# The Effects of Targeted Recruitment and Comprehensive Supports for Low-Income High Achievers at Elite Universities: Evidence from Texas Flagships* 

Rodney J. Andrews<br>The University of Texas at Dallas and NBER ${ }^{\dagger}$

Scott A. Imberman
Michigan State University and NBER

Michael F. Lovenheim<br>Cornell University and NBER

November 2015


#### Abstract

We study a set of interventions in Texas that were designed to overcome the multitude of hurdles faced by low-income, high-ability students in the higher education system. The Longhorn Opportunity Scholars (LOS) and Century Scholars (CS) programs were implemented in 1999 and 2000, respectively, and involved recruiting at specified low-income high schools, providing additional financial aid, and enhancing academic supports once enrolled in college if students attended University of Texas - Austin (LOS) or Texas A\&M College Station (CS). These two schools are the flagships of Texas public universities and are widely regarded as the top public universities in Texas. Using administrative data on all public college students in Texas we find via difference-in-differences estimators that these programs, and in particular the LOS program, had large, positive effects on high achieving students. Both interventions increased attendance at flagships while LOS also increased attendance at other 4 -year schools at the expense of 2 -year schools. The latter finding indicates substantial spillover effects of the recruitment portion of the program to students who are not able to attend the flagships. Reduced-form intention-to-treat results show that, amongst students in the top $30 \%$ of their high school class who attend any college, BA attainment increases by 3.7 percentage points from LOS while earnings increase by $4.4 \%$. Upper-bound treatment-on-the treated estimates that attribute all of these earnings gains to flagship enrollment are 61 pp and $107 \%$, respectively. There is no statistically significant impact on these measures from the CS program, but it does increase the likelihood of students majoring in more technically demanding fields like STEM and social sciences and we cannot rule out sizeable positive earnings effects (upper bound TOT estimates are an insignificant $69 \%$ ). These results indicate that school-based targeted recruitment can substantially increase enrollment of low-income students in higher quality colleges and, when combined with adequate support services, improves educational and labor market outcomes.


KEYWORDS: Postsecondary Education, Higher Education, Low-Income Students

[^0]
## 1 Introduction

Changes in the US economy over the past several decades have led to historically high demand for skilled labor (Autor 2014; Autor, Katz and Kearney 2008). In 1979, the gap in median yearly earnings between households with at most a high school degree and households with a worker who has a college degree was $\$ 30,298$. By 2012, this gap had nearly doubled to $\$ 58,249$ (Autor 2014). The increasing earnings premium associated with having a college degree underscores the immense and growing importance of postsecondary education in driving labor market outcomes. However, these high returns have been met with sluggish increases in postsecondary attainment, particularly among students from low-income backgrounds (Lovenheim and Reynolds 2013; Bailey and Dynarski 2011; Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 2010). For example, Bailey and Dynarski (2011) show the college enrollment gap between those in the bottom and top income quartiles grew from 39 percentage points to 51 percentage points between the early 1980s and the turn of the 21st century. The college completion gap between these two groups also grew dramatically during this period, from 31 percentage points to 45 percentage points. The unequal investment in postsecondary education across the income distribution combined with the large earnings premium associated with college graduation suggests the current higher education system may contribute to, rather than mitigate, growing income inequality in the US. Indeed, some evidence suggests that changes in the earnings premium associated with college can explain between 60 and 70 percent of the rise in income inequality over the past several decades (Goldin and Katz 2007). Developing policies that can support the collegiate attainment of students from low-income backgrounds is of primary policy importance.

Differences in collegiate investment between low-income and high-income students take two forms. The first is that students from low-income families are less likely to attend college at all (Bailey and Dynarski, 2011; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). For example, tabulations from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) show that while only $13 \%$ of students from families with earnings over $\$ 125,000$ do not attend college, $56 \%$ of students from families with income below $\$ 25,000$ do not attend college. As family income increases, the likelihood of attending college increases steeply. The second type of investment gap, which has received far less attention, is that low-income students tend to enroll in schools of lower
quality than their higher-income counterparts (Hoxby and Avery 2013; Lovenheim and Reynolds 2013). In the NLSY97, only $2 \%$ of low-income students attended a flagship public school, while among the highest-income students $16 \%$ did. ${ }^{1}$ The likelihood of attending a private school also increases with income, and the proportion of students enrolling in a two-year school declines with income. There is substantial evidence of large impacts of college quality on college completion (Cohodes and Goodman 2014; Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 2010), time to degree (Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 2012), and subsequent earnings in the labor market (Andrews, Li and Lovenheim forthcoming; Hoekstra 2009; Black and Smith 2006, 2004; Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg 1999). ${ }^{2}$ A representative estimate from Hoekstra (2009) shows that attending the public flagship university leads to a $24 \%$ increase in earnings. Hence, differences in college quality between low-income and high-income students could significantly affect both collegiate attainment and earnings gaps.

In order to develop policies to address the gaps in postsecondary investment that exist across the income distribution, it first is important to understand why they are present. There are five main explanations for why students from low-income households tend to graduate from college in general, and from more elite colleges in particular, at lower rates. First, families with fewer resources at the time of college usually have fewer resources with which to invest in a child throughout his or her life. These resource differences develop into differences in academic preparation for college during students' teenage years (Cameron and Taber 2004; Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). Second, there is increasing evidence that low-income students face considerable information gaps that often preclude them from applying to and enrolling in more selective schools, even when they are academically qualified and would pay little to nothing in out-of-pocket costs (Hoxby and Avery 2013; Hoxby and Turner 2013). A third explanation is that low-income students are affected by both academic and social "mismatch" when they enroll in higher-quality schools. On average, such students have worse academic preparation for college and often are not part of the dominant cultural majority, particularly at more elite postsecondary institutions (Aucejo, Arcidiacono and Hotz 2013; Arcidiacono and Koedel, 2014; Arcidiacono et al., 2011; Dillon and Smith 2013). Fourth, the complexity of the financial aid

[^1]application may prevent students from applying for aid, and thus attending more expensive colleges (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2013, 2008, 2006; Bettinger, et al., 2012). Finally, lower family resources may prevent families from investing in a higher-quality school (Lovenheim and Reynolds 2013).

Prior research has found at most modest effects of policies designed to overcome one of these disadvantages on student outcomes. One reason for these modest effects is that there are interactive effects of student disadvantage, making it necessary for programs to address several of these barriers simultaneously in order to effectively support postsecondary education among students from low-income backgrounds. In this paper, we present the first analysis in the literature of a set of interventions in Texas aimed at addressing the set of disadvantages faced by low-income students. The Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship (LOS) program at the University of Texas at Austin (UT Austin) and the Century Scholars (CS) program at Texas A\&M University - College Station, which are the two flagship schools of the Texas public higher education system, began in 1999 and 2000, respectively. ${ }^{3}$ The programs targeted high schools that served low-income students and traditionally sent few students to these institutions. Together, the LOS and CS programs were implemented in 110 high schools in Texas. While entirely independent, the programs offer a similar suite of interventions that attempt to overcome the multiple disadvantages faced by low-income students in the higher education system: lack of information about college quality, lower academic preparation for college, and lower financial resources. The programs contain extensive outreach and recruiting, with students going back to their high schools to share their experiences and university staff providing information sessions. This outreach and recruitment of students from low-income high schools helps overcome information barriers that may preclude students from these schools from applying to and enrolling in an elite postsecondary school (Hoxby and Turner 2013). They also have the potential to generate "spillover" effects by inducing students in targeted schools who are not offered scholarships to attend the flagships or other higher quality institutions. Program participants also are provided scholarships to help alleviate financial strain. ${ }^{4}$ Once enrolled,

[^2]the LOS and CS programs include multiple academic support services for students as well as policies to help foster cohesion among the students. These services can help overcome social and academic mismatch. Critically, the programs did not provide students with help in the admissions process; all students who were induced to attend UT-Austin and Texas A\&M were academically qualified to attend those schools.

We use administrative data from the State of Texas that links K-12 education records with higher education enrollment and performance information as well as earnings records from the Texas unemployment insurance system. Using these data, we exploit the timing differences in the roll-out of the LOS/CS programs to identify their effects on higher education outcomes and post-college earnings. Because these programs were targeted towards high-performing students, we first generate a performance index using the extensive set of high school test score information we have about each student. Our analysis focuses on high-achieving students, who we define as the top $30 \%$ of students within each high school on this performance index. We then estimate difference-in-difference models in which we compare changes in outcomes among high-ability students in treated schools to changes for high-ability students in untreated schools when the LOS/CS programs are implemented. The main identification assumption in these models is that the trends in enrollment patterns and outcomes among high-achieving students would have been the same in treated and untreated high schools absent the programs. This assumption may be strong due to the fact that the treated schools are highly selected. In order to make this assumption more credible, we construct a "trimmed common support" group using the rich information we have about the demographics and college-sending patterns of each high school in Texas prior to 1999 combined with information on the criteria UT-Austin and Texas A\&M say they used to select the schools. Our resulting analysis sample is comprised of the set of schools that are more observationally-similar across the treatment and control groups than would be the case if we used all high schools in Texas. This is a feasible identification strategy because much of the targeting for these programs was based on geography. We also show evidence of common trends in flagship enrollment prior to the treatments, and we find little evidence of demographic shifts among students due to the treatments.

The results of our analysis suggest that the LOS and CS programs had large effects on the
likelihood students enrolled in a flagship, with somewhat larger impacts for the LOS program. Enrollment at UT-Austin increases by $58 \%$ and Texas A\&M enrollment increases by $49 \%$ among high achieving college attendees from treated schools relative to those in observationally similar untreated schools. These enrollment increases came from both reduced enrollment at twoyear schools and less-selective four-year universities, which suggests these treatments increased college quality substantially for students. Further, we find evidence that many students switched from two-year to four-year schools other than UT-Austin and TAMU, and thus the programs generated spillover effects to students who did not attend the flagships. Notably, we find little impact on the likelihood of enrolling in any public school in Texas, which supports our focus on a sample of college attendees.

Our estimates consistently indicate that students from schools treated by the LOS program benefit from large increases in a range of life outcomes. Exposure to the LOS program increases the likelihood of high-achieving college attendees graduating with a four-year degree in six years by 3.5 percentage points. We also show that the LOS program did not lead high achieving students to major in less-technical subjects. In particular, there is no change in STEM majoring. These findings suggest that the extra academic support services were sufficient to overcome any academic mismatch effects. The LOS program increased earnings substantially: high-achieving college attendees in LOS high schools experienced a $4 \%$ increase in earnings 10+ years post-high school. Attributing all of this increase to the LOS treatment indicates that the LOS program led to a doubling of earnings among treated students. We also find that men and women were affected differently by the LOS program. Women experienced a larger increase in enrollment at UT, while the earnings effects are much larger among men. Male earnings increased by $7.4 \%$ 10-years after high school due to the LOS program.

For the CS program, we do not find any statistically significant effects on 6 -year college graduation, although the point estimates are negative and there is some evidence of longer time to degree. We also find little evidence that the CS program increased earnings. While the enrollment effects are largest among men, male earnings do not increase as a result of the CS program. It is somewhat surprising that the CS and LOS programs have such different effects. We argue this difference is likely driven by two factors. First, the LOS program led
to a much larger change in school quality because it caused students to switch from two-year schools to UT-Austin. The enrollment effects of the CS program were driven predominantly by students who otherwise would have attended less-selective four-year schools. Second, the LOS program was larger in scope and the academic support services were more intensive. All students attending UT-Austin from an LOS school received the academic support services, in contrast to the CS program that limited services to scholarship recipients. The LOS support services were much more academically-focused than in CS as well.

Our analysis cannot determine how much of the impacts we find are due to the change in school quality or the provision of supports and financial aid. We interpret our estimates as telling us whether a program that provides a full package of academic and social supports for low-income students who otherwise would not attend the flagships can successfully improve educational and labor market outcomes. Our results suggest that, if the program induces these "marginal" students to attend, they are more likely to succeed than at lower-quality institutions where they would, arguably, get less support. This finding provides evidence that attending a higher-quality school can generate substantial economic improvements for low-income and relatively high-ability students, provided they receive sufficient assistance while enrolled to offset their lack of preparation. Second, the LOS and CS programs are easily replicable beyond Texas. The pillars of the program - targeted recruitment, mentoring, special classes and financial assistance - are within the tool sets of flagship institutions in any state. The different effects of the LOS and CS programs, however, highlight the importance of understanding how the design features of these types of programs translate into student outcomes.

