		x		
Liberal Score Interaction			x	
District-Year FE				х


But female judges are 3.6% less likely to be reversed

Gender Slant * Female District Judge	0.010***	0.010***	0.012***	0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Democrat * Female District Judge	-0.009	-0.024**	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Female * Female District Judge	-0.009	-0.022***	-0.007	-0.011
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Democrat * Female * Female District Judge		0.152***		
		(0.015)		
Observations	145862	145862	144965	145563
Clusters	133	133	130	133
Outcome Mean for Male Judges	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.180
Outcome Mean for Female Judges	0.157	0.157	0.157	0.157
Circuit-Year FE	х	x	x	х
Judge FE	х	x	x	х
District Judge FE	х	x	x	х
Demographic Controls	х	x	x	х
+ Interactions		x		
Liberal Score Interaction			x	
District-Year FE				х

Gender Slanted Judges also reverse Democrats and minorities

Gender Slant * Democrat District Judge	0.006*	
	(0.004)	
Democrat * Democrat District Judge	-0.022	
	(0.014)	
Female * Democrat District Judge	-0.007	
	(0.008)	
Gender Slant * Minority District Judge		0.011**
		(0.005)
Democrat * Minority District Judge		-0.009
		(0.010)
Female * Minority District Judge		0.018*
		(0.010)
Observations	145862	145862
Clusters	133	133
Outcome Mean	0.177	0.177
Circuit-Year FE, Judge FE	Х	X
District Judge FE, Demographic Controls	х	Х

Figure: Reversals and Promotions from District to Circuit Courts



Notes: The graph shows the relationship between the probability of being elevated from a District to a Circuit Court and the share of decisions that were reversed on appeal, conditional on demographic controls and circuit fixed effects. The sample is restricted to district judges for which we observe at least 50 cases.

Reversals and Promotion from District to Circuit Courts

Dependent Variable	Promoted to	
	Circuit	: Court
Share of Decisions Reversed on Appeal	-0.351***	
	(0.136)	
Share of Votes to Reverse on Appeal		-0.372***
		(0.116)
Female	0.036	0.037
	(0.028)	(0.029)
Democrat	-0.022	-0.018
	(0.0191)	(0.018)
Observations	862	862
Outcome Mean	0.058	0.058
Circuit FE	Х	Х
Demographic Controls	Х	Х



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- .. and there are many other kinds of implicit bias

Is it implicit or explicit?



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- Robustness by context window
- Robustness by word dropped
- Robustness by size of word set
- Robustness to increasing set of judges considered
- Robustness to dropping cases

- Omitted variables
 - Is it gender slant or something else?
 - Is it the affected judge's gender or something else?
- Assessment of randomization

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Tiny fraction of gender cases $(\frac{1,719}{114,702})$ involved in calculating gender slant

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
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
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
Robustness by Context Window


Figure: Correlation of Gender Slant for Embeddings Based on Different Windows




Notes: The graphs show a scatter plot of the gender slant measure obtained by training embeddings using different window sizes (5 vs. 10; 10 vs. 15) to construct co-occurrence matrix.










- Estimate of how 'unobservables would need to be 'delta' as important as observables for the treatment effect to be 0. (Oster 2016)
 - Reversals: 53
 - Authorship: 1.2
 - Citations: 0.6
 - Decisions: 2.6
 - Daughters: 6

Effect of language slant of senior judge on author characteristics

Dependent Variable: Author is	Democrat	Democrat	Minority	Age
		& Female		
Gender Slant	-0.027**	0.001	0.006	0.069
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.168)
Democrat	0.156***	-0.010	0.019	1.176**
	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.566)
Female	-0.045**	-0.019	0.025	-0.009
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.499)
Observations	46735	3907	23436	120365
Clusters	137	99	126	139
Outcome Mean	0.366	0.305	0.340	63.030
Circuit-Year FE	Х	Х	Х	Х
Demographic Controls	Х	Х	Х	Х
Panel Includes Democrat Judge	Х			
Panel Includes Democrat and Female Judge		Х		
Panel Includes Minority Judge			Х	