## 2 The Longhorn Opportunity and Century Scholars Programs

### 2.1 Program Description

The Longhorn Opportunity Scholars and Century Scholars Programs were first implemented in 1999 and 2000, respectively, to increase enrollment rates for low-income and minority students at UT-Austin and Texas A\&M in the wake of the state's affirmative action ban. The affirmative action ban went into effect in 1997 and made it illegal for schools in the state to consider race as a factor in admissions. The pre-existing affirmative action system was replaced by the Texas

Top $10 \%$ Rule in 1998, which stipulated that any student in the top $10 \%$ of his or her high school class could attend any Texas public university. ${ }^{5}$ Post-1997, the vast majority of students in UT-Austin and Texas A\&M were admitted under this rule. As a result of the Top $10 \%$ rule, during the period we study students ranked outside the top 10 percent of their class at high schools serving low-income students were very unlikely to enroll in UT-Austin or Texas A\&M.

Despite the fact that many students from low-income schools became eligible to attend Texas A\&M and UT-Austin under this rule, minority enrollment at these colleges fell dramatically (Kain, O'Brien and Jargowsky 2005). In response to these declines, the LOS and CS programs were developed to try to recruit students from low-SES backgrounds to the state flagships and to support their academic success whole enrolled. The LOS program targeted 70 high schools in Houston, Dallas, San Antonio, El Paso, Beaumont and Laredo that had high shares of low-income and minority students and few prior applicants to UT-Austin. The CS program similarly targeted 70 low-income schools in Houston, Dallas and San Antonio with few prior applicants to Texas A\&M. There was some overlap between the two programs, with students from several high schools being eligible for both programs. Over 600 students are admitted to Texas A\&M and UT-Austin under these programs each year. Figures 1 and 2 show the geographic distribution of LOS and CS schools in our estimation sample, respectively; they are mostly located in the large urban centers in the state and hence the focus of these programs is on the urban poor. That these interventions are isolated to specific cities in Texas means it is likely that we will be able to find similar schools throughout the state that are untreated to form our control group.

Though administered by different universities, the two programs are similar and are summed up best by the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship Brochure:

More than simply a scholarship, the program serves as the catalyst for the creation of a comprehensive academic community development package with a three-fold aim: to identify students who, through a variety of circumstances, might not have otherwise had either the opportunity or the desire to attend The University; to deploy University resources to attract them to Austin; and most importantly, to give these students the resources and attention that will help them to succeed academically and ultimately become alumni of The University of Texas at Austin.
while Texas A\&M describes the century scholar program as follows:

[^3]The Century Scholars Program is more than just a monetary award; it offers students access to a first-rate education and programs that prepare students to become state, national, and world leaders. The Century Scholars Program offers academic support and hands-on contact with advisors, mentorships with faculty, freshman seminar course that focuses on academic and personal success, campus involvement, community engagement, and civic responsibility, and opportunities to serve as a Century Scholars Ambassadors. Century Scholars receive professional training in public speaking, interviewing, and presentation skills. The students may return to their former high schools to share their experiences and help continue the Texas A $\mathcal{G} M$ tradition of excellence. These skills are highly valued by any future employer, professional school, or graduate program. ${ }^{6}$

There are several consistent properties across the programs that make them worth investigating together:

1. Most students are given additional financial aid if they enroll in the flagship school.
2. There is an active recruiting effort made at targeted high schools to try and overcome any information barriers about cost, the likelihood of admission, and the value of attending a higher-quality school that may have existed. Recruitment occurs through both university staff and students who have gone through the programs. These students thus could address issues pertaining to academic and social mismatch directly.
3. Once enrolled, the LOS and CS students are given access to academic support services. Furthermore, the LOS and CS programs establish formal enrolled student and alumni communities that offer support, guidance, and resources to low-income students.

Despite these similarities, there are two substantive differences across the programs that could lead them to have different effects on student outcomes. The first is the scope of the programs. For LOS, initially the plan was to only offer services to students who received financial support from the program, restricted to a maximum number of scholarships per high school. However, in practice they allowed all enrolled students from targeted schools to receive program services (but not the scholarship money). Furthermore, an administrator of the LOS program informed us that students who did not qualify for LOS scholarship money directly usually qualified for other scholarships. For CS, students from targeted high schools only receive the academic support services if they are awarded the scholarship money. Students also must maintain a minimum GPA in order to keep their CS fellowship. That more students

[^4]received academic support services under the LOS program suggests that the LOS program effects could be larger than any CS effects.

The second difference between the programs is in the type of academic support services offered. Under the LOS program, students were offered extensive support, including guaranteed spaces in residence halls, free tutoring, and peer mentoring. In addition, the LOS program had students enroll in small sections of core classes, such as Introductory Chemistry and Economics, exclusively for LOS students. Instructors for these sections taught the same content but could tailor the instruction to recognize that the students were coming from disadvantaged backgrounds and likely had a lower baseline set of skills than the average first-year student. The academic support services in the CS program were much less extensive and entailed faculty mentoring (in lieu of peer mentoring) as well as professional training in public speaking, interviewing and presentation skills. The different types of academic services offered under the LOS and CS programs could plausibly generate different impacts of the programs.

These interventions could influence several important postsecondary outcomes and earnings in ambiguous directions that point to the need for an empirical analysis. In particular, we might expect the LOS/CS programs to have a positive effect on student outcomes because of the overall positive effects of college quality on educational attainment and earnings (e.g., Andrews, Li and Lovenheim, forthcoming; Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 2010; Hoekstra 2009; Black and Smith 2004, 2006; Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg 1999). ${ }^{7}$ The LOS/CS programs should increase the likelihood that students enroll in UT-Austin and Texas A\&M. Indeed, in interviews with ten freshmen recipients of the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship, Bhagat (2004) finds that the financial, social, and academic supports offered by LOS were the primary reasons that students selected the University of Texas at Austin, suggesting that the programs had positive effects on enrolling. This is consistent with the evidence in Domina (2007) and Andrews, Ranchhod and Sathy (2010) of higher flagship enrollment after the LOS/CS program implementation among students in treated high schools. Outside of the flagships, the other options for these students typically are worse in terms of the quality and resource levels of the institution, including attending lower-quality four-year schools, attending a two-year college or

[^5]not attending college at all. Domina (2007) shows that while students in LOS/CS schools were more likely to enroll in a flagship, they were just as likely to attend a non-selective four-year school after the treatment was implemented. This finding suggests that the alternative for most of these students is a two year school or no college at all. We examine the enrollment effects of these programs directly below using richer and more comprehensive data on enrollment than were used in this prior work. Our results suggest a more nuanced story that differs across LOS and CS treatments.

Due to the increased flagship enrollment driven by the LOS and CS programs, they likely led to a substantial increase in college quality for treated students. To provide some context, USNews and World Report ranks UT-Austin as the $58^{\text {th }}$ and TAMU as the $68^{\text {th }}$ best national universities. The next highest public institutions in the state are UT-Dallas ranked 145, Texas Tech ranked 156, and University of Houston at 186. Table 1 provides information on selectivity and resources of Texas public institutions. The table compares University of Texas at Austin and Texas A\&M to "emerging research universities" (ERUs) and other four-year schools. ${ }^{8}$ The means in the table show that both flagships are substantially more selective than the ERUs and other 4-year institutions as measured by SAT scores of incoming students. The flagships also spend substantially more per-student, have lower student-faculty ratios, higher graduation rates and higher retention rates.

The ambiguity in predicted impacts of the programs arises because of potential tension between overall college quality effects and the potential for academic "mismatch" that can occur when students of lower academic preparation are brought into a more demanding educational environment. ${ }^{9}$ The students affected by the LOS and CS programs tend to be high-achievers in their high schools, but because they come from low-income schools they still may be underprepared for the rigors of a flagship university. Indeed, this is the reason that the programs offer academic support services. If the LOS/CS programs induce students to enroll in schools in which they are mismatched, they could lower these students' degree attainment, persistence,

[^6]and future earnings. They also could shift these students to easier, potentially less lucrative majors. Nonetheless, the LOS and CS programs provide a system of social and academic supports that potentially mitigate the experience of mismatch.

As a result of these conflicting theoretical impacts, a priori it is not possible to determine the net effect of the targeted recruitment programs. The success or failure of these programs must be determined empirically, and the fact that the theoretical predictions are ambiguous makes it critical for policy to examine empirically their effects on student educational and labor market outcomes in order to determine whether or not the LOS/CS models are an appropriate way to stimulate higher attainment rates among low-income students at elite colleges and universities. These arguments underscore the importance of conducting a rigorous analysis that can identify the effects of these targeted recruitment programs on students.

### 2.2 Prior Literature

While, to our knowledge, no prior work exists that examines the impact of this type of multifaceted treatment aimed at addressing the multiple disadvantages faced by students from low-income backgrounds at selective higher education institutions, there are several important studies that have examined programs that contain individual components of the CS and LOS treatments. In particular, prior work has examined the impacts of college outreach programs and financial aid, with very little research being done on targeted college services. An important contribution of our analysis stems from the fact that it may not be enough to merely address one of the disadvantages faced by low-income students. Instead, to increase the postsecondary attainment of such students, particularly at highly-selective schools, it may be necessary to provide interventions that simultaneously affect a range of student disadvantages. Our study is the first to provide evidence on this type of broad intervention.

Previous research on college outreach programs has not found strong evidence they increase student academic outcomes. Using National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS:88) data, Domina (2009) studies the effect of being exposed to a college outreach program that provides information on the college application process and, in some cases, tutoring support and college counseling services for high school students. Domina reports that about $5 \%$ of students
in the NELS:88 sample are exposed to such a program. Using propensity score matching techniques, he finds little evidence that exposure to an outreach program influences high school achievement or college enrollment. In a randomized controlled trial of Upward Bound, Myers et al. (2004) find largely the same results, except for a positive four-year college enrollment effect.

These studies do not examine the impact on college quality other than the four-year/2-year margin. However, a major effect of the type of college outreach embedded in the CS/LOS programs might be to influence students to attend a flagship rather than a non-flagship school. There is some evidence that college outreach can positively influence the quality of schools to which students apply and enroll. Hoxby and Turner (2013) conduct a randomized controlled trial in which they send detailed information to high-achieving, low-income students throughout the United States on college enrollment strategies as well as information about selective schools and their likelihood of admission. They also include application fee waivers. Their findings suggest that simply providing these high-achieving, low-income students with information about their probabilities of admission to different tiers of schools and expected costs has significant effects on the types of colleges and universities to which these students apply and attend. The LOS and CS programs provide similar information and recruiting techniques, and they thus could have large effects on the school choices made by students in the targeted high schools.

Our proposed research also relates to a body of work examining the effect of financial aid on student collegiate choices and outcomes. Evidence from state merit aid programs that offer free or highly-reduced tuition to in-state students who attend a public institution suggest these programs are successful at altering the college enrollment decisions of high-achieving students (Cohodes and Goodman 2014; Cornwell, Mustard and Sridhar 2006; Dynarski 2000). However, these programs do not tend to increase students' academic performance in college and even may reduce it because they induce many students to enroll in lower-resource schools than they otherwise would have (Cohodes and Goodman 2014; Fitzpatrick and Jones 2012; Sjoquist and Winters 2012).

Importantly, the LOS and CS programs should have the opposite college quality effect to what has been found in the merit aid literature. The likely alternative for these students is
a less-selective and lower-resource state university, community college or no college at all. ${ }^{10}$ UT-Austin and Texas A\&M-College Station have much higher per-student expenditures, lower student-faculty ratios and significantly higher 6 -year graduation rates (Table 1). In addition, both flagships have student bodies with higher measured pre-collegiate academic ability relative to other public colleges and universities in Texas, as measured by the SAT score. Any resulting peer effects, therefore, may play a role in driving the education differences across these schools and could have a positive impact on LOS/CS students (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2006; Zimmerman 2003; Sacerdote 2001).

A sizable body of work has studied the Texas Top $10 \%$ plan, which provides an important institutional backdrop for our analysis. The Top $10 \%$ plan was implemented in 1998 as an alternative to affirmative action. It gave automatic admission to any student in the top $10 \%$ of his or her high school class to any public college or university in Texas. There is a large literature exploring the effect of the Texas Top $10 \%$ plan on enrollment and completion outcomes, especially among minority students. This research tends to find that the Texas Top 10\% plan increases enrollment among high-achieving students at flagship schools (Daugherty, Martorell and McFarlin forthcoming; Niu and Tienda 2010; Domina 2007;), especially those who were in high schools that traditionally did not send many students to these schools (Long and Tienda 2008; Domina 2007). The effects on completion are more ambiguous, with some studies finding a negative effect (Cortes 2010) and some finding no effect (Daugherty, Martorell and McFarlin forthcoming). We discuss in Section 4 how this policy affects our identification strategy.

## 3 Data

The data we use in this study come from three sources: administrative data from the Texas Education Agency (TEA), administrative data from the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB), and quarterly earnings data from the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC). The data are housed at the Texas Schools Project, a University of Texas at Dallas Education Research Center (ERC). These data allow one to follow a Texas student from Pre-Kindergarten

[^7]through college and into the workforce, provided individuals remain in Texas. We discuss each of these data sets in turn. ${ }^{11}$

Beginning in 1992, the TEA began collecting administrative data on all students enrolled in public schools in Texas. These data contain students' grade level, the school in which he or she is enrolled, scores from state standardized tests, and a host of demographic and educational characteristics such as race/ethnicity, gender, special education status, whether the student is eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, whether the student is at risk of dropping out, and enrollment in gifted and talented programs. The test score data we use are from the $11^{\text {th }}$ grade Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) exams for reading, writing and mathematics. The TAAS exams are administered to all students in Texas, and they are "high stakes" in the sense that students must achieve a passing score on them in order to graduate. Because students can retake them, we use the lowest score for each student, which typically corresponds to the score from the first time students take the exam. Although the TEA data begin in 1992, in 1994 Texas redesigned the high school exams. We therefore exclude data from before the 1996 graduating cohorts and use TEA data from the high school classes of 1996-2002.

The LOS/CS programs targeted only high-ability students at each school. Hence, we focus our analysis on the top of the within-school achievement distribution. We estimate the students' academic ability as the first principal component of a factor analysis model that includes $11^{\text {th }}$ grade TAAS scores on mathematics, reading and writing. As argued by Cunha and Heckman (2008) and Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010), combining test scores in a factor model provides a stronger proxy for student academic ability than using any one test score alone. Using this academic ability factor, we rank students in his or her school-specific $11^{\text {th }}$ grade cohort. Andrews, Li and Lovenheim (forthcoming) present evidence that the within-high school rank on these exams is highly correlated with whether one is admitted to a flagship university through the Top $10 \%$ Rule, ${ }^{12}$ which is evidence that the relative rank on these exams is a good proxy for relative academic rank in each high school.

Our higher education data from the THECB contain detailed information about college enrollment and key collegiate outcomes for all students who enroll in a public college or university

[^8]in the State of Texas. For these students, we observe the enrollment decision in every school in each semester, major choice, the timing of all degrees received, and credits earned that we can use to calculate GPAs. The quarterly earnings data from the TWC are from 2007-2012 and contain earnings for every worker in Texas, with the exception of those working for the Federal government or US Postal Service. A core difficulty with measuring earnings is that earnings early in one's career may not be indicative of permanent earnings (Haider and Solon 2006). Because the LOS and CS programs are relatively recent, we are constrained in the length of the post-high school time period over which we can observe earnings. We construct two measures of earnings to provide insight into the role of timing. The first is average log quarterly earnings in all quarters in which earnings are observed six or more years post-high school graduation. The second uses all earnings observations that are at least ten years after high school graduation.

To construct our earnings measure, we take all quarterly earnings observations of $\$ 100$ or more that meet the time criteria ${ }^{13}$ and estimate a regression of $\log$ quarterly earnings on a set of calendar year and quarter-of-year dummies. ${ }^{14}$ We then take the residuals from this regression and calculate the person-specific mean log earnings residual. These earnings residuals can be interpreted as individual-specific average earnings that have been adjusted to account for year and quarter.

A core limitation of our data is that students only are followed if they attend college in Texas and then work in the labor force in Texas post-graduation. The main concern is that the LOS/CS programs induce students who would have attended an out-of-state or private school to move to the in-state flagship. ${ }^{15}$ This would affect the interpretation of our estimates, as it would appear that students are "upgrading" school quality due to the programs while in actuality they are just shifting from a similar out-of-state or private school to a public flagship university. Of course, these students still would receive the academic services once enrolled as well as the scholarship money, but any college quality effects would be muted. Thus, this

[^9]type of sorting likely would lead us to overstate the program impacts, especially if the students induced to switch schools have higher innate ability, desire to attend college, and/or wealth that would generate better college outcomes and earnings.

We address this potential bias in a few ways. First, we note that in the wider population affected by LOS and CS, very few students attend out-of-state or private schools. Indeed, in Texas overall only $18 \%$ of first-time 4 -year college enrollees who were seniors in high school the prior year attend an out-of-state school. While similar statistics for in-state private schools are not available, only $12 \%$ of enrollment in Texas degree granting institutions is in private colleges. Given the low income of students in LOS/CS schools, we would expect these numbers to be far lower for our subpopulation of interest.

Second, and most importantly, we estimate whether the LOS and CS programs have any impact on attending an in-state public school. Thus, the treatment effect is relative to not attending college, attending a 2-year college, attending a private college, or attending an out-of-state college. As we show below, we find little indication that treated students were more likely to be observed in the data. Thus, for the programs to induce private/out-of-state students to move to the flagships, there would have to be an offsetting increase in 2-year school or noncollege attendance by other treated students, which is very unlikely.

In addition to sample selection that can occur at the college choice stage, there can be selection post-college due to migration out of Texas. While it is uncommon for students to move out-of-state after college, it occurs often enough to be of concern. According to the 20082012 American Communities Survey, 2\% of individuals in Texas with a bachelor's or higher degree move to a different state each year. Assuming that this rate is cumulative, then up to $10 \%$ of college graduates may move out of state within 5 years. Of course, this measure is unlikely to be cumulative: those in a cohort with the highest propensity to leave would have already left in earlier years. Additionally, the figures do not break down whether a student gets a degree from an in- or out-of-state school. We would expect the former to have a lower leaving rate. Nonetheless, the figures also are not broken down by age, and so we might expect younger people to be more likely to leave. We note as well that Andrews, Li and Lovenheim (forthcoming) show that earnings of bachelor degree holders in Austin (home of UT-Austin)
and College Station (home of TAMU) who move out-of-state do not differ meaningfully from those who remain in-state. Given this context, we operate primarily under the assumption that any attrition in the earnings data is unrelated to whether one is treated by the CS/LOS program. In support of this assumption, we show that the LOS/CS treatment is uncorrelated with being missing from the earnings data.

## 4 Methodology

Our methodological approach to examining the effect of the LOS/CS programs on student college choice, academic outcomes and labor market earnings is to estimate difference-in-differences models in which we compare changes in outcomes when students are treated to changes among students in schools that are not treated. As discussed above, the LOS and CS programs are most likely to affect higher-ability students. We therefore restrict the analysis to students who are in the top $30 \%$ of their high school class in a given year according to the ability index discussed in Section 3. We focus on the top $30 \%$ of students rather than the top $10 \%$ because our ability index is an imperfect proxy for class rank. The top $30 \%$ of students accurately captures the large majority of groups that are potentially eligible for enrollment in a state flagship from schools in our sample. This is highlighted in Figure 3 which shows enrollment in UT-Austin from LOS targeted schools and in TAMU from CS targeted schools both before and after program implementation. The figure shows that the vast majority of enrollees in the flagships are in the top three deciles of the achievement distribution in those schools. It is also worth noting that the figures show the drastic increase in flagship enrollment from these schools after implementation of the programs. Particularly striking are the increases in the top decile of students which jump from $1.5 \%$ to $7 \%$ for UT and from a little over $2 \%$ to $4 \%$ for TAMU.

We begin with a difference-in-difference model that allows us to identify intention-to-treat effects of the LOS/CS programs:

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i j t}=\alpha+\beta_{1} \text { LOS_School }_{j t}+\beta_{2} \text { CS_School }_{j t}+X_{i j t} \Gamma+\phi_{j}+\theta_{t}+\varepsilon_{i j t}, \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $Y_{i j t}$ is an educational or labor market outcome of interest for student $i$ from high school $j$ who is in $12^{\text {th }}$ grade in year $t$, and $X$ is a vector of individual characteristics such as high school
test scores, race, gender, and free/reduced price lunch status. The model also contains school fixed effects $\left(\phi_{j}\right)$ and year fixed effects $\left(\theta_{t}\right)$. The main treatment variables, LOS_School and $C S \_S c h o o l$, are indicators for whether the graduating cohort in school $j$ and year $t$ is eligible for the LOS or CS programs, respectively.

In equation (1), the main parameters of interest are $\beta_{1}$ and $\beta_{2}$, which show how outcomes change among top $30 \%$ students in LOS/CS schools relative to top $30 \%$ students in untreated schools when the programs are implemented. The main assumption under which $\beta_{1}$ and $\beta_{2}$ are identified is that the counterfactual trends in outcomes among schools not receiving the treatment are the same as those among the treated schools. This identification assumption is potentially strong, especially since the programs are targeted at low-income schools that could have substantially different trends than non-LOS/CS schools absent the treatment.

In order to make this identification assumption more likely to hold, we restrict the analysis schools to the set of high schools with common support amongst key observable characteristics that determine treatment, in particular low prior flagship enrollment and low income levels. Using data from the 1997-1998 school year (which is before either program was implemented but after implementation of the Top $10 \%$ rule), we estimate a probit regression of the likelihood a high school becomes an LOS or CS school as a function of the quadratic polynomials in the following school-level characteristics: percent enrolling in UT-Austin or Texas A\&M, percent taking the SAT or ACT, percent scoring above either 24 on the ACT or 1120 on the math and verbal sections of the SAT ("college ready"), percent economically disadvantaged, percent black, and percent Hispanic. The first three variables account for under-representation at the flagship by measuring how many students are potentially eligible to attend the flagships and how many actually enroll. The last three variables account for the socioeconomic makeup of students in the schools. We estimate this model separately for LOS and CS treatments, and we use this model to calculate a propensity score that shows the likelihood a given high school is treated by each program.

The probit regression estimates are shown in Table 2. For both LOS and CS schools, the strongest explanatory factor is the racial composition: high schools with high black or Hispanic populations are more likely to be treated. For the Longhorn Opportunity Scholars treatment,
the percent taking the SAT also is an important predictor of treatment. Economic disadvantage rates appear to play a role as well, although this measure is only significant for CS schools. Interestingly, despite the universities' stated goal of targeting schools with low prior attendance rates at UT and TAMU, enrollment does not have a statistically significant relationship with treatment. Nonetheless, this is likely due to a high negative correlation between flagship attendance and socio-economic status. Indeed, without conditioning on student demographics, these pre-treatment enrollment rates are strongly related to the likelihood of being selected to be an LOS or CS school.

In order to generate a common support sample that is likely to exhibit similar counterfactual trends, we first drop all treated schools with a predicted treatment likelihood higher than the highest control school and then restrict control schools to have propensity scores greater than 0.05 (there are not treated schools with propensity scores that low). We construct this trimmed analysis sample separately for the LOS treatment and for the CS treatment and then pool the two analytic samples together to estimate equation (1). Thus, our trimmed common support sample is comprised of a set of schools that have broadly similar likelihoods of being treated based on their observable characteristics. ${ }^{16}$ Figure 4 shows the propensity score densities for treated and control schools by likelihood bin, separately for UT-Austin (LOS) and Texas A\&M (CS), respectively. In the figure, we have excluded the large mass of control schools with propensity scores below 0.05 as they dominate the graph if included. Ostensibly, we are excluding a large set of high schools that serve higher-SES students and thus that have no probability of being selected for the LOS/CS treatments. As the figures demonstrate, there also are several treated schools that have a predicted likelihood of treatment that is greater than any control school. These schools are shown in green; they are excluded from the main analysis because they are sufficiently different from any comparison school that it makes the identification assumptions underlying our estimator more difficult to support. We refer to the sample that excludes these very high and low treatment likelihood schools as the "trimmed common support sample."

Tables 3 and 4 provides summary statistics for students in our trimmed common support

[^10]sample and who are in the top $30 \%$ of their high school class as measured by our achievement index. Throughout the study we consider two samples. Our primary focus is a sample that restricts to college attendees as these are the students who are most likely to be impacted by the programs and, as we show below, there appears to be no impact on the college attendance margin. Nonetheless, we also provide estimates for a sample of all high school graduates in the top $30 \%$ of their high school class. Table 3 provides means and standard deviations for student characteristics. The figures are similar regardless of whether we look at the full HS graduate sample or the college attendee sample, which further supports our decision to focus on college attendees. Twenty-four percent of students in the sample attend an LOS high school after implementation and thus are eligible for the program. Eleven percent are eligible for the CS program. Looking at test scores, not surprisingly given our restriction to high achievers, the students tend to score around $90 \%$ correct on all three exam subjects. Looking at demographics, the students are mostly Hispanic - about $70 \%$ - with the rest split relatively evenly between black and white. Students have relatively high rates of gifted and talented classification at $24 \%$ but are equally likely to be at risk of dropping out of high school. Finally, approximately half of the students are economically disadvantaged. ${ }^{17}$ This is a relatively high rate for high school students as eligibility for free and reduced price lunch tends to be underreported amongst this age group. Indeed, in the 2000-01 school year the average economic disadvantage rate in Texas for high school students was $36 \%$.