Graphical Intuition of Randomization




Random Strings

- 1. Propose a statistic summarizing the yearly sequence of numbers of democratic appointees per seat within a circuit.
 - Test for autocorrelation (judges seeking out cases), mean-reversion (judges 'due' for certain cases), and longest-run (specialization)
- 2. Compute the statistic for the actual sequence, s*.
- 3. Compute the statistic for each of 1,000 bootstrap samples like the actual sequence, i.e., s₁, s₂, s₃... s_n.
- 4. Compute the empirical p-value, p_i by determining where s* fits into s₁, s₂, s₃... s_n.
- 5. Repeat steps 1-4 and calculate p_i for each circuit.

Random Strings

- p-values should look uniformly distributed
 - (1001th random string should have a statistic anywhere between 1-1000)
 - Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for whether the empirical distribution of p-values approaches the CDF of a uniform distribution

Appellate Randomization Check $E[p_{ct}\varepsilon_{ict}] = 0$



 Test for autocorrelation (judges seeking out cases), mean-reversion (judges 'due' for certain cases), and longest-run (specialization)

• p-values should look uniform (1001th random string should have a statistic anywhere between 1-1000)

KS-Test for whether the empirical distribution of p-values approaches the CDF of a uniform distribution

Judge Randomization Check

	Economics Case			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Econ Training	0.00788	-0.000716	-0.00512	0.00540
	(0.00807)	(0.00454)	(0.00893)	(0.00416)
Ν	123519	115561	500266	389105
adj. R-sq	0.115	0.024	0.112	0.023
Circuit-Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sample	Author	Author	On Panel	On Panel
Sample	Year < 1976	Year > 1991	Year < 1976	Year > 1991

Omnibus check: No endogenous settlement or selection of cases.

Table: Randomization Check: Orthogonality with Case Characteristics as Determined by Lower Court

Case Characteristics as Determined by Lower Court	Male Democrat (1)	Female Republican (2)
Direction of Lower Court Decision	0.0115	-0.171
	(0.0856)	(0.187)
Plaintiff claims employer acted in retaliation	-0.102	0.184
	(0.0936)	(0.205)
All plaintiffs are female	0.0126	-0.0920
	(0.0747)	(0.164)
Title IX claim	0.0415	-0.0558
	(0.0252)	(0.0553)
Section 1983 claim	0.0533	-0.0474
	(0.0500)	(0.110)
Constructive discharge from employment	0.00764	0.0726
	(0.0559)	(0.122)
Procedural issues dominate	0.0167	0.163
	(0.0586)	(0.128)

Table: Randomization Check: Orthogonality with Case Characteristics as Determined by Lower Court

Case Characteristics as Determined by Lower Court	Male Democrat (1)	Female Republican (2)
Plaintiff suing under state law	0.0677	-0.283
	(0.0830)	(0.181)
Plaintiff claims illegally denied promotion	-0.0591	-0.0465
	(0.0755)	(0.165)
Plaintiff claims illegally not being hired	-0.0909+	0.105
	(0.0529)	(0.116)
Plaintiff claims illegally fired	0.0460	-0.159
	(0.0961)	(0.210)
Plaintiff claims unequal pay	-0.0235	-0.0868
	(0.0675)	(0.148)
Plaintiff sued under 14th Amendment	0.0606	-0.167+
	(0.0429)	(0.0938)
Plaintiff sued under 1st Amendment	0.0574	-0.0503
	(0.0353)	(0.0775)

Table: Randomization Check: Orthogonality with Case Characteristics as Determined by Lower Court

Case Characteristics as Determined by Lower Court	Male Democrat (1)	Female Republican (2)
Damages major point of contention	0.0765	0.166
	(0.0669)	(0.147)
Contains Section 1981 claim	0.0295	-0.0818
	(0.0585)	(0.128)
Contains age discrimination claim	0.0368	-0.241
	(0.0695)	(0.152)
Contains pregnancy discrimination claim	0.0232	0.0911
	(0.0484)	(0.106)
Contains emotional distress claim	-0.0781	0.0432
	(0.0530)	(0.116)

Notes: Significant at +10%, *5%, **1%. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents a separate regression of a distinct case characteristic on the fraction of the panel comprising of male Democrats (respectively, female Republicans).