In Table 4 we provide means and standard deviations for a selection of the outcomes we investigate in this study. First we consider the student's initial college of attendance (hence, we are not accounting for transfers). Amongst this sample of high achieving high school graduates, nearly two-thirds have some post-secondary education at a public institution in Texas. Nonetheless, very few attend the flagships as was evident in Figure 3. Only 5\% of top 30\% graduates from these schools attend either UT or TAMU, accounting for $8 \%$ of all college attendees. A large portion attend emerging research universities or other 4-year schools and almost half of all the college attendees are observed first attending a two-year school. Of those who attend college the choice of major field is spread widely while one-third graduate within six

[^11]years.
A key element in establishing the validity of a difference-in-differences identification strategy is being able to show that exogenous observable characteristics are not affected by the treatment. To address this, in Table 5 we provide balance tests using equation (1), in which we exclude the observable characteristics in $X$ and use each observable shown in the column header as a dependent variable. In Panel A, we focus on college attendees who were in the top $30 \%$ of their high school class using our achievement index, while in Panel B we expand the sample to top $30 \%$ high school graduates. Our preferred sample is the top $30 \%$ of students restricted to college attendees, as this is the group most likely on the margin of treatment. Among these students, there is scant evidence that the observable characteristics of students change when the treatments are enacted. For LOS, there is one coefficient that is significant at the $5 \%$ level, but it is very small, suggesting a 0.6 of a percent increase in TAAS writing scores relative to the mean. Similarly, only black share is statistically significant at the $5 \%$ level for the CS treatment though a couple other estimates are significant at the $10 \%$ level. These indicate that the CS schools saw a slight shift towards lower socio-economic status enrollment relative to the comparison schools. Nonetheless, we view these as likely to be too small to substantially affect our estimates and, if anything, would bias our estimates negatively. Most crucially we do not see any indication of impacts of CS treatment on high school test scores. Estimates for the top $30 \%$ high school graduates are similar and are inconsistent with large changes in the demographic characteristics of schools surrounding treatment that would bias our results.

Given the targeted nature of these programs, it is important to understand what drives the assignment to the treatment conditional on the observables. Returning to Figures 1 and 2 that show the geographic distribution of LOS and CS schools, respectively, as well as the comparison schools we see that much of the treatment variation is geographic: the LOS and CS programs were targeted towards urban high schools in the largest cities in Texas. Thus, there are many observationally-equivalent schools that are not located in these cities that comprise much of the control groups. There are some control schools in these cities as well. However, they tend to be located outside the urban centers and reflect the fact that these programs faced budget constraints that allowed them only to treat a subset of qualifying schools. Figures 1 and

2 suggest that there is plausibly exogenous variation in treatment status based on geography that allows us to identify $\beta_{1}$ and $\beta_{2}$ in equation (1). To take explicit advantage of this, we provide robustness checks below that use only control schools outside of treated areas that are categorically excluded from being treated, as they may form a more credible control group.

The central conditions needed for identification are common to any difference-in-difference model: outcomes in the treated and control schools must be trending similarly prior to treatment and there must not be shocks in 1999-2002 that affected CS/LOS schools differently from the control schools. Our trimmed common support sample makes these assumptions more likely to hold, but it still is important to provide direct evidence on their validity. Thus, we estimate event study models in which we interact indicators for whether a school will ever be treated by the LOS or CS programs with each calendar year and estimate the impacts on flagship enrollment and graduation. This allows us to test explicitly for the existence of differential pre-treatment trends in these outcomes. As we describe in detail below, we find no evidence such trends exist, which supports our empirical strategy. It is more difficult to test for unobserved shocks that differentially impact the treated high schools. Of particular concern is the imposition of the Top $10 \%$ Rule in 1998. As a result of this rule, most admissions to the flagship schools were from the top $10 \%$ of a class. Equation (1) is identified under the assumption that the top $30 \%$ in the treated and control schools are similarly affected by the Top $10 \%$ Plan. This assumption is made more palatable by the use of the trimmed common support sample, since both treated and control schools serve low-SES students with low historical flagship enrollment rates (see Table 3). However, our event study estimates also shed light on any bias from the Top $10 \%$ Plan as this law went into effect in 1998 while the LOS/CS treatments were not rolled out until 1999-2000. We therefore should see effects in 1998 if the Top $10 \%$ Rule is driving our estimates, but as shown below the time pattern of effects much more closely matches the timing of the LOS/CS rollout than the Top 10\% Plan implementation.

Equation (1) is designed to identify intent-to-treat (ITT) parameters. That is, $\beta_{1}$ and $\beta_{2}$ in equation (1) shows the effect of being exposed to the LOS/CS intervention by being in a treated high school (or by being a high-performing student in a treated high school). From
a policy perspective, this is an extremely important parameter because universities cannot compel take-up. In addition, there can be spillover effects onto students who do not receive a LOS/CS scholarship, particularly from the recruitment part of the programs. Thus, from the policymaker's standpoint, the ITT is the most relevant parameter. However, the treatment-on-the-treated effect (TOTE) also is a policy parameter of high interest in this setting. This parameter shows the direct effect of receiving the services and financial benefits associated with these programs, combined with the requisite increase in college quality, on educational and labor market outcomes. However, we face a data limitation in calculating the TOTE driven by the fact that we do not observe who received scholarships. As discussed in Section 2, according to discussions with an LOS program administrator, all students from LOS schools who attended UT-Austin were enrolled in the program. While most, but not all, of the LOS scholars received financial aid through the program, they all had access to the supports and mentoring provided by LOS. Furthermore, most students who did not receive scholarships through LOS were able to receive financial support from other programs at the university above and beyond their Federal grants. It therefore is reasonable to consider all UT-Austin students from LOS high schools to be treated, since they receive at least some of the services under the LOS program. For the CS treatment, it is less clear who received services because the program was much more limited in scope. We proceed under the same assumption for these students, that all Texas A\&M attendees from CS high schools are treated.

This assumption about who is treated should lead us to calculate a lower bound on the TOTE. However, the potential for spillovers to students who do not attend the flagships - that is, the program may have induced some students to increase college quality but not attend the flagships themselves - complicates this interpretation. In the presence of spillovers, some of the impacts on non-flagship students would be applied to flagship attendees rather than attendees of other colleges, thus increasing the estimate. Essentially, this increases the numerator in the Wald estimator without increasing the denominator generating an upwards bias. Given substantial evidence shown below of non-trivial spillover effects in college enrollment behavior, in order to interpret the TOTE estimates we assume that the upwards bias from the increase in college quality for non-flagship attendees is larger than any downwards bias from attributing
full treatment to all flagship attendees from treated schools. This allows us to interpret our TOTE estimates as upper-bounds on the true treatment effects.

To estimate treatment effects on the treated, we use enrollment in UT for a student from an LOS school in the post adoption period as a direct measure of LOS treatment and enrollment in Texas A\&M from a CS high school post adoption as being treated by the CS program. Since the choice to enroll is endogenous, we employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model that instruments LOS enrollment with whether the student attended an LOS high school and CS enrollment with whether the student attended a CS high school. Specifically, we estimate

$$
\begin{align*}
& \text { LOS_student }_{i j t}=\gamma_{0}+\gamma_{1} \text { LOS_School }_{j t}+\gamma_{2} \text { CS_School }_{j t}+X_{i j t} \Omega+\delta_{j}+\nu_{t}+\mu_{i j t}  \tag{2}\\
& \text { CS_student }_{i j t}=\lambda_{0}+\lambda_{1} \text { LOS_School }_{j t}+\lambda_{2} \text { CS_School }_{j t}+X_{i j t} \Omega+\delta_{j}+\nu_{t}+\mu_{i j t}  \tag{3}\\
& Y_{i j t}=\alpha+\beta_{1} \text { LOS_Student }  \tag{4}\\
& i j t \\
&+\beta_{2} \text { CS_Student }_{i j t}+X_{i j t} \Gamma+\phi_{j}+\theta_{t}+\varepsilon_{i j t},
\end{align*}
$$

where LOS_Student ${ }_{i j t}$ equals one if the student attended an LOS high school after the school was identified as LOS and subsequently enrolls in UT-Austin, $C S_{\_} s t u d e n t t_{i j t}$ is a similar indicator for enrolling in a Texas A\&M from a CS high school after the CS program was implemented, and all other variables are as previously defined in equation (1). The parameters $\beta_{1}$ and $\beta_{2}$ in equation (4) are the TOTE estimates that use the roll-out of the LOS and CS programs as instruments for whether a student is treated by the program. The identification assumptions in this model are virtually identical to those underlying equation (1), with the additional condition that $\gamma_{1}$ and $\lambda_{2}$ need to be strongly related to treatment. Because of the difficulties with interpreting these estimates, we focus predominantly on the ITT results, but we show the TOTE estimates as well to provide some context for the magnitudes of the ITT estimates.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Main Results

Estimates of equation (1) using college enrollment outcomes as the dependent variable are shown in Table 6. ${ }^{18}$ In the table, each set of two estimates in a column is from a separate regression. Panel A shows estimates for college attendees and Panel B shows estimates for high school graduates. All estimates shown in Table 6 and throughout the remainder of the paper use the trimmed common support sample and are restricted to the top $30 \%$ of students in their high school class.

In Panel B of the first column of results, we provide estimates of the effect of the CS/LOS treatments on attending a public college in Texas. Recall that we only have data on students who attend public colleges in Texas; if the programs induce students to enter the public university system from other places - such as private schools, out-of-state schools, or from not attending college at all - this could generate a sample selection bias. The estimates in column (1) show no evidence of a change in enrollment in a public Texas 2-year or 4-year college or university due to the CS/LOS programs. The coefficients are small with small standard errors, and they are not statistically significantly different from zero at conventional levels. These results support our focus on the college attendee sample when we examine collegiate outcomes and earnings.

Columns (2) and (3) of Table 6 provide estimates of the impact of attending an LOS or CS high school on enrollment at a flagship. We find an increase in attendance of 2.78 percentage points in UT-Austin due to LOS exposure and an increase of 1.6 percentage points in Texas A\&M enrollment due to CS exposure. Relative to the sample means, these estimates imply an increase in UT-Austin enrollment of $56 \%$ and an increase in Texas A\&M enrollment of $46 \%$. The effects in Panel B are similar, showing significant increases in enrollment in the requisite flagships from both programs. Importantly, in the college attendee sample the CS treatment did not affect enrollment in UT-Austin, nor did LOS treatment affect enrollment in Texas A\&M. This result suggests these programs were not simply moving students across flagship schools, and they are inconsistent with differential secular enrollment trends confounding our estimates,

[^12]as these would likely affect enrollment in both flagships.
As discussed above, a core identification assumption embedded in equation (1) is that the treatment and control schools are trending similarly prior to the treatment rollout. In order to provide evidence in support of this assumption, Figures 5 and 6 show event study estimates of enrolling in UT-Austin and Texas A\&M for the top-30\% college and high school samples, respectively. Across all figures, there is little evidence of a differential upward trend in UTAustin or Texas A\&M enrollment prior to treatment. In both samples, there is a clear increase in flagship enrollment after 1999 among students in treated schools when the LOS and CS programs first began that is not predictable from pre-treatment relative trends. Furthermore, these estimates suggest that the Top $10 \%$ Rule is not a serious confounder in this setup, as there is no apparent increase in 1998 (the first year of the Top $10 \%$ Rule). That is, any differential changes in enrollment between treated and untreated schools start to occur in 2000 after LOS and CS were implemented, not in 1998 when Texas Top $10 \%$ Rule is implemented. Overall, Figures 5 and 6 are consistent with the identification assumptions underlying our difference-indifference approach of common pre-treatment trends or shocks between treatment and control.

Since the LOS/CS programs did not affect the extensive margin of college enrollment and did not shift students across flagship schools, it is important to understand where the changes in enrollment came from. The remainder of Table 6 explores this question. We split nonflagship colleges and universities into 3 sectors: emerging research universities, ${ }^{19}$ other four-year universities, and community colleges. ${ }^{20}$ Although there is some variability across samples, three general patterns emerge. First, much of the increase in UT enrollment for the LOS treatment is driven by declines in two-year enrollment. Thus, the LOS program takes many students who would have enrolled at a local community college and induces them to enroll at UT-Austin. This represents a dramatic increase in college quality for these students. That the LOS treatment shifts students from a two-year to a flagship school is a very important finding given the fact that these students were not given admission help; they were eligible to attend UT-Austin before the LOS program was implemented but chose not to. This finding is consistent with evidence from Hoxby and Avery (2013) that low-income, high-achieving students systematically

[^13]choose less-selective schools than their higher-income counterparts and suggests that programs like the LOS scholarship can successfully get these students to enroll in more-selective schools.