• Is inattention the mechanism for heuristics?

- Or explicit, consciously drawing out gender stereotypes into the text?
- (1) Examine correlation with other forms of implicit cognition
 Arguably clean extraneous factor, such as presidential elections
- (2) Examine Project Implicit data from 10,000 self-reported lawyers
 Compare demographic correlates of implicit and explicit bias


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Electoral Cycles Among U.S. Circuit Judges (Berdejo and Chen 2017)

Figure: Dissents and Partisan Voting




Increases with campaign intensity across states and time (Chen 2019)

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


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Electoral Cycles Correlate With WEAT

Dependent variable	Dissent
	(1)
9 Mo. Before Election	0.00439*
	(0.00224)
9 Mo. Before Election	-0.00225**
X WEAT (family/career)	(0.00113)
N	997494
Judge FE	Х
9 Mo. Before Election × Judge Bio	Х

Correlates of Implicit and Explicit Bias

Dependent Variable	Implicit Bia	as (Career-Fa	mily IAT)	Explicit	Bias (self-re	eported)
Liberal	-0.070***			-0.170***		
	(0.024)			(0.026)		
Female		0.118***			0.022	
		(0.021)			(0.021)	
Age			0.004***			-0.005***
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Observations	9954	9954	9954	9954	9954	9954
Outcome Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Adjusted R2	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.000	0.004

10,000 self-identified lawyers in Project Implicit database

More work or experiments needed

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Age			0.004***			-0.005***
			(0.001)			(0.001)
Observations	9954	9954	9954	9954	9954	9954
Outcome Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Adjusted R2	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.000	0.004

10,000 self-identified lawyers in Project Implicit database

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Daughters Reduce Gender Slant

Daughter	-0.477*	-0.468*
	(0.274)	(0.278)
Democrat	-0.016	-0.069
	(0.535)	(0.613)
Female	-0.659***	-0.683***
	(0.232)	(0.239)
Democrat * Female		0.321
		(0.631)
Observations	98	98
Outcome Mean	-0.085	-0.085
Adjusted R2	0.528	0.520
Circuit FE	х	Х
Number of Children FE	Х	Х
Demographic Controls	Х	Х
Interacted Demographic Controls		х

Conditional on number of children, having a daughter as good as random.

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• Two standard deviations of gender slant

- 1. 20% lower likelihood of pro-women's rights vote
- $\sim \frac{2}{3}$ of party effect; \sim female effect
- 2. 10% lower likelihood of female assigned authorship
- \blacktriangleright \sim party effect; $\sim \! \frac{1}{3}$ of female effect
- 3. 6% lower likelihood of citing a female
- \blacktriangleright ~ party effect; $\sim \frac{1}{6}$ of female effect
- 4. 10% more likely to reverse a female
- ▶ >> party and female effects; \exists reverse gender gap
- Female district judges 12% less likely to be elevated than a male

• Having a daughter

- 5. 0.5 standard deviation lower gender slant
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- 1. Follow up analysis of current results
 - * Are female judges assigned different types of opinions?
 - ★ Does bias impact the career of female judges?
- 2. More work needed to define exactly what we are measuring
 - * Are these implicit attitudes?
 - * How does our measure correlate with actual IAT scores?
- 3. Extensions to other domains
 - * Preliminary analysis on congressional speech shows similar results
 - * What about disparities in criminal sentencing? (w/ judge FE)
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 - * Should appellate review be blinded to identity of district judges?
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