Second, the CS treatment increases flagship enrollment more at the expense of emerging research enrollment than two-year enrollment. Thus, the CS treatment led to a smaller increase in college quality than did the LOS treatment. The third pattern evident in Table 6 is that there are spillovers from the LOS, though not the CS, program to students who do not enroll in flagships, as enrollment in non-flagship four-year schools increases at the expense of 2-year school enrollment. While unexpected, we believe this is a result of the recruitment efforts that UT-Austin made under this program. These recruitment efforts plausibly induced many students to attend a four-year rather than a two-year college, even if they could not get into or chose not to attend UT-Austin. ${ }^{21}$ The increased four-year non-flagship enrollment suggests that TOTE estimates will overstate the effect of treatment from receiving the LOS treatment, as it will attribute outcome changes from some students were ineligible for the LOS program but whose outcomes were impacted by the recruitment efforts.

Thus far, our results indicate that students in LOS and CS schools experienced a substantial increase in college quality by shifting from lower-resource public schools to UT-Austin and Texas A\&M. The prior literature on the educational returns to college quality suggest that these interventions should lead to higher BA receipt (Cohodes and Goodman 2014; Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 2010). In Table 7, we examine how the LOS and CS programs affected four- and six-year degree completion. The structure of the table is almost identical to that of Table 5, except here we provide both ITT and TOTE estimates in each panel. First, we examine first-year GPA to see whether students are performing better or worse when they attend a more-selective school. The effects are of opposite sign across programs, with those coming from LOS high schools experiencing an increase of 0.11 GPA points and GPAs among students from CS schools declining by 0.08 points.

The different effects of the LOS and CS programs on first-year GPA are similar to the differences in program effects on BA completion. In the college attendee sample, there is

[^14]a large, statistically significant effect on six-year graduation of 3.7 percentage points. This is a $11.1 \%$ increase relative to the mean for this group. In contrast, the CS treatment has a negative effect on the four-year graduation rate that is substantially attenuated and statistically insignificant by six years. Thus, the CS program leads to a delay in graduation and it may also decrease graduation rates slightly. However, both programs increase the likelihood that students graduate from the respective flagship university. We hypothesize that the different graduation and grade point effects across treatments relates to the scope of the two different programs as well as the fact that the LOS program led to a much larger change in college quality than CS. Alternatively, as we will show below, the CS program appeared to induce a shift towards students choosing more difficult majors which could also drive down on-time completion and grades. Figures 7 and 8 present event study estimates that are consistent with these results. Critically, as in Figures 5 and 6, there is no evidence in these figures of differential pre-treatment trends that could bias the estimates in Table 7.

The TOTE estimates in Table 7, particularly for the LOS treatment, show that the reduced form effect on six-year graduation rates is enormous relative to the first stage. Being treated by the LOS program increases the likelihood of BA receipt by 60.6 percentage points in the college attendee sample and by 100 percentage points in the high school graduate sample. The estimate of one is an outgrowth of our use of a linear probability model for ease of interpretation and the fact that these are likely upper bounds. Consistent with the ITT results, there is no evident increase, and perhaps even a decline, in six-year graduation among those treated by the CS program. Across samples, the first stages are universally well-powered, with first-stage F-statistics well above $10 .{ }^{22}$ Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that when these lowincome students from disadvantaged backgrounds are induced to attend a high-quality flagship, their educational outcomes improve or, at least in the case of TAMU, do not significantly worsen. This finding runs counter to what one would expect if the students are academically mismatched to the more demanding educational environment and is consistent with there being a large positive effect of college quality on the likelihood of completing college. It is important to emphasize, though, that this is not a test of mismatch as the students attending these

[^15]colleges are also receiving enhanced academic services. One policy-relevant interpretation of these results is that these academic services are more than sufficient to overcome any academic mismatch faced by the treated students.

Another prediction of mismatch theory is that under-prepared students will gravitate to easier majors when they are overmatched. If anything we find the opposite pattern. In Table 8, we examine whether enrolling in the CS or LOS programs induces students to alter their chosen course of study. We focus in this table on the student's "final major," which is either the major at graduation or the last observed major for students who do not graduate from a public Texas college by the end of our sample period. ${ }^{23}$ Table 8 shows that for LOS, students are more likely to major in arts and humanities and are less likely to major in "other" subjects. This other category is comprised of education along with mainly vocational and technical support majors, and thus these major changes reflects the fact that students are switching out of two-year and less-selective four-year schools. Importantly, there is no negative effect on STEM majoring for the LOS program. Hence, at worst we can say that LOS students are not taking easier majors than they would have otherwise.

For the CS program we see a substantial shift from "other" to arguably more difficult majors, in particular STEM and social sciences. Communications and arts and humanities increase as well, but not at the expense of the more technical majors. Hence, on average, CS students choose more technically demanding majors which could provide some explanation for the longer time-to-degree and lower initial grades.

These are particularly important findings because of the growing evidence that mismatch leads to students shifting to easier majors (Arcidiacono, Aucejo and Hotz 2013; Arcidiacono, Aucejo and Spenner 2012). We find little evidence to support such mismatch effects here for high achievers. On net, students' major choice is not highly affected by the LOS program and CS, if anything, leads students to choose harder majors. That students are not majoring in easier subjects but are attending more elite schools and graduating at higher rates suggests the programs led to large increases in human capital accumulation. ${ }^{24}$

The large returns to college quality (Andrews, Li and Lovenheim forthcoming; Hoekstra

[^16]2009; Black and Smith 2004, 2006; Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg 1999) combined with the suggestive evidence of larger returns to more technical majors (Andrews, Li and Lovenheim, forthcoming; Altonji, Blom and Meghir 2012; Arcidiacono 2004) suggest that the LOS and CS interventions should raise earnings after college. In Table 9, we examine the effect of these programs on earnings, using the adjusted log quarterly earnings measures discussed in Section 3. In the first two columns, we examine whether being in an LOS or CS high school affected the likelihood that one appears in the earnings data. The estimates are close to zero and are precisely estimated, suggesting treatment does not cause a sample selection problem.

In the remaining columns of Table 9, we show both short-term and medium-term effects using all earnings after 6 and 10 years post high school graduation. Arguably, given that many students take more than 6 years to complete college and may attend graduate school, the $10+$ year results should be more reflective of lifetime earnings. Both sets of estimates show large effects of the LOS program on earnings. Being in an LOS high school increases earnings after 6 years by $3.8 \%$ and after 10 years by $4.3 \%$. These estimates translate into very large TOTE effects: among the top $30 \%$ of college attendees, being treated by the LOS program increases earnings after 6 years by up to $88 \%$ and earnings after 10 years by as much as $107 \%{ }^{25}$ The large size of these estimates is consistent with the dramatic shift in college quality and the sizable increase in the likelihood of graduating from college. The results among top- $30 \%$ high school graduates are qualitatively similar but are smaller and less precise. This occurs because there is far more earnings variance among the high school sample, and the proportion of students who are on the margin of treatment is smaller. We therefore favor the college attendee sample of high ability students. In contrast to the LOS estimates, there appears to be less earnings gains from the CS program. The ITT estimates are relatively small and statistically insignificant at $2.1 \%$ after 6 years and $0.7 \%$ after 10 for the college attendee samples. Nonetheless, the TOTE estimates, while also statistically insignificant, are suggestive of positive earnings effects of up to $69 \%$ are, at least, inconsistent with negative earnings impacts. Overall, these results indicate that the LOS program had very large, positive effects on the long-run labor market outcomes of the targeted low-SES students while the effects of the CS program are less clear, but unlikely to be negative.

[^17]
### 5.2 Geography Robustness Check

As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the treatment designation had a strong geographic component. It therefore is possible that the untreated schools outside of the treated areas form a better control group, since they are ineligible for treatment due to arguably exogenous reasons. That is, control schools in treated areas may be more problematic because in those areas UT and TAMU made decisions about which schools to treat and thus the untreated schools may differ from treated on dimensions observed by UT and TAMU but not by us. It is unlikely that the flagships made decisions about which cities to treat, however, based on the characteristics of schools outside of the treated areas.

To take advantage of this geographically induced variation, in Table 10 we present estimates of equation (1) that exclude all control schools in in the same school district as a treated school. For the sake of brevity, we only show ITT estimates. The estimates are quite similar to our baseline estimates and the small reduction in sample sizes shows that most of our comparison schools in the baseline model are from districts not targeted by LOS/CS anyway. Further, the estimates generally become slightly more positive indicating that any bias generated by using comparison schools in the same districts as the treated schools leads us to underestimate the impacts of these programs.

### 5.3 Estimates by Gender

Since men and women attend college at different rates and have different labor force participation rates, it is instructive to examine effects by gender. Table 11 shows ITT estimates for men and women separately for the top $30 \%$ college attendee sample. The LOS and CS treatments increased flagship enrollment among both men and women, although the estimate for female enrollment at Texas A\&M is not statistically significant. Men were more responsive to the CS program and women to the LOS program in their enrollment behavior. Both groups exhibited a decline in two-year enrollment from the LOS treatment, although for women it was not statistically significant at conventional levels. The LOS program also increased 6-year BA attainment among men and women. The CS treatment had a negative effect on attainment for men and no effect for women.

The starkest differences in program effects come when examining earnings. Among men, the LOS treatment increased earnings substantially, with an ITT effect of over $7 \%$ that is statistically significant at the $5 \%$ level. There is no CS effect. In contrast, the LOS program estimates for earnings among women are much smaller at $1 \%$ to $2 \%$ and are not statistically differentiable from zero. This is despite the fact that the UT-Austin enrollment effect is much larger among women than men. Hence, even though women attended UT-Austin at higher rates and were more likely to obtain BA degrees, the earnings effects of the LOS program are concentrated amongst men. There is some evidence that women in CS high schools experienced earnings increases as well, with positive coefficients that are similar in size to the LOS estimates. However, as with the LOS results, the estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero. Overall, these results show that the earnings effects were most prevalent among men for the LOS program, although both men and women experienced increases in college quality and BA attainment rates.

## 6 Conclusion

Persistent increases in the college wage premium combined with sluggish growth in collegiate attainment, particularly among students from low-income backgrounds, make it of first-order importance to understand what policies can reduce attainment gaps in higher education across the socioeconomic distribution. Given the evidence of the educational and labor market returns to college quality as well as the low enrollment rates among low-income students at elite schools, policies designed to raise enrollment rates of disadvantaged students at high-quality colleges have the potential to reduce these disparities. We study two examples of such policies in Texas, the Longhorn Opportunity and Century Scholars programs, which were designed to address the multitude of disadvantages faced by low-income students in higher education: information, tuition subsidies, and academic support once enrolled. These programs were targeted at schools that served large numbers of low-income students and that did not historically send many students to University of Texas at Austin (LOS) or Texas A\&M University (CS).

We combine the timing of the implementation of the LOS and CS programs with detailed administrative data from K-12 records, higher education records and earnings as long as workers
remain in Texas and attend a public university. We implement a set of difference-in-difference estimators using a trimmed common support sample of treated and comparison schools that compare how the enrollment behavior, educational outcomes and earnings of high-ability students change when the programs are implemented in targeted high schools in 1999 and 2000.

Our estimates suggest that these types of bundled interventions can generate better outcomes among targeted students. Both the LOS and CS programs induced many students to enroll in UT-Austin and Texas A\&M instead of lower-resource four-year and two-year institutions. This shift towards the flagship provided a large quality upgrade relative to the schools the students would have attended in the absence of the program. High-achieving students affected by the LOS program saw large and statistically significant increases in graduation likelihood, and we find no evidence of academic mismatch in the form of students switching to "easier" majors. We find no statistically significant effect of CS treatment on the likelihood of graduating from college, however. College students from LOS high schools experienced a large increase in earnings, and our upper-bound treatment on the treated results indicate earnings may have doubled for those who received the LOS treatment. For the CS program, earnings estimates are positive but not statistically significant.

The differences in outcomes between these programs have two likely explanations. First is that while we see no impact from LOS on students entering more technically advanced majors like STEM and social sciences, we do see increases in majoring in these fields from the CS program. Hence the increased difficulty of the fields entered for CS students may have reduced completion. The second explanation is that the services provided by the LOS program were more comprehensive and included special course sections, guaranteed housing, and free tutoring. These or similar services were not provided by the CS program. Even so, despite the longer time-to-degree it is encouraging that we see little to indicate that the CS program reduced earnings.

The results from this analysis suggest that programs like the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship hold much promise in promoting better postsecondary and labor market outcomes among high-ability, low-income students. Furthermore, while it is unclear if the students treated by the program are actually "undermatched" for the state flagships, the results suggest that mismatch
problems can be overcome with sufficient support services. Crucially, programs like these and the supports they provide can easily be replicated in any state flagship institution. The estimates for the Century Scholar program, however, provides a cautious note as it is not automatic that such a program will succeed in affecting postsecondary and labor market outcomes. More work focusing on the specific ways in which these programs were implemented and the implications for effectiveness would be of high value in order to better understand how to structure these programs to maximize their positive effects on students.

## References

[1] Altonji, Joseph G., Erica Blom and Costas Meghir. 2012. "Heterogeneity in Human Capital Investments: High School Curriculum, College Major, and Careers." NBER Working Paper No. 17985.
[2] Andrews, Rodney J., Jing Li and Michael F. Lovenheim. Forthcoming. "Quantile Treatment Effects of College Quality on Earnings." Journal of Human Resources.
[3] Andrews, Rodney J., Jing Li and Michael F. Lovenheim. 2014. "Heterogeneous Paths Through College: Detailed Patterns and Relationships with Graduation and Earnings." Economics of Education Review 42: 93-108.
[4] Andrews, Rodney J., Vimal Ranchhod, and Viji Sathy. 2010. "Estimating the Responsiveness of College Applications to the Likelihood of Acceptance and Financial Assistance: Evidence from Texas." Economics of Education Review 29(1): 104-115.
[5] Arcidiacono, Peter. 2004. "Ability Sorting and the Returns to College Major." Journal of Econometrics 121(1-2): 343-375.
[6] Arcidiacono, Peter, Esteban Aucejo, Hanming Fang, and Ken Spenner. 2011. "Does Affirmative Action Lead to Mismatch? A New Test and Evidence." Quantitative Economics 2(3): 303-333.
[7] Arcidiacono, Peter, Esteban Aucejo, and Ken Spenner. 2011. "What Happens After Enrollment? An Analysis of the Time Path of Racial Differences in GPA and Major Choice." IZA Journal of Labor Economics 1(5).
[8] Arcidiacono, Peter, Esteban M. Aucejo and V. Joseph Hotz. 2013. "University Differences in the Graduation of Minorities in STEM Fields: Evidence from California." NBER Working Paper No. 18799.
[9] Arcidiacono, Peter and Cory Koedel. 2014. "Race and College Success: Evidence from Missouri." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 6(3): 20-57.
[10] Arcidiacono, Peter and Michael F. Lovenheim. Forthcoming. "Affirmative Action and the Quality-Fit Tradeoff." Journal of Economic Literature.
[11] Autor, David H. "Skills, Education, and the Rise of Earnings Inequality Among the 'Other 99 Percent'." Science 344(6186): 843-851.
[12] Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz and Melissa S. Kearney. 2008. "Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists." Review of Economics and Statistics 90(2): 300-323.
[13] Bailey, Martha J. and Susan M. Dynarski. 2011. "Inequality in Postsecondary Education." In G.J. Duncan and R.J. Murnane (eds.), Whither Opportunity? Rising Inequality, Schools, and Children's Life Chances. Russell Sage: New York, New York.
[14] Bettinger, Eric. "How Financial Aid Affects Persistence." In C.M. Hoxby (ed.), College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay for it. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
[15] Bettinger, Eric P, Bridgett Terry Long, Philip Oreopoulos, and Lisa Sonbonmatsu. 2012. "The Role of Application Assistance and Information in College Decisions: Results from the H\&R Block Fafsa Experiment." Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(3): 1205-1242.
[16] Bhagat, Geeta Srinivasan. 2004. "The Relationship between factors that Influence College Choice and Persistence in Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship Recipients at The University of Texas at Austin." Doctoral Dissertation at the University of Texas at Austin.
[17] Black, Dan A. and Jeffrey A. Smith. 2004. "How Robust is the Evidence on the Effects of College Quality? Evidence from Matching." Journal of Econometrics 121(1-2): 99-124.
[18] Black, Dan A. and Jeffrey A. Smith. 2006. "Estimating the Returns to College Quality with Multiple Proxies for Quality." Journal of Labor Economics 24(3): 701-728.
[19] Bound, John, Michael F. Lovenheim and Sarah E. Turner. 2010. "Why Have College Completion Rates Declined? An Analysis of Changing Student Preparation and Collegiate Resources." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2(3): 129-157.
[20] Bound, John, Michael F. Lovenheim and Sarah E. Turner. 2012. "Increasing Time to Baccalaureate Degree in the United States." Education Finance and Policy 7(4): 375-424.
[21] Brewer, Dominic J., Eric R. Eide and Ronald G. Ehrenberg. 1999. "Does It Pay to Attend an Elite Private College? Cross-Cohort Evidence on the Effects of College Type on Earnings." Journal of Human Resources 34(1): 104-123.
[22] Cameron, Stephen V. and Christopher Taber. 2004. "Estimation of Educational Borrowing Constraints Using Returns to Schooling." Journal of Political Economy 112(1): 132-182.
[23] Carneiro, Pedro and James J. Heckman. 2002. "The Evidence on Credit Constraints in Post-Secondary Schooling." The Economic Journal 112(482): 705-734.
[24] Cohodes, Sarah and Joshua S. Goodman. 2014. "Merit Aid, College Quality, and College Completion: Massachusetts' Adams Scholarship as an In-Kind Subsidy." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 6(4): 251-283.
[25] Cornwell, Christopher, David B. Mustard, and Deepa J. Sridhar. 2006. "The Enrollment Effects of MeritBased Financial Aid: Evidence from Georgia's HOPE Program." Journal of Labor Economics 24(4): 761-786.
[26] Cortes, Kalena E. "Do Bans on Affirmative Action Hurt Minority Students? Evidence from the Texas Top 10\% Plan." Economics of Education Review 29(6): 1110-1124.
[27] Cunha, Flavio and James J. Heckman. 2008. "Formulating, Identifying and Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation." Journal of Human Resources 43(4): 738-782.
[28] Cunha, Flavio, James J. Heckman and Susanne M. Schennach. 2010. "Estimating the Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive Skill Formation." Econometrica 78(3): 883-931.
[29] Dale, Stacey Berg and Alan B. Krueger, 2014. "Estimating the Return to College Selectivity over the Career Using Administrative Earnings Data." Journal of Human Resources 49(2): 323-358.
[30] Dale, Stacey Berg and Alan B. Krueger, 2002. "Estimating the Payoff to Attending A More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables." Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4): 1491-1527.
[31] Daugherty, Lindsay, Francisco Martorell and Isaac McFarlin, Jr. Forthcoming. "Percent Plans, Automatic Admissions, and College Enrollment Outcomes." IZA Journal of Labor Economics.
[32] Dillon, Eleanor Wiske and Jeffrey Andrew Smith. 2013. "The Determinants of Mismatch Between Students and Colleges." NBER Working Paper No. 19286.
[33] Domina, Thurston. 2007. "Higher Education Policy as Secondary School Reform: Texas Public High Schools after Hopwood." Education Evaluation and Policy Analysis 29(3): 200-217.
[34] Domina, Thurston. 2009. "What Works in College Outreach: Assessing Targeted and Schoolwide Interventions for Disadvantaged Students." Education Evaluation and Policy Analysis 31(2): 127-152.
[35] Dynarski, Susan. 2000. "Hope for Whom? Financial Aid for the Middle Class and Its Impact on College Attendance." National Tax Journal 53(3): 629-661.
[36] Dynarski, Susan and Judith Scott-Clayton. 2013. "Financial Aid Policy: Lessons from Research." Future of Children May.
[37] Dynarski, Susan and Judith Scott-Clayton. 2008. "Complexity and Targeting in Federal Student Aid: A Quantitative Analysis." Tax Policy and the Economy 22: 109-150.
[38] Dynarski, Susan and Judith Scott-Clayton. 2006. "The Cost of Complexity in Student Financial Aid: Lessons from Optimal Tax Theory and Behavioral Economics." National Tax Journal 59(2): 319-356.
[39] Fitzpatrick, Maria D. and Damon Jones. 2012. "Higher Education, Merit-Based Scholarships and PostBaccalaureate Migration." NBER Working Paper No. 18530.
[40] Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence F. Katz. 2007. "Long-Run Changes in the Wage Structure: Narrowing, Widening, Polarizing." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2007(2): 135-165.
[41] Hoekstra, Mark. 2009. "The Effect of Attending the Flagship State University on Earnings: A DiscontinuityBased Approach." Review of Economics and Statistics 91(4): 717-724.
[42] Hoxby, Caroline and Christopher Avery. 2013. "The Missing "One-Offs": The Hidden Supply of HighAchieving, Low-Income Students." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Spring: 1-50.
[43] Hoxby, Caroline and Sarah Turner. 2013. "Expanding College Opportunities for High-achieving, Low Income Students." Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 12-014.
[44] Johnson, Matthew T. 2013. "Borrowing Constraints, College Enrollment, and Delayed Entry." Journal of Labor Economics 31(4): 669-725.
[45] Kaine, John F., Daniel M. O'Brien and Paul A. Jargowsky. 2005. "Hopwood and the Top 10 Percent Law: How They Have Affected the College Enrollment Decisions of Texas High School Graduates." Report to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation: http://www.utdallas.edu/research/tsp-erc/pdf/wp kain 2005 hopwood top 10 percent.pdf.
[46] Long, Mark and Marta Tienda. 2008. "Winners and Losers: Changes in Texas University Admissions Post-Hopwood." Education Evaluation and Policy Analysis 30(3): 255-280.
[47] Lovenheim, Michael F. and C. Lockwood Reynolds. 2013. "The Effect of Housing Wealth on College Choice: Evidence from the Housing Boom." Journal of Human Resources 48(1): 1-35.
[48] Myers, David, Rob Olsen, Neil Seftor, Julie Young, and Christina Tuttle. 2004. The Impacts of Regular Upward Bound: Results from the Third Follow-up Data Collection. Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research.
[49] Niu, Sunny Xinchun and Marta Tienda. 2010. "The Impact of the Texas Top Ten Percent Law on College Enrollment: A Regression Discontinuity Approach." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 29(1): 84-110.
[50] Sacerdote, Bruce. 2001. "Peer Effects With Random Assignment: Results For Dartmouth Roommates." Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(2): 681-704.
[51] Sjoquist, David L. and John V. Winters. 2012. "State Merit-based Financial Aid Programs and College Attainment." IZA Discussion Paper No. 6801.
[52] Stinebrickner, Ralph and Todd R. Stinebrickner. 2006. "What Can be Learned about Peer Effects Using College Roommates? Evidence from New Survey Data and Students from Disadvantaged Backgrounds." Journal of Public Economics 90(8-9): 1435-1454.
[53] Stinebrickner, Ralph and Stinebrickner, Todd. 2008. "The Effect of Credit Constraints on the College Drop-Out Decision: A Direct Approach Using a New Panel Study." American Economic Review 98(5): 2163-2184.
[54] Zimmerman, David J. 2003. "Peer Effects in Academic Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." Review of Economics and Statistics 85(1): 9-23.

Figure 1: UT Austin Longhorn Opportunity Scholars and Comparison Schools

## UT Longhorn Opportunity Scholar and Comparison Schools



Figure 2: Texas A\&M Century Scholars and Comparison Schools

## TAMU Century Scholar and Comparison Schools


Figure 3: Flagship Enrollment in LOS/CS Schools Prior to Program Start by Achievement Decile


Figure 4: Distribution of LOS and CS Treatment Probabilities by Treatment Status


Figure 5: Flagship Enrollment Trends by Treatment Status - Top 30\% College Attendees Sample


Figure 6: Flagship Enrollment Trends by Treatment Status - Top 30\% HS Graduates Sample



Figure 7: 6-Year Bachelor Attainment Trends by Treatment Status - Top 30\% College Attendees Sample



Figure 8: 6-Year Bachelor Attainment Trends by Treatment Status - Top 30\% HS Graduates Sample



Table 1: Average Characteristics of Public 4-Year Institutions in Texas

| School Characteristic | UT-Austin | Texas A\&M | Emerging <br> Research | Other <br> 4 -Year |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Max USNews Ranking | 53 | 68 | 145 | NA |
| Graduation Rate | 0.79 | 0.79 | 0.47 | 0.37 |
| Retention Rate | 0.94 | 0.91 | 0.76 | 0.64 |
| Avg Full Prof Salary | $\$ 137,871$ | $\$ 128,367$ | $\$ 122,131$ | $\$ 87,352$ |
| UG Student/Faculty FTE | 14.0 | 17.0 | 22.6 | 21.2 |
| Instr Exp per UG Student | $\$ 19,320$ | $\$ 13,421$ | $\$ 7,880$ | $\$ 6,491$ |
| Acad Support Exp per UG Student | $\$ 5,633$ | $\$ 3,853$ | $\$ 2,865$ | $\$ 2,229$ |
| Student Service Exp per UG Student | $\$ 1,761$ | $\$ 1,914$ | $\$ 1,572$ | $\$ 1,387$ |
| SAT Math $75^{t h}$ Percentile | 710 | 630 | 588 | 519 |
| SAT Reading $75^{t h}$ Percentile | 680 | 610 | 553 | 537 |
| Institutions | 1 | 1 | 7 | 21 |

Means from Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) provided by the US Department of Education. Data is from 2013-14 except expenditure data which is from 2012-13 school year. "Emerging research" universities are institutions declared by state of Texas to be eligible for special funds to increase research activity. These include UT-Dallas, UT-Arlington, UT-San Antonio, UT-El Paso, Texas Tech and University of Houston.

# Table 2: Probit Regressions of LOS/CS Eligibility on LOS/CS Determination Factors 

| HS Characteristic <br> in 1998 | Dependent Variable |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | HS is a UT | HS is a TAMU |
|  | Longhorn School | Century School |
| \% Taking SAT | $0.212^{* *}$ | -0.026 |
|  | (0.092) | (0.058) |
| $\left(\%\right.$ Taking SAT) ${ }^{2}$ | -0.0023** | 0.0002 |
|  | (0.0009) | (0.0005) |
| \% College Ready | -0.132 | -0.039 |
|  | (0.081) | (0.048) |
| (\% College Ready) ${ }^{2}$ | 0.0018 | 0.0011 |
|  | (0.003) | (0.001) |
| \% Econ Disadv | 0.089 | 0.085* |
|  | (0.057) | (0.047) |
| $\left(\%\right.$ Econ Disadv) ${ }^{2}$ | -0.0007 | -0.0005 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| \% Black | $0.124^{* * *}$ | $0.110^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.044) | (0.032) |
| $(\% \text { Black })^{2}$ | 0.0001 | 0.0002 |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| \% Hispanic | $0.155^{* * *}$ | $0.223^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.053) | (0.052) |
| (\% Hispanic)2 | -0.00060 | $-0.00140^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.00043) | (0.00041) |
| \% Enroll in UT | 0.242 |  |
|  | (0.630) |  |
| $\left(\%\right.$ Enroll in UT) ${ }^{2}$ | -0.283 |  |
|  | (0.249) |  |
| \% Enroll in TAMU |  | 0.168 |
|  |  | (0.233) |
| $\left(\%\right.$ Enroll in TAMU ${ }^{2}$ |  | -0.020 |
|  |  | (0.034) |
| Observations | 949 | 949 |

Notes: "\% College Ready" is the share of students in the graduating class who scored above 1100 on the math and reading portions of the SAT exam or 24 on the ACT exam.

Table 3: Summary Statistics for Trimmed CommonSupport Sample - Student Characteristics

|  | College Attendees | HS Graduates |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Attends LOS HS | 0.24 | 0.23 |
|  | $(0.43)$ | $(0.42)$ |
| Attends CS HS | 0.11 | 0.11 |
|  | $(0.31)$ | $(0.31)$ |
| TAAS Writing | 91.5 | 91.8 |
| (\% Correct) | $(5.8)$ | $(5.9)$ |
| TAAS Reading | 91.6 | 91.9 |
| \% Correct) | $(5.5)$ | $(5.5)$ |
| TAAS Math | 89.3 | 89.7 |
| (\% Correct) | $(7.6)$ | $(7.6)$ |
| White | 0.16 | 0.17 |
|  | $(0.36)$ | $(0.38)$ |
| Black | 0.13 | 0.13 |
|  | $(0.33)$ | $(0.34)$ |
| Hispanic | 0.69 | 0.67 |
|  | $(0.46)$ | $(0.47)$ |
| Gifted \& Talented | 0.24 | 0.26 |
|  | $(0.43)$ | $(0.44)$ |
| At Risk | 0.26 | 0.25 |
|  | $(0.44)$ | $(0.44)$ |
| Male | 0.45 | 0.46 |
|  | $(0.50)$ | $(0.50)$ |
| Econ. Disadvantaged | 0.50 | 0.50 |
|  | $(0.50)$ | $(0.50)$ |
| Observations |  |  |

Notes: Authors' tabulations using college attendees from the linked ERC-THECB data for the 1996-2002 high school graduating cohorts. Restricted to trimmed common support and top $30 \%$ of HS class as defined by TAAS achievement index.

Table 4: Summary Statistics for Trimmed CommonSupport Sample - Outcomes

|  | College Attendees | HS Graduates |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Enroll in College | - | 0.63 |
|  | - | $(0.48)$ |
| Enroll in UT | 0.05 | 0.03 |
|  | $(0.21)$ | $(0.16)$ |
| Enroll in TAMU | 0.03 | 0.02 |
|  | $(0.18)$ | $(0.14)$ |
| Enroll in Emerging | 0.14 | 0.07 |
| Research U | $(0.34)$ | $(0.25)$ |
| Enroll in Other | 0.31 | 0.16 |
| 4-Yr | $(0.46)$ | $(0.36)$ |
| Enroll in 2-Yr | 0.47 | 0.35 |
|  | $(0.50)$ | $(0.48)$ |
| Major in | 0.23 | 0.15 |
| Arts \& Sciences | $(0.42)$ | $(0.36)$ |
| Major in | 0.11 | 0.06 |
| Business | $(0.32)$ | $(0.24)$ |
| Major in | 0.06 | 0.03 |
| Social Science | $(0.24)$ | $(0.18)$ |
| Major in | 0.14 | 0.07 |
| STEM | $(0.34)$ | $(0.26)$ |
| Graduate in 6 Yrs. | 0.33 | 0.20 |
|  | $(0.47)$ | $(0.40)$ |
| Resid. Log Earn | 0.14 | 0.12 |
| (10+ Yrs after HS) | $(0.81)$ | $(0.83)$ |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 28,153 | 61,235 |

Notes: Authors' tabulations using college attendees from the linked ERC-THECB data for the 1996-2002 high school graduating cohorts. Restricted to trimmed common support and top $30 \%$ of HS class as defined by TAAS achievement index.
Table 5: Balance Tests for Trimmed Common-Support Samples

| Dep. Var. $\rightarrow$ | Achievment | TAAS Raw Scores |  |  | White(5) | Black(6) | Hisp$(7)$ | G\&T(8) | At-Risk(9) | Male(10) | EconDisadv$(11)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Index $(1)$ | Writing $(2)$ | Read $(3)$ | Math <br> (4) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Panel A: Top 30\% College Attendees ( $\mathrm{N}=28,153$ ) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LOS | $\begin{gathered} 0.025 \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.207^{* *} \\ (0.096) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.046 \\ (0.116) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.321 \\ (0.252) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016 \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.011 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.003 \\ & (0.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.032 \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016 \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.006 \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.013 \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ |
| CS | $\begin{gathered} -0.004 \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.034 \\ (0.100) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.085 \\ (0.119) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.065 \\ & (0.232) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.022^{*} \\ & (0.012) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.019^{* *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.023^{*} \\ & (0.012) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.030 \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.030 \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.013 \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.048^{*} \\ & (0.024) \end{aligned}$ |
| Sample Means | 0.673 | 36.6 | 44.0 | 53.6 | 0.158 | 0.127 | 0.691 | 0.237 | 0.261 | 0.450 | 0.500 |
| Panel B: Top 30\% High School Graduates ( $\mathrm{N}=61,235$ ) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LOS | $\begin{gathered} 0.019 \\ (0.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.127 \\ (0.082) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 \\ (0.109) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.347 \\ (0.239) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.017^{*} \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.011^{*} \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.004 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.015 \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.010 \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.016^{*} \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.028^{*} \\ & (0.017) \end{aligned}$ |
| CS | $\begin{aligned} & -0.012 \\ & (0.015) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.021 \\ & (0.082) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.136 \\ (0.109) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.130 \\ & (0.239) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.018^{*} \\ (0.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.022^{* *} \\ (0.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.013 \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.014 \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.008 \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.040^{* *} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ |
| Sample Means | 0.692 | 36.7 | 44.1 | 53.8 | 0.176 | 0.134 | 0.667 | 0.264 | 0.254 | 0.455 | 0.500 |

Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) in the text using data for the 1996-2002 high school graduating cohorts, excluding all student characteristics and using the variable listed in the column title as the dependent variable. Each group of two coefficient estimates in each column comes from the same regression. Restricted to trimmed common support and top $30 \%$ of HS class as defined by TAAS achievement index. Standard errors clustered at the high school level are in parentheses: ${ }^{* * *},{ }^{* *}, *^{*}$ indicate significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels, respectively.

Table 6: The Effect of Attending a Longhorn Opportunity or Century Scholar High School on College Enrollment

| Treatment | Attend Any TX College (1) | Attend <br> UT <br> $(2)$ | Attend TAMU (3) | Attend Other Research U (4) | Attend Other <br> 4 Yr <br> $(5)$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Attend } \\ 2 \mathrm{yr} \\ (6) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Panel A: College Attendees |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LOS | - | $\begin{gathered} 0.027^{* * *} \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.005 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.012 \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.025 \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.037^{*} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ |
| CS | - | $\begin{gathered} -0.003 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016^{* *} \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.003 \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.011 \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.001 \\ (0.016) \end{gathered}$ |
| Mean | - | 0.048 | 0.035 | 0.137 | 0.307 | 0.472 |
| Panel B: High School Graduates |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LOS | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.023^{* * *} \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.006^{*} \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.034^{* * *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.060^{* * *} \\ (0.019) \end{gathered}$ |
| CS | $\begin{aligned} & -0.016 \\ & (0.018) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.008^{* *} \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.012 \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.014 \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.027 \\ & (0.021) \end{aligned}$ |
| Mean | 0.627 | 0.026 | 0.020 | 0.069 | 0.157 | 0.354 |

Notes: Estimation of equation (1) in the text using the linked ERC-THECB data for the 1996-2002 high school graduating cohorts. Each group of two coefficient estimates in each column comes from the same regression. All models include high school and year fixed effects as well as the demographic, high school and test score controls discussed in Section 4 of the text. Restricted to trimmed common support and top $30 \%$ of HS class as defined by TAAS achievement index. Sample sizes for the college attendee and HS grad samples are 28,153 and 61,235 , respectively. Note that sample means do not necessarily sum to one as do not include health science campuses. Standard errors clustered at the high school level are in parentheses: $* * *, * *, *$ indicate significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels, respectively.
Table 7: The Effect of Longhorn Opportunity and Century Scholar Programs on College Graduation and First-Year GPA College Attendees

Notes: Estimation of equations (1) and (2)-(4) in the text using the linked ERC-THECB data for the 1996-2002 high school graduating cohorts. Each group of two min comes from the same regression. All models include high school and year fixed effects as well as the demographic, high school and test score controls discussed in Section 4 of the text. Restricted to trimmed common support and top $30 \%$ of HS class as defined by TAAS achievement index.
The first-stage estimates of the effect of CS treatment on UT enrollment and the effect of LOS on TAMU enrollment are not shown, although they are included in the model. These estimates are close to and are not statistically significantly different from zero. Standard errors clustered at the high school level are in parentheses: $* * *,{ }^{* *}, *$ indicate significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels, respectively.

Table 8: The Effect of Longhorn Opportunity and Century Scholar Programs on Last Major Recorded - College Attendees

|  | Liberal |  | Social |  | Agri- | Commun- |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Arts | Business | Science | STEM | culture | ications | Other |
| Treatment | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ | $(5)$ | $(6)$ | $(7)$ |

Panel A: Intention-to-Treat Estimates of CS/LOS Programs

| LOS | 0.033 | -0.004 | 0.003 | -0.002 | -0.000 | 0.000 | $-0.029^{*}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(0.020)$ | $(0.008)$ | $(0.007)$ | $(0.010)$ | $(0.001)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.017)$ |
| CS | $0.022^{*}$ | -0.001 | $0.021^{*}$ | $0.016^{*}$ | 0.002 | $0.014^{* *}$ | $-0.073^{* * *}$ |
|  | $(0.013)$ | $(0.010)$ | $(0.013)$ | $(0.009)$ | $(0.001)$ | $(0.005)$ | $(0.017)$ |

Panel B: Upper Bound Treatment-on-Treated (2SLS) Estimates of CS/LOS Programs

| Attends UT | 0.561 | -0.073 | 0.064 | -0.029 | -0.004 | 0.010 | $-0.530^{*}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| from LOS HS | $(0.350)$ | $(0.138)$ | $(0.113)$ | $(0.169)$ | $(0.015)$ | $(0.062)$ | $(0.293)$ |
| Attends TAMU | $0.500^{*}$ | -0.026 | $0.421^{*}$ | $0.314^{*}$ | 0.034 | $0.269^{* *}$ | $-1.511^{* * *}$ |
| from CS HS | $(0.286)$ | $(0.192)$ | $(0.236)$ | $(0.184)$ | $(0.022)$ | $(0.106)$ | $(0.349)$ |
| Mean | 0.230 | 0.112 | 0.059 | 0.136 | 0.002 | 0.022 | 0.438 |

Notes: Estimation of equations (1) and (4) in the text using the linked ERC-THECB data for the 1996-2002 high school graduating cohorts. Each group of two coefficient estimates in each column comes from the same regression. All models include high school and year fixed effects as well as the demographic, high school and test score controls discussed in Section 4 of the text. Restricted to trimmed common support and top $30 \%$ of HS class as defined by TAAS achievement index. Sample size is 28,153 . First-stage estimates are shown in Table 6. Standard errors clustered at the high school level are in parentheses: ${ }^{* * *},{ }^{* *}, *$ indicate significance at the $1 \%, 5 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels, respectively.
Table 9: The Effect of Longhorn Opportunity and Century Scholar Programs on Ln(Earnings)

| Treatment | ITT Estimates |  |  |  | Upper Bound TOT Estimates |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | In $6+$ Years Earnings Sample <br> (1) | In $10+$ Years Earnings Sample <br> (2) | 6+ Years After HS Grad (3) | 10+ Years After HS Grad <br> (4) | $6+$ Years After HS Grad (5) | $10+$ Years After HS Grad <br> (6) |
| Panel A: College Attendees |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LOS | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ | $0.037^{* *}$ <br> (0.019) | $0.042^{* *}$ (0.019) | $\begin{gathered} 0.631^{* *} \\ (0.310) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.726^{* *} \\ (0.326) \end{gathered}$ |
| CS | $\begin{aligned} & -0.002 \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.021 \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.527 \\ (0.338) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.319 \\ (0.370) \end{gathered}$ |
| Obs | 28,153 | 28,153 | 26,258 | 23,911 | 26,258 | 23,911 |
| Panel B: High School Graduates |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| LOS | $\begin{gathered} -0.002 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.009 \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.011 \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.301 \\ (0.424) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.350 \\ (0.439) \end{gathered}$ |
| CS | $\begin{aligned} & -0.004 \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.009 \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.006 \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.417 \\ (0.547) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.172 \\ & (0.573) \end{aligned}$ |
| Obs | 61,235 | 61,235 | 54,614 | 49,255 | 54,614 | 49,255 |

Notes: Estimation of equations (1) and (4) in the text using the linked ERC-THECB data for the 1996-2002 high school include high school and year fixed effects as well as the demographic, high school and test score controls discussed in Section 4
 are adjusted for college graduating cohort year and quarter fixed effects as discussed in the text. First-stage estimates are $1 \%, 5 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels, respectively.
Table 10: ITT Estimates Excluding Comparison Schools in School Districts with Treated Schools

| HS Class |  | Enroll in |  |  |  |  |  | 4-yr BA | 6-yr BA | 6+ Years Post | 10+ Years Post |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Achievement | Treatment | Any College <br> (1) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { UT } \\ & (2) \end{aligned}$ | TAMU <br> (3) | $\begin{gathered} \text { ERU } \\ (4) \end{gathered}$ | Other 4-yr <br> (5) | $\begin{gathered} 2-\mathrm{yr} \\ (6) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Attainment <br> (7) | Attainment (8) | $\begin{gathered} \text { HS } \operatorname{Ln}(\text { Earnings }) \\ (9) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { HS } \operatorname{Ln}(\text { Earnings }) \\ (10) \end{gathered}$ |
| College | LOS | (1) | 0.029** | -0.003 | -0.011 | 0.030* | $-0.047^{* *}$ | 0.002 | 0.038** | 0.045** | 0.049** |
| Attendees |  | - | (0.007) | (0.006) | (0.010) | (0.017) | (0.021) | (0.008) | (0.012) | (0.018) | (0.019) |
|  | CS | - | -0.006 | 0.016** | -0.003 | -0.009 | 0.002 | -0.032** | -0.021 | 0.027 | 0.016 |
|  |  | - | (0.008) | (0.006) | (0.011) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.009) | (0.013) | (0.018) | (0.040) |
| Obs |  |  | 26,914 | 26,914 | 26,914 | 26,914 | 26,914 | 26,914 | 26,914 | 25,125 | 22,905 |
| High | LOS | -0.003 | 0.025*** | 0.007** | 0.002 | $0.034^{* * *}$ | -0.085 *** | 0.014*** | $0.027^{* * *}$ | 0.013 | 0.012 |
| School |  | (0.015) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.006) | (0.011) | (0.019) | (0.005) | (0.008) | (0.014) | (0.014) |
| Graduates | CS | $-0.034^{*}$ | $-0.002$ | $0.008^{* *}$ | $-0.011$ | $0.013$ | $-0.018$ | $-0.013^{* *}$ | $-0.016^{*}$ | $0.004$ | $-0.004$ |
|  |  | $(0.019)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.007)$ | $(0.011)$ | $(0.019)$ | $(0.005)$ | $(0.010)$ | $(0.015)$ | $(0.014)$ |
| Obs |  | 58,916 | 58,916 | 58,916 | 58,916 | 58,916 | 58,916 | 58,916 | 58,916 | 52,561 | 47,396 |

Notes: Estimation of equations (1) and (4) in the text using the linked ERC-THECB data for the 1996-2002 high school graduating cohorts. "ERU" denotes "Emerging as the demographic, high school and test score controls discussed in Section 4 of the text. Restricted to trimmed common support and top $30 \%$ of HS class as defined by TAAS achievement index. Standard errors clustered at the high school level are in parentheses: ${ }^{* * *}$, ${ }^{* *}$, * indicate significance at the $1 \%$, $5 \%$ and $10 \%$ levels, respectively.
Table 11: ITT Estimates by Gender Among College Attendees



[^0]:    *We gratefully acknowledge that this research was made possible through data provided by the University of Texas at Dallas Education Research Center. The conclusions of this research do not necessarily reflect the opinions or official position of the Texas Education Agency, the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board, or the State of Texas. We would also like to thank Sara Muehlenbein, Alyssa Carlson and Mark Lu for excellent research assistance. We are further grateful for generous financial support for this project provided by the Russell Sage Foundation and the William T. Grant Foundation. Finally, we'd like to thank seminar participants at the Association for Education Finance and Policy Annual Meeting, Dalhousie University, Institute for Research on Poverty Summer Research Workshop, Michigan State University, Middle Tennessee State University, Society of Labor Economists Annual Meeting, Syracuse/Cornell Summer Education Seminar, University of Michigan, University of Rochester, University of Virginia, and Vanderbilt University for helpful comments.
    ${ }^{\dagger}$ Corresponding author contact information: Rodney Andrews, Department of Economics, University of Texas at Dallas, 800 West Campbell Road, WT21, Richardson, TX 75080; email: rodney.j.andrews@utdallas.edu.

[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ This is not just a reflection of the differences in enrollment. Among those who enroll in any college, $3.7 \%$ of low-income students enroll in a public flagship university, and $18.4 \%$ of high income students enroll in this school type.
    ${ }^{2}$ On the other hand Dale and Krueger $(2013,2002)$ find little impact of college quality on earnings.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ Details on the Century Scholars program can be found at https://scholarships.tamu.edu/Scholarship-Programs/Century-Scholars. The Longhorn Scholars Program has since been discontinued though a description can be found in internet archives at https://web.archive.org/web/20030622194253/http://www.utexas.edu/student/finaid/scholarships/los_index.html.
    ${ }^{4}$ For example, CS scholars currently receive $\$ 5,000$ per year for four years. Assuming scholarship amounts did not change, this covered most of the $\$ 5,639$ cost for tuition and fees in 2004. Similarly, LOS scholars in 2002 received $\$ 4,000$ per year from the program. Tuition at UT-Austin in 2005 was $\$ 7,286$.

[^3]:    ${ }^{5}$ The ranking is determined by each high school separately, but typically is based on student grade point average.

[^4]:    ${ }^{6}$ Reprinted from https://scholarships.tamu.edu/century_scholars.aspx

[^5]:    ${ }^{7}$ Another potential mechanism is that increased financial support provided by the programs may help students progress through the higher education system by relaxing credit constraints. However there is very little evidence that credit constraints or financial aid have more than a modest impact on students' paths through college (e.g., Johnson 2013; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2008; Bettinger 2004)

[^6]:    ${ }^{8}$ The ERU designation is for institutions that are eligible for a special pool of state funds for increasing research output. These are sometimes called "Tier1" schools as part of the goal of the program is to increase the schools' research and academic reputations to the top tier of public universities in the US. For our purposes, this is a useful distinction as it provides a "second tier" of public institutions below the flagships but with better resources than other institutions. This group includes University of Texas at Arlington, UT at El Paso, UT at Dallas, UT at San Antonio, Texas Tech University, University of North Texas, and the University of Houston.
    ${ }^{9}$ See Arcidiacono and Lovenheim (2015) for an overview of the "quality-fit" tradeoff in higher education.

[^7]:    ${ }^{10}$ While it is possible that some students would have attended private or out-of-state schools, such behavior is likely rare for the population targeted by LOS/CS. Further, while we cannot directly test this with our data as we only observe attendance at public institutions in Texas, as we show below we nonetheless find no evidence that the likelihood of attending any postsecondary public institution changed as a result of the programs.

[^8]:    ${ }^{11}$ The data used in this project are virtually identical to those used in Andrews, Li and Lovenheim (2014, forthcoming).
    ${ }^{12}$ They show that admission through the Top $10 \%$ Rule is highly predictive of attending UT-Austin or Texas A\&M, but conditional on the relative rank on the TAAS test scores this variable loses its predictive power.

[^9]:    ${ }^{13}$ We also exclude all earnings that occur while an individual is enrolled in a Texas public graduate school as these earnings are unlikely to be reflective of permanent earnings (we do not observe if the student is enrolled in a private or out-of-state graduate school). Furthermore, we highlight that the data do not include zero earnings among workers. A worker-quarter observation only is present if the worker has earnings in that quarter. Missing observations can be due to unemployment, labor force non-participation or leaving the State of Texas. We do not include missing observations as zeros because we are unsure whether an individual has left the state or is not working and residing in Texas. These sample restrictions and the way in which we construct our earnings measures are very similar to the methods used by Andrews, Li and Lovenheim (2014; Forthcoming) with these data.
    ${ }^{14}$ Earnings are inflation adjusted to 2007.
    ${ }^{15}$ Daugherty, Martorell and McFarlin (forthcoming) show that the Top $10 \%$ Rule had just such an effect on student college-going in a low-income district.

[^10]:    ${ }^{16}$ We have also conducted our analyses using a sample that drop control schools below the lowest treated school and a sample trims at a propensity score of 0.10 . In both cases we get very similar results.

[^11]:    ${ }^{17}$ Texas considers a student to be economically disadvantaged if he or she is eligible for subsidized school lunches or is enrolled in another state or Federal anti-poverty program.

[^12]:    ${ }^{18}$ Note that, since enrollment in UT and TAMU is part of the treatment, we cannot show TOTE impacts on whether the student enrolls in college or in which type of school a student enrolls.

[^13]:    ${ }^{19}$ These emerging research universities are listed in Section 2.
    ${ }^{20}$ A very small number of students attend health science campuses that we do not separately identify in this analysis.

[^14]:    ${ }^{21}$ In results available upon request, we have estimated equation (1) using the bottom $70 \%$ of students. We find that enrollment in non-flagship four-year schools increases more among the bottom $70 \%$ students due to LOS treatment. This finding reinforces the conclusion that we are picking up spillover effects, because these students are very unlikely to be admitted to a flagship university in Texas. For bottom $70 \%$ students, there also is a small shift away from enrolling in any college due to CS treatment, highlighting a potential unintended cost of the program.

[^15]:    ${ }^{22}$ We do not show estimates of the effect of LOS on Texas A\&M enrollment ( $\gamma_{2}$ in equation (2)) or the effect of CS on UT-Austin enrollment ( $\lambda_{1}$ in equation (3)) for the sake of brevity. These estimates are both close to zero and not statistically significant in all regressions.

[^16]:    ${ }^{23}$ In results available upon request, we show that these patterns are similar for initial major.
    ${ }^{24}$ When we look at the bottom $70 \%$ sample, the spillover effects appear to induce some students who switch to higher quality colleges to move away from STEM majors. This further highlights the potential for the extra academic supports - which are not available to the bottom $70 \%$ sample - to offset mismatch.

[^17]:    ${ }^{25}$ Recall that the percent effect from a log model is given by $e^{\beta}-1$.